Political,Institutional, and Economic Factors Underlying Deficit Volatility

It is well known that fiscal policy can counter‐cyclically smooth out the effect of unexpected shocks and public deficit volatility may reflect the (optimal) policy response to them. However, the welfare losses associated to fiscal instability are also an important challenge for many countries, as it typically implies an inefficient allocation of resources, higher sovereign risk premium and an inadequate provision of public services. In this paper, we empirically analyze the political, institutional, and economic sources of public deficit volatility. Using the system‐generalized method‐of‐moments (GMM) estimator for linear dynamic panel data models and a sample of 125 countries analyzed from 1980 to 2006, we show that higher public deficit volatility is typically associated with higher levels of political instability and less democracy. In addition, public deficit volatility tends to be magnified for small countries, in the outcome of hyper‐inflation episodes and for countries with a high degree of openness.     

Fiscal Balance and Current Account in Professional Forecasts

This paper investigates the relationship between financial institutions' expectations of the current account and the fiscal balance. Using professional macroeconomic forecasts for the G‐7 countries, we find a positive relationship between forecasts of the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance deficit and forecasts of the current account deficit, indicating that professional forecasts embody links implied by the twin deficits hypothesis. In assessing the relationship between the forecasts of the fiscal deficit and the current account, we find that forecasters correctly make the distinction between the effect of fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers.     

Investigating heterogeneity in European fiscal behaviours

The aim of this paper is to analyse the heterogeneity in fiscal behaviours in the euro zone. The fiscal behaviours are analysed according to a new specification in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance reacts to the change in the output gap, the public debt ratio, the inflation rate and the interest rate. Our study covers 12 countries in the euro zone during 1999–2010 using annual data from the AMECO database. We use the quantile regression methodology to test the fiscal rule. Our findings show the persistence in fiscal behaviour and counter‐cyclical fiscal policy. The results also show that fiscal responses differ according to the chosen quantile. In particular, a high fiscal indicator is associated with a debt‐stabilisation motive and concern about inflation. A shock analysis indicates how the fiscal dispersion could be changed according to the nature of the shock. The results of this paper are useful for understanding fiscal coordination and for improving the European fiscal framework.     

Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in the Euro Area?

We test the relationship between the cyclically adjusted primary balance and alternative indicators of cyclical conditions for the euro area and 18 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. A countercyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy is found during bad times after 1999 in the euro area as a whole and in a few member countries only (France, Ireland and The Netherlands). It is also associated with high public deficits or low public debts. There is no significant case of procyclical fiscal policy after 1999, neither in good times nor in bad times.     

Fiscal Policy in Real Time*

In this paper, I estimate the ex ante or intentional cyclical stance of fiscal policy in OECD countries. I use the fiscal plans reported at the time of budgeting, together with other information available to fiscal policy‐makers in real time. Indeed, fiscal plans might be significantly different from ex post outcomes because governments do not have complete control over their implementation, which is influenced by several exogenous factors. When fiscal‐policy rules are estimated using real‐time data, I show in this paper that OECD countries have often planned a counter‐cyclical fiscal stance, especially during economic expansions. This contrasts with conventional findings based on actual data, which tend to point towards a‐cyclicality or pro‐cyclicality. Forecast errors for the government structural balance and the output gap play a central role in explaining the differences between estimates based on ex ante and ex post data.     

Fiscal policy under a minimum‐time objective

In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the fiscal policy driven by a minimum‐time objective of economic development. We find that in equilibrium government should levy the highest possible consumption taxes, reduce public expenditures to the lowest possible level, and keep labor income tax rate and capital income tax rate satisfy a substitution relationship at the balanced budget constraint. We also identify the condition under which income tax rate should be set to zero. We further find that the equilibrium fiscal policy is equivalent to the growth‐maximizing fiscal policy, whereas it generally deviates from the welfare‐maximizing fiscal policy. We hence identify a circumstance where setting the policy goal of reaching an economic‐performance target as soon as possible cannot be justified in the sense of maximizing the welfare of households.     

The Fiscal Multiplier in a Liquidity‐Constrained New Keynesian Economy

We study the effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy using a liquidity‐constrained New Keynesian model in which government bonds are liquid, and private financial assets are only partially liquid. We find that the fiscal multipliers in this economic environment are large enough for fiscal policy to be highly effective. In this model, a bond‐financed fiscal expansion can stimulate output because higher public borrowing improves liquidity by increasing the proportion of liquid assets in private‐sector wealth.     

Regional volatility in emerging countriesThe case of Russia1

An uneven distribution of natural resources and the Soviet legacy of artificial regional specialization expose Russia's regions to large income shocks. Using an unique regional dataset covering Russian regions between 1992 and 2003, we assess how these features influence the magnitude and persistence of regional income shocks. We propose a novel measure of regional exogenous shocks that we use to show that fiscal policy in Russia's regions has largely been pro‐cyclical, exacerbating rather than moderating regional exogenous shocks.     

