On the Effectiveness of Capital Gains tax as a Stabilizer of Real Estate Prices

This paper examines the effectiveness of capital gains tax as a stabilizer of real estate prices. Capital gains tax is shown to induce long-term holdings of real estate through a tax deferral effects and hence negate the intended effect. Furthermore, it is shown that a change in the tax rate may stabilize the price only temporarily without any lasting effect on the speculative holdings of real estate. Of course the presence of property tax, for example, may affect speculative activities differently—a subject into which this paper does not delve. [323]     

对上海、重庆房产税征收的深思考——基于不动产购买者分析视角

房产税改革的试点工作已经一年多了,改革道路中所遇到的困难较多,所取得的成效也不是很明显,加之大众的舆论压力,房产税的开征似乎在被否定,其实不然。房产税对高房价的抑制作用是一个过程,并非一蹴而就的事情。政府应加大投资力度,并出台相关政策法规促进并保护改革的顺利进行;地方政府需在配合中央工作的同时,引导其走入正确的轨道上来;房产开发商则需履行好商业道德,诚信做事;至于不动产购买者,要维护房产税的开征工作,丢弃投机行为,并为房产税的开征提供合理化建议。房产税的改革工作需要多方共同努力,创造条件,才能为房地产市场走向理性化营造良好环境。     

The size and growth of banks: evidence from four European countries

This paper tests for mimicry in local tax setting, by using a panel data set of the English non-metropolitan districts in the 1980s — when property tax rate variability across districts was highest. The results confirm the presence of large and significant spatial interactions among districts. Even after allowing for district-specific and time effects, a district appears to be significantly affected by its neighbours' policies. A 10% increase in the local property tax rate of a district's neighbours leads to an increase of 4–5% in its own property tax rate. On the other hand, the absence of correlation in tax rates between lower tier (district) authorities and upper tier (county) authorities suggests that the spatial pattern in district tax rates is not simply driven by spatially auto-correlated shocks.     

房地产税、市场结构与房价

本文在住房流量模型的基础上,构建了一个购房者和开发商的住房市场局部均衡模型,考察了完全垄断和完全竞争情形下房地产税与房价之间的关系。结果表明,无论何种市场结构,提高房地产税均导致房价下降;住房市场垄断性越强,房价越高,房地产税对房价影响越大。笔者对1996-2008年中国33个大中城市数据的检验发现,市场结构对房价影响大于房地产税。房地产税增长率每增加1%,房价增长率将减少0.03%;勒纳指数每增加1%,房价增长率将增加0.16%。房地产税与市场结构相互作用将使房价上涨,但影响微不足道。因此,对住宅开征房地产税,将对房价上涨有一定限制作用,但不能有效抑制房价上涨,而增强住宅市场竞争性、降低开发商垄断具有显著效果。     

Numerical simulation on property tax reform: evidence from China

This article analyses the property tax reform in China in a computable general equilibrium model that recognizes the interaction between and among housing markets in different provinces and macroeconomic development. Using real data in 2010, we present the benchmark equilibrium for reference property and income tax rates. Then, we examine different property and income tax policies and make a comparison of their production, consumption, welfare and national income. We find that the implementation of property tax would decrease the house production at the expense of welfare in taxed area. The expansion of the taxed regions may increase the total social welfare and national income. Even though property tax policy may not be able to change the income distribution in China, increasing income tax rate could narrow the income disparity. Finally, this article shows the reliability of the conclusions when sensitivity analysis on optimal condition of equilibrium computation is performed under varied property tax policy.     

The asset price incidence of capital gains taxes: evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and publicly-traded real estate firms

We provide new evidence on the asset price incidence of corporate-level investment subsidies by examining the relative stock price performance of publicly traded companies in the real estate industry that should have been differentially affected by the capital gains tax rate reduction enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. By comparing real estate firms that have an organizational structure that allows entities who sell property to it to defer capital gains taxes and that plan to use the structure to acquire property with those that do not, we isolate the effect of the tax cut from industry trends and firm-level heterogeneity. When we examine the time period surrounding the reduction in the capital gains tax rate, our results suggest the tax change was substantially capitalized into lower share prices for these firms and the benefit of the seller’s capital gains tax deferral accrued mainly to the buyer of an appreciated property.     

