Sleeping with the enemy: The perils of having the government on(the)board

We study the causal effect of unsought political connections on firm value. To address concerns of potential endogeneity and sample-selection bias we exploit the nationalization of Argentina's pension system, a unique natural experiment yielding exogenous variation in new political connections. We find unsought political connections to have a large negative effect on the value of newly connected firms. Yet this result only materializes when, in addition to becoming a shareholder, the government also obtains the right to appoint directors. Decreased stock liquidity or higher stock volatility do not explain this result, suggesting a channel that decreases expected cash flows to shareholders.     

政治关联断损、研发投入与企业创新效率

政治关联断损现象逐渐引起学者重视，但少有研究涉及政治关联断损对企业创新的影响。基于中组部“18号文”导致上市公司大量官员独立董事强制辞职事件，通过使用双重差分模型对2012-2016年沪深A股上市公司相关数据进行实证研究发现，官员独立董事辞职造成的政治关联断损能够显著促进企业增加研发投资，虽然对提高企业创新效率无显著影响，却能够增强研发投资对创新效率的正向影响。政治关联断损层级与企业研发投资间具有显著负向关系，虽然对创新效率无显著影响，却对研发投资与创新效率间关系起显著负向调节作用。政治关联断损和断损层级对企业研发人员投入强度无显著影响，也不能显著调节研发人员投入强度与创新效率间的关系。     

董事来源地特征、政治关联等级与公司价值*——基于“18号文”董事政策性辞职的经验证据

董事政治关联对于公司价值的影响一直是学者们关注的重要问题。中组部2013年10月30日发布了《关于进一步规范党政干部在企业兼职（任职）问题的意见》（以下简称“18号文”）,禁止现任及尚未办理离职手续的政府官员在企业兼职任职。基于此,本文以2013年10月30日-2014年10月30日期间我国股市所有辞职董事为样本,研究了董事政治关联等级与公司价值的关系,以及该关系受到的董事来源地特征的影响。本文发现：（1）董事政治关联等级越高,辞职引发的公司价值的下跌程度越显著;（2）考虑辞职董事来源地特征后发现,异地董事、京城董事或者异地且京城的董事辞职后,其政治关联等级对公司价值下跌的影响更显著。进一步分析表明,“18号文”公布时也有显著的市场反应,表现为聘有政治关联董事的公司价值下跌更明显。本文研究表明,聘任政治关联等级较高的董事,特别是异地或权力中心的董事,是公司建立政治联系、影响公司价值的重要途径。     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

The effect of regulating political connections: Evidence from China's board of directors ban

There is a great deal of variation in how countries regulate the relationships between politicians and public-traded firms, but little evidence about how such policies affect firm performance. In 2013, China passed a new regulation that banned politicians from serving on the boards of directors of companies. Using a novel data set that links board members, government officials, and forced resignations, I estimate the effect of the policy on firm performance and stock returns. I find that the loss of a high-level politician significantly reduces a firm’s cumulative stock return and future profits. The effect is driven by officials from government-controlled public sectors and is larger when the firm is in low-marketized areas. The analysis provides important evidence about the efficacy of a commonly used policy tool for reducing political influence in the private sector.     

Stock markets and economic uncertainty: Roles of legislative sessions and coalition strength

Legislative sessions constitute a critical component of the Westminster Parliamentary system, in a country like India. They play a crucial role in important policy decisions that have ramifications for the corporate sector's cash flows, leading to changes in stock price and volatility. Using data from India, we find that legislative session meetings influence stock price volatility, and the effect is inversely proportional to the strength of the ruling coalition government. These findings advance the theories of intraparty portfolio allocation and partisan trust discrimination in representative democracies based on intraparty and interparty competition in a ruling alliance. Our findings suggest that political competition reflected through government strength in legislative session meetings shapes the mechanism of economic uncertainty, i.e., the foundation of asset price volatility. We draw implications for the conduct of parliamentary business as well as stock investment strategy.     

