利他行为的“道德人”分析

人们普遍认为，利他主义有三种表现形式：即亲缘利他、互惠利他和纯粹利他；而人的行为动机有两种：利己和利他。单纯从利己动机来各种解释利他行为存在着贫困性，引入“道德人”概念则可以对动机上无论是利己还是利他的利他行为有一个统一的解释。     

利他行为及其经济学意义——兼与叶航等探讨

本文指出了叶航(2005)和叶航、汪丁丁、罗卫东(2005)建立的“利他行为演化均衡”模型的错误,重新梳理了利他行为与经济学的关系。现代经济学的分析框架并不排斥利他偏好,利他行为难以进入经济学实证分析,主要是由于利他行为难以量化。人类利他行为是生物进化和社会发展的综合产物,道德情感和道德规范在其中起了关键性的作用,但这并不妨碍经济学把利他偏好当作人性的一部分。经济学可以通过解释道德情感的进化根源、道德规范的形成机制以及道德规范对个人行为方式的影响,来解释人为什么有利他行为。     

作为内生偏好的利他行为及其经济学意义

现代经济学与现代生物学对人性的看法相当一致,都把自利看作人类行为的基本前提。但来自桑塔费学派的最新研究证明,在人类进化的早期阶段,利他行为作为社会规范内部化的产物,在维持个人之间的合作劳动、有效提高族群生存竞争能力方面,具有不可替代的重要作用。我们在ESS(即“进化稳定策略”)基础上提出一个演化均衡模型,进一步解释了利他行为的进化优势以及合作剩余导致利他偏好内生的机制。     

利他偏好的内生模型及其经济学解释

利他行为对自利人性假设的挑战,要求经济学必须把偏好进行内生化处理。笔者首先构建了一个利他偏好内生模型,使得人类行为统一于效用最大化模式并具有了内在一致的规律性和可预测性;然后对利他偏好内生模型的合理性进行了解释。笔者认为,与利己行为不同,行为主体不是从利他行为后果而是从利他行为本身获得效用;通过整体间的生存适应性补偿机制,利他者不仅可以战胜利己者得以存在和持续,而且利他惩罚行为还为人类走出囚徒困境提供了有力的保证。     

利他偏好的内生模型及其经济学解释

利他行为对自利人性假设的挑战，要求经济学必须把偏好进行内生化处理。笔者首先构建了一个利他偏好内生模型，使得人类行为统一于效用最大化模式并具有了内在一致的规律性和可预测性；然后对利他偏好内生模型的合理性进行了解释。笔者认为，与利己行为不同，行为主体不是从利他行为后果而是从利他行为本身获得效用；通过整体间的生存适应性补偿机制，利他者不仅可以战胜利己者得以存在和持续，而且利他惩罚行为还为人类走出囚徒困境提供了有力的保证。     

运用"经济人--道德人"假说对合作行为的分析

对于合作的分析,现代经济学是以"经济人"假说作为分析前提的。这种分析在解释合作最重要的特征——互惠利他所包含的有意识的利他行为时存在着"贫困性"。虽然在良好的法律和制度保证下,"经济人"也会促进公共利益或社会福利,但这种利他行为是无意识的。在"经济人"假说分析的基础上,结合"道德人"假说可以对合作行为有一个很好的解释,尤其是对于"囚犯困境"的解释。     

从利他性到社会理性——利他主义经济学研究的一个综合观点

利他主义经济学的研究非常繁杂,缺乏一个统一的理论.本文提出利他行为的方向性问题,分析了基因决定论的局限,综合研究了基因选择、个体选择以及群体选择对人类个体利他行为的影响,从而形成了利他性研究的一个综合性理论.在解决利他行为方向性问题的基础上,发现人类利他行为实质上是人的社会性的体现,从而提出了社会理性概念,扩展了利他主义经济学的研究.     

