Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.     

改善经济运行环境的时机选择:政府与资本的博弈

通过政府与国内非法、合法资本持有者间的不完美信息动态博弈模型,得出政府对待非法资本的严厉打击,将在一定程度上引起国内整体性的跟随性流出。即政府对待非法资本的态度,将在一定程度上影响我国资本净流出/流入的方向。而国内存在大量资本净流入时,相当于放宽了政府对非法资本的严厉打击的现实约束,为在资本净流量波动尽量小的前提下改善经济运行环境创造了条件。     

The euro for the Balkans?

This paper makes the case for full euroization of the Balkans. It argues that the full adoption of the new currency, including the use of euro notes and coins, would bring important benefits for the countries in south east Europe. The key benefit of euroization would be the opportunity it would provide to radically reform and open the financial system, thus changing the equilibrium of the domestic political economy (by eliminating political influence over credit allocation). It also argues that the loss of seigniorage would be minor, but that there is no reason why the rich EU should benefit from this. Compensation for the loss of seigniorage would be technically easy to implement. Finally, the paper presents a small model that demonstrates how a devaluation might actually impair the debt‐servicing capacity of the government. This implies that the exchange rate cannot easily absorb shocks to the interest rate to be paid on external debt, or to the availability of capital for emerging markets in general. A deterioration in the availability of external capital might thus trigger extremely large exchange rate adjustments, which in turn can disrupt the domestic financial system. This should be an important consideration for such a highly indebted region. JEL classification: F33, F32.     

Status Preference, Wealth and Dynamics in the Open Economy

Abstract. The implications of status preference in a simple open economy model are investigated in this paper. The open economy is modeled as a continuum of identical representative agents who have preferences over consumption and status. In the paper status is identified as relative wealth, which takes the form of relative holdings international financial assets. A symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium is derived in which status is the source of transitional dynamics for domestic consumption and the current account balance. This result illustrates another way to combine transitional dynamics with interior equilibria in the small open economy Ramsey model with perfect capital mobility. We also show that status preference plays a critical role in influencing the open economy's adjustment to government expenditure and world interest rate shocks.     

The Boom and Bust of the RMB's Internationalization: A Perspective from Cross‐Border Arbitrage

The RMB's internationalization developed very quickly from 2010 to 2015H1, but it slowed down significantly since 2015H2. This paper argues that cross‐border arbitraging activities played a significant role in both the boom and the bust of the RMB's internationalization. A slower pace of the RMB's internationalization based more on real demand might become a new norm in the future. To pursue a more sustainable RMB internationalization in the next decade, the Chinese government should maintain a relatively high economic growth rate, avoid the burst of systemic financial crisis, continue to liberalize the capital account in a gradual and cautious way, accelerate the reform and opening up of the domestic financial market, and integrate the RMB's internationalization with Asian monetary cooperation.     

Optimal Capital Taxation in a Neoclassical Growth Model

This paper studies the optimal factor tax incidence in a neoclassical growth model with a given share of government expenditure in output. In the Ramsey planner's optimization, the effect of next period's capital on government expenditure equals the given share of the marginal product of capital. Capital accumulation reduces the discounted net marginal product of next period's capital by way of increasing government expenditure. In order to internalize the distortion, it is optimal to tax capital income in the long run.     

资本管制、外商投资与最优税差 --对中国转型时期过渡性资本外逃的研究

本文根据我国过渡性资本外逃的现实,构建一个政府和国内企业之间关于外资超国民待遇和资本投向的博弈模型,从理论上演绎了外资超国民待遇导致过渡性资本外逃的机制;揭示了资本管制程度对于过渡性资本外逃的效应;诠释了我国改革开放初期为何能够实施程度较高的内外资差别待遇,而在国内资本存量越来越大的今天,政府降低外资超国民待遇的客观必然性。文章进一步分析了当政府不了解企业资本外逃真实成本时,不对称信息对最优外资税率的效应。最后文章认为,统一内外资的税率和其他政策待遇是今后改革的必然取向     

Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity

This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner’s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached.     

