Undergraduate Coursework in Economics: A Survey Perspective

Survey results from a large sample of economics departments describe offerings for principles courses, coursework requirements for economics majors, and program augmentations such as capstone courses, senior seminars, and honors programs. Findings are reported for all institutions, and institutions are subdivided into six different categories based on public or private control and the highest economics degree offered. The coursework required for the economics major typically consists of ten courses, five in a required core and five electives. The most conspicuous curriculum change over the past 30 years is the rise of econometrics as a required course, now mandatory at about half of major programs. The authors estimate that about 40 percent of students who matriculate as first-year undergraduates take at least one economics course before they leave.     

One Semester Or Two

The problem of optimum instruction in economics includes all kinds of technological constraints created by choices among different media of instruction. It also includes the problem of how long a course is required for adequate instruction. Traditionally, principles of economics has been taught as a two-semester, three-hour credit course. This article investigates the extent to which the results achieved by students after one semester's study are equivalent to those achieved after two semesters, and finds the differences less than might be supposed.     

现代主流经济学的制度转向及其制度不及——兼论新制度主义的分析思维及其范式缺陷

新古典经济学是研究既定制度下个体理性行为的学说,而社会制度的确立原则不同于属于个体的行为原则,因为社会制度涉及到众多社会性因素。不幸的是,流行的新制度主义恰恰舍弃了包括伦理、历史和权力等社会性因素,而试图把制度分析纳入新古典经济学框架,它或者基于博弈均衡来分析和解释那些正式规则,或者基于理性建模的互动行为分析来构设社会制度。正是基于这种抽象思维,新制度主义必然不能真正剖析制度的产生和演化,舍弃权力结构的博弈均衡所构设的社会制度。     

The new institutional economics and its relevance to social economics

There has been a quiet revolution in economic theory, led by the New Institutionalists. Pioneered by Douglass C. North, this group argues that institutions are the main determinants of economic performance, yet neoclassical economics has no role for institutions. Contrary to many misconceptions, this theory of institutions can be integrated with neoclassical economics, leaving mainstream economic theory in tact, but broader and more relevant. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the main arguments of the New Institutionalists are summarized. Second, the bridge between institutions and social economics is explored. The article concludes by arguing that the New Institutional approach is fruitful, and that the theory will gradually be integrated with neoclassical economics, until the two merge into a single body of theory.     

Feminist Ecological Economics and Sustainability

Synopsis New developments in feminist ecological economics and ecofeminist economics are contributing to the search for theories and policy approaches to move economies toward sustainability. This paper summarizes work by ecofeminists and feminist ecological economists which is relevant to the sustainability challenge and its implications for the discipline of economics. Both democracy and lower material throughputs are generally seen as basic principles of economic sustainability. Feminist theorists and feminist ecological economists offer many important insights into the conundrum of how to make a democratic and equity-enhancing transition to an economy based on less material throughput. These flow from feminist research on unpaid work and caring labor, provisioning, development, valuation, social reproduction, non-monetized exchange relationships, local economies, redistribution, citizenship, equity-enhancing political institutions, and labor time, as well as creative modeling approaches and activism-based theorizing.      

Can Darwinism be ��Generalized�� and of what use would this be?

It has been suggested that, by generalizing Darwinian principles, a common foundation can be derived for all scientific disciplines dealing with evolutionary processes, especially for evolutionary economics. We show, however, that in the development of evolutionary biology, the abstract principles of so-called “Generalized Darwinism” have not been crucial for distinguishing Darwinian from non-Darwinian approaches and, hence, cannot be considered genuinely Darwinian. Moreover, we wonder what can be gained by invoking the abstract principles of Generalized Darwinism given that they do not suffice to substantiate an explanation of actual evolutionary processes. To that end, specific hypotheses are required. They neither follow from the suggested abstract principles, nor are they more easily found on that basis. Accordingly, we find little evidence in the literature for the claim that generalized Darwinian principles enhance the explanatory power of an evolutionary approach to economics.     