纯粹利他与经济学

经济学被称为“社会科学中的物理学”。因其对数学工具的成功运用，经济学具有严密的逻辑结构，并能进行缜密的实证研究，故在社会科学中的地位日益显要。然而，经济学也常因其“经济人”假设而受到人们的诟病。利他，特别是不求任何个人利益的纯粹利他，在经济学中是否有容身之地？经济学是否注定与注重利他的伦理学分道扬镳？     

快乐理论对囚徒困境的新解释

无所不包的人类行为皆在一定的精神快乐需要支配下而产生,皆为实现自我的一定的快乐满足而展开的结果。文章根据快乐理论对囚徒困境的解释,提出在实际的决策过程中,人们并不总是在追求自身利益最大化或者帕累托最优,人们要达到的是最大快乐。利他行为能给局中人带来许多快乐,从某种意义上讲,利他便是利己（所谓助人为乐）。帕累托最优往往是理想,追求它要付出大量的代价和努力,而获得尽可能多的快乐满足则是符合现实的,而且大多数人的最大快乐是在个体追求自身快乐最大化过程中实现的,从而体现了利己和利他合作博弈的利益一致性。     

利他性惩罚的演化

实验和现实数据均显示,即使在一次性的交往过程中人类也会惩罚非合作者.即使这种"利他性惩罚"可以解释人类社会较高水平的合作行为,但是它也会产生一个演化悖论:现有模型认为非亲缘个体之间的利他性合作只有在小规模群体中才可以稳定地演化,因而用这一模型来解释利他性惩罚的演化时就会产生一个结果,即人们不会自己承担成本去惩罚别人,并为大量非亲缘的成员提供利益.然而,本文认为,利他性合作与利他性惩罚之间是不对称的,这就使得利他性惩罚可以在一次性和匿名交往中演化,并使利他性惩罚和利他性合作都得以维持.     

国外家族企业代理理论研究新进展

基于私有产权、两权合一和家族管理特征的考虑,传统代理理论把家族企业视为治理信任和降低代理成本的高效率制度安排。然而,越来越多的研究发现,当父母对子女的不对称的利他主义与私人所有权、所有者管理等特征相互交织时,家族企业凸现自我控制问题,这削弱了正式治理机制的效率。因此,家族企业同样面临逆向选择、道德风险和要挟等代理问题。嵌入在血缘和利他主义中的家族和企业两大系统的相互作用,使家族企业的代理问题更加复杂化,也给家族企业治理提出了难题。     

The Bioeconomics of Cooperation

When transactions and information are costly and exchange is non-simultaneous, ‘institutions matter’. They matter because exchange under these circumstances subjects the participants to potentially harmful behaviors by other participants, among which are: opportunistic behavior, agency, the free-rider problem, cheating, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Institutions constrain these behaviors, allowing the participants to take advantage of the gains from trade and specialization, and thereby facilitating cooperation. Individuals adhere to institutional rules because they gain by doing so. Because the individual gains are inseparable from the structure of the institutions, the institutions themselves necessarily become the focus of the analysis—as we see in the new institutional economics (NIE). The new group selection position in biology involves a similar shift in focus from the level of the individual to the group when studying the evolution of altruism. But some of the proponents of group selection go further, arguing that altruism in biology evolves because it is in the interest of the group, but not the individual. In fact, group level analysis is necessary in biology, as in the NIE, because it allows for the discovery of ‘institutions’ that constrain cheating, opportunistic behavior, etc., thereby making participation in the group in the long-run self-interest of the individual. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Why Skew Selection, a Model of Parental Exploitation, Should Replace Kin Selection

Synopsis In his 1964 paper, William Hamilton wrote that inclusive fitness trumps direct fitness if, and only if, the effect of interactions among siblings on their parent’s fitness is ‘zero’. Kin selection models have succeeded only because they have ignored the fact that, if an altruist dies saving two siblings, the ‘zero impact on their parent’s fitness’ constraint is violated. Imagine a parent with three offspring. If two offspring drown, parental fitness is 1. On the other hand, if one altruistic offspring dies saving its two drowning siblings, parental fitness doubles to 2. Thus, direct fitness trumps inclusive fitness as an explanation for the evolution of altruism. In other words, parents that produce some portion of altruistic offspring willing to die to save some of their siblings (who would die without the intervention of the altruist) will realize greater fitness than parents producing no altruists. Skew selection, a bioeconomic extension of Michael Ghiselin’s (1974) parental exploitation model, is presented to explain the evolution of altruism from a direct fitness point of view.     