利益均衡视阈下的不动产税制设计

开征不动产税是在我国市场经济逐渐走向成熟,利益主体日趋多元化背景下,完善税收体系的重要举措.因而,有关不动产税的研究,应置于利益均衡的范畴内,通过确认、界定、分配和协调各个利益主体之间的关系,以构建更具稳定性和实效性的不动产税制.     

Partially Irreversible Investment Decisions and Taxation under Uncertainty: A Real Option Approach

The paper applies contingent claims analysis in a real option investment model in order to investigate taxation's influence on investor's decisions under uncertainty. The results show the distortion from realistic-type tax systems, allow to identify a tax-induced paradox in option valuation for specific settings and acknowledge the property of investment neutrality of well-known 'ideal' tax systems in the context of different degrees of irreversibility. Furthermore, it is clarified that the idea of risk-neutral valuation cannot be adopted by the real option approach in general.     

空置税：取代物业税的一种思路

近期，社会各界对物业税应否进入政府操作层面的争论再度升温。剖析物业税可能带来的矛盾与问题，可得出以空置税取代物业税的思路：一方面，空置税可以吸收国际上利用物业税有效调控房地产市场的成功经验，发挥物业税的积极作用；另一方面，空置税可以避免在我国当前客观实际情况下开征物业税可能带来的种种弊端。     

房地产税渐进改革路径*——基于税制要素设计的实证研究

在保持房地产市场平稳的前提下，使房地产税成为地方重要税种是中国房地产税改革的重要政策目标，但在高房价收入比背景下，这二者相互冲突。本文基于房地产税制要素设计和微观家庭数据测算，探讨中国房地产税的渐进改革路径及其影响，认为鉴于居民纳税能力受高房价收入比限制，房地产税可从低税率、高减免起步；伴随房价收入比收敛，逐步提高税率、降低减免。起步阶段，税制改革应重视居民纳税能力和纳税意愿，优先实现房地产市场平稳软着陆；在中长期，房地产税可逐步成为地方政府主体税种，起到完善税制和地方税体系、提升地方治理能力的作用。     

You can take it with you: Proposition 13 tax benefits,residential mobility,and willingness to pay for housing amenities

The endogeneity of prices has long been recognized as the main identification problem in the estimation of marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the characteristics of a given product. This issue is particularly important in the housing market, since a number of housing and neighborhood features are unobserved by the econometrician. This paper proposes the use of a well defined type of transaction costs–moving costs generated by property tax laws–to deal with this type of omitted variable bias. California's Proposition 13 property tax law is the source of variation in transaction costs used in the empirical analysis. Beyond its fiscal consequences, Proposition 13 created a lock-in effect on housing choice because of the implicit tax break enjoyed by homeowners living in the same house for a long time. Its importance to homeowners is estimated from a natural experiment created by two amendments that allow households headed by an individual over the age of 55 to transfer the implicit tax benefit to a new home. Indeed, 55-year old homeowners have 25% higher moving rates than those of comparable 54 year olds. These transaction costs from the property tax laws are then incorporated into a household sorting model. The key insight is that because of the property tax laws, different potential buyers may have different user costs for the same house. The exogenous property tax component of this user cost is then used as an instrumental variable. I find that MWTP estimates for housing characteristics are approximately 100% upward biased when the choice model does not account for the price endogeneity.     

Economic growth,corruption and tax evasion

In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is financed by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. We show that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases. But, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low shame” countries is lower than that of “uniform shame” countries which is, in turn, lower than that of “high shame” countries. This happens because the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an honest country rather than in a corrupt country.     

物业税可行吗？

物业税作为一种财产税，具有其自身的特征。未来我国在物业税的设计过程中需要考虑多种因素，规避相关风险，否则很可能使得现在的高房价变成未来的高额物业税。     

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research, but little empirical support. The empirical literature has concentrated on cross-country studies and the size of the public sector, and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality. This analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution (here tax structure). New data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in Norway are exploited. We show how the multi-dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences. In the econometric analysis, instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution. The estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution.     

