Liquidity Constraints and Investment in Transition Economies

We use Bulgarian firm-level data to investigate the impact of liquidity constraints on investment performance. Internal funds are an important determinant of investment in most industrialized countries. We test whether internal funds are important for firm investment during the current transition process in Bulgaria. We use a simple accelerator model of investment to test whether liquidity constraints are relevant in the case of Bulgaria. Our estimations are based on data for the period 1993–95, prior to the Bulgarian financial crisis in 1996–97. It turns out that Bulgarian firms are liquidity constrained, and that firms' size and financial structure help to distinguish between firms that are more and less liquidity constrained. In our view, liquidity constraints can be given a different interpretation in the case of transition economies as compared to Western economies. A more in depth analysis of the data reveals that liquidity constraints, and consequently the access to external funds for Bulgarian firm investment, are to be seen against the background of soft-budget constraints and the failure of the financial system to enforce an efficient allocation of funds. In our view, the lack of liquidity constraints may actually be seen as a sign of financial weakness in the case of Bulgaria.     

Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraintsAn empirical analysis using enterprise‐level data in transition countries1

This paper presents empirical work grounded in the soft budget constraint (SBC) literature. A loan is soft when a bank cannot commit the enterprise to hold to a fixed initial budget and/or the timing of repayment. Using data collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 2002) in 26 transition economies, we analyze the determinants of managers’ expectations of having a soft loan. In particular, we find that managers’ expectations are lower when the initial financing requires collateral, and higher for larger firms and when firms had recently experienced financial distress. We also provide evidence that managers’ expectations influence their price responsiveness.     

The Limits of Discipline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies

The existing literature on soft budget constraints suggests that firms may be subsidized for political reasons or because of the creditors' desire to recover a part of the sunk cost invested in an earlier period. In all these models hard budget constraints are viewed as being, in principle, capable of inducing the necessary restructuring behaviour on the level of the firm. This paper argues that the imposition of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance. Using evidence from the post-communist transition economies, the paper shows that a policy of hard budget constraints cannot induce successful revenue restructuring, which requires entrepreneurial incentives inherent in certain ownership types (most notably, outside investors). The paper also shows that the policy of hard budget constraints falters when state firms, because of inferior revenue performance and less willingness to meet payment obligations, continue to pose a higher credit risk than privatized firms. The brunt of state firms' lower creditworthiness falls on state creditors. But the 'softness' of these creditors, while harmful in many ways, is not necessarily irrational, if it prevents the demise of firms that are in principle capable of successful restructuring through ownership changes.     

中国国有工业企业劳动力冗员问题研究

科尔奈发展的预算软约束理论提出了一个引人注目的关于国营企业冗员现象的解释。然而这类文献有时忽略这样一种现象,即政府、特别是转型经济中的政府往往会让国有企业(SOES)追求一些非经济目标,并通过补贴和政策性贷款来为此提供资助。通过对大约700家国有企业的研究,我们发现在不减轻企业社会负担的情况下,预算约束的硬化是直接导致九十年代初中国国企冗员上升的主要原因之一。     

Innovation and Bureaucracy Under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints

Because of the inherent uncertainty, promotion of innovation critically depends on screening mechanisms to select projects. This paper studies the relationship between bureaucracy and financial constraints as two such mechanisms. The lack of commitment to hard financial constraints interferes with its ex post screening capability; ex ante bureaucratic screening is optimally chosen as a substitute. However, bureaucracy makes mistakes by rejecting promising projects and delays innovation, and the efficiency loss due to soft financial constraints increases as prior knowledge becomes worse and as research stage investment requirements become lower. In a centralized economy, bureaucracy may reduce the number of parallel projects, particularly for projects with higher uncertainties and less research stage requirements. This theory fits much of the evidence and in particular it explains why the computer industry, but not the nuclear or aerospace industries, has fared so poorly in centralized economies.     

预算约束与金融制度选择的新理论:文献述评

本文的考察发现,在预算约束与金融制度结构之间存在着十分紧密的逻辑联系,而且国内外不少文献已经围绕于此展开了广泛而深入的讨论。针对预算约束与金融制度选择的关系,现有文献的理论发现大致包括三个层面:第一,虽然缓解乃至消除软预算约束是任何一种金融体系共同面临的挑战,但软预算约束的消除并非一定有利于长期经济增长;第二,分权的或者集权的金融体制都具有"内生性",因此,至少在理论上无法对其进行孰优孰劣的直观评判,同时也无法在它们之间进行简单的复制和移植;第三,金融体系应对预算约束问题的能力要远弱于企业制度,因此,当一个国家面对预算约束问题时,应当首先着手改善微观经济基础的金融需求结构,而不是调整金融供给结构。     

