Social Security and Old Age Unemployment Risk with Efficient Wage Bargaining

I analyze a life‐cycle economy with old age productivity risk where wages, employment, and severance payments are set through efficient bargaining between risk averse unions and risk neutral firms. Allocations with limited union membership are second‐best inefficient as they generate too little labor supply in young age, too much consumption before retirement, too little employment of older workers (early retirement), and too little insurance against old age unemployment. Providing public transfers to early retirees (disability benefits or early pensions) might help to increase the degree of risk sharing at the cost of lower old age employment. Depending on whether absolute risk aversion is increasing or decreasing in consumption, these policies might or might not produce efficiency gains at equilibrium.     

Globalization and the decline in labor shares: Exploring the relationship beyond trade and financial flows

We employ data from up to 125 countries during the 1970–2009 period to explore the relationship between globalization and labor share. Existing studies report a negative relationship between trade and investment flows and labor shares. While we also find that economic flows are often negatively related to labor shares, measures of social globalization tend to be positively related to labor shares. While greater mobility of goods and capital may be associated with increases in capital's bargaining power, all else equal, greater flows of information, ideas, and people may increase the bargaining power of workers.     

Labor and india's economic reforms

Before liberalization in 1991, India had developed exceptionally complex labor regulations which strengthened the bargaining power of unions and increased job security in the formal economy, at the cost of employment. Deregulation and privatization can be expected to strengthen competition, accelerate productivity growth, narrow gaps between formal and informal labor markets outcomes, and weaken union power. Is this happening in post-1991 India? Because India liberalized its economy so recently, and so gradually, it is too early to tell. Key areas of the economy continue to be highly regulated, including labor markets. Yet, there are signs that industrial relations are changing. Increased competition in product markets and dissipation of rents are eroding the protection labor regulations once afforded workers in formal labor markets. In a more competitive environment, the same labor regulations that once increased job security, might expose workers to greater risks.     

Labor market dynamics in urban China and the role of the state sector

This paper studies the effect of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the dynamics of the Chinese urban labor market. Using longitudinally matched monthly panel data, we document very low labor force dynamics in the state sector, which leads to a high long-term unemployment rate. We develop and estimate an equilibrium search and matching model with three differences between the state and non-state sectors: labor productivity, labor adjustment cost, and workers’ bargaining power. Counterfactual analysis shows that, among the three channels, reducing the bargaining power of state sector workers is most effective in reducing unemployment duration and unemployment rate.     

The labor wedge as a matching friction

We use a search and matching model to decompose the labor wedge into three classes of labor market frictions and evaluate their role for the labor wedge and unemployment. We find that there is an asymmetric effect of labor market frictions on the labor wedge and unemployment. While the wedge is to a large extent explained by changes in matching efficiency, unemployment is accounted for by the combination of frictions to matching efficiency, job destruction and bargaining. If search and matching frictions give rise to the labor wedge, then it is relevant for explaining unemployment mainly through changes in matching efficiency.     

Labor markets and productivity in developing countries

In middle-income countries, the informal sector often accounts for a substantial fraction of the urban labor force. We develop a general equilibrium model with matching frictions in the urban labor market, the possibility of self-employment in the informal sector, and scope for rural–urban migration. We investigate the effects of labor market institutions, different types of growth, and company taxes on labor market outcomes and aggregate productivity. We quantify these effects by calibrating the model to data for Mexico, and show that matching frictions can lead to a large informal sector when formal sector workers have substantial bargaining power.     

Relative wages, labor specialization and bargaining patterns

The goal of this paper is to study the effects of centralized and decentralized bargaining patterns on wage inequality when there are two different types of labor, skilled and unskilled. We present two models where labor is specialized between firms, that is, there are two types of firms, each one employing one type of labor. We show that the revenue shares of the production factors in each type of firm and the union power are crucial determinants of the relative wage. In contrast, the relative expected wage is the same across models and bargaining patterns.     

