A Response to Mark D. White

In this response to Mark D. White, I agree with White's clear distinction between Kant and deontology but reject the suggestion that I would have implied that virtue ethics is a more appropriate ethical foundation for economics than both utilitarianism and deontology. Moreover, I argue against any attempt at creating a hierarchy in ethical foundations for economics, including one that would put deontology first or a view, apparently entertained by White, which would (almost) equate virtue with moral duty, thereby reducing virtue ethics to deontology.     

Beyond Utilitarianism and Deontology: Ethics in Economics

Abstract

This article starts from a methodological position that fact and value are mutually related, both in the real world and in economic analysis. It then discusses deontological ethics. This approach is concerned with equality and dignity, as expressed in right and norms, and how these rights and norms constrain individual choices. Deontology is thus different from the utility maximisation of utilitarian ethics, where ethics appears in utility functions as moral preferences. The paper then argues that, although deontology does better than utilitarianism in analysing ethics in economics, it has its own weaknesses. These weaknesses require another theory of ethics for economics, virtue ethics, which emphasises the interrelatedness of agents and commitment to shared values beyond the rules that a society has institutionalised. Virtue ethics internalises morality not as a preference or a constraint, but through the practices in which agents are related in their pursuit of value added.     

Space for virtue in the economics of Kenneth J. Arrow,Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom

Virtue ethics interprets human action as pursuing good ends through practices that develop qualities internal to those final goals. The philosophical approach has been identified as critical of economics, leading in turn to the innovative response that by viewing the market as mutually beneficial exchange, economic practice is in fact defendable on virtue ethics grounds. This defends economics using arguments drawn from virtue ethics, but there is a need also to explore space for virtue ethics within economic theory. Examining key contributions of Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom, the article notes that virtue ethics’ appreciation of persons’ communicability of ends is increasingly being relied upon within economics, though sometimes under different names. Its strength to interdisciplinary work between economics and philosophy lies in presenting a methodology able to capture how human beings are capable of, though not fixated on, cooperation.     

Comments on John Roemer’s first welfare theorem of market socialism*

Abstract

In this comment on John Roemer’s “theory of cooperation with an application to market socialism”, I extend Roemer’s first welfare theorem of market socialism in two directions. First, I prove a version of the theorem that deals with non-linear taxation. Second, I offer a connection between the theorem and welfare equality. I then argue that the models and questions that Roemer contribute to bring to welfare economics raise questions that go much beyond the research on socialist ethics. In particular, I introduce a positive model of moral behavior that yields different predictions from Roemer’s Kantian model. I conclude that individual morality should become a central concern of welfare economists.     

Ethics and social capital for global well-being

Social capital is associated with considerable benefits for individuals and communities. Because some social capital is non-excludable, people may be disinclined to undertake activities that will create it. This is especially likely when the norm of self-interest is prominent. In addition, given the birds of a feather phenomenon, social capital appears to thrive in homogenous networks, and to languish in the face of diversity. I argue that social capital meets the criteria of a moral concept and that treating it as such can address these vulnerabilities. In particular, as a moral principle, social capital would be more demanding than mere self-interest and the moral requirement of universality would trigger a duty to act impartially with respect to networks. Since market interactions can create social capital, and social capital is a moral good, market interactions are in part constitutive of the good. I also argue that global social capital is important for both global well-being and sustainable globalization. Given the benefits of social capital, including it in the choice architecture as a moral principle will be worth the investment.     

Judgment: Balancing Principle and Policy

Judgment is an element of decision-making that is of critical importance to both ethics and economics but remains underappreciated in both. In this paper, I describe one conception of moral judgment, drawn from the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin, in which an agent weighs and balances the various moral duties and principles relevant to a choice situation in a way that maintains the integrity of her moral character. After explaining the foundations and uses of judgment in ethics, I discuss its importance to two areas of economic modeling, individual choice and policy-making, both of which can be enhanced by incorporating judgment alongside more basic ethical motivations and concerns.     

Ethics, Innovation and Innovation Studies

I argue that the critical potential of innovation studies can be considerably enhanced by including questions of ethics, both as an object of study and as an aspect of study. I approach this by first reviewing what we understand by ethics, secondly by speculating how two stylized opposing positions in innovation studies-radical epistemology and radical politics-might each treat the question of ethics, and finally by offering a position that is complementary to those whilst not attempting any resolution of their supposed dilemma.     

双重效应原则及其评析

双重效应原则是判断具有双重结果的行为是否具有道德合理性的准则。该原则既关注行为意图,又关注行为后果,将意图和后果纳入同一准则中,克服了义务论和后果论在评价行为方面的局限性,对解决义务论和后果论所遇到的道德困境具有重要意义。然而,双重效应原则因自身的局限性以及应用中面临的实际困难而遭受诸多批判。本文试图结合具体案例对双重效应原则进行分析。     

Wealth and sensibility. The historical outcome of better living conditions for all according to Adam Smith

In this paper, I argue that Smith's commercial society is characterised more by restraint of self-command than by restraint of emotions through self-command, as usually stated. According to Smith, the appropriate degree of self-command varies with historical circumstances: better living conditions for all favour relaxation of self-command and lead people to express their sentiments more freely. I thus highlight a crucial link in Smith's thought between variations in general economic conditions and variations in moral judgement on the expression of emotions, or, in other words, between The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations.     

Introduction to an Unpublished Note by Nicholas Kaldor & Joan Robinson

Some have argued for the priority of needs in moral and development theory, on the grounds that people have conflicting and incommensurable values and conceptions of the good. In this paper, I concentrate on one version of this view, that due to John Rawls. Rawls' view is that a person's advantage should be evaluated in terms of certain primary goods which are citizens' needs. I outline a variation on James Griffin's account of well-being, which involves certain values that make any human life better—prudential values. I argue that such values are commensurable, and that the account is consistent with pluralism. The discussion supports and helps us to understand various criticisms of Rawls. It also suggests that one argument for the priority of needs in development theory is invalid.     