Firm investment in transition

In this paper a model based on the Euler equation of optimal capital accumulation in the presence of convex adjustment costs is developed and estimated. The theoretical model explicitly allows for differential financial status across firms. The empirical analysis uses Romanian manufacturing firm panel data to estimate dynamic investment models with the generalized method of moments (GMM‐IV) technique and tests the derived hypotheses. The results indicate that the model based on the perfect market assumptions is rejected. The version of the model that allows for differential financial status of firms by using a theoretically derived sample selection rule is not rejected by the data. Controlling for soft budget constraints, common for transition economies, further improves the performance of the model.     

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束

本文在一个动态博弈的框架下 ,考察了政策性负担与转轨经济中企业的预算软约束问题。在信息不对称情况下 ,政策性负担将导致国有企业经理的道德风险 ,从而导致国有企业的低效率 ;当市场竞争达到一定程度时 ,政策性负担必然带来国有企业的预算软约束。而且 ,预算软约束同企业的公有制性质无关 ,在同样承担政策性负担的条件下 ,私有企业比国有企业更容易产生预算软约束 ,并且要求政府提供更多的补贴。当国有企业承担政策性负担时 ,政府剥夺企业的生产自主权往往是一种次优的制度安排     

Seeds of Corruption – Do Market Institutions Matter?

Ten years into the transition process, corruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon thatcan seriously jeopardize the best intentionedreform efforts. Because of the complex anddeep political economy dynamics surroundingthe process transition economies areundergoing it is essential for policy-makersto understand the causes of corruption. Thispaper develops an integrated analyticalframework of the role basic marketinstitutions play as determinants ofrent-seeking and illicit behavior intransition economies. Using data onlyrecently available on the incidence ofcorruption and institutional development inthese economies, we provide preliminaryevidence on both the systemic links betweendevelopment of market institutions andincentives for corruption and the relativeimportance of such institutions. The mainlesson from our analysis is that awell-established system of marketinstitutions – one characterized by clear andtransparent rules, fully functioning checksand balances, including strong enforcementmechanisms, and a robust competitiveenvironment – reduces rent-seekingopportunities and, in turn, the incentives forcorruption. The empirical results suggestthat high barriers to new business entrantsand soft budget constraints on incumbent firmsare particularly important institutionalfactors engendering opportunities andincentives for corruption. As in otherstudies, the empirical results also supportthe notion that economic development andmaturation of democratic processes both tempercorruption, as does, to a lesser extent,openness to trade.     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

Bad loans,soft budget constraints and the political economy of financial market reform in transition economies

Financial market imperfections and especially the bad debt problem are among the most important factors impeding economic restructuring in transition economies. This paper analyses the implications of non-performing loans for the lending policy of banks and for the ensuing allocation of credit. It is shown that a lending bias exists in favour of old debtors, which not only impedes structural change but may also counteract policies intended to harden budget constraints and to promote restructuring. The paper also discusses from a political economy perspective, why despite these negative implications financial market reforms were not pursued more forcefully in most countries.     

Revenue decentralization,central oversight and the political budget cycle: Evidence from Israel

This paper examines whether revenue decentralization and direct external financial supervision affect the incidence and strength of political budget cycles, using a panel of Israeli municipalities during the period 1999–2009. We find that high dependence on central government transfers – as reflected in a low share of locally raised revenues in the municipality's budget – exacerbates political budget cycles, while tight monitoring – exercised through central government appointment of external accountants to debt accumulating municipalities – eliminates them. We also find that this pattern is predominantly accounted for by development expenditures. These results suggest that political budget cycles can result from fiscal institutions that create soft budget constraints: that is, where incumbents and rational voters can expect that the costs of pre-election expansions will be partly covered later by the central government.     

INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.     

Hardened Budgets and Enterprise Restructuring: Theory and an Application to Romania

We identify the presence of soft budgets and analyze their impact on enterprise restructuring in Romania over the initial transition period. A simple analytical framework is developed to show that hardened budget constraints foster rationalization of costs but not new investment. The latter requires availability of external financing. The model emphasizes the importance of the credibility of hardened budgets and the empirical findings are consistent with its predictions. Using a sample of over 4000 Romanian enterprises from 1992 to 1995, we show that hardened budget constraints induce labor shedding. However, there is no evidence of new investments. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 749–763. University of Sienna, Central European University, and CEPR; and World Bank and CEPR. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G32, G34.     