Coevolution of economic behaviour and institutions: towards a theory of institutional change

Traditionally, economics has regarded institutions, notably norms and regulations, as fixed or exogenous. Surprisingly few insights on institutional evolution from natural and social sciences have made their way into economics. This article gives an overview of evolutionary theories of institutions in biology, sociology, anthropology and economics. These theories are subsequently compared with non-evolutionary theories of institutions. Next, the insights and approaches are integrated into a framework for analysis of institutions based on the notion of coevolution.JEL Classification: B52, D10, D70, D64, Z13J.C.J.M. van den Bergh     

Gender Development, Institutions, and Level of Economic Development

Gender inequality and the lack of gender development are major problems in developing countries. Neoclassical economics has generally argued that economic development will greatly enhance gender development. However, more recent work has emphasized the role of institutions. In this paper, a distinction is made between malleable institutions and those that change only over long periods of time. Empirical estimations of the impacts of economic development, malleable institutions, and hard-to-change institutions on gender development are carried out. The results indicate that both economic development and reform of malleable institutions are important determinants of relative gender performance. However, non-malleable institutions and cultural practices limit the impact that reform and economic development can have on relative gender performance.     

金融企业激励机制建设的理论基础与现实选择

面对当前金融资金机构对我国金融企业高层次专业人才的竞争，中国金融企业必须高度重视激励机制的建设。本认为，我国金融企业应按照激励要素产生、传导、持续原理，遵循竞争性、公平性、激励性、经济性等原则，设计出既符合国际惯例又适合中国国情的激励机制。     

中国省级预算中的非正式制度:一个交易费用理论框架

运用交易费用经济学 ,本文研究了中国省级预算中非正式制度出现的原因及其主要形式。本文的主要观点是 :中国省级预算中存在的非正式制度是省级政治中的政治家发展出来解决他们制定和实施预算合同时所面临的交易费用问题的。主要的非正式制度包括三种横向非正式制度 ,即预算产权、部分等级制和完全等级制 ,以及围绕着这三种横向非正式制度而形成的“以关系为基础”的纵向非正式制度。     

Bolivia’s Institutional Transformation: Contact Zones,Social Movements,and the Emergence of an Ethnic Class Consciousness

Over the past two decades, development economics has experienced a shift in focus from standard neoclassical analysis to institutions. While studying economic institutions is indeed important, evaluating their transformation and embeddedness is equally crucial for understanding and improving human wellbeing, especially in countries where market institutions are not fully developed. With that perspective in mind, we consider the importance of culture in the evolution of institutions in Bolivia by combining the concept of contact zones with old institutional economics (OIE). Contact zones refer to daily interactions in social spaces where culture and class meet and negotiate with each other. The contact zone between Bolivians and post-WWII development policies surfaced as an Andean collective memory, allowing for a possibility of social and political autonomy through the creation of an alternative to development, El Buen Vivir.     

Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?

Empirical constitutional economics has made a huge leap forward over the last decade. Interesting insights into the effects of constitutions have been discovered. Rather than summarizing the state of the art, this paper identifies some of the current shortcomings and proposes a number of extensions. It calls for recognizing additional constitutional institutions as explanatory variables, as well as the incorporation of additional dependent variables. Its major emphasis is, however, on calling for the next logical step in this field, namely to endogenize constitutions.     

Limits of the New Institutional Economics Approach to African Development

In the last two decades, there has been a marked shift in the research on Sub-Saharan Africa from standard neoclassical analysis to new institutional economics (NIE). The increasing emphasis on NIE is reflected in a wide range of works by international financial institutions and scholars. However, the NIE approach retains fundamental limitations due to its narrow interpretation of institutions, its over-reliance on analysis of transactions costs and property rights, and its ahistorical attachment to markets and private sector firms as major engines of development. Furthermore, NIE typically fails to look “inside institutions” to identify the complex cultural factors that shape the interests and behaviors of the members of institutions. This paper engages in a critique of NIE analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development, and suggests the need for a nuanced analysis of property rights and culture, along with development programs to address inequality and poverty and to foster state-led development.     

Elements of Publicness in Urban Transit

This paper examines the claim that Veblen's theory of cultural evolution has generalized Darwinian principles to socioeconomic phenomena. Our argument takes place in the debate around "generalized Darwinism" in evolutionary and institutional economics. We claim that Veblen frequently relied on the concept of selection and considered institutions both as units and as factors of selection. We also argue that some of Veblen's insights can be clarified by expressing them in evolutionary-game theoretic terms. Thus, we suggest a close connection between the ontological framework of generalized Darwinism and the technical study of evolutionary phenomena through evolutionary game theory.     

