From Big Bang to Big Crash: The Early Origins of the UK’s Finance-led Growth Model and the Persistence of Bad Policy Ideas

Using newly declassified documents from the British Public Records Office, we argue that the finance-dependent growth regime that typified the UK economy in the period up to the Great Crash of 2008 has much deeper roots than is commonly realised. We use these documents to demonstrate that the growth of finance was integral to the Thatcher revolution, tying together mortgage markets, household debt, and boom-bust cycles as early as the mid-1980s. We also show how policy-makers in this period were aware of all the weaknesses of this growth model, to the point that they effectively diagnosed what would happened in 2008, back in 1987. We argue that selecting for a finance-led growth model as the preferred growth model so early effectively rendered other possible growth models for the UK unattainable. The result was the shift from an economy characterised by ‘stop-go’ cycles in the post-war period to an economy characterised by recurrent ‘boom-slump-austerity-reset’ cycles in the Thatcher and post Thatcher periods. The 2008 crisis did not change this highly unstable mode of accumulation.     

Wage led aggregate demand in the United Kingdom

The wage led aggregate demand hypothesis is examined for the United Kingdom over the period 1971–2007. Existing studies disagree on the aggregate demand regime for the UK, and this appears to be due to differing empirical approaches. Studies relying on equation-by-equation estimation procedures tend to find support for wage led aggregate demand in the UK, while the single study using a multiple time series estimation procedure finds no support for the hypothesis. We test the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis in the UK using VAR models estimated on quarterly data employing an alternative identification strategy based on shocks to real earnings. The results provide support for the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis during the period of study. However, the expansionary effects of higher earnings seem to be limited and relatively short-lived.     

Financialisation and Rising Shareholder Power in Kaleckian/Post-Kaleckian Models of Distribution and Growth

We establish the link between rising shareholder power on the firm level, increasing pressure on labour, and redistribution at the expense of wages, with the macroeconomic effects on capacity utilisation, profits and capital accumulation. Three channels of transmission of ‘financialisation’ and increasing shareholder power, the ‘preference channel’, the ‘finance channel’ and the ‘distribution channel’, are introduced into two different variants of the Kaleckian distribution and growth model, the Kaleckian model and the Post-Kaleckian model. Within these models, three potential regimes of accumulation are derived, the ‘contractive’ regime, the ‘profits without investment’ regime, and the ‘finance-led growth’ regime. Only the ‘profits without investment’ regime generates a strict micro-macro identity, whereas the other two regimes are characterised by fallacies of composition, a ‘paradox of accumulation’ in the ‘finance-led growth’ regime and a ‘paradox of profits’ in the ‘contractive’ regime.     

Central Bank Reform and the Politics of Blame Avoidance in the UK

Following the financial crisis, the UK central bank gained important new prudential powers for upholding financial stability. Yet the reforms diverged significantly from the government’s original plans and arguably produced a suboptimal institutional design. Drawing on theories of blame avoidance, we argue that the changes were motivated primarily by the need to manage reputational risk. Prior to the 2010 election, the two main parties tried to deflect blame for the crisis by putting forward competing proposals for agency reconfiguration. In response, the Bank of England pursued a strategy of agency subversion aimed at reshaping the reforms to minimise future reputational damage. This involved pushing for ‘hard’ delegation to maximise control of new macroprudential powers, while using ‘fuzzy’ delegation to shift microprudential supervision down to subordinate agencies. The article sheds new light on the drivers of post-crisis reform and the importance and limits of delegation as a strategy of blame avoidance.     

