A political foundation of public investment and welfare spending

This paper develops a political economy model to examine the implications of political selection under an authoritarian regime. We formalize the fiscal policy choice of local governments, focusing on two political selection mechanisms and their implications for public investment and welfare spending. A growth-oriented promotion system induces local officials to increase public investment, which may increase output but crowd out welfare transfers. This mimics the recent investment-driven growth in China and relatively low effort to tackle high inequality. Under a broader incentive structure, we show that it is possible for an authoritarian regime to attain the social welfare of a democracy.     

外部资源、技术决策偏好与政治关联企业研发投资

在政治关联—外部资源—研发投资作用机制中融入技术决策偏好的调节效用,采用2012-2015年创业板非金融保险类上市公司数据,通过结构方程模型（SEM）,探究上述4个变量间关系及其理论模型。结果发现,在控制企业部分特征的影响后,政治关联对企业研发投资具有消极作用,但是引入外部资源会对该消极作用起到遮掩效用,而高管技术决策偏好能够反向调节政治关联对研发投资的消极作用,并且外部资源的遮掩效用与技术决策的调节效用互不干涉,进而揭示出政治关联影响企业研发投资的理论机制。     

Policy uncertainty and inventory behavior: Evidence from the US manufacturing sector

This study investigates the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on asymmetric inventory investment (i.e., inventory stickiness or sticky inventory management). Using a sample of 74,912 US firm-year observations over the 1984–2021 period, we observe a significantly negative relationship between EPU and asymmetric inventory investment. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal that managers' pessimistic expectations regarding future demand and higher cost of funding and maintaining capacity are the channels through which EPU affects asymmetric inventory behavior. Moreover, this negative impact is more pronounced for firms that face longer-duration uncertainty, rely heavily on government purchases, and have higher firm-specific political risk. Lastly, we find that reducing inventory stickiness leads to improved firm performance during periods of increasing policy uncertainty.     

民营企业政治联系的背后:扶持之手与掠夺之手——基于资本投资视角的经验研究

以往的研究为政治联系带来的"扶持之手"提供了较多证据,而文章从资本投资视角探讨民营企业构建和维持政治联系所付出的隐性代价,发现在市场化程度较低的地区有政治联系的民营企业资本投资很大程度上受到政府"掠夺之手"的侵害,虽具有较大的投资规模,但却表现为较低的投资效率,并且不利于企业R&D投资;而在市场化程度较高的地区"掠夺之手"则未显著出现。文章认为,从资本投资角度看,在市场化程度较低的地区构建政治联系对民营企业弊大于利。     

Political uncertainty and labour investment efficiency

ABSTRACT

We examine the impact of political uncertainty on the labour investment efficiency (LIE) of a firm. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we test the market discipline and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. Our findings suggest that political uncertainty adversely affects LIE. The results are consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. That is, firms hire more labour in a period of increased information asymmetry due to the political uncertainty, which deteriorates LIE. Our findings are robust to a battery of alternative measures of LIE and estimation methods. We conduct several additional analyses and document that the adverse impact of political uncertainty is stronger when the newly appointed government official is older, the firm is state-owned, the firm belongs to a politically sensitive industry or the firm operates in locations with stringent labour protection. By contrast, when the firm locates in a region with weak Chinese government intervention or after President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, the adverse impact of political uncertainty on LIE is less pronounced. Last, we document that after hiring more labour, firms receive tangible and intangible benefits in terms of receiving more loans, collect more government subsidies, and able to re-establish some political connection but at the cost of lower performance.     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

基于实物期权的农户农业长期投资行为研究

通过对现有研究农户生产性投资行为的文献进行分析,对农户生产性投资作了进一步细分:农业长期投资和短期投资.我们认为只有农业长期投资会影响到农村经济和农业持续发展,进而我们发现了农业长期投资的一个重要特征,即实物期权的性质.因而,我们运用实物期权的方法对农业长期投资进行分析,从而更好地解释了我国农业长期投资面临的困境,并给出了我们的建议.     

Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies

This paper explores the impact of elections on public investment. Working with a sample of 67 presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1975 and 2012, we find that the growth rate of nominal public investment is higher at the beginning of electoral cycles and decelerates thereafter. The peak in public investment growth occurs 28 months before elections, and each month closer to the next election the growth rate of public investment declines by 0.7 percentage points. Other political variables, such as cabinet ideology and government fragmentation have less influence on short-term public investment dynamics. Fiscal rules and stronger institutions seem to attenuate the impact of elections on investment, but available information is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. These results are robust to a number of controls, including for fixed elections.     

Corporate Investment and Tax Disincentive: Evidence from China

This study investigates how taxes influence corporate investment behavior. Based on a census of Chinese industrial enterprises, we utilize a tax-adjusted q model to examine the effects of taxes on corporate investment in fixed assets in China. Results show that the effective tax rate has a relatively small but significantly negative impact on Chinese firms’ investment in fixed assets. We extend the tax-adjusted q model to control for the lagged investment effect and peer effect of investment. Models with these effects do better at explaining the impact of taxes on firms’ investment. The lagged investment models present smaller but significant tax disincentive. Firms compete for investment with other firms both in the same region and in the same industry through peer effect. In addition, the tax disincentive differs among state owned enterprises, private enterprises, and other enterprises in China.     

基础设施投资对社会其他部门投资影响效应

基础设施投资在经济发展中起着十分重要的作用,直接影响着经济发展的速度和质量。文章通过建立计量模型,运用1993—2003我国30个省市(自治区)的面板数据,研究了我国基础设施投资对社会其他部门投资的影响。结果发现基础设施投资对社会其他部门投资具有明显的挤入效应,其中西部地区最大,中部地区次之,东部地区最小。最后提出政策建议:提高财政支出效率,加快基础设施领域改革,加快西部地区基础设施建设。     

Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.     

股权结构、内部现金流和企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的检验

中国上市公司控制权和现金流权的高度分离为我们提供了一个很好的研究投资现金流敏感性的样本.本文从终极控制人的视角,以我国2003-2007年上市公司为研究对象,研究了终极控制股东现金流权及控制权与现金流权的偏离对企业过度投资的影响.研究表明:企业的投资现金流敏感度随着终极控股股东现金流权的增加而趋于下降;伴随控制权与现金流权分离水平的增加而上升.这种结果和自由现金流假说一致,即控股股东拥有过多的自由现金流可能导致过度投资,并且这种过度投资问题在资产收益率低的公司里更加严重.我们的结果不仅解决了以往关于现金流和投资之间的敏感是由于控股股东偏好过度投资还是投资不足的争论,而且为控股股东存在“激励效应”和“堑壕效应”提供了直接证据     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

Political connections and labor investment efficiency: Evidence from China's private firms

This study investigates whether political connections affect labor investment efficiency. We test this question in the context of China's private firms, where we find that political connections are negatively associated with labor investment efficiency. We also explore the channels through which political connections reduce labor investment efficiency and provide evidence that political connections aggravate both agency problems and information asymmetry. Further tests show that the influence of political connections is more pronounced for firms with overinvestment problems or high-level political connections, and for firms from regions facing severe unemployment or loose anticorruption. Overall, our results are consistent with the “grabbing hand” argument that politicians destroy firm operational efficiency.     

Expropriation risk and FDI in developing countries: Does return of capital dominate return on capital?

Previously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization. Institutional factors that affect the likelihood of an abrupt and total loss of foreigners’ capital (i.e., return of capital) dominate factors that affect rates of return conditional on a strictly positive terminal investment value (i.e., return on capital). The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that expropriation risk is most important among the available measures of different dimensions of institutional quality. A one-standard-deviation reduction in expropriation risk is associated with a 72% increase in FDI, which is substantially larger than the effects of any other dimensions of institutional quality as simultaneously estimated in our empirical models of expected FDI inflows. We show that this evidence is consistent with the predictions of a standard theory of FDI under imperfect contract enforcement and multiple dimensions of political risk.     

