基于公平偏好下的风险企业家道德风险研究

风险企业家在向风险投资家寻求融资共同发展风险项目的过程中表现出有限理性,具有公平偏好心理,其往往因为嫉妒心理而影响到自身的努力水平,这样,风险投资中的道德风险问题不可避免,进而会损害到风险投资家的利益。本文从有限理性的角度出发,通过设计针对具有公平偏好的风险企业家的有效激励机制,以此来分析和防范公平偏好心理带来的道德风险问题。研究表明,风险投资家应尽可能选择公平偏好程度较小的风险企业家作为投资对象,以减少或规避风险投资市场中的道德风险。     

不公平对待对努力水平的影响——基于三阶段锦标模型的研究

行为经济学研究认为,人们在自利偏好之外还存在公平偏好,不公平对待将导致额外效用;而心理学实验又表明,不公平对待会使人们产生相对剥夺感并增加努力成本。基于公平偏好理论及相对剥夺观点,构建了三阶段晋升锦标模型,研究不公平对待对代理人努力水平的影响。结果表明,代理人的努力水平选择取决于对未来的预期,并且工资差距、努力成本、嫉妒和自豪心理以及监管精度都会影响代理人的努力水平。这一结论有利于预测代理人的行为规律,为建立最优激励机制提供更符合现实情况的理论依据。     

考虑保鲜努力的生鲜农产品零售商与物流服务商的协调合同

物流服务商提高生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平会对零售商的利润产生重要影响。一般的物流合同不能有效鼓励物流服务商提高生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平。为此,本文建立了一种成本分担与收入共享合同。该合同在不损害物流服务商利益的前提下,使物流服务商提高保鲜努力水平;同时,零售商分担部分保鲜努力成本,并分享部分销售收入给物流服务商。研究结果表明,这一合同可形成一种有效的内在激励机制,提高物流服务商对生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平,最终实现系统利润的最大化、双方的共赢。     

基于纵向公平偏好视角的委托代理模型及薪酬激励机制研究

在高管薪酬水平过高、企业内部薪酬差距过大的背景下,从纵向公平偏好的视角研究了企业内部的委托代理关系和薪酬激励机制,假设员工是具有嫉妒和自豪两种纵向公平偏好的风险规避者,设计了代理人具有纵向公平偏好的委托代理模型。通过模型求解得到如下结论:当总经理的预期净收入高于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而减小;当总经理的预期净收入低于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而增大。     

二级供应链中代理人的甄别与激励研究

文章分析了由一个制造商与一个分销商所组成的二级供应链中,既存在契约签订之前的逆向选择问题又存在契约签订之后的道德风险问题这一情况下,制造商对分销商的类型甄别及努力激励的机制设计问题。主要得到以下结论：①制造商可以通过努力收益分享的方式激励销售商投入最优的努力水平,进而规避道德风险行为。②制造商通过设计一组激励相容机制可以达到甄别分销商类型的目的,但必须支付给高销售能力分销商一定的租金。③高销售能力分销商的销量水平不存在扭曲,而低销售能力分销商的销量水平向下扭曲,其原因在于制造商降低给低销售能力分销商规定的销量就能够降低支付给高销售能力分销商的信息租金。文章从供应链中逆向选择与道德风险共存的角度对供应链委托代理关系进行研究,得出结论为供应链中的委托代理双方提供了一定的决策依据。     

考虑公平偏好的两阶段众包创新激励机制研究

为解决多任务多阶段众包创新委托代理的激励问题,使接包方更努力完成任务,文章基于现代经济学公平偏好理论,建立了考虑任务参与者公平偏好的双任务两阶段委托代理模型.借助模型分析了众包创新过程中公平偏好程度与接包方的努力程度、产出分享比例及众包创新绩效等的关系.结果 显示,对称信息情况下公平偏好程度对众包创新的两个阶段产出效益无影响.非对称信息情况下随着公平偏好强度增大,发包方收益和接包方努力水平也在提高,而固定收入、产出分享系数在减小.通过模型仿真也发现公平偏好程度并不是越大越好,过于频繁地采取相同的激励措施会降低激励效果.     

制造商与零售商共同努力减少无缺陷退货的收益共享合同

针对制造商与零售商在共同努力减少客户无缺陷退货中的双边道德风险问题,本文分析了制造商和零售商的努力水平对无缺陷退货率的影响,运用委托-代理理论设计了双边道德风险下的收益共享合同,分析了各参数对合同的影响。结果表明,最优收益共享激励系数与制造商的努力弹性系数负相关,与零售商的努力弹性系数正相关,与产品的单位收益、产品的首次销售量以及双方的努力成本系数无关。     

参与者公平偏好对协作型众包创新绩效激励机制的影响

协作型众包创新是以最大化创新绩效为目标的众包模式,相关实践案例已有所显现,但协作型众包创新过程中参与方的努力行为经常受到其公平偏好心理的影响。针对这一问题,采用委托代理理论,通过设计仅基于个人创新绩效(AR)和基于总创新绩效(TR)的两种激励机制提升协作型众包创新绩效,并深入探讨公平偏好对激励机制的影响。结果表明,AR机制中参赛者不可能出现利他性努力行为,而TR机制下利己性努力和利他性努力均与公平偏好负相关;两种激励机制下众包创新绩效均随公平偏好敏感度增大而下降,参赛者数量增加是否有利于提升众包创新绩效也取决于公平偏好程度;TR机制一定会产生比AR机制更高的众包绩效及发包方经济收益,但这种价值效应会被参赛者的公平偏好心理所弱化。     