The Regressive Recovery: Distribution,Inequality and State Power in Britain's Post-Crisis Political Economy

This article interrogates the underlying mechanisms at the heart of Britain's post-crisis political economy. We argue that the contemporary economic recovery has been characterised by a dynamic of ‘regressive redistribution’: a socially regressive dynamic of state-led economic restructuring that has worked through two axes at the centre of the recovery. The first axis, a monetary policy framework centred upon Quantitative Easing, has driven asset-price inflation to the benefit of the wealthiest asset holders. The second axis centres upon the politics of regressive labour market restructuring which has provoked widespread wage deflation. In combination, these two axes have been central to defining the contours of the Britain's post-crisis political economy paradigm: characterised by rising asset wealth for the few, and falling living standards alongside increasing economic insecurity for wage earners. The opportunity to change path from the trends of deepening inequality that defined the pre-crisis era has not been taken. Instead, the prevailing policy paradigm of the post-crisis period – discursively unified and sustained by David Cameron's government – has intensified the regressively redistributive dynamics at the core of the neo-liberal project. Ultimately, this is likely to further entrench structural weaknesses in Britain's economy in the years ahead.     

Flexible Labour,Firm Performance and the Dutch Job Creation Miracle

Unlike internal (‘functional’) forms of flexibility of labour, external (‘numerical’) forms of flexibility (i.e. high shares of people on temporary contract or a high turnover of personnel) yield substantial savings on a firm’s wage bill. Savings on wage bills lead to higher job growth, but do not translate into higher sales growth. Externally flexible labour appears to be related to lower labour productivity growth, the effects being different for innovating vs non‐innovating firms. We discuss these findings from firm‐level and worker‐level data against the background of the Dutch job creation miracle during the 1980s and 1990s. Modest wage increases and flexibilization of labour markets may indeed create lots of jobs. However, this is likely to happen at the expense of labour productivity growth, raising serious doubts about the long‐run sustainability of a low‐productivity–high‐employment growth path.     

Housing as a wage and luxury good: absolute poverty and the distribution of income in supply-side economics

A fundamental tenet of supply-side economics is the ‘trickle-down’ effect, according to which a redistribution of income shares to those with higher incomes is supposed to result in sufficient income growth to make everyone better off. Apart from the inherent improbability of such an outcome, it is possible to argue that such a redistribution causes scarce resources to be transferred to luxury goods production, reducing the supply of the wage goods commodities in whose production those resources are used. The reduced availability of such commodities can give rise to an increase in absolute poverty (defined as the inability to afford basic necessities). This increase in absolute poverty forms a ‘threshold’ which must be more than balanced by an increase in real income due to the supply-side acceleration of economic growth before the ‘trickle-down’ effect may be said to have been realized. Some evidence from the UK is provided, together with a note on how this poverty mechanism affects the calculation of the retail Prices index.     

Inflation regimes and the stability of the pass-through of wages to consumer prices in Canada

This article has formally identified distinct historical inflation regimes in Canada since 1961 in order to facilitate an investigation of the impact of regime changes on the wage-price dynamics in the economy. Both in and out-of-sample evidence suggest that wage growth exerts an influence on inflation only during a high-inflation regime but inflation exerts a more systematic and quantitatively stronger influence on wage growth regardless of the prevailing inflation regime. Overall, the results do not support either the ‘cost-push’ view of inflation or the ‘new view’ that claims that increased globalization during the 1990s has reduced the feedback from wage growth to inflation by weakening the bargaining power of workers.     

Neoliberal Entrenchment of North Atlantic Capital. From Corporate Self-Regulation to State Capture

After the financial crisis of 2007–8, neoliberal capitalism by all appearances has entrenched instead of being displaced. Its political–economic programme or ‘comprehensive concept of control’ continues to hold society in thrall. This was different in the crisis of 1974–5 when the corporate liberalism of the postwar years and its industry-centred class compromise were beginning to be replaced by finance-led neoliberalism and a compromise with asset-owning middle classes. Under corporate liberalism, real capital accumulation was protected from the ‘rentier’/‘money-dealing’ fraction of capital associated with speculative investment; neoliberalism has allowed its resurgence. Large corporations in the first phase of the transition (‘systemic neoliberalism’) embarked on a strategy of transnational restructuring no longer dependent on 1960s-style state support. In the process, financial group formation, here measured by dense director interlocks (≥2) amongst the largest corporations in the North Atlantic economy (where this type of corporate governance obtains), was intensified. The resurgence of money-dealing capital and rentier incomes in the 1990s led to a decline in real accumulation (‘predatory neoliberalism’), and after the crisis of 2007–8, to a demise of the financial group structure of Atlantic capital as the network of dense interlocks radically thins out and capital comes to rely on states again, this time to protect it from a democratic correction of the neoliberal regime and with state autonomy greatly reduced by public debt.     