奥运会投资风险问题的理性思考

采用文献资料、比较分析、逻辑分析等方法,重点对奥运会投入模式、结构、预算与风险问题进行了分析,结果显示:结合型投入模式更有利于奥运会的产出效益,降低直接投入与间接投入的比值、建立科学的预算体系是规避奥运会投资风险的重要保证.     

政治关联断损、研发投入与企业创新效率

政治关联断损现象逐渐引起学者重视，但少有研究涉及政治关联断损对企业创新的影响。基于中组部“18号文”导致上市公司大量官员独立董事强制辞职事件，通过使用双重差分模型对2012-2016年沪深A股上市公司相关数据进行实证研究发现，官员独立董事辞职造成的政治关联断损能够显著促进企业增加研发投资，虽然对提高企业创新效率无显著影响，却能够增强研发投资对创新效率的正向影响。政治关联断损层级与企业研发投资间具有显著负向关系，虽然对创新效率无显著影响，却对研发投资与创新效率间关系起显著负向调节作用。政治关联断损和断损层级对企业研发人员投入强度无显著影响，也不能显著调节研发人员投入强度与创新效率间的关系。     

二代涉入、制度情境与中国家族企业创新投入——基于社会情感财富理论的研究

基于社会情感财富理论,本文以2012-2016年中国A股上市家族企业为样本,采用倾向得分匹配法,对一定制度情境下二代涉入对家族企业创新投入的影响进行实证研究。研究结果表明:二代涉入会抑制家族企业的创新投入,发生二代涉入的家族企业会更重视约束型社会情感财富,而该类社会情感财富会导致家族企业对创新投入持保守态度;制度环境对二代涉入与家族企业创新投入之间的关系具有正向调节效应,从而会缓和二代涉入对家族企业创新投入的抑制作用;政治关联对二代涉入与家族企业创新投入之间的关系具有负向调节效应,从而会加剧二代涉入对家族企业创新投入的抑制作用。据此,本文建议:发生二代涉入的家族企业不能为了加强对企业的控制而排斥引入外部优良人才或外部投资者,创始人应该注重二代成员对家族企业归属感等的培养,提升二代成员对延伸型社会情感财富的保护意愿;政府和家族企业必须共同努力推进市场化改革,藉此完善家族企业赖以生存的制度环境;家族企业应当尽量避免政治寻租等行为对创新的抑制作用。     

评估中国对外投资风险*——通过投资者—国家争端解决案件的角度

近年来，中国对外投资规模大幅增加，海外投资风险也随之加大，对风险的评估和预防日益重要。国际投资协定及其框架下的投资者—国家争端解决机制（ISDS）已经逐渐成为保护投资者海外资产的主要工具之一。本文通过回顾ISDS的发展历程和特点, 并且利用ISDS仲裁案件数据库，研究了影响ISDS案件发生的因素。本文发现，中国目前对外直接投资分布于ISDS案件高发的行业和地区，面临的海外投资风险较大。回归分析表明，东道国经济发展水平越低、人均国民收入越低以及政治环境越差，就越容易发生ISDS案件。     

政治风险规避与中国企业的 OFDI 策略选择

政治风险已经成为中国企业对外直接投资(OFDI )遭受损失最重要的原因之一,但是企业可以通过选择合理的投资策略来规避风险,降低损失。文章基于2004－2013年?中国境外投资企业(机构)名录?提供的 OFDI 企业数据,利用二值选择模型、倾向得分匹配(PSM )法和条件 Logit 固定效应模型分别考察了我国企业面临东道国政治风险时的策略选择问题以及投资经验对政治风险的调节作用。结果发现：东道国政治风险越高,企业越倾向于采取序贯式投资,投资经验可帮助企业规避和降低部分政治风险,提高企业在高政治风险东道国 OFDI 的概率;与生产性 OFDI 企业相比,销售宣传类 OFDI 企业对东道国政治风险的反应弹性较大,在具备投资经验后,对政治风险的敏感性降低。文章为中国企业“走出去”过程中如何有效地规避东道国的政治风险和提高成功并购的概率提供了有益的思路和借鉴。