THE SIZE OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS AND THE STANCE OF MONETARY POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

Implementing fiscal programs during monetary policy expansions seems to improve significantly their economic stimulus. We find this result by estimating the effect of government consumption shocks on gross domestic product (GDP) using a panel of 23 developing economies. Our goal is to better understand the reasons for the low fiscal multipliers found in the literature by performing estimations for alternative exchange rate regimes, business‐cycle phases, and monetary policy stances. In addition, we perform counterfactual simulations to analyze the possible gains from fiscal‐monetary policy coordination. Our results also show lower multipliers in developing economies with flexible regimes, especially during economic slowdowns. (JEL E62, E63, F32)     

FISCAL POLICY AND ASSET PRICES

We analyse the impact of fiscal policy on asset prices using a panel vector auto‐regressive (PVAR) approach and quarterly data for ten industrialized countries. We find that positive fiscal shocks lead to a temporary fall in stock prices and a gradual and persistent decrease in housing prices. The empirical findings also point to: (i) a contractionary effect of fiscal policy on output in line with the existence of crowding‐out effects and the deterioration of credit conditions; (ii) a weakening of the effectiveness of fiscal policy in recent times; (iii) a more persistent response of asset prices for countries with a lower degree of openness; (iv) a larger impact of fiscal policy on asset prices for small countries; (v) a close link between the responsiveness of asset prices to fiscal policy and the government’s size; (vi) an increase of the sensitivity of asset prices to fiscal policy shocks following the process of financial deregulation and mortgage liberalization; and (vii) significant fiscal multiplier effects in the context of severe housing busts. Finally, the evidence suggests that changes in equity prices may help governments towards consolidation of public finances.     

Oil shocks and fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola: Assessing the role of asymmetries and institutions

The aim of this article is to examine procyclicality in Angola, assess whether it behaves asymmetrically over the oil cycle, and test the hypothesis that institutions and fiscal rules can moderate procyclicality. Received wisdom suggests that in resource‐rich economies, fiscal policy tends to be procyclical albeit improvements in the past decades due to institutional reforms. Similar evidence is available for oil‐rich economies; however, we know little about how procyclicality behaves over the oil cycle; that is, whether spending (and revenue) grows faster during oil‐market booms, than during downturns. Further, evidence on institutions and fiscal rules in oil‐exporting economies is still ambiguous. We bridge both gaps by examining fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola, one of the largest oil‐producers in Africa, and a country that has experienced an intense process of institutional reforms since 2002. Therefore, it is an ideal candidate for our study. We use data for the 2004–2014 period to estimate a threshold vector error correction model that extends vector autoregressive and vector correction methods used up to date. Our results indicate that revenue and spending are generally procyclical to oil shocks, that revenue is more procyclical during booms, and that institutional quality, net inflows, financial openness, and fiscal rules affect procyclicality.     

Inequality and public debt: A positive analysis

This study extends the multi‐country, politico‐economic model of fiscal policy to incorporate wage inequality within each country. In this extended framework, we present conflict over fiscal policy within and across generations and show that a low‐inequality country realizes tight fiscal policy with low public debt accumulation, whereas a high‐inequality country experiences loose fiscal policy with high public debt. This model prediction is consistent with empirical evidence from OECD countries for the years 1980 to 2010.     

Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective

Abstract Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue‐sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis ( Brennan and Buchanan 1980 ). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.     

地方财政政策逆周期调节：财政分权还是债务增发*

财政政策工具实际操作偏离最初设计将会降低政策工具的调控效果，导致宏观经济波动加剧。针对地方政府财政政策的逆周期性调控目标，本文关注财政分权深化和政府债务增发的逆周期性效应。研究发现：地方政府财政政策总体呈现顺周期特征。财政分权程度的提高放大了地方财政政策的顺周期性。地方政府债务增发使地方财政政策呈现逆周期特征。地方政府财政政策及其收入面、支出面均呈现顺周期性，由“顺”转“逆”的债务平衡点分别为0137，0113，0209。当前绝大部分地区的债务规模都在债务平衡点之下。驱动地方政府债务逆周期调控的内在因素是官员晋升激励。晋升激励的程度越高，地方债务逆周期调控的力度就越大。但外部市场融资环境的波动削弱了地方政府债务逆周期调控的力度。本文的政策主张是，不宜过度财政分权，应该扩大地方债发行规模，促使地方财政政策逆周期调节。     

Pro‐social leadership under authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is regarded as being unaccountable for people's needs, but few studies have documented how authoritarian countries balance their policy goals. China is known to use a promotion system to incentivize local leaders to develop the economy, while neglecting social spending. This paper documents that more leaders having a liberal arts background have been promoted as top provincial leaders. After carefully ruling out other channels, we provide evidence that the shift of top provincial leaders’ college educational backgrounds from science/technology to liberal arts/social science has increased fiscal expenditure shares on science, education, culture and public health and cut economic construction expenditures accordingly. The finding is mainly driven by the post‐1994 period, when local leaders had stronger incentives for economic growth. This indicates that Chinese top authorities are promoting more pro‐social local leaders when providing pro‐growth incentives in general.     

United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.     

Cyclicality of fiscal policy and the shadow economy

A survey of recent literature on cyclical properties of fiscal policy reveals that fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries whereas it is countercyclical in developed ones. However, there is no consensus on what drives the difference in this specific cyclical property of fiscal policy. Using cross-section and panel data sets for 78 countries we document that procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in countries with a larger size of the shadow economy. We also show that policies reducing the size of the shadow economy lead to a less (more) procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal response to shocks.     

PUBLIC FINANCE AND INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES OVER GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES

Do preferences toward globalization strategies vary across public‐finance regimes? In this paper, we use data on individual preferences toward immigration and trade policy to examine how pre‐tax and post‐tax cleavages differ across globalization strategies and state fiscal jurisdictions. High exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among U.S. natives, especially the more skilled. The magnitude of this post‐tax fiscal cleavage is comparable to the pre‐tax labor‐market effects of skill itself. There is no public‐finance variation in opinion over trade policy, consistent with U.S. trade policy having negligible fiscal‐policy impacts. Public finance thus appears to shape opinions toward globalization strategies.