Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Political stability and growth: An application of dynamic GMM and quantile regression

This paper studies the effect of political stability on economic growth by taking 120 developing countries over the period of 1996–2014. We apply relatively advanced dynamic two step system-GMM and quantile regression. Political stability is found to be a key determinant of economic growth. More importantly, political instability (or risk) is found to be higher in the OIC countries and is a deterrent to economic growth. Also, for the lower and middle income OIC countries, political instability appears to affect economic growth more severely perhaps due to the absence of strong economic and political institutions. Moreover, political instability is also found to be significantly higher in the oil-dependent OIC countries. Notably, political instability is likely to affect growth through the channels of investment and human capital accumulation in the developing countries. Finally, the impact of political stability and political instability on growth is found to be equally distributed across the OIC countries with higher or lower growth level. Therefore, the development of political and economic institutions along with human capital development is recommended for all the developing countries in general and the OIC countries in particular.     

Political institutions and telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and discuss venues for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.     

Did support for economic and political reforms increase during the post‐communist transition,and if so,why?

We study the dynamics of individual support for changes in the economic and political system, using a unique dataset for 12 transition economies over the period 1991–2004. We document that support for transition was initially lower in the CIS countries and that there has been a converging trend in the support for reforms between the CIS and the Baltic and Central and Eastern European countries. We suggest several explanations for the initial divergence and the post‐98 convergence in support for transition between these three groups of countries, and show that economic growth, declining income inequality and improving quality of governance have contributed to increase the support for transition. In addition, we find that increased support for the market economy and democracy in the CIS is accompanied by a larger increase in trust towards the political institutions. Our results also confirm the implications of Aghion et al. ( 2010 )'s model of a negative correlation between trust and the demand for government regulation.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.     

Public ownership of banks and economic growth

In an influential article, La Porta et al. (2002) argue that public ownership of banks is associated with lower GDP growth. We show that this relationship does not hold for all countries, but depends on a country's initial conditions, in particular its financial development and political institutions. Public ownership is harmful only if a country has low financial development and low institutional quality. The negative impact of public ownership on growth fades quickly as the financial and political system develops. In highly developed countries, we find no or even positive effects. Policy conclusions for individual countries are likely to be misleading if such heterogeneity is ignored.     

Economic Growth in a Cross‐section of Nonindustrial Countries: Does Colonial Heritage Matter for Africa?

The paper investigates the effects of Sub‐Saharan African colonial heritage on economic growth in a sample of nonindustrial countries. An empirical Solow growth model is specified in a way that allows an examination of whether or not growth in Sub‐Saharan Africa reflects a legacy of extractive colonialization strategies, motivated by a hostile disease environment that resulted in extractive growth‐retarding institutions that persisted after independence. Parameter estimates suggest that the partial effects of extractive institutions engendered by a twentieth century colonial heritage account for approximately 30% of the growth gap between the former colonies in Sub‐Saharan Africa and other nonindustrial countries.     

THE VANISHING BEQUEST TAX: THE COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BEQUEST TAXATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bequest tax revenues have been declining in OECD countries for at least 70 years. We propose an explanation that is based on a dynamic politico‐economic model where the evolution of bequest taxation is determined by wealth inequality. Since economic development induces a growing role of labor income and thus a reduction of wealth inequality, bequest taxation is reduced over time. The model also embeds a process of structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and a consequent shift of the tax base from easy‐to‐tax land to hard‐to‐tax capital. This process implies a lower tax level and slower equalization‐induced tax reduction, the higher is the tax avoidance rate and the less developed is the economy. The introduction of franchise restrictions which are gradually lifted over time allows the hump‐shaped long‐term evolution of bequest taxation to be reproduced starting from the nineteenth century for those countries that are now modern industrial democracies. The evolution of political institutions also helps to explain the discrepancies currently observed between tax systems in developed and underdeveloped countries.     

Dynamic dissolutions and unifications

I reexamine the key results from the literature on the size and number of countries under different political institutions in a simple dynamic model. I find that the canonical static results that democracies lead to too many too‐small countries and that Leviathans lead to too few too‐large countries no longer necessarily hold. The key dynamic element that drives the new results is that public goods are modeled as public capital; this changes the incentives to unify or divide countries. I also show that there are hysteresis effects on the size and number of countries; that is, arbitrary initial configurations of national boundaries may tend to persist because of the initial public capital location decisions they promote.     

Political freedom and the response to economic incentives: labor migration in Africa, 1972-1987

This study examines the thesis that political institutions and the freedoms and civil rights generated by these institutions affect migration decisions. The hypothesis is based on one stated by Adam Smith in 1776, that economic conditions that reflect greater political freedoms and civil liberties harbor higher levels of resource mobility in response to economic incentives. Pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis is based on data from the World Bank for 32 African countries during 1972-87. Findings support the hypothesis that migration rate is more affected by the expected returns ratio to labor in countries where civil liberties are greater than in nations with fewer civil liberties. The implication, from the inclusion of institutional factors in the model, is that civil liberties have an indirect impact on the rate of labor migration out of agriculture in Africa. The impact is a mix of economic incentives and civil liberties. In the political rights model, the most free countries had the largest migration elasticity. The findings on political rights impacts support findings by Friedman and McMillan that civil liberties are a more important determinant of economic growth than political rights. Further testing for measurement error confirmed that the data were flawed, but not so greatly that the basic findings were overturned. The migration out of African agriculture was found to be sensitive to the effect of price signals, which were conditioned by the degree of political rights and civil liberties. Policy makers are urged to consider both changes in pricing and institutions.     