Channels of restructuring in privatized Czech companies1

The main contribution of this paper to the literature on restructuring in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe is the analysis of productivity‐growth effects for different channels of restructuring. It examines a panel of 737 voucher‐privatized Czech companies in the first years after the transfer of ownership (between 1993 and 1998). The results indicate that asset sales and employee incentives serve as restructuring channels through which productivity of the privatized companies increases. The analysis also indicates that capital expenditures, labour shedding and CEO replacements are not significantly correlated to productivity growth. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the availability of bank loans is positively associated with productivity growth, but not for less profitable firms. This provides some evidence in support of soft budget constraints accommodated via bank lending.     

Enforcing the 1988 Basel Capital Requirements: Did it Curtail Bank Credit in Emerging Economies?

We examine whether the enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) curtailed the supply of credit in emerging economies. Preliminarily, we identify 16 emerging economies that – according to official and impartial reports – enforced the 1988 Basel standard during the 1990s. Then we perform our twofold econometric analysis. In the former part, we use macro data to test whether, controlling for economic fundamental variables, the enforcement brought about a slowdown in aggregate credit in these countries vis-a-vis other emerging economies. We find some support for our hypothesis. In the latter part, we employ individual bank data to better identify the 'capital crunch' effect of the enforcement. Here, we find that CAR enforcement – according to the 1988 Basel standard – significantly curtailed credit supply, particularly at less well-capitalized banks. The two empirical parts together suggest that the CAR enforcement did curtail aggregate credit in the examined emerging countries and that this result is rooted in the attempt by under-capitalized banks to reduce their loans. We argue that among developing countries – where banks are often the only source of financial intermediation – the positive effect of higher capital requirements, represented by the reduction of poor quality lending, may be offset by their negative impact on bank liquidity and on the level of economic activity. Hence, our results suggest that particular care is required to avoid potential negative macroeconomic effects when phasing in new and higher capital requirements in emerging economies.
(J.E.L.: G18, G21, G28)     

State enterprise performance and soft budget constraints: The case of Bulgaria

This paper analyses the performance of state enterprises in Bulgaria during 1992-94. Consistent with the literature on other transitional economies, this paper finds that one key factor underlying (the lack of) enterprise adjustment in Bulgaria during this period was the availability of financing. Empirically, the (lack of) past adjustment and the softness of finance are the best predictors of current adjustment. Many state enterprises, mostly smaller ones, appear to have adjusted to the new economic structure, partly in response to tighter budget constraints. However, a number of large, hard-core lossmaking state enterprises did not adjust, due primarily to the soft budget constraints that they faced. These enterprises crowded out profitable enterprises, both public and private, through their large financing requirements, adversely affecting economic growth. Moreover, continued bank financing of these large loss-makers decapitalized the banking system, and budgetary financing of their losses, largely through tax arrears, has undermined fiscal policy. This lack of enterprise adjustment and the resulting financial indiscipline lies at the core of the macroeconomic difficulties that Bulgaria has recently faced.     

Enterprise restructuring and adjustment in the transition to market economy: lessons from the experience of Central and Eastern Europe

Some aspects of the process of enterprise restructuring and adjustment in the Central and Eastern European countries are analysed on the basis of evideance from recent empirical research on microeconomic performance in these transition economies. The paper outlines a stylized picture of some types of enterprise behaviour which occur in this period and highlights a number of issues related to the process of enterprise restructuring and adjustment such as the problem of micro budget constraints, the motivation for enterprise restructuring, the issues of corporate governance. Some of the current impediments to enterprise restructuring as well as some of the determinants of enterprise performance in the transition periód are also featured in the paper.     

The impact of equity ownership groups on investment: Evidence from Ukraine

We empirically investigate the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment in Ukraine with a novel dynamic investment model where investment is based on present and historical levels of profitability (market-to-book value of equity) and lagged investment. Groups include state, insider, non-domestic, financial and financial and industrial group (FIG) ownership. Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of profitability significantly affects investment; the majority presence of and increases in state ownership have a negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. We explain the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints), measured by cash flow interacted with a dummy variable of majority ownership of the respective group, and the extent of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group and relate them to over- and under-investment, and to the free cash flow or cash constraint hypothesis.     

Budget deficits and interest rates: a fresh perspective

We extend the literature on budget deficits and interest rates in three ways: we examine both advanced and emerging economies and for the first time a large emerging market panel; explore interactions to explain some of the heterogeneity in the literature; and apply system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). There is overall a highly significant positive effect of budget deficits on interest rates, but the effect depends on interaction terms and is only significant under one of the several conditions: deficits are high, mostly domestically financed, or interact with high domestic debt; financial openness is low; interest rates are liberalized; or financial depth is low.