新技术条件下政府对自然垄断型公用事业的管制政策研究

本文讨论了技术与自然垄断市场结构和政府管制政策的关系以及新技术条件下政府对自然垄断型公用事业管制政策调整中的管制滞后现象，认为新技术条件下政府对自然垄断型公用事业的管制政策，应是基于产业拆分基础上的放松管制和激励性管制。本文最后讨论了政府对自然垄断型公用事业拆分和放松管制的4个阶段。     

关于我国城市公用事业法律管制若干问题的探讨

城市公用事业对于城市的生存发展具有特别重要的意义，有关城市公用事业的法律规制不仅是个重要的理论问题，同时也极具现实意义。本文基于对城市公用事业的基础性，自然垄断性，地域性及普遍服务性等基本特征的认识，就我国城市公用事业法律管制中的价格管制机构问题，城市公用企业的成本控制问题，以及针对不同管制对象的不同管制模式等问题进行探讨，并提出一些可能的解决办法。     

我国市政公用事业管制机构的设立与职能

本文分析了市政公用事业的基本特征，讨论了我国市政公用事业设立管制机构的基本设想．并探讨了市政公用事业管制机构的主要职能。     

城市公用事业政府管制改革路径研究

城市公用事业具有自然垄断属性和公共产品性质,政府一般实行管制政策。但是,20世纪70年代以来,全球掀起了公用事业市场化改革的浪潮,放松管制的呼声也越来越高。公用事业自身的属性决定了单纯的放松管制是不全面的,在公用事业领域引入有效竞争的前提下,需要对公用事业进行管制创新与适当管制。     

公用事业民营化后的政府管制

本文分析了公用事业与自然垄断产业的关系、公用事业民营化以后政府管制的理论基础以及竞争与管制的关系，并研究了公用事业民营化后几个具体的管制问题。     

中国民航业放松进入管制的经济学思考

中国民航业具有极强的市场进入壁垒,长期以来的严格进入管制成为制约中国民航业进一步发展的瓶颈。放松进入管制有利于消除民航业的价格刚性、增加社会总福利;有利于提高民航业的整体效益;有利于中国民航业的深化改革。从战略路径选择来看,放松进入管制要与放松价格管制相结合,要与消除市场势力相结合,要与发展航空公司战略联盟相结合。     

北京市自然垄断性公用事业政府管制改革的社会经济绩效分析

本文对北京市自然垄断性公用事业政府管制改革的社会经济绩效进行了较为系统的分析。文章认为，政府管制制度进一步完善，管制效率获得提高；管制制度的激励性有所改善，经营主体呈现多元化经营格局；财政压力得到有效缓解，公用事业发展迅速；自然垄断性公用事业的发展对北京市国民经济持续增长的促进效应显著。     

英国城市公用事业民营化改革评析

20世纪80年代初，英国以电信产业为开端，相继对电力、煤气和自来水供应、铁路运输等主要城市公用事业实行了民营化改革，同时，对这些产业的政府管制体制也实行了重大改革。改革中积累的经验和教训为中国城市公用事业的民营化改革提供了一个可资借鉴的范式。     

西方国家公用事业民营化改革的经验及其对我国的启示

西方国家公用事业领域的改革取得了显著的成效,积累了相当丰富的经验。在我国公用事业领域改革过程中,借鉴国外公用事业民营化的成功经验,在政府宏观规制下,通过引入竞争机制,实现公用事业的民营化改造,有利于公用事业摆脱困境,实现企业效率和公共福利的共赢。     

对银行行为与效率的分析

基于对银行管制理论的分析以及对市场进入管制下银行行为的描述,讨论了政府管制对银行福利的效应及可能引起的社会成本;针对政府管制产生的低效率状况,探讨了银行业管制改革的对策及效率目标。     

公共服务的覆盖面管制：价格与质量的社会权衡

文章讨论了同质单一公共服务覆盖面的管制问题。不同消费者存在异质的偏好，这种差异会影响公共服务的管制方式和目标，此时管制不仅是协调消费者剩余和经营者利润，而且还涉及到服务价格和质量的权衡。本文分析了公共服务最优覆盖面的决定因素，并考察了垄断和不同管制方式对公共服务覆盖面的影响。     

Institutionalizing “the Public Interest” in Public Utility Regulation: Harry M. Trebing and the Second Wave of Reform

John R. Commons and colleagues established the basic model for independent public utility regulation in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, based on documented market and public interest failures. After limited success and repeated failures in the implementation of regulation, Harry M. Trebing and others at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the late 1960s and 1970s revised and strengthened the model as well as the implementation capabilities of regulators, based on the regulatory weaknesses and unique opportunities for reform in the telecommunication industry. This model was then adapted to improve the regulation of other public utilities. Whereas the new model has also had limited success, the experience accumulated through it has prepared the ground for an inevitable third wave of regulatory reform.     

