论人力资本理论的发展对公司治理体系的影响

<正>公司治理是一个企业的基础制度层面的问题。普遍认为公司治理在本质上表现为一个所有权的分享安排框架。现代企业契约论将企业视为一定契约的联结。那么企业所有权体现为一种契约规定之外的剩余权。具体化为剩余控制权和剩余索取权。即公司治理变现为一个关于公司剩余控制权和剩余索取权的分享安排框架。古今中外,基本上都理所当然地认为股东是企业的惟一所有者。企业所有权分配应该是一个在不同的股东之间进行的问题。这些股东具有一个共同的特点,即他们全都是企业物力资本的投资者。     

公司治理模式的比较及我国的实践

公司治理模式是一整套制度安排，这些安排决定了企业的目标、行为，以及在企业众多的利益相关者如股东、债权人、经营者、职工、供应商和用户等当中，由谁来控制企业，怎样控制企业，风险与收益如何在不同主体之间分配等。公司治理模式的本质是一个关于企业所有权的契约，企业所有权包括企业控制权和剩余索取权。从各国的实践来看，英、美等国家的公司治理模式又不同于德、日等国家的，且各国的公司治理模式不是天然而成、一成不变的，现有各国的公司治理模式是历史长期演变的结果。     

我国上市公司治理结构剖析

公司治理结构研究的是企业制度安排问题,它本质上是一种描述企业不同成员之间契约关系的现代企业组织管理制度.本文通过系统的研究,深入剖析了我国上市公司治理结构的现状和存在的问题,提出了进一步完善我国上市公司治理结构的基本思路.     

企业治理结构的模式及其转化

本文分析了企业治理结构的单边治理模式和共同治理模式，以及企业治理结构模式之间的转化。得出结论：现实经济中存在一个丰富多彩的企业所有权的世界，任何类型的企业治理结构模式都有其自身的经济效率和存在的客观必然性。在现代社会，企业的共同治理模式将占据主流地位；只要创造一个最能体现契约自由的制度环境，企业治理结构的各模式之间就可以实现相互转化，企业所有权安排能不断地趋向最优状态。     

浅论管理人持股

企业高级管理人员是股份制公司治理结构中的重要组成部分,管理人激励问题构成了现代企业理论的核心内容之一。公司所有权与经营权的分离形成了股东与经理人之间的委托－代理契约关系。由于契约双方存在着不可避免的利益冲突,代理问题的产生也就在所难免。管理人持股设计了一种激励机制来解决代理问题。大量事实证明了其有效性。在目前我国进行的管理人持股探索过程中还存在着许多问题,导致了国企管理人持股与企业业绩之间的弱相关     

从公司治理结构透视财务管理目标

公司法人治理结构是现代企业制度中最重要的架构。现代企业制度区别于系统企业的根本点在于所有权和经营权的分离，从而需要在所有者和经营者之间形成一种相互制衡的机制，用以对企业进行管理和控制。现代企业中的公司治理结构正是这样一种协调股东和其他利益相关者关系的一种机制，它涉及到激励与约束等多方面的内容。简单地说，公司治理结构就是处理企业各种契约关系的一种制度。     

债权人市场、债权人保护与公司治理

一、债权人市场与公司治理的关系1．债权人保护机制是公司治理的重要内容。现代企业理论认为，企业本质上是多边契约关系的总和，是一张由股东、债权人、经营者、生产者、消费者及其他有关利益主体共同组成的“契约网”。契约本身所内含的利益主体的平等性和独立性要求公司的利益主体之间应该是平等、独立的关系，而企业的效率只能建立在利益相关者平等的基础上。     

论利益相关者理论的合理性

企业是利益相关者之间相互合作的组织,由于各利益主体在企业中的利益是不同的,拥有控制权的一方就可能损害其他利益相关者的利益。因此,有效率的公司治理结构应该是利益相关者分享企业所有权的共同治理。     

一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义———兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点

一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义———兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点杨瑞龙周业安（中国人民大学经济学研究所）一、导论企业治理结构本质上就是一个关于企业所有权安排的契约。但在探讨这一特殊契约的经济内涵时，经济学界存在着很大的分岐...     

论知识型企业的性质

本文分析了知识型企业的涵义和特征,澄清了在知识型企业上的误解,从知识型企业人力资本的产权特征和知识型企业异质性得出了知识性企业的合约性质,即知识型企业是人力资本与物质资本的一个合作契约,是一个不完全的契约.因此,其所有权安排是物质资本所有者与人力资本所有者都应该拥有企业的所有权,而企业所有权的分配状况则主要取决于人力资本所有者与物质资本所有者的谈判力对比.     

Reproducing the Firm: Routines,Networks, and Identity

Firm survival or reproduction does not occur as a matter of course. Especially under circumstances in which uncertainty and equivocality prevail is firm reproduction potentially problematic. Uncertainty prevails when there is insufficient or inadequate information to assess a situation, equivocality when the information available is multiinterpretable. Firm routines, social networks in a firm, and an organization’s identity can explain how a firm reproduces. We offer suggestions as to which of these will contribute to firm reproduction under what circumstances.     

