共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 593 毫秒
1.
2.
本文在分析上市公司利润导向与成长能力导向目标的特征及相互关系的基础上,基于Holmstrom和Milgrom(1991)的多任务委托代理模型,构建了上市公司利润导向与成长能力导向目标的激励机制模型,并探讨了代理人在两个目标上的努力程度和代理能力水平对委托代理效果的影响.研究表明:(1)在信息对称条件下,委托人对两个目标的激励因子均为零,即采取固定工资报酬形式,代理人在两个目标上的努力程度和代理能力水平受其行为的自影响系数和交互影响系数的影响.(2)在信息非对称条件下,委托人对两个目标的激励因子不仅受代理人行为的自影响系数和交互影响系数的影响,而且还与两个目标的可衡量程度有关,此时代理人在两个目标上的努力程度和代理能力水平不仅受其行为的自影响系数和交互影响系数的影响,而且还与两个目标的激励因子有关.基于模型结论,本文还提出了提升我国上市公司成长能力的政策建议. 相似文献
3.
4.
扶弱抑强:组织中的资源配置歧视 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
文章基于锦标赛模型分析了组织中扶弱抑强的歧视性资源配置现象.模型表明,若互相竞争的代理人能力不对称,则扶弱抑强的歧视性资源配置政策将降低刺激代理人努力的竞赛奖金(即激励成本),因而有利于委托人.模型还表明,强者与弱者的能力差距必须在一定范围内,委托人才能通过竞赛激励合约得到好处;并且委托人倾向在代理人能力相差不大时减少代理人生产风险,而在代理人能力相差悬殊时选择增加代理人生产风险,即通过操纵代理人的"运气"来促进代理人的竞争.文章分析也有助于思考广泛存在的各种扶弱抑强的社会现象. 相似文献
5.
6.
企业团队中拆台行为的博弈分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
文章在建立了基于相对业绩比较的企业团队激励机制模型,由于团队内部相互拆台可能发生,于是在此基础上建立有拆台行为的激励模型。拆台会导致努力水平降低,团队产出减少。为了防止拆台行为的发生,进一步引入基本目标要求建立了减弱拆台行为团队分析模型。分析得到在团队组织中,引入基本目标后,员工的拆台倾向将减弱。同时如果员工满足的最低目标不超过最优产出时,其努力水平将减少。 相似文献
7.
8.
针对多个代理人之间存在多种关系———竞争、合作和中立的情况,建立了信息对称和信息非对称条件下的多代理人行为选择模型,通过模型求解与模拟计算分析多关系条件下多代理人的行为选择和委托人的最优选择或激励机制。结果表明:信息对称条件下,员工薪酬与员工间的竞争程度无关,但合作关系更能激励员工努力工作;信息非对称条件下,员工间关系影响其薪酬和企业利润,合作关系下的企业总收益比其他关系下的企业收益高,员工间的合作关系会影响并提高处于其他关系下员工的努力程度。最后提出:企业面对多员工管理问题时应尽量构建合作的工作环境,以减小员工工作努力程度的不确定性、实现利益最大化。 相似文献
9.
《中南财经政法大学学报》2014,(4)
劳方和资方的议价能力决定了劳动契约的属性,而劳资双方的风险态度则是影响各自议价能力的重要因素。本文利用比较制度实验的方法,分析不同风险态度的委托人在面对信任契约、奖励契约和惩罚契约时的选择倾向,不同风险态度的代理人实际努力水平的差异,以及风险态度对双方收益的影响。研究结果表明:除对信任契约和奖励契约下的委托人行为没有显著影响外,风险态度对委托人的契约选择行为、代理人的实际努力水平以及他们的总收益都存在着显著的影响。这一研究结论为劳动契约设计的激励相容提供了行为基础。 相似文献
10.
11.
Christian Deutscher Bernd Frick Oliver Gürtler Joachim Prinz 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2013,115(4):1138-1157
In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In a first step, we develop a formal model, which yields the prediction that favorites exert higher productive effort, while underdogs are more tempted to engage in destructive actions (sabotage). This is because favorites have a higher return on productive effort and both types of effort are substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this prediction. In line with the model, we find that favorite teams win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls. 相似文献
12.
On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis 下载免费PDF全文
When agents compete for a bonus and their productivity in each of several possible occasions depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times this is checked to assign the bonus affects the level of uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the effort made by competing agents (Cowen and Glazer, 1996; Dubey and Haimanko, 2003; Dubey and Wu, 2001). Theoretical predictions are derived and experimental evidence is collected for two competing agents, with the bonus awarded to that agent who outperforms the other. Sampling occasions (1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric or symmetric), and piece‐rate reward are manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty. For control, a single‐agent case is included. Results indicate that, for tournaments, greater uncertainty does indeed lead to greater than expected effort and lower average variable costs. 相似文献
13.