利他行为对信息系统集成知识创新的影响

针对知识的非消耗性属性,以利他行为的客观存在性为前提,将知识创新中的利他行为划分为知识共享利他行为和知识创新成本分担利他行为,针对两种情形构建知识创新模型,通过模型演算分析利他行为对知识创新绩效的影响。指出:利他行为对知识创新效益的影响可能为正也可能为负——有助于提升知识创新度,但也会促使"搭便车"行为发生,即知识收益分享比例和知识创新成本分担比例都存在闵值,小于该闵值时知识创新整体效益将提升;利他行为受合作主体的知识积累效率和知识创新努力程度的影响。最后,以厦门区域医疗协同平台为例,阐述了信息系统集成知识创新中的利他行为。     

现代经济学中人性假设的心理学基础及其问题——“经济人”假设与“为己利他”行为机理的比较

现代主流经济学的经济人假设以早期还原主义心理学为理论基础,它仅仅反映了动物性的本能需求而忽视了人类的社会性;因此,它不仅无法揭示无形的手来自何处以及如何运作,也无法根本上理解囚徒困境与现实相悖的现象。相反为己利他行为机理则以新近人本主义心理学为理论基础,它将人类基于动物性的本能目的和基于社会性的实现手段结合起来;因此,它可以更好地挖掘无形的手是如何运作而实现社会协调,从而是比经济人假设更合理、有效的人性抽象。     

Family ownership,altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises

Given the continuing uncertainty about whether family firms enjoy lower agency costs, this article hypothesizes that a combination of the effects of family ownership, altruism and self-control is instead at play. To begin with, family ownership can indeed reduce agency costs through better aligning the interests of owners and managers. This is a ‘determining’ effect in that it independently mitigates one source of agency problems. However, altruism combined with self-control problems arising from the highly concentrated ownership often found in family firms can also increase agency costs. This is an ‘embedding’ effect as it is rooted in the personal relationships within the family firm. Using the Business Longitudinal Database compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that for larger SMEs (those with 20–200 employees), the gains in lower agency costs arising from family ownership are almost completely offset by the losses from altruism and the lack of self-control.     

The Logic of Good Social Relations

Good social relations have more or less an aspect of gift-giving which, by nature, can be neither bought nor imposed. Interaction in this respect will lead purely selfish people to an irremediably inferior state, while pure altruism and unconditional morality are very demanding on the ground of motivation. However, a satisfactory solution solely requires that an actor reciprocates the others' attitude, a much less demanding behaviour. Such reciprocity also fosters standard economic efficiency, and can be elicited by a number of widespread psychological features.     

Competition for Power and Altruism

The paper analyzes the trade-off between power and altruism by using an experimental framework which involved a group of experimental agents, undergraduate students of the University of Siena. The results show that the introduction into the experimental structure of a tournament for the power appreciably altered the behaviour of agents. More specifically the degree of altruism, measured by the dictator offers, significantly decreased when the agents were able to trade altruism for power. The results were more clear-cut and robust in the case of the dictator game, but also in the case of the ultimatum game the introduction of the tournament for power altered the behavior of subjects. A significant gender effect emerged.     

Group Selection and the Limits to Altruism

Several evolutionary mechanisms have been identified in the literature that would generate altruism in humans. The most powerful (except for kin selection) and most controversial is group selection, as recently analyzed by Sober & D.S. Wilson. I do not take a stand on the issue of the existence of group selection. Instead, I examine the level of human altruism that could exist if group selection were an engine of human evolution. For the Sober & Wilson mechanism to work, groups practicing altruism must grow faster than other groups. I call altruistic behavior that would lead to faster growth efficient altruism. This often consists of cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma. ltruistic acts such as helping a temporarily hungry or injured person would qualify as efficient altruism. Efficient altruism would also require monitoring recipients to avoid shirking. Utilitarianism would be an ethical system consistent with efficient altruism, but Marxism or the Rawlsian system would not. Discussions of efficient altruism also help understand intuitions about fairness. We perceive those behaviors as fair that are consistent with efficient altruism. It is important to understand that, even if humans are selected to be altruistic, the forms of altruism that might exist must be carefully considered and ircumscribed.     

Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Dynasties and Uncertain Lifetimes

This paper studies how the lack of an annuities market affects savings behavior and intergenerational transfers in a dynastic overlapping generations economy. I find that the answer to this question depends crucially on altruism. On the one hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is operative, then the lack of annuity markets enhances capital accumulation. On the other hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is not operative, the absence of annuity markets can either increase or decrease aggregate savings. I characterize under which conditions capital accumulation is enhanced. I also prove that an overlapping generations economy with altruism and uninsurable lifetime risk faces capital overaccumulation relative to the modified Golden Rule. The efficient allocation corresponding to the modified Golden Rule can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by a pay-as-you-go social security system, and this can only be done if individuals are altruistic.