Regional economic growth disparities: A political economy perspective

Regional differences in economic growth have been observed within many countries. Our story emphasises three region-specific factors driving growth—capital, labour and political factors. Conditional on differences in production factor (i.e., labour and capital) variations across democratic states, what role do differences in underlying “political factors” across regions play in accounting for regional growth disparities? We build a political economy model of endogenous growth where regions have the same political institutions, but experience different (and estimable) distributions over voter political biases (i.e., our “political factors”). In our model, political factors affect regional productivity as a consequence of politico-economic equilibrium. We discipline our regional growth accounting exercises by calibrating/estimating each model to American state-level economic and political-survey data. We show that the capital factor is the predominant driving force behind growth in American states. Nevertheless, regional variations in distributions of voter's political biases also account a great deal for regional growth disparities. We also evaluate how much politics would have distorted agents' welfare and regional growth, were regional economies given the opportunity to live under an efficient social planner's allocation system; and, if agents were to live under the same democratic system but where all voters have equal voting influence.     

Risky business: Institutions vs. social networks in FDI

Political economy scholarship on foreign direct investment (FDI) emphasizes variation in host country political risk but overlooks variation in investors' sensitivity to political risk. We show that relational contracting, relationship‐based contract enforcement, is more efficient for high‐risk, human capital‐intensive activities for which the costs of writing legally enforceable contracts are prohibitive. We disaggregate FDI into two distinct varieties: mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and venture capital (VC). We propose that VC flows are less sensitive to host institutions but correlate strongly with skilled migrant networks that monitor compliance and impose reputational costs. Our empirical analysis of dyadic VC and M&A flows covers over 100 countries during 1980–2009. We address other mechanisms through which migrant networks facilitate FDI and verify our results hold at the country‐industry level. These findings suggest that relational contracting facilitates global integration of dynamic, knowledge‐intensive industries even when formal institutions are weak.     

Knowledge externalities,innovation and growth in European countries: the role of institutions

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the linkages between institutions and economic growth in the European context and highlights innovation as the intermediate variable that drives this interplay. Building on the literature in the evolutionary approach to the economics of innovation and in the economic growth theory with a political economic perspective, we assume that knowledge externalities can fully take place where institutions guarantee a level playing field in the access to knowledge. We estimate the effects of a set of relevant institutional variables on the growth rate of technological knowledge and per capita GDP for a sample of European countries. The empirical analysis confirms that institutions that tend to equalise opportunities to innovate significantly amplify the impact of an exogenous increase in the knowledge base on the growth rate of per capita GDP.     

The Politics of Capital Flight in the Global Economic Crisis

This paper studies the effects of economic governance and political institutions on portfolio investment during the Global Economic Crisis of 2008–2009. Leveraging a unique cross‐national dataset on portfolio flows immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it shows that countries with “better institutions” – those with more (or less) democratic, more (or less) constrained or more accountable political systems – were no less vulnerable to portfolio outflows than countries with “worse institutions.” However, countries with better governance prior to the crisis – those with better regulatory apparatuses, rule of law, property rights, and those considered less politically risky – experienced lower net portfolio capital outflows after Lehman. Governance is in fact the strongest predictor of portfolio capital flows during the global flight to liquidity, while political institutions perform poorly. The findings shed light onto the political factors that mediated how the collapse of Lehman affected national financial markets the world over, and have implications for literatures on the political economy of foreign investment, as well as for broader topics of institutions, governance, and economic performance.     

Is democracy good for growth? — Development at political transition time matters

Is democracy a better political regime for economic prosperity than autocracy? This paper shows that the answer depends on the initial economic development level during the democratic transition when the foundation of institutions was laid. Democracy facilitates growth only in countries that already have adequate development at transition time. These countries are more likely to create and sustain growth-enhancing institutions than others. Without appropriate development, democracy does not improve growth; this applies to about 40% of the third-wave democratized countries. These results are based on a sample of 153 countries in 1960–2010 and robust to various specifications and endogeneity issues.     

The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries

This paper examines the influence of government ideology, political institutions and globalization on the choice of exchange rate regime via panel multinomial logit approach using annual data over the period of 1974-2004 in a panel of 180 countries: 26 developed and 154 developing.We provide evidence that government ideology, political institutions and globalization are important determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime. In particular, we find that left-wing governments, democratic institutions, central bank independence and financial development increase the likelihood of choosing a flexible regime, whereas more globalized countries have a higher probability of implementing a fixed regime. More importantly, we find that political economy factors have different effects on the choice of exchange rate regime in developed and developing countries. All our results are robust to panel ordered probit model.     

Political instability and economic growth

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.     

DEMOCRATIC AID AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF RECIPIENTS

We investigate whether democratic aid flows, which are directed toward the democratization of recipients by covering democracy‐related programs and government and civil society activities, affect the future political regime of recipient countries. We introduce a multinomial multivariate logit model and we use 5‐yr averaged data covering the period 1972–2004 for 59 democracy aid‐recipient countries categorized into three broad classes according to the prevalent political regime. We find strong evidence that democratic aid flows are positively associated with the likelihood of observing a partly democratic or a fully democratic political regime in democratic aid‐recipient countries and that this result is robust to the potential endogeneity of democratic assistance.(JEL D70, F35, C25)     

Institutions,innovation and growth

This paper looks at the link between the quality of economic institutions and innovation, and innovation and growth. We construct a measure of the innovation content of individual manufacturing industries and show that countries with stronger economic institutions specialize in more innovation‐intensive industries. Our results also provide evidence that industries involving higher levels of innovation grow relatively faster in countries with better economic institutions. The results suggest that innovation is an important channel through which higher quality economic institutions contribute to better growth performance in the long run.