Tournaments are vulnerable to collusion. This paper finds that biased tournaments can be more effective at preventing collusion than unbiased ones. When agents can collude to exert low effort, introducing some bias into tournaments generates opposite effects on favored and disfavored agents׳ respective incentives to exert high effort and provides strong incentives for the favored agent to deviate from collusion. Introducing an adequate degree of bias reduces the principal׳s incentive cost for preventing collusion; however, granting excessive bias instead increases the incentive cost. We show that the optimal level of bias can be endogenously determined. 相似文献
14.
Kristoffer W. Eriksen Ola Kvaløy Trond E. Olsen 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2011,113(3):729-753
In some tournaments, it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Union members bargain over wage distribution, and some firms allow self‐managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labor. We analyze, and test experimentally, a tournament where heterogeneous agents determine the spread between winner prize and loser prize. We investigate the relationship between prize spread, uncertainty, heterogeneity, and effort. We find that a large prize spread is associated with a low degree of uncertainty and a high degree of heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity triggers effort. By and large, our real‐effort experiment supports the theoretical predictions. 相似文献
15.
On the Competition of Asymmetric Agents 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract. Rank-order tournaments are usually implemented in organizations to provide incentives for eliciting employees' effort and/or to identify the agent with the higher ability, for example in promotion tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by experimentally analyzing a ceteris paribus variation of the prize spread – being the major design feature of tournaments – in a symmetric and an asymmetric setting. We find that effort significantly increases with the prize spread as predicted by standard theory. However, only for sufficiently large prize spreads weak players competing against strong players strain themselves all the more and sorting of agents is feasible. 相似文献
16.
Rank-order tournaments are often presented as devices for aligning incentives in a principal-agent setting. In most of this
literature agents are expected to be identical so that the principal is indifferent ex ante as to who wins the contest, implying
that the selection properties of the tournament can be ignored. In this paper we consider a tournament which is not necessarily
symmetric, and in which agent type is private information. The principal cares about who wins, but the basic tournament will
not achieve perfect selection; the lower-type agent may sometimes win. In a two-player tournament we present a simple reward
system in which the winner's reward depends upon which (if any) of two “test standards” is passed; conditions are presented
under which this system allows the principal to choose the best agent. This system can be extended in a simple manner to rank
types in ann-player tournament. We suggest that the theory can be applied to internal labor markets and research contests. 相似文献
17.
Rank order tournaments, in which the payment to an agent is based upon relative observed performance, are a commonly used
compensation scheme. In practice, agents often compete in some (but not all) events in a set of tournaments. The present study
considers two mutually exclusive tournaments, in which agents themselves decide which event to enter. An agent bases this
decision upon the combination of three distinct effects: a prize effect, a winning probability effect, and an effort cost
effect. The precise impact of each of these effects is analyzed. Of particular interest is the possibility that a field of
higher quality may be attracted to the event with smaller prizes.
相似文献
18.
We examine legal services contracts characterized by a contingency fee and an hours reporting requirement in a moral hazard setting. We find that hours reporting requirements in contingency contracts can reduce the rent needed to induce high attorney effort under moral hazard. Under certain conditions, the ability to set hours above the first-best level leads a client to choose a contract inducing high effort when she otherwise would not. The important condition of this result is, however, that hours must be contractible. We apply our model to the 2010 Florida “sunshine” law that requires hours reporting by private attorneys employed on a contingency fee basis by the attorney general. We find the sunshine laws of Florida and other states may, in addition to providing more transparency in government contracting, increase the public benefit from an attorney general’s employment of private attorneys. 相似文献
19.
DMITRY RYVKIN 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2009,11(5):819-855
We consider three prominent tournament formats—contests, binary elimination tournaments, and round-robin tournaments—in the case when players are heterogeneous in their abilities but the heterogeneity is, in a well-defined sense, weak. Using linear approximation, we characterize equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the three tournament games and compare them to the benchmark symmetric case of identical players. We describe small deviations from the symmetric equilibria by elasticities of a player's equilibrium effort with respect to her own ability and the abilities of her rivals. Our results only require general symmetry and smoothness assumptions but not specific functional forms for the probabilities of winning in tournaments. We show that, in equilibrium: (i) a player's effort and payoff depend on her rivals' abilities in a model-independent way, either through the average ability of the field (for static games), or through the properly discounted average ability of the field (for dynamic elimination tournaments); (ii) players respond stronger to changes in their own relative abilities than to changes in their rivals' relative abilities; (iii) aggregate effort (dissipated rent) does not change compared to the benchmark case; (iv) it is not possible to manipulate aggregate effort through seeding in binary elimination tournaments, although optimal seeding schemes for other purposes can be identified; and (v) balanced seeding and a uniform distribution of relative abilities cancel out the dependence of a player's effort on her rivals' abilities in binary elimination tournaments. 相似文献