Siamese Twin Troubles: Structural and Regulatory Transformations in Unequal Thailand

This paper takes an institutional approach to inequality in Thailand by exploring the country's structural and regulatory transformations. It discusses how Thailand's transition from agriculture to industry and services has been impeded by both the demand and supply sides of government subsidies since the 1950s. The relative failure of structural transformation has slowed down economic catch-up and widened the well-being gap between those inside and outside the agricultural sector. Furthermore, while regulatory transformation has mitigated state-led malaise in certain Asian economies, post-1997 reform in Thailand has incentivized unconventional political actors, such as academics, medical doctors and civil society leaders, to make collective efforts in toppling elected governments in exchange for gaining selection into oversight agencies. The case of Thailand indicates how regulatory reform may create perverse incentives that adversely affect democratization, decentralization, competition, and taxation. Dealing with inequality therefore requires a big push toward progressive structural and regulatory transformations altogether.     

Decentralization,social capital,and regional growth: The case of the Italian North-South divide

This paper aims to show how a region's constant level of social capital may have a very different impact on its economic growth depending on whether the central or the local level of government is responsible for regional policy.Our case study is the economic performance of Northern and Southern Italy in the post-World War II period, when a long phase of regional convergence came to a sudden halt in the early 1970s. We focus on the economic effects of the 1970s institutional reforms on government decentralization and wage bargaining. Our main hypothesis is that decentralization allocates the provision of public capital to institutions, the local ones, more exposed to a territory's social capital. Since social capital is lower in the Southern regions, decentralization made their developmental policies less effective from 1970 onwards, and regional inequality increased.We build an endogenous growth model augmented to include the interaction between social capital and public investment as well as the reform of the Italian labour market. We calibrate our model using data of the Italian regions for 1951–71. Our quantitative results indicate that decentralization triggered the influence of local social capital on growth and played a central role in halting the convergence path of the low-social-capital regions.     

From Friction to Free Trade Negotiations: Australia's Engagement with the European Union

Following decades of skirmishes, Australia's relationship with the European Union (EU) has finally come of age. With the commencement of negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement, the outlook is promising for enhanced cooperation. Yet there are distinctive—and at times diverging—hierarchies of interests. This article argues that, although the EU and Australia regard each other as like‐minded partners, their interests and domestic pressures do not necessarily denote comprehensive convergence. This is due to the burden of memory, divergent concerns and values, some mutual neglect and an element of mutual misunderstanding.     

Is growth corrupted or bureaucratic? Panel evidence from the enlarged EU

This article aims at analysing the issue of conditional convergence in the new enlarged European Union (EU) over the period 1995–2012 by means of panel data techniques. We examined the issue of conditional convergence in the enlarged EU giving particular attention to the effects of corruption and bureaucracy on growth controlling for a widely used set of explanatory variables such as investment (domestic and foreign), human capital formation, inflation, general government final consumption and trade openness. Furthermore, we examine if growth responds differently to corruption and bureaucracy in the new EU members by means of two group-specific interaction variables to capture possible different responses to corruption and bureaucracy. The analysis reveals evidence of conditional convergence in the enlarged EU, with investment share, foreign direct investment, human capital, and country openness appearing as robust growth drivers. In contrast, inflation and government consumption rather hamper growth. Furthermore, the effects of corruption and bureaucracy on growth seem to differ across old and new EU members.     

产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

20世纪60年代以后,学者研究发现,传统的贸易理论无法解释大量工业化国家之间的贸易,从而使产业内贸易的研究成为国际贸易的核心问题之一。本文建立古诺双寡头垄断模型对同质产品产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策进行了博弈分析,通过研究发现：寡头垄断企业之间即使在比较优势和报酬递增都不存在的条件下也会互相向对方市场销售商品;追求社会福利最大化的政府很容易陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境,从而导致双方社会福利恶化。本文认为,政府之间应该加强交往,深化合作,通过谈判解决贸易争端,避免陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境。     

