解析军队物资采购监督管理

加强军队物资采购监督管理,是落实从严治军的要求,保证军队物资采购依法规范运行的重要措施,深化军队采购制度改革,健全预防和惩治物资采购活动中违法违纪行为的重要政策机制.为此,解放军总政治部、总后勤部于2008年2月联合颁发了<军队物资采购监督管理规定>(以下简称<规定>),明确了军队物资采购监督管理的相关内容.     

军队后勤物资联合采购的联盟规划方法解析

随着我国科学技术的不断提高，军队后勤物资联合采购得到了有效的发展。军事经济贯彻和落实科学发展观的重要手段之一就是联合采购，本文对军队后勤联合采购形成的原因进行了分析，并且对联合采购的联盟规划方法做了详细的阐述。     

军队物资招标采购的几个关键问题

为了提高军队物资招标采购质量,深入分析军队物资招标采购过程四个关键环节的活动内容,包括拟制标书、划分标包、签订合同和质量控制。针对技术需求、项目性质特点、合同约定事项和过程监督四个关键问题提出相应的科学做法,进一步完善军队物资招标采购管理运行体系。     

对军队物资招标采购评标方法的探讨

评标是决定最终招标采购结果的重要环节。《军队物资招标管理规定》明确规定，军队物资招标采购的评标方法分为最低评标价法、综合评分法和性价比法。在招投标活动中，价格一般是评标的核心内容，是评价投标的一种衡量标准或尺度。不同的采购项目，其评标办法也应当有所不同。然而，在物资采购具体活动中．也出现过同样的采购项目，由于采用的评标方法不同，其结果也是不同的现象。以计算机采购为例，对于CPU，硬盘、内存、显示器等主要配置技术参数完全相同的计算机，因各自品牌不同，品质各有千秋，     

电建施工企业的物资精细化管理

本文介绍了通过严格履行物资集中管理职能。规范物资采购行为；实施网络化物资信息管理；进行材料市场价格等风险预测、及时调查市场、提高抗风险能力；规范供货商管理，保证商家信誉、产品可靠性；保证废旧物资的综合利用，严格执行处理规定；加强项目物资考核，推行“阳光”物资采购六种物资管理方式，使公司物资管理走向了精细化，提高了企业的管理水平。     

抓好“源头管控”加强“末端约束”

军队采购是政府采购的特殊组织形式,也是市场经济的重要组成部分.2001年11月,中央军委16号文件批转《总后勤部关于深化军队物资、工程、服务采购改革总体方案》,标志着军队采购制度改革正式启动.未来10年,将是军队物资采购系统巩固改革成果、深入推进改革、加强行业建设的一个至关重要的阶段,我们必须以更加坚定的决心、更加宽阔的思路、更加有效的手段,解决工作中的不规范问题. (一)规范采购运行机制 一是着力推进法规制度建设.军队物资集中采购现行规章制度对采购工作的诸多细节规定的还不够明确,对多种违规行为也缺乏刚性制约措施和责任追究制度.     

军队物资应急进口采购建设研究

利用进口渠道从国际市场上引进科技含量高、技术水平先进和国内目前相对紧缺的物资,对提高我军应急保障能力和加快适应经济全球化及新军事变革要求、确保对突发事件的妥善处理,具有重要意义。文章深入分析了加强军队物资应急进口采购建设的三个方面,明确提出了物资应急进口采购建设的基本框架。     

全国政府采购论文大赛获奖名单

团体奖特等奖总后军需物资油料部采购管理局一等奖山西省省级政府采购中心二等奖江苏省省级机关政府采购中心二等奖中央国家机关政府采购中心个人特等奖佟胜海总后军需物资油料部采购管理局尚晓汀中央国家机关政府采购中心王丛虎中国人民大学公共管理学院许大卫北京市政府采购中心何红锋天津南开大学法学院姚承文辽宁省沈阳市政府研究室柴青辽宁省沈阳市政府研究室王跃进山西省省级政府采购中心梁戈敏广西壮族自治区政府采购中心个人一等奖崔小宁军事经济学院军队采办系凌大荣军事经济学院军队采办系胡华安军事经济学院军队采办系刘辉军事经…     

军队物资应急进口采购建设研究

利用进口渠道从国际市场上引进科技含量高、技术水平先进和国内目前相对紧缺的物资,对提高我军应急保障能力和加快适应经济全球化及新军事变革要求、确保对突发事件的妥善处理,具有重要意义.文章深入分析了加强军队物资应急进口采购建设的三个方面,明确提出了物资应急进口采购建设的基本框架.     