From profit margins to income distribution: Joan Robinson's odyssey from marginal productivity theory

The point of departure for this paper is a 1941 Note on profit margins co-authored by Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor that remained unpublished until 2000. Robinson's reviews of Henry Clay's The Problem of Industrial Relationships, Bresciani Turroni's The Economics of Inflation, and Roy Harrod's Towards a Dynamic Economics, along with her 1965 Cambridge Inaugural Lecture, may be interpreted as analogous documents that develop her critique of neoclassical wage theory and identify the money wage as the economy's ‘key’ price. These publications were critical steps toward the wage mark-up hypothesis and Post-Keynesian support of incomes policy to contain inflation. Robinson's Harrod review anticipated her later ideas about economic growth. With Kalecki's notion of ‘the degree of monopoly’ and her own concept of neo-mercantilism (from the Inaugural Lecture), these themes are nascent in the Robinson–Kaldor Note on profit margins.     

Financial development,trade openness and economic growth in African countries: New insights from a panel causality approach

This paper examines the causal relationship between financial development and economic growth for 21 African countries within a framework which also accounts for international trade. We develop a financial development index based on four different financial development indicators and apply the panel bootstrapped approach to Granger causality. The empirical results show limited support for the finance-led growth and the trade-led growth hypotheses. The results imply that recent attempts at financial development and trade liberalization do not seem to have made a significant impact on growth.     

Combining minimum wage and exchange rate policy to release the external constraint on growth

In this article we analyse the combination of a minimum wage and a devaluation/depreciation so as to release the external constraint on growth. The policy maker aims at achieving both balanced trade and higher growth. These may be reached by devaluating the domestic currency, which however supports traditional industries characterized by high price elasticity and low income elasticity of demand. The release of the external constraint in the short term then yields a stronger constraint in the longer term. If traditional industries are unskilled and labour‐intensive, the setting of a minimum wage distorts the specialization towards sectors with high demand growth. Devaluation/depreciation and minimum wage may thus be combined to release both the short term and longer term external constraint. We determine the condition for such a policy to be efficient. This combined policy must come with an educational policy that supports skill upgrading. It is typically tailored to ‘advanced emerging countries’ which aim at changing their specialization without slowing their growth.     

How the P* Model Rationalizes Monetary Targeting: A Comment on Svensson

In this comment, we answer the question posed in Svensson’s (2000) paper ‘Does the P* Model Provide any Rationale for Monetary Targeting?’– in contrast to him ‐‐ in the affirmative. We argue that a strategy of monetary targeting can be rationalized within the P* framework. Furthermore, we demonstrate that money growth targeting is a special form of inflation forecast targeting based on a ‘limited’ information set. In contrast to ‘full information’ inflation forecast targeting, monetary growth targeting is likely to be more robust under changing conditions of the real world.     

A microeconomic analysis of wage determination in the Canadian public sector

Using cross-section, micro wage rate data for the period 1967–1975, this paper analyses the extent to which price expectations, price ‘catch-up’, and labour market conditions affect the rate of change of base wage rates in the Canadian public sector. The results indicate that both price movements and labour market conditions do influence base wage rates in a manner that is not radically different from that in the private sector. The paper also explores the importance and significance of these factors when the data are disaggregated according to jurisdiction and method of contract settlement. The final section of the paper is devoted to an exploration of wage spillovers within the public sector and between the public and private sectors.     

The role of unemployment in wage determination: further evidence on the wage curve from Turkey

This paper presents an empirical estimation of the correlation between wages and regional unemployment rates in Turkey, more specifically it explores the role of regional unemployment rates in wage determination. The analysis builds upon a series of recent empirical studies on the wage-unemployment relationship, now commonly known as ‘the wage curve’, a downward sloping curve in wage-unemployment space. The existing studies are for most part in advanced market economies, while this paper presents one of the few attempts at a wage curve analysis within the context of a developing market economy. A cross-sectional estimation of micro level individual wage data for the Turkish labour market in 1994, suggest a statistically significant negative correlation between wages and regional unemployment rates. Separate regressions for men and women, however, show a wage curve to exist only in the male labour market. The study also presents the results on other variables of wage determination such as returns to schooling, returns to age, job tenure, gender, industrial and occupational affiliation of the worker, economic sector and union status.     