浅论全球化时代的普遍伦理

随着全球化浪潮的推进,人类生活的互相联系与依赖的一体化趋势日益明显,这带给了我们世界文明的进步与发展,也造成了人类生存道德危机,现今世界迫切呼唤普遍伦理的到来。普遍伦理不是现存伦理的普遍化,而是一种新的伦理规则。它的建立是完全可能的,世界市场的形成为它提供了经济基础,人类对永久和平幸福的向往为它提供了观念基础,以及现存伦理规范中的一些共同认识为它提供了沟通基础。     

International law as a moral theory of state territory?

Current states face challenges from other states and secessionist movements, and no moral theory exists to evaluate these conflicting claims. One step towards a theory is to evaluate international law on territory, specifically as articulated through decolonisation. I argue that international law does not provide a plausible moral theory of territory because the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis cannot coherently coexist with the principle of self‐determination. I suggest that philosophers must choose between viewing territory as an expression of national self or as a property right, or else develop a third view from sources beyond current international law.     

中、西方管理伦理比较及其对中国企业的启示

从思维方式的差异、管理伦理目的的差异、管理伦理手段的差异及管理伦理的变革意识的差异四个方面比较分析中西方管理伦理的差异,进而比较中西方管理伦理的优劣势,确定中国企业在管理伦理中的对策,即进行跨文化的管理伦理建设,树立以人为目的的理念,培育健全的社会责任意识,提高企业家的道德素质.     

心性儒学还是政治儒学？新邦旧命还是旧邦新命？——关于儒学复兴的几点思考

20世纪新儒家在复兴儒学上专注于心性儒学有两个问题。第一,他们保守得太多,在多元社会中试图保守一元价值。第二,他们又退让得太多,在器物和制度层面全盘接受西方之科学与民主。作者认为,保守、发展儒学应着重于政治层面。但是蒋庆所做的政治儒学,因其认可心性哲学的先天普适性,故也保守过多。其政治建构,是将儒家的一个情境化表达（汉代公羊学）当成儒家的神圣教条。他和其他一些人的努力,是建筑在中国文化特殊性的基础上,也失去了儒家政治思考的普适向度。作者指出,我们所应回到的,是儒家之精神,并由新情势演绎出一套适应当代情境的、面对全球问题的儒学政治建构,以达成阐旧邦以赋新命之目的,而不是将“旧命”强加在新邦之上。     

The Health Services Industry: Realism in Social Control

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between institutions and development ethics. In a value context, the center of the discussion between institutions and development ethics is based on confronting ethics as "means of the means," which implies that ethics is not only concerned with the ends of human action but also enters into the value dynamisms of the instruments utilized by development agents in achieving these ends: the means. A common acceptable definition of development ethics is the ethical reflection of the ends and means for any purposeful social-economic activity toward development. Institutions are the social cement that condition and enhance the roles agents play in economic life. We argue that development ethics and institutions are entwined: development ethics influence institutions and institutions influence development ethics.     

When lack of accountability allows observing unobservables: moral hazard in sub-national government credit markets in Mexico

This article estimates the amount of moral hazard effect in sub-national credit markets. I employ the case of Mexico because of the country’s lack of political accountability; a fact that I argue allows for observation of this informational problem. In particular, out of every dollar borrowed, sub-national governments spend 45 cents in activities unrelated to the purpose of credit.     

Post-Crisis Experiments in Development Finance Architectures: A Hirschmanian Perspective On ‘Productive Incoherence’

Abstract

The Asian and especially the global crisis of 2008 have catalyzed decentralization of the developing world’s financial governance architecture. I understand this state of affairs via the concept of “productive incoherence” which is apparent in a denser, multilayered development financial architecture that is emerging as a consequence of heterogeneous practical adjustments to changing circumstances rather than as the embodiment of a coherent doctrine. Drawing on Albert Hirschman, I argue that the absence of an encompassing theoretical blueprint for a new economic system—i.e. a new “ism” to replace neoliberalism—is in fact a vitally important virtue. If we cannot live without a new “ism,” I propose “Hirschmanian Possibilism” as a new doctrine—one that rejects an overarching theoretical framework from which to deduce the singly appropriate institutional structure of the economy. Hirschmanian Possibilism asserts instead the value of productive incoherence as a framework for pursuing democratic, ethically viable development institutions.     

生物技术的负面影响

本文简要介绍了生物技术给人类社会带来的益处后，主要探讨了生物技术带来的若干负面效应，诸如转基因作物的潜在危险性，克隆人带来的问题，基因武器的灾难，基因歧视和基因鸿沟问题，生物技术的专利授予和生物资源保护等问题，最后，作者提出要正确认识科技进步，要用道德，伦理和法律杜绝其负面效应。     

Gaus,Hayek, and the place of civil religion in a free society

In The Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus uses Hayekian insights to give a contractarian justification for the specific social rules the rules that comprise the social order of a free people. But in doing so, Gaus inadvertently endorses a kind of skepticism about our ability to justify the institutions that comprise our social order as a whole. The disadvantage of a political theory so pervasively skeptical is that, while contractors can arrive at a series of specific solutions to their social problems, they have no way to assure themselves that their moral nature and their moral practices as a whole are sufficiently sound that the rules they endorse are genuinely morally binding. I argue that this problem can be solved in political practice through the adoption of a civil religion. Civil religions provide narratives and social practices that assure members of free orders that their regimes are good or justified on the whole. In this way, we can introduce the idea of civil religion into contractarian political theory as a social technology for sustaining a free social order.