偏好、禀赋、技术与企业产权制度的演进

通过对要素所有者的最大化行为的分析发现,企业产权分配依赖于要素的投入系数和产出系数,企业所依存的偏好、禀赋和技术条件正是通过对这两个参数的影响而主导着企业产权制度的发展.从历史过程和这三个条件的发展趋势来看,企业产权制度演进的趋势必然是以人力资本为主导的联合产权制度.     

国外企业本质理论的演进与评述

本文在回顾企业理论演进史的基础上．比较与评述了各流派企业本质理论的主要观点。本文认为，各流派对企业本质的认识，从分析与讨论的焦点来看，集中体现为生产、交易与契约3个概念；而从认识与方法论来看．主要包括分工、交易成本与熊彼特传统3个角度。因此，对企业本质的认识还远未结束。     

Teams, Firms and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior

Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.     

企业的性质:管理学视角的研究

经济学关于企业性质的研究侧重于企业为什么存在的问题。然而,管理学更为关注的问题包括两方面:第一,企业为什么能够持续存在-由此形成了两种典型的观点:一是价值活动观;二是核心能力观。第二,企业为什么必须存在-现有理论观点主要包括:企业是价值创造的有机系统;企业是经济发展的基本单元;企业是社会运行的重要机构。     

Digital Platforms and the Nature of the Firm

Abstract:

Digital platforms turn traditional approaches of the firm, which relied on the wage relation to explain the major difference between firm and market, upside down and underline the advantages of coordination through organization over coordination through market. This study aims to propose a definition of the firm able to integrate, besides the integrated firm, also hybrid forms such as networks of subcontractor/subcontracting firms as well as atypical forms such as digital platforms. By reactivating the firm-boundary problem, this article suggests putting valorization by labor at the heart of the firm’s decisions concerning integration. It suggests therefore a general definition of the firm as a techno-institutional center of capital valorization, provided that firms make profits by means of the appropriation of labor incorporated into their (productive, structural, intellectual) capital through institutional arrangements. By stressing the relation of production between the owners of the means of production and the direct producers, the approach of the firm supported here should allow to cover the different existing models of the firm, from the classical firm to hybrid models, around which the boundary debate has revolved, to digital platforms.     

The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth

This articleanalyzes the links between the internal organization of the firmand macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth modelin which firms face agency costs due to the existence of asymmetriesof information and the formation of vertical collusions insidethose firms. To respond to the threat of collusion, optimal collusion-proofincentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive sidecontracting within organizations. Collusion affects thereforethe firms' profitability, the incentives to innovate, and, finally,the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the economy. On theother hand, when the growth rate is small, the prospects of long-termrelationships within firms increase the agents' incentives toinvest in a better collusive technology. We then discuss thetwo-way relationships between the structure of internal transactioncosts, organizational technologies, and macroeconomic growth.     

Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm

This paper provides a theory of general equilibrium with externalities and/or monopoly. We assume that the firm’s decisions are based on the preferences of shareholders and/or other stakeholders. Under these assumptions a firm will produce fewer negative externalities than the comparable profit maximising firm. In the absence of externalities, equilibrium with a monopoly will be Pareto efficient if the firm can price discriminate. The equilibrium can be implemented by a two-part tariffWe would like to thank John Fender, Herakles Polemarchakis, Les Reinhorn, John Roberts, John Roemer, Colin Rowat, Erkan Yalcin two anonymous referees and participants in seminars at the Universities of Birmingham, Durham, Heidelberg, Mannheim and Queens, the Public Economic Theory conference at the University of Warwick, July 2000, and the EEA congress, Lausanne 2001 for comments and suggestions     

Codification,Abstraction, and Firm Differences: A Cognitive Information-based Perspective

Synopsis The resource-based view shares with population ecology, organizational systematics, organizational cladistics, and institutional theory a concern with why firms differ and with what keeps them different. These two questions only have meaning if – as has been the case in the eoclassical theory of the firm – similarities between firms are taken as the default assumption. This paper distinguishes between ontological heterogeneity – differences in the world – and epistemic heterogeneity – differences in the way that the world is construed. Focusing on the latter, it puts forward an argument for taking epistemic heterogeneity between firms as the default assumption. It starts with a general analysis of how living systems make sense of the world. It then goes on to identify the cognitive activities of codification and abstraction as key sources of epistemic heterogeneity. The findings are applied to those systems called firms where a dominant logic allows epistemic heterogeneity to persist. In some case this leads to competitive advantage, in others to a debilitating inertia. The implications for a knowledge-based theory of the firm are briefly explored.     

Specialization,product development,evolution of the institution of the firm,and economic growth

This paper considers the effects of the division of labor on economic growth and welfare in a general equilibrium environment where changes in individual specialization and product development can proceed simultaneously. The nature of the dynamic equilibrium is shown to depend on the interaction of transaction efficiency, economies of specialization, and economies of complementarity. Where the dynamic equilibrium involves evolution in the division of labor, this will be associated with increased per capita real income and hence economic growth. It is also shown that the emergence of firms is an aspect of the evolution of division of labor if transaction efficiency for a producer good is lower than that for labor used to produce this good.