制度压力感知与官员独董辞职--基于“中组部18号文”的实证研究

现有文献发现,官员特征(如官员的任期、异地交流、更替等)对地方经济增长和公司财务行为有重要影响,但是由于不易准确度量及缺少恰当的研究情境,对官员对制度压力的感知情况考察不足。作为外生的政策冲击,“中组部18号文”的颁布及施行提供了难得的研究机会。使用手工搜集的自“中组部18号文”发布以来的官员独董辞职数据,本文从制度压力感知的角度,考察了官员行政级别、公司产权性质和地区政治强度对官员独董辞职时间早晚的影响。研究发现：行政级别越高、国有控股上市公司以及上市公司所属地区政治强度越大的官员独董,对制度压力的感知越深刻、越敏锐,辞职时间也就越早。可见,企业经营者需要深入思考政治关联的不确定性和脆弱性,认清其可能存在的潜在风险。此外,文章还考察了外部治理环境对官员独董辞职行为特征的调节效应,并且发现,良好的外部治理环境有助于提升政策的执行效率。     

Surviving Unstable Property Rights in Early Modern China: A Case Study of Young Brother Bank

China’s banking industry experienced rapid growth during the free access era from 1911 to 1927. However, the reasons private banks were so successful then remain unclear, particularly when property rights were not well protected due to government intervention. Using archived Young Brother Bank documents, we describe the bank’s development from its founding as a family firm through its reinvention from a partnership into a corporation. We focus on organizational form choice and bank performance in this case study. We find that bankers in early modern China gain political connections by placing influential nonfamily members (often, acquisitive local warlords) on boards of directors because this protects them from the depredations of those warlords. This is a precondition for operating family businesses in unstable political circumstances.     

Political connections and labor investment efficiency: Evidence from China's private firms

This study investigates whether political connections affect labor investment efficiency. We test this question in the context of China's private firms, where we find that political connections are negatively associated with labor investment efficiency. We also explore the channels through which political connections reduce labor investment efficiency and provide evidence that political connections aggravate both agency problems and information asymmetry. Further tests show that the influence of political connections is more pronounced for firms with overinvestment problems or high-level political connections, and for firms from regions facing severe unemployment or loose anticorruption. Overall, our results are consistent with the “grabbing hand” argument that politicians destroy firm operational efficiency.     

Firm return volatility and economic gains: The role of oil prices

In this paper we investigate whether the oil price contributes to stock return volatility for 560 firms listed on the NYSE. Using daily data, we find that the oil price is a significant determinant and predictor of firm return variance. We devise trading strategies based on forecasts of firm return variance using the oil prices and historical averages. We find that investors can make substantial gains in returns by using the oil price in forecasting firm return variances.     

高管政治关联助推公司媒体报道了吗?—来自民营企业IPO期间的证据

媒体报道对资产定价具有重要影响,致使其日益受到公司管理层的重视.文章以2006?2014年民营企业IPO为样本,基于公司管理层经历或背景,研究高管政治关联对公司媒体披露的影响及其市场效应.研究发现:(1)高管政治关联有助于公司在IPO期间获得更高的媒体关注度和更正面的报道倾向;而且,政治关联层级越高,媒体报道对其越有利.(2)高管政治关联对媒体报道的影响主要通过非证监会四大信息披露媒体和地理邻近媒体来实现的;而地区制度环境可在一定程度上抑制高管政治关联对媒体报道的影响.(3)由政治关联所带来的媒体报道水平的改善,有助于促进IPO首日抑价的上升;但中长期会导致股价反转.文章不仅丰富了公司治理对媒体(信息)披露管理影响方面的文献,而且为民营企业的政商关系研究提供了新的经验证据.     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

How does political connection affect firm financial distress and resolution in China?

We examine the impact of political connections on firm performance, financial distress, and its resolution in China, a country where government influence over stock markets has been demonstrated to be considerable. Our findings suggest that over 1999 to 2015, although political connections had limited impact on the emergence of financial distress, such connections assisted distressed firms in gaining increments to debt financing and contributed to a higher likelihood of recovery. This indicates that Chinese authorities follow market economy principles, and only intervene in firms’ operations after they fall into financial distress. In addition, central and local government political connections have different impacts on distress recovery. We conduct additional analyses on differences in distress outcomes for various ownership (State-owned enterprises, SOEs, and non–SOEs) and sample sub-periods (1999–2007 and 2008–2015). Our results are robust to potential endogeneity issues and to alternative measures of financial distress.     