On the Behavioral Foundations of the Law of Supply and Demand: Human Convergence and Robot Randomness

This research builds on the work of D.K. Gode and Shyam Sunder who demonstrated the existence of a strong relationship between market institutions and the ability of markets to seek equilibrium—even when the agents themselves have limited intelligence and behave with substantial randomness. The question posed is whether or not market institutions account for the operation of the law of supply and demand in markets populated by humans with no role required of human rationality. Are institutions responsible for the operations of the law of supply and demand or are behavioral principles also at work? Experiments with humans and simulations with robots both conducted in conditions in which major institutional and structural aids to convergence were removed, produced clear answers. Human markets converge, while robot markets do not. The structural and institutional features certainly facilitate convergence under conditions of substantial irrationality, but they are not necessary for convergence in markets in which agents have the rationality of humans.     

Homo Economicus,AIs, humans and rats: decision-making and economic welfare

ABSTRACT

Critics of economics often highlight two related issues: the empirical falsity of the ‘homo economicus’ assumption of rational, self-interested maximisation; and the ethical consequences of models based on this assumption. Yet many experiments in biology show non-human creatures often seem to behave as if they were rational maximisers, suggesting that context rather than cognitive capacity is important for determining behaviour. The critique of rational choice poses a less serious methodological challenge to economics than is sometimes thought. However, economists do need to respond to the ethical critique that decisions and policies based on the assumption of rational self-interested maximisation change the norms of individual behaviour for the worse. This paper argues that economics has become divorced from ethics because for a century it has dealt only with ordinal, not cardinal, welfare rankings and has thus ruled out interpersonal comparisons. While enabling economists to separate normative from positive analysis, this separation protocol has left welfare economics both internally contradictory and unable to address major societal decisions, even though welfare economics is used constantly in limited ways, such as cost-benefit analysis. This separation reflects empirically inaccurate assumptions concerning preference formation and the conditions of supply and demand (but not the rational choice assumption) in the foundational welfare economic theorems. Economics must urgently revisit welfare economics, particularly in the context of modern economies in which individuals are increasingly interdependent, and the assumptions required for the fundamental welfare theorems therefore increasingly invalid.     

Institutions in the economy and some institutions of mainstream economics: From the late 1970s to the 2008 financial and economic crisis

This article proposes a conceptual and theoretical institutional approach to the relations between the economy and economics and uses it to examine, through a structured survey of the literature, the relations between institutions in the economy and the institutions of mainstream economics, macroeconomics, and financial economics, highlighting issues related to the financial and macroeconomic crisis and focusing on the United States from the late 1970s to 2008. Institutions are socially shared systems of rules of behavior or of thought. Some systems of mental and behavioral rules are socially shared among economic agents and policymakers in part because they are socially shared among academic economists. They may exert on economic agents and policymakers some of the same types of influence they have on economists. On the other hand, there are important limits to the influence of the institutions of economics outside academia, and institutions in the economy also influence the institutions of economics.     

Restructuring financial systems in transition and developing economies: an approach based on the French financial system

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the redesigning of financial systems in Central and Eastern European and developing countries by focusing attention on specific financial institutions appropriate to easing the transition and fostering the creation of markets. The paper argues that the immediate emulation of the better-known institutions of the most developed, market-based financial systems, i.e. the US and the UK, should not be taken for granted. It underlines, instead, the importance of drawing inspiration from the experiences of a variety of institutions and financial systems. Particularly relevant are those systems that have experienced forms of transition and a mix, over time, of market and state intervention.
The approach of this paper is one of institutional financial economics (Neave, 1991 and Williamson, 1986), in which structural details of financial institutions and contracts, in our case French financial institutions, are analysed. We argue that the principles on which some French financial institutions are based and aspects of their functioning are of value to reformers. We discuss the lessons that can be learnt from the Crédit National, the Commissariat Général du Plan, the CODEVI and the SOFARIS.     

Amalgamations of universities:are there economics of scale or scope?

This paper estimates a multiple-output cost function for Australian universities. The estimates are used to evaluate the cost savings arising from the amalgamation of two or more institutions. These cost savings in turn are decomposed into those due to economics of scale and those due to economics of scope, using a new measure of economics of scope associated with the amalgamation of two institutions.