铁路物资采购预算管理控制策略探讨

针对铁路物资采购预算管理控制策略问题，介绍了铁路物资采购预算管理的现状。主要是铁路物资用料需求的特殊性和铁路物资采购的质量问题。提出公开招标对铁路物资采购的影响，主要有利于公平竞争、有利于节约采购成本、有利于杜绝腐败和有利于供应商的到货质量，提出物资招标采购的质量控制策略主要是以细化招标环节为切入点，强化采购质量过程控制。     

COMPARING PPP WITH TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF SCHOOLS PROCUREMENT IN IRELAND

Advocates of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) argue that they can deliver public infrastructure more efficiently than traditional procurement through timelier completion and superior value for money. Despite these claims comparative analysis of the performance of both procurement methods has received scant attention in the PPP literature to date. This paper addresses this issue by providing an in‐depth, case‐based comparison of PPP versus traditional procurement in the schools sector in Ireland. Through detailed semi‐structured interviews with key stakeholders and an examination of the available documentation, we assess whether the key objectives of using PPP have been achieved. Overall, we find no evidence that PPP leads to faster delivery of infrastructure when the overall procurement process from contract notice to delivery is accounted for. In addition, we find only limited evidence to suggest that PPP results in better value for money.     

价值链视角下应急物资保障管理机制研究

应急物资保障管理是突发公共事件中实施救助处置的重要支撑和保障，直接影响紧急救援的反应速度和应急成效。然而，应急物资保障管理是一体化、多维度的运行系统，某一环节的缺失或效力不足都会影响到整个体系的运行成效。基于价值链理论视角，结合疫情防控中应急物资保障实践，对应急物资保障管理机制进行深入探究。从决策层、管理层和运行层3个维度建立应急物资保障管理价值链模型，深度剖析我国应急物资管理在协同保障过程中各环节的价值作用。研究发现，外部要素主导指挥的决策驱动系统、辅助要素强力支撑的决策调控系统以及基本要素相互调适的决策核心系统，共同构成完整的应急物资保障管理价值链及决策机制。在此基础上给出相应政策建议，以期为提升应急物资援助效力、完善国家应急物资保障体系提供借鉴。     

Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions

Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry. Our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications. For the first time, we show that even within an independent private value paradigm, as the number of potential bidders increases, bidders' equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive, and the expected procurement cost may rise because the "entry effect" is always positive and may dominate the negative "competition effect". We then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration, controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity, and use the recently developed semi-parametric Bayesian estimation method to analyse the data. We select the model that best fits the data, and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the "entry effect" and the "competition effect" with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost.     

Industry- and company-level factors influencing the development of the forest energy business — insights from a Delphi Study

The global business environment of today requires industries to be increasingly agile in order to create added value. There is a particularly urgent need to innovate and redefine business models in the mature pulp and paper industry, which is continually announcing mill closures and reporting persistent profitability problems. This paper focuses on the emerging forest energy business, which appears to offer many novel opportunities for both the forest and the energy industry. We conducted a qualitative dissensus-based online Delphi study and carried out themed expert interviews in order to identify the main industry- and company-level factors that are most likely to influence the bioenergy sector, its value-creation potential and forest and energy companies' future roles in it. The Delphi technique proved to be a valuable research tool with which we were able to obtain comprehensive information on a subject that lacks historical and financial data, and yet requires input from many quarters. The results suggest that the complementary resources held by forest and energy companies make collaboration in the bioenergy business favorable. Moreover, the procurement and logistics of forest raw material appear to be key success factors in terms of yielding the most synergetic gains. Uncertainty about policy interventions nevertheless causes concern given their relatively rapid effect on the prospects of the bioenergy business.     

