考虑回收质量不确定的闭环供应链碳减排与定价策略研究

在碳交易机制的背景下,综合考虑消费者的低碳偏好性和废旧产品回收质量的不确定性,通过构建由制造商和零售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究回收质量与碳交易价格对产品定价、最优减排量及减排投资成本上限的影响。研究表明:市场规模越大,最优单位碳减排量越大;当废旧产品回收质量较低时,系统总利润随碳交易价格的升高而降低,当废旧产品回收质量较高时,系统总利润随碳交易价格的升高而升高,此时,零售商应采取薄利多回收的策略。最后,通过数值算例对主要参数进行灵敏度分析。     

承包商主导型国际基础设施工程项目竞标模式

通过与传统的招标、议标模式相比较,引出承包商主导型国际基础设施项目竞标模式。对此类承包商通过提交原始项目方案主动参与项目前期开发和项目竞标的模式,阐述了不同国家和地区所采取的管理政策及其基本程序,并着重分析了其中两种典型竞标模式(瑞士挑战竞标制和奖励性竞标制)的特点和应用情况。最后分析了上述竞标模式在实践应用中的优劣势,提出了需要重点关注的问题和解决的建议。     

低价竞标法的探讨与研究

低价竞标是国际上普遍认可和通行的建筑工程招标方法。文章针对我国目前运用低价竞标时可能出现的问题进行了分析 ,并提出通过制定相关法律法规、推行工程担保制度、建立科学的招标投标机制来完善低价竞标法。     

佣金支付策略对拍卖结果的影响

在SIPV模型下,分别给出当佣金由买方、卖方以及买卖双方共同支付时,投标人的均衡出价策略、买卖双方及拍卖行的期望收益,得出佣金由卖方支付时投标人出价更积极,但三种情况下投标人的均衡期望收益是完全相同的;而佣金由卖方支付时卖方获得的期望收益更低,拍卖行在此时获得更高的期望收益;当佣金由买卖双方共同支付时,拍卖行更愿意将卖方的支付比例设置的高一些;考虑到保留价的设置时,卖方支付佣金时最优保留价设置最高,另外是买方支付佣金时的情形,不考虑佣金支付时最优保留价设置最低。     

竞标中的动态博弈

文章考虑了由两个先期竞标者进行竞标而形成的动态博弈问题。在文章的模型中,一方面,竞标者在竞标成功之后可以与合伙人之间有先后决定的合作问题,另一方面,两个先期竞标者之间,又有相互竞标的竞争的关系。通过两期行动的选择,分别说明了竞标者的决策与合伙人的决策。     

工程投标决策浅析

施工企业在投标竞争中能否取胜,决定施工企业的生存与发展。在竞标中中标及获得利润多少,不仅取决于投标人的实力,而且与投标人的决策有着极其密切的关系。所以投标人在建设工程投标过程中,应对投标决策进行分析并选取适合的策略和技巧,增加投标的中标率,获得较高的期望利润。     

考虑价格敏感度的闭环供应链回收模式选择研究

随着报废汽车回收管理办法中"五大总成"作为非金属交由钢铁企业作为原材料到修改为可进行回收再制造,这将对资源的重复利用和汽车行业的发展起到巨大的推动作用。论文以报废汽车为例,首先,基于新车和再造汽车差别定价,构建了制造商回收,制造商和零售商两者混合回收以及制造商、零售商和第三方三者混合回收的三种闭环供应链决策模型,求解出各模式的最优定价策略;其次,通过研究消费者对回收价格的敏感程度及回收方之间的竞争关系,得出制造商、零售商和供应链系统在不同条件下的最优回收策略;再次,在不稳定的情形下,通过利润共享进行协调,使供应链系统的利润达到最大化并且处于长期稳定的状态;最后,通过数值分析,验证了结论的正确性。     

低价竞标的应用及报价技巧

低价竞标是国际上普遍认可和通行的建筑工程招标方法.在我国,建设工程实行低价竞标,是大势所趋,本文就低价竞标的优点、在我国的应用情况、完善低价竞标的措施及投标报价的技巧和具体做法作了叙述和探讨.以完善的竞标法为依据,达到既能中标的又能得到较好的经济效益的目的.     