Optimal contract theory with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper incorporates managers' time-inconsistent preferences into the classical DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) contract model to study corresponding impacts on the optimal contract, corporate financial policies, and the optimal capital structure. The extended model shows that the impatience of the time-inconsistent agent has positive effects on the optimal payout decision which is opposite to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and consequently provides a guideline to tailor the contract between investors and the agent. It also shows in the optimal capital structure, the total debt capacity shrinks with the degree of the agent's time inconsistency, and the long-term one shrinks more. In addition, our model predicts that the agent's time inconsistency not only imposes significant limits on the use of long-term debt but also has great effects on firms' capital structures. Thus our finding can potentially explain observed cross-sectional differences in firms' capital structures.     

新常态下的人力资本与经济增长——综合金融资本和创新创业的理论建模

在国内外形势的双重影响下,中国经济步入了"新常态"的阶段,放缓的经济增长步伐带来新的矛盾和挑战,经济增长模式从以往的粗放型逐渐向集约型转变,但以往的经济理论在经济新阶段都具有一定的局限性.本文使用主流宏观经济学前沿的建模方法将现有的四大经济增长理论囊括在一个综合模型中,把人力资本投资、金融资本投资、实物资本投资、创新创业活动、纳什博弈机制有机地结合在统一的分析框架下,对经济增长理论文献做出重要的概括和拓展.通过校准赋值和数值模拟,得出理论模型的基本结论:人力资本积累虽然可以通过创新和创业促进经济增长,但是其效果仍是递减的,呈现出新古典增长模型的属性.     

Taxation without commitment

This paper considers a Ramsey model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which a benevolent government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is forced to keep budget balance in every period, then it may not be able to sustain zero capital taxes in the long run, as shown in Benhabib and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 77:231–259, 1997) and Phelan and Stachetti (Econometrica 69:1491–1518, 2001). However, (Dominguez in J Econ Theory 135:159–170, 2007) shows that if the government is allowed to borrow and lend to households, the optimal capital income tax still converges to zero in the long run, as long as the value of defaulting is independent of the level of government debt. This paper provides a game theoretic setup with government debt where the value of the worst equilibrium only depends on the initial level of capital and can be determined in advance. This implies that under our assumptions the best sustainable equilibrium has zero capital taxes in the long run, even in the absence of government commitment.     

Survival of the gene,intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving

This paper provides a model of bequest and investment in children's human capital at low incomes. It posits that parents and children are linked through their common concern of grandchildren and intergenerational transfers provide a material basis for the perpetuation of the family line. The model characterizes intergenerational strategic interactions in a dynamic game theoretical framework. Moreover, it explores intergenerational uncertainty as a source of precautionary saving. In contrast with the existing literature, the model implies that there are qualitative differences between precautionary saving from one's own income uncertainty and precautionary bequests from children's income uncertainty.     

Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition

In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.     

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, INFORMATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC GROUPS

A domestic ratification game nested within an international bargaining game establishes that domestic politics influences the outcome of international negotiations. When information on the domestic side is incomplete, an informational role of lobbies is established. Cooperation is more likely when domestic lobbies provide information to Congress about a treaty presented for ratification, especially when cooperation would not otherwise occur. As government becomes more divided, cooperation is less likely; when it does occur, the legislature is better off – internal divisions worsen the external leverage of states, while a united home front is the executive's best chance for obtaining her ideal agreement.     

Growth and equilibrium indeterminacy: the role of capital mobility

Summary. The paper presents a human capital driven endogenous growth model which, in general, permits a multiplicity of equilibrium balanced growth paths. It is shown that allowing for perfect capital mobility across countries increases the range of parameter values for which the model permits equilibrium indeterminacy. As opposed to the closed capital markets case, simple restrictions on preferences are no longer sufficient to eliminate the indeterminacy. Intuitively, under perfect capital mobility agents are able to smooth consumption completely. This induces an economy with open capital markets to behave like a closed economy with linear preferences thereby increasing the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. Received: 18 November 1998; revised version: 10 August 1999