The Liverpool macroeconomic model of the United Kingdom

The paper describes the Liverpool Model, a rational expectations model of the UK economy used for forecasting since March 1980. The model is of the ‘new classical’ type, in that all markets clear; in the labour market, there is a union sector with one-year nominal wage contracts but the non-union sector clears excess demands. Equilibrium (or ‘natural rate’) values of output, employment, real wages, etc are endogenously determined. In- and out-of-sample errors, a full set of simulations, and a complete listing are included. The interim experience of the model as a test bed for rational expectations methods is ‘far from discouraging’.     

Security and the Subsurface: Natural Gas and the Visualisation of Possibility Spaces

ABSTRACT

Beneath the surface of the United Kingdom lies a sprawling natural gas infrastructure. Based on recent (2014/15) ‘follow the thing’ fieldwork conducted in the UK onshore gas industry, this paper explores the ways that dangers related to the subterranean circulation of natural gas come to be visualised, and how these visualisations make possible different security interventions. These practices are shown to be limited by the ground, which despite its enrolment as a security device conceals from view the shifting landscapes of risk that surround these gaseous movements. Drawing on Manuel DeLanda's concept of the possibility space, I provide a conceptual framework for attending to security’s visualisation practices, describing how attempts are made to overcome the subsurface obfuscation of natural gas. I argue that, rather than being understood as a process of circulatory ‘filtration’ or ‘maintenance’, security must instead be regarded as a series of transformative practices of ecological (re)organisation that are predicated upon the visualisation of entities’ spaces of possibility. In the process, I provide an account of how the three-dimensional geographies and materialities of gas circulations and their milieus are intimately tied up in their governance and politics.     

The domestic politics of financial regulation: Informal ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations

This paper contributes to our understanding of post-crisis financial regulation by reasserting the centrality of domestic politics in defining government preferences and explaining regulatory outcomes. It draws on Robert Putnam's two-level game approach and Foreign Policy Analysis to develop a model of a three-level informal ratification game. This adds value to existing approaches by capturing the contested nature of government preferences and delineating the causal mechanisms through which domestic groups shape international negotiations. The model is used to explain the UK's pivotal role in the reform of bank capital requirements in the European Union (EU). It demonstrates that governments are able to take advantage of a narrowing domestic ‘win-set’ by marginalising the influence of industry and building political momentum for regulatory reform. In particular, the paper shows how UK negotiators were able to exploit the increased domestic costs of agreement and synergistic strategies between negotiations to successfully oppose the maximum harmonisation of capital rules across the EU.     

Gulf Cooperation Council Oil Exporters and the Future of the Dollar

How has industrial restructuring and technological upgrading in South Korea undertaken in the post-crisis era impacted on the state's capacity to guide strategic industry development? The latest reincarnation of the ‘end of the developmental state’ thesis proposes that industry policies are losing their strategic long-term oriented character due to the state's lack of legitimacy to play a guiding role after the economic recovery. I test this view in light of the Korean state's role, since the early 2000s, in the promotion of a new mobile communications software standard known as the Wireless Internet Platform for Interoperability (WIPI). I argue that the Korean state retains a strategic long-term approach to techno-industrial governance. The argument is developed through examining how bureaucratic actors gained the legitimacy to challenge Qualcomm, the strategy involved in promoting WIPI, and how the bureaucracy supported domestic firms under an increasingly open international trading environment. The findings reveal the state's ability to renew its legitimacy to play a developmental role through re-articulating policy goals from catching-up to nurturing innovation. Furthermore, the state has experimented with new forms of cooperation between government and business to nurture the growth of new infant technological growth sectors such as telecommunications.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.