考虑公平关切的团队多主体行为演化研究

基于行为经济学相关理论,在团队合作过程中考虑成员的公平关切行为,构建了公平关切作用下团队成员行为决策的演化博弈模型,研究了成员公平关切度、产出能力、利润分享系数、协同效应系数等因素对成员行为选择的影响;分析了成员行为选择的演化稳定策略,旨在为提升成员努力水平、防范机会主义行为提供参考。结果表明,成员公平关切系数、努力成本系数与其努力水平呈负相关,而利润分享系数、成员产出能力则与主体努力水平呈正相关。     

贷款抵押物对完全信息条件和道德风险条件下竞争均衡的影响

文章分析了贷款抵押物对完全信息条件和道德风险条件下竞争均衡的影响。抵押机制能消除事前事后非对称信息引起的矛盾。完全信息条件下,抵押物不影响借款者的收益和努力程度,但能降低贷款利率,抵押物价值越大,利率越低,没有抵押物时,利率最高。道德风险条件下,抵押物影响借款者的收益和努力程度以及贷款利率的大小。抵押物价值越大,则借款者工作越积极,收益也越高,利率也越低。     

Distributional preference in Japan

Using experiments developed by Engelmann and Strobel ( 2004 ), this study investigates distributional preference in Japan. We find that just over half the people in the study have a maximin preference, approximately 7 to 19% have an efficiency preference, approximately 8% have a self‐interest preference, and approximately 18% chose the allocation that would reduce the payoff to the rich and the poor, given that her/his payoff would remain constant. The last preference could be interpreted as what is referred to as “malice”, “deep envy” or a “feeling of vulnerability” in behavioural economics and cross‐cultural psychology.     

偏好反转对协同知识创新决策的影响

基于协同知识创新决策风险性,引入行为经济学偏好反转理论,从知识积累视角构建偏好反转影响下的知识创新模型。将协同知识创新决策从单纯的选择决策拓展为选择/放弃决策,在不同决策背景下对模型进行演算。结果发现,当协作方对创新资源投入分摊比例较低时,主体对未来收益的不确定性预期较低,而在偏好反转的影响下,放弃决策对预期收益的退出定价可能较高,从而使背离放弃决策相比进入选择决策更有利于协同创新。研究结论解释了当前较多的协同知识创新联盟尽管没有实现科技政策调整的预期效果,但未大规模解体且力趋稳定合作的现象。     

Changing the probability versus changing the reward

There are two means of changing the expected value of a risk: changing the probability of a reward or changing the reward. Theoretically, the former produces a greater change in expected utility for risk averse agents. This paper uses two formats of a risk preference elicitation mechanism under two decision frames to test this hypothesis. After controlling for decision error, probability weighting, and order effects, subjects, on average, are slightly risk averse and prefer an increase in the expected value of a risk due to increasing the probability over a compensated increase in the reward. There is substantial across-format inconsistency but very little within-format inconsistency at the individual level.     

公平偏好在劳动契约中的作用探讨

劳动契约是典型的不完全契约,一般认为自利的工人仅仅只会做出最低程度的努力水平,而近年来的实验与行为经济学发现工人的选择并不完全符合自利的假设,工人的努力程度还会受到其公平偏好的影响,由于工人的选择直接影响到企业的获利状况,故企业在制定工资水平时应该考虑工人对公平的诉求。     

On fair allocations

This paper examines the effects of fairness on economic behavior and allocations, where fairness is defined as the absence of envy among consumers. We use the benefit function to investigate the welfare cost of fairness. We show how fairness generates a form of altruism, captured by a “fair expenditure” function that depends on the distribution of welfare. We define the most efficient fair allocations and explore the implications of fairness for economic behavior, pricing and redistribution policies.     

Social responsibility promotes conservative risk behavior

Previous studies show that group risk taking can be more conservative than individual risk taking. Two common, but untested reasons for this greater caution are the influence of social responsibility and a tendency to conform to the preferences of others. We study changes in risk taking in simple settings, where another’s risk taking can sometimes be observed, and where decisions affect not only one’s own payoffs but sometimes also affect those of a passive, second party. We find that social responsibility leads to more conservative risk behavior in group decision making. Conformism has a more symmetric effect: observing the choice of another tends to lead both individual and social decisions toward whatever the other’s expressed risk preference is. Direct tests fail to link the social behavior we observe to the social preference for distributional fairness common in decision-making under certainty.     

Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy canmake his utility decline with his employer's income. This articleuses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contractswhen a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker'sparticipation constraint and so calls for higher pay and/ora softer effort requirement. Moreover, a firm with an enviousworker can benefit from profit sharing, even when the worker'seffort is fully contractible. We discuss several applicationsof our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-levelworker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is lowerin nonprofit organizations, and how governmental productionof a good can be cheaper than private production.     

Notes on economic equality

In this paper we propose a simple definition of economic equality and characterize non- paternalist egalitarian preferences. We compare our definition to the ideas of envy and fairness and extend these ideas to the case of extended benevolent preferences. In productive economies efficiency and equality may conflict, just as do efficiency and the absence of envy. We suggest a feasible compromise in this case.