Welfare Effects of Reducing Home Bias in Government Procurements: A Dynamic Contest Model

This paper models an international contest for government procurement as a dynamic game between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. We show that trade liberalization, in the form of a reduction in bias against the foreign firm, improves both domestic and global welfare if (i) either the foreign firm's profit is sufficiently large or (ii) the initial degree of home bias is sufficiently small. If the initial home bias is large, a small reduction in the bias may reduce welfare.     

广告公司商务模式结构和企业绩效的关系研究

广告公司商务模式与经济绩效有密切的关系。良好的商务模式对公司经济绩效和社会绩效具有显著正向积极影响。广告公司及时准确地调整商务模式结构的战略选择、运作流程、价值获取和价值维护四个维度,可以改善和提升经济绩效和社会绩效。     

Restrictions on Competition in Municipal Competitive Procurement in Sweden

The bidding process in public procurement in Sweden is a first-price sealed bid auction. Although there is a competitive effect on the bids in this type of auction, the contracting entity can, through the choice of procurement procedure, restrict the number of bidders. This paper studies this choice and imposes an implementation cost on the contracting entity to motivate such a restriction. The results, based on data for Swedish municipalities, suggest that contract specifications and municipality characteristics (that are assumed to influence the implementation cost) affect the volume of the procurement and the number of bidders but not necessarily the choice of procurement procedure.Special thanks to Karl-Gustaf Löfgren and Xavier de Luna for valuable comments and suggestions on this paper. Financial support from The Swedish Competition Authority and the Swedish Council for Research in Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR) is gratefully acknowledged.     

EVALUATING THE COSTS,QUALITY, AND VALUE FOR MONEY OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

Public?private partnerships (PPPs) are often promoted as a means to lower the costs and increase the quality and value for money (VfM) of public construction and infrastructure projects. While the increasing capital stock of PPPs warrants evaluation of their performance there has until now been limited systematic assessment of PPP versus conventional public procurement. This article contributes to the literature by presenting the findings of a systematic review of empirical peer‐reviewed studies comparing the costs, quality, and/or VfM of infrastructure PPP projects with conventional public procurement. The international literature suggests that PPPs are on average more costly and provide approximately similar VfM as conventional procurement. The number of empirical evaluations is limited, however, and evidence on the quality of infrastructure facilities is particularly scarce. While infrastructure PPPs continue to proliferate, systematic assessment of their performance is warranted to assist policy‐makers in choosing the procurement method that offers best value for taxpayers, users and society.     

Biased procurement auctions

In a complex procurement a buyer may consider biasing the auction rules in order to account for differences in product characteristics offered by the sellers. This paper studies the gathering, disclosure and use of information about this bias. While we also describe the optimal procurement auction in our setting, the main focus of the paper is on the case where the buyer does not have commitment power. We find that without commitment full disclosure of the buyer’s preferences is optimal. Furthermore, lack of commitment distorts the buyer’s incentives to learn about its preferences: unlike the commitment case, without commitment the value of this information can be negative. Based on Chapter 3 of my Ph.D. dissertation at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a John M. Olin Dissertation Fellowship and a Melvin and Joan Lane Stanford Graduate Fellowship. Thanks to Pat Bajari, Tim Bresnahan, Vinicius Carrasco, George Deltas, Jonathan Levin, Paul Milgrom, Ilya Segal and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions.     

Common Value Auctions with Default: An Experimental Approach

This paper examines a common value auction in which bidder default is explicitly allowed. The lack of contractual enforcement has implications for the formation of bids as well as the revenue properties of the auction. Using a common value procurement auction, we explore these implications in an experimental setting. Our results show that bidders are more aggressive when default is allowed. A theoretical result shows that allowing default can actually be in the best interest of the auctioneer. Experimental evidence, however, indicates that this result does not hold true in practice. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the data in our experiments is consistent with winner's curse behavior.