Tax and transfer programs,retirement behavior,and work hours over the life cycle

In this paper, we use a computable overlapping generations model economy to analyze the quantitative effects of some reforms on tax and transfer programs, aimed at easing the tax burden on the labor supply of older workers. We focus on retirement behavior, work hours over the life cycle, and efficiency gains. We find that the labor supply of older workers is very responsive to changes in tax and transfer programs and show that the gains, in terms of old-age work hours, are non-trivial. However, we also find that longer careers may not substantially increase aggregate hours because workers may reallocate labor supply over the life cycle in response to retiring later. Moreover, since longer careers may also reduce saving rates, we also find that changes in tax and transfer programs aimed at boosting the employment rates of the elderly may reduce output per head.     

延迟退休年龄下隔代抚育与劳动参与的抉择*——基于工资收入随机性假定的研究

隔代抚育会对延迟退休年龄政策在促进劳动力供给上产生挤出效应。为了对此进行验证，本文在工资收入随机性的假定及延迟退休5年的情景下，模拟了面临孙辈照护需求的女性临近退休者提前退休所产生的福利变化。进一步，本文采用CHIP和CHARLS的微观调查数据，对不同群组的收入增长率和收入风险进行了估计，继而分析了当面临孙辈照护需求时这些收入特征对退休决策者制度退休和退休后劳动参与抉择产生的影响。总体上，在延迟退休年龄政策下，隔代抚育将对女性劳动力供给产生挤出效应。当面临孙辈照护需求时，女性临近退休者的制度退休抉择主要受自身收入增长率和收入风险的影响，收入增长率越低，或收入风险越高，她们提前退休的意愿就越强烈；制度退休后的劳动参与则更多地受子女收入增长率的影响，子女收入增长率越高，劳动参与的概率越低。     

The effects of immigration in frictional labor markets: Theory and empirical evidence from EU countries

Immigrants are newcomers in a labor market. As a consequence, they lack host-country-specific labor market knowledge and other country-specific and not directly productive valuable assets affecting their relative bargaining position with employers. We introduce this simple observation into a search and matching model of the labor market and show that immigrants increase the employment prospects of competing natives. To test the predictions of our model, we exploit yearly variations between 1998 and 2004 in the share of immigrants within occupations in 13 European countries. We identify the impact of immigrants on natives׳ employment rate using an instrumental variable strategy based on historical settlement patterns across host countries and occupations by origin country. We find that natives׳ employment rate increases in occupations and sectors receiving more immigrants. Moreover, we show that this effect varies depending on immigrants׳ characteristics and on host country labor market institutions which affect relative reservation wages.     

Domestic Unionization and the Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy

This paper examines the effect of lobbying by a labor union and its parent firm on the argument for strategic export policy in a third market-unionized duopoly. The lobbying-induced export policy frequently deteriorates domestic welfare as compared with free trade. It is true that the politically-determined export policy can improve domestic welfare if the union's bargaining power is strong and the domestic government's responsiveness to political contributions is weak. However, even if the conditions are met, implementing the lobbying-induced export policy will not enhance domestic welfare more than improving labor–management relations. Moreover, the improvement of their relations will be hampered by the opportunity of their lobbying. These results indicate that strategic export policy toward a unionized duopoly should be restrained in light of political economy.     

Employer pay policies, public transfers and the retirement decisions of men and women in Denmark

The empirical retirement literature measures individual responses to variations in income flows due to public transfers, private individual or employer-provided pensions. We estimate a model accounting for the incentive effects from these sources. A dynamic structural model is extended to allow both individual and employer heterogeneity. This is applied to a Danish matched panel of workers and establishments, spanning a period of reforms to a public early retirement programme. Employer-specific compensation is found to be an important determinant of work and retirement income flows. Employer effects on retirement age are only found among sub-samples where access to public transfers is limited.     