Commitment in regulation: Defense contracting and extensions to price caps

Department of Defense regulation of weapons contracting uses incentive devices common to public utility regulation. This paper examines parallels between fixed-price contracts in weapons acquisition and the use of price caps to motivate public utilities. It uses defense contracting experience to identify limits to the efficiency and administrability benefits one can expect adoption of a price caps regime to produce in practice.     

Welfare effects of pricing in anticipation of Laspeyres price-cap regulation: an example

A monopolist in a simple two-period model knows that a price cap will be imposed on a Laspeyres index of the firm's prices in the second period. (Tariff basket regulation is relevant to some UK utilities.) A simple example is developed to study the welfare changes that result from strategic weight manipulation by the firm as a consequence of its ability to adjust first-period revenue shares and interperiod price relatives. Uniform regulation requiring an equal percentage reduction in all of the regulated firm's prices provides a natural standard for comparison. One particular configuration of parameters induces identical pricing and welfare under the two forms of regulation in the example. Otherwise, compared with uniform regulation in the example, Laspeyres index regulation raises producer welfare but reduces consumer welfare in the first period and may also reduce consumer welfare in the second period. A numerical illustration shows that total welfare may also be lower under Laspeyres regulation.     

双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择

城市公用事业通常是自然垄断行业,在我国从计划经济向市场经济转轨的过程中,它还具有较强的行政垄断性。我国对自然垄断与行政垄断并存的公用事业的规制改革与西方国家有所不同,应区别两种垄断的不同性质,有针对性地确定改革目标。本文阐述了我国城市公用事业的自然垄断特性,分析了其行政垄断的根源及表现,对双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择提出了一些建议。     

大力发展农村合作组织 提高农村公共物品供给能力

随着农业税的取消,作为农村公共物品主要供给者的乡(镇)、村两级组织的收入大大减少,极大地影响了公共物品供给,严重制约了我国农村经济的发展和农民社会福祉的提高,成为构建社会主义新农村的一大瓶颈。文章认为,在新形势下,应充分认识到农村合作组织对缓解农村公共物品供给不足问题的重要作用,及时调整农村公共事业发展的思路,通过配套政策支持,大力发展农村合作组织,提高农村公共物品供给能力,以适应农村公共事业发展的需要。     

Welfare Analysis of a Fiscal Reconstruction Policy in an Overlapping Generations Economy with Public Investment

Constructing an endogenously growing overlapping generations model with public investment, we examine the welfare effects of a fiscal reconstruction policy. In this paper we define a fiscal reconstruction policy as a policy where the government reduces its spending level without changing the tax revenue and allocates the surplus of the revenue to redeem public debt. We show that if government spending is not productive it is possible that a fiscal reconstruction policy improves the utilities of both the current and future generations, while if government spending is productive it can harm the utilities of both generations. Received February 26, 2002; revised version received July 8, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003     

Economics,Ethics, and the Long Arc of Public Utilities: A Paper in Honor of Harry M. Trebing

Harry M. Trebing has made substantial contributions to the understanding of social control of economic enterprise, particularly in the regulation of public utilities. Imbued with institutional economic ways of knowing, he sustained the construct of progressive-era public interest regulation during a period of neoclassical economic assault on regulatory institutions.     

Governance Alternatives and Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry

Alternative governance mechanisms can be expected to resultin differences in enterprise performance. This research analyzesthe prices charged by U.S. electric utilities using a comprehensivepricing model and a large and detailed dataset that controlsfor enterprise costs and subsidies. It finds that public ownershipis associated with significantly lower prices than with privatelyowned utilities, most likely because the latter are subjectto regulation. Also associated with lower prices are electedcommissioners (rather than those appointed by state governors),commissions with fewer members, and utilities whose governingbodies hold open meetings–all characteristics that implymore direct consumer influence on the price-determination process.Among customer groups, residential users are the biggest beneficiariesof public ownership, while industrial users appear to have moreinfluence with elected state regulatory commissions. These findingsare reconciled with theory and help explain the sometimes ambiguousresults of previous studies.     

Public health insurance and optimal income taxation

If individuals differ not only in their inherent capacity to earn income, but also in the probability that they will fall ill, can subsidized public health insurance be justified on the grounds that it serves as an efficient tool to redistribute welfare? This question is analyzed in a model where the social welfare function is a weighted average of individual expected utilities, and where taxation is by a linear income tax. The answer is ‘yes’, except in certain special cases.