TAXES AND GROWTH: TESTING THE NEOCLASSICAL AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODELS

Changes in the tax rate alter real growth permanently in an endogenous growth model, but only temporarily in a neoclassical model, where the only permanent effect is a decrease in the steady-state level of output per capita. Using data from the 1960'1992 period for a panel of 11 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development economies, this paper's empirical results support the following conclusions. First, consistent with the tax smoothing hypothesis, tax rates have exhibited significant persistent changes while output growth rates have not. Second, a higher tax rate permanently reduces the level of output but has no permanent effects on the output growth rate. These findings are inconsistent with endogenous growth mechanisms and suggest that the relationship between output and the tax rate is best described by the neoclassical growth model. (JEL E62, 041)     

A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty

In this paper we use a real option model for assessing uncertain investment projects and we show that—due to a flexibility premium—taxes asymmetrically affect the option value of projects that differ in their riskiness. Hence, this may generate distortions. We analytically identify a set of neutral tax rates (a tax regime) that preserve the post‐tax investment threshold if taxes change, and determine normal and paradoxical settings for investments. Unlike other tax paradoxes neither depreciation rules nor loss offset restrictions cause these paradoxical reactions. Taxes affect each project individually, depending on the project risks involved. This implies that, for a variety of uncertain projects, taxes cannot be neutral on aggregate.     

开征累进物业税的战略构想

地价过快上涨和投机需求旺盛是造成房价不合理上涨的两个重要原因。在城乡同时开征累进物业税可以解决上述问题。累进物业税的开征对象包括城市住宅、城市已出让土地及农村住宅。在城乡共同开征物业税的基础上,将物业税归为地方税种,在中央和地方之间重新分配土地出让金,弱化地方抬高地价的内在冲动。     

REAL ESTATE TAX IN URBAN CHINA

Since its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has adopted several contrasting policies to address the urban housing problem. Among them have been changes in real estate tax law. The first real estate tax laws in the PRC were promulgated in January 1950. Amended several times, they became ineffective after 1973. In September 1986, the State Council promulgated a new real estate tax law affecting all urban properties. According to this new law, real estate taxes are to be levied on owners, so that most real estate taxes have been paid by enterprises rather than households. However, with the recent drive to privatize housing in urban China, property rights are being transferred from public to private ownership, and in conjunction with real estate taxes, this is producing undesired inequalities. This paper investigates the development of real estate taxation, examines the role of property tax in the ongoing housing reform, and recommends changes in real estate taxes that would better achieve the government's egalitarian goals. ( JEL H20, R31)     

PUBLIC FINANCE AND REGIONAL ACCOUNTS*

This paper discusses the problems that arise in the regional allocation of public sector accounts. These problems arise mainly in connection with the regional allocation of government expenditures on a governing rather than a procurement basis, and in the derivation of a meaningful surplus or deficit. The latter in turn requires an examination of the real geographic incidence of government revenues—to avoid, for instance, the assignment of the whole tobacco tax to Virginia and North Carolina. The use of a procurement basis for government product and the real geographic distribution of direct tax incidence for government revenue would produce a more complete and meaningful regional surplus or deficit measure, and gross regional products will not be as subject to spurious inter-regional variation.     

Limited Consumer Attention in International Trade

This paper introduces a model of limited consumer attention into an otherwise standard new trade theory model with love‐of‐variety preferences and heterogeneous firms. In this setting, we show that international integration needs not be welfare enhancing if the consumers' capacity to gather and process information is limited. Rather, it intensifies competition for scarce consumer attention, which causes mutual overbidding of producers in their advertising expenditures. The mutual overbidding renders advertising—which is informative in principle—wasteful and diverts purchases to imported goods at an inefficient scale. Wasteful advertising provides scope for policy intervention in the form of an advertising tax. However, if the tax instrument is not allowed to discriminate against foreign producers, it cannot eliminate inefficient diversion of consumer purchases to imports; hence it needs not be successful in securing gains from international integration in this framework.