Offshoring and Reshoring: The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power

This paper demonstrates that an increase in bargaining power of Northern firms relative to that of their Southern contractors can trigger reshoring if the North-South wage differential is moderate, such that only industries with a high share of unskilled labor find outsourcing profitable. However, such an increase in Northern bargaining power can increase offshoring if the wage differential is so high that even industries with a low share of unskilled labor also offshore.     

Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning: A Theoretical Model With Heterogeneous Labor,Biased Technical Change and International Sourcing

The employability of an aging population in a world of continuous and biased technical change is top of the political agenda. Due to endogenous human capital depreciation the effective retirement age is often below statutory retirement age resulting in permanent non‐employability of older workers. We analyze this phenomenon in a putty‐putty human capital vintage model and focus on education and the speed of human capital depreciation. Introducing a two‐stage education system with initial schooling and lifelong learning, not even lifelong learning turns out to be capable of aligning economic and statutory retirement. However, well‐designed education programs will keep more workers in highly productive activities at the end of their working life, and hence will substitute for simple social transfers, or for an early switch towards very low paid jobs.     

Cash Transfers to the Poor and the Labor Market: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper studies the effects of cash transfers to the poor on the labor market. This is investigated in a matching model with endogenous labor market participation and job destruction. Depending on their productivity, workers might want to stay in the job, become unemployed, or leave the labor market; in addition, workers out of the labor force might decide to search for a job. Cash transfers are introduced to all agents with income below a given level. Two qualitative results are found: (i) The size of cash transfers has a negative effect on the employment rate, but an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate; and (ii) the coverage of this welfare program has a positive effect on the employment rate, and an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The numerical simulations also show that: (i) if the government target is to reduce inequality and poverty, the more efficient policy is to increase the level of benefits instead of increasing the eligibility of the program; (ii) compared with a welfare program that condition eligibility to labor market participation, the “unconditional” cash transfer program has a stronger impact on inequality and poverty, but with a reduction in labor market participation and output.     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

A Search Model of Unemployment and Inflation*

This paper introduces money into the standard labor‐matching model. A double‐coincidence problem makes money necessary as a medium of exchange. In the long run, a rise in the growth rate of money leads to higher inflation and higher unemployment, such that the long‐run Phillips curve is not vertical. The optimal monetary growth rate decreases with greater worker bargaining power, the level of unemployment benefits, and the payroll tax rate.     

Gender Inequalities in Labor Market Outcomes of Informal Caregivers near Retirement Age in Urban China

ABSTRACT

This study examines the impacts of unpaid family care on labor supply and earnings of women and men near retirement age in urban China. Using the 2011 China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable approaches, it finds that grandchild care is negatively associated with both women's and men's labor force participation, while there are no effects for eldercare. For women caregivers, caring for grandchildren substantially lowers paid labor hours compared to noncaregivers. No significant relationships are found between eldercare and paid labor hours of women workers. For men workers, neither grandchild care nor eldercare is significantly associated with labor hours. The study also finds no statistically significant relationships between grandchild care and labor earnings for either women or men. Eldercare, however, is positively associated with the earnings of men workers.     

The impact of targeting policy on spouses’ demand for public goods,labor supplies and sharing rule

This paper studies the impact of targeted unconditional cash transfers on the spouses’ demand for public goods, labor supplies and sharing of resources. We estimate a collective labor supply model with distributional factors which is extended to include preferences over marketable public goods (including child goods). In this way, unlike previous research, we consider the impact of such transfers on the intrahousehold allocation of resources and distinguish between the labeling and recipient effects. We exploit the UK experience and find evidence in favor of the collective model with separable preferences over labor supplies and public goods. This finding implies a recipient effect and not a labeling effect of child benefits. Given the household’s unearned income, the bigger the wife’s bargaining power, the more the resources allocated to public goods (including child goods) and the wife’s private consumption. The results can be useful in the design of family policy which aims to improve the relative welfare of children within the family and alleviate any intrahousehold consumption inequalities.