Political economy of private firms in China

The sweeping change in political economy associated with the rapid growth of the private sector in China is rarely studied empirically in the economics literature. Using four cross-sectional surveys of private firms between 1995 and 2010, we examine the dynamics of rent creation from Party membership and other political connections when the regime changed from anti-capitalistic to pro-capitalistic during the period 2002–2004. We find that entrepreneurs with political connection enjoyed significantly more rents only after the constitutional amendments. This finding sheds lights on the nature of the political economy of today’s Chinese economy. Endogeneity/causality problems are addressed.     

What leads to official corruption in China? A politico-economic analysis of economic opportunities and government corruption across China’s provinces

This paper investigates the relationship between economic opportunities and official corruption in China. We construct a cross-province sample of corrupted officials to analyse the effects on official corruption of mineral reserve, coal production, real estate and road construction, while including control variables such as population, GDP per capita, economic growth rate, private assets, provincial government capacity, fiscal transparency and distance of the province from Beijing. Spanning from December 2012 to November 2015, our sample contains 526 high-level government officials who worked in various provinces in China. We find through multivariate regression that economic opportunities represented by coal, minerals, real estate and road construction all have a positive and significant effect on official corruption in China at the levels of provincial department director or deputy director; meanwhile, capacity of political extraction, road construction and coal production are better indicators of official corruption at the level of governor or deputy governor.     

Stock Price Effects of Mandatory Exchangeable Debt

We study mandatory exchangeable debt offerings. A firm that issues mandatory exchangeable debt requires bondholders to exchange their bonds for shares of the underlying firm in which the issuing firm has a stake. We find significant announcement (−3.3%) and long-run (−13%) abnormal price declines for underlying companies. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory exchangeable debt issuers exploit private information that they possess to issue mandatory exchangeable debt when the underlying stock is overvalued.     

Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly

This paper considers a differentiated goods managerial mixed duopoly composed of one social welfare‐maximising public firm and one profit‐maximising private firm. We model the firm choice of the strategic contract. We find that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently strong, the price competition can become the unique equilibrium market structure. Furthermore, we show that there exists an area of the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects such that the situation wherein the public firm chooses its price contract whereas the private firm chooses its quantity contract can become the unique equilibrium structure.     

Stock price synchronicity to oil shocks across quantiles: Evidence from Chinese oil firms

This paper investigates behaviour of stock price synchronicity to oil shocks across quantiles for Chinese oil firms. The spillover effects of the oil market on a firm are segregated into firm-specific and market-wide information. First, our results report a higher level of synchronicity by dynamic conditional correlations than by R-square since the former better captures dynamic linear dependence. Second, we find strong evidence of size effect. In particular, stock price synchronicity is generally higher in large-cap firms than in small-cap ones. Oil shocks affect synchronicity in the upper quantiles differently based on firm size. Third, we also find that synchronicity responds to oil shocks significantly in extreme low quantiles, implying that shocks in the oil market are transmitted to Chinese oil firms via firm-specific information. Finally, we determine that oil shocks have little or no immediate impact on stock price synchronicity; instead, cumulative lagged effect is evident. This evidence highlights the lagging effect of spillover of oil shocks on Chinese oil firms.     

Political connections and corporate performance: Evidence from Pakistan

This study seeks to understand how political connections affect firm performance. Using a hand‐collected dataset of Pakistani firms from 2008–2014, our firm fixed effects and Heckman two‐stage regression results show that connected firms outperform those without political ties. Moreover, we show channels through which political benefits are realized in terms of greater access to debt, lower financing costs and lower tax rates. These benefits are found to be particularly large when firms are connected to politicians who held political positions most recently and firms connected through their owners. Finally, we do not find evidence for differences in political favours across regulated and unregulated industries.     

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation. We first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality. Second, we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal: Both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading. Third, there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low. Finally, we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long-run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition (but not on social welfare).