产品生态化设计与再造决策

基于再制造的产品生态化设计是生产商应对内外部刺激的关键策略,在市场需求和回收量不确定情况下,产品的制造/再制造系统变得复杂化。从生产商以生产总成本最小化为决策目标,建立了数学模型并求解得到了产品生态设计率、普通产品的回收再造率和生态产品的再造率等三个决策变量的最优值。通过数例进行计算并且分别基于12种成本参数进行敏感性分析。结果表明,生产商对于决策变量具有较强的策略性选择。     

建筑工程量清单计价下的投标策略及技巧

投标报价是工程投标的核心。报价策略及技巧运用是否得当,不仅影响投标人能否中标,而且影响到投标人在激烈竞争中能否生存和发展。只有不断总结投标报价的经验、教训,才能不断提高报价水平,在激烈的竞标中立于不败之地。     

承包商不平衡报价策略选择的多案例研究——基于合同状态视角

不平衡报价策略是承包商实现创收的有效手段之一,而如何让承包商在有限的投标条件下高效的寻找不平衡报价机会点,并使其形成一条有规律可循的行为路径是本文研究的关键。以合同状态理论及风险分担作为不平衡报价策略研究的理论基础,并选择某电厂扩建项目、某市综合办公楼工程、某市跨江大桥建设工程为研究对象进行案例研究和分析。研究结果表明可按照预期变更情形的不同将不平衡报价策略分为地质勘查资料与实际情形不符、招标文件缺陷以及项目施工过程中出现的其他可预见状态变化三类,进而形成承包商实现不平衡报价策略的行为路径。     

Auctioning divisible goods

Summary. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected revenue than a discriminatory auction. Received: November 4, 1999; revised version: March 9, 2001     

A simple model of coalitional bidding

Summary. We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and the resulting bids. We do so in a simple model in which the seller may have good reason to allow joint bidding. In particular, we study a model in which the agents are budget constrained, and are allowed to form coalitions to pool their finances before engaging in the first price auction. We show that if the budget constraint is very severe, the equilibrium coalition structure consists of two coalitions, one slightly larger than the other; interestingly, it is not the grand coalition. This equilibrium coalition structure is one which yields (approximately) the maximum expected revenue. Thus the seller can induce the optimal (revenue maximizing) degree of cooperation among budget constrained buyers simply by permitting them to collude. Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: November 13, 2000     

Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis

Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% efficiency and higher revenue for the seller. We employ experiments to compare actual performance between indicative bidding and one of these alternative procedures. The data shows that indicative bidding performs as well as the alternative procedure in terms of entry efficiency, while having other characteristics that favor it over the alternative procedure. Our results provide an explanation for the widespread use of indicative bidding despite the potential problem identified in the equilibrium analysis.     

Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb–Douglas utility function

This paper presents a more general independent private value model based on the assumption that Cobb–Douglas utility function is used to make a tradeoff between the probability of winning the unit and the profit under the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. The equilibrium bidding strategies are given and the seller's expected revenue comparisons are made.     

考虑固定收益率的采购拍卖投标策略研究

本文分析了单物品多因素采购拍卖中的供应商投标问题,在考虑供应商存在固定收益率的前提下,建立了相应的多因素拍卖中存在固定收益率的投标策略模型。本模型在Che建立的多因素拍卖打分函数模型的基础上,引入Lorentziadis考虑的固定收益率。分析表明,模型中存在3种类型的供应商,且各类供应商具有相应的投标策略。同时,分析了不同类型的供应商的投标策略与其市场竞争力之间的相互关系。     

REPUTATIONAL BIDDING

We consider auctions where bidders care about the reputational effects of their bidding and argue that the amount of information disclosed at the end of the auction will influence bidding. We focus on bid disclosure rules that capture all of the realistic cases. We show that bidders distort their bidding in a way that conforms to stylized facts about takeovers/licence auctions. We rank the disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues and find that, under certain conditions, full disclosure will not be optimal. First‐price and second‐price auctions with price disclosure are not revenue equivalent and we rank them.     

工期投机行为对投标的影响研究

成本加工期双因素投标方式中,承包商的最优报价并非成本最低时的报价,工期也并非成本最低时的工期,最优报价较最低价略有提高,工期则略有缩短。另一方面,由于业主要严格控制建设时间,必然导致成本较正常水平上升,这就为承包商的投机性投标行为提供了可能性。     

A non-expected utility model and its application in practical auctions

ABSTRACT

This article presents a non-expected utility decision model which is nonlinear in the winning probabilities. The model not only explicitly expresses bidders’ attitudes to risk, but also addresses their preference over the bidding criteria. To demonstrate how to apply the model in the practical auction design, the first- and second-price auctions with both commission rate and reserve price are examined, respectively. For nonrisk-neutral bidders, the equilibrium bidding strategies are characterized, in which the commission rate has a significant influence on the bidding strategy through the critical valuation. However, the existence of the optimal commission rate is uncertain, but once it exists, it depends on the information rent of the highest or second highest order valuation in terms of the inverse hazard rate. With risk-aversion bidders, the only difference to the optimal reserve price is a constant between the first- and second-price auctions. The revenue comparisons show that the classical Revenue Equivalence Theorem fails in practical auctions with the commission rate. This article extends the application of the decision-making model in the auction design in theory and provides some guidance for the auction house and the seller to make their decisions in reality.     

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value,all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed.