‘Conscience Capitalism’ and the Neoliberalisation of the Non-Profit Sector

This article analyses a range of initiatives, labelled as ‘conscience capitalist’, that have become prominent since the 2008 financial crash. Conscience capitalism encompasses projects emerging in both the for- and non-profit sectors that seek to connect neoliberal capitalism with concepts of morality and conscience. The article begins by unpacking conscience capitalism, showing how its for-profit advocates seek to transform capitalism by orienting it towards accounting for social and environmental externalities, and how its non-profit supporters seek to incorporate components of neoliberalism to serve their environmentally and/or socially focused agendas. Conscience capitalism appears to be a re-evaluation and call for reform of the prominent forms of neoliberalism. However, this article argues that, rather than comprising a hindrance, conscience capitalism offers a means of advancing the project. This is evident in its attempts to reconstitute social and environmental externalities in terms relatable to the market, and represent social and environmental problems in quantitative terms in which the success of market-based solutions can be read. Acknowledging some of the successes of conscience capitalist campaigns, the article concludes by arguing that this continued neoliberalisation of the non-profit sector favours campaigns consistent with neoliberalism and has the potential to undermine the democratic governance of non-profits.     

Hospital competition,spillovers and provision of uncompensated care

Using data for California from 2005 until 2010, we investigate to what extent market competition and the presence of non-profits in the area may play a role in equilibrium uncompensated care (UC) levels, allowing those effects to differ according to the hospital’s ownership type. Previous studies have not explored the potential spillover effects from non-profit hospitals into the hospital decision of UC provision. We find evidence that regions with more non-profits experienced larger increases in UC levels, and even more in less concentrated markets. Our results also indicate that UC provision by for-profit hospitals decreases the larger the presence of non-profits in the region, and this effect is magnified when competition is more intense. We, therefore, find no positive spillover effects of non-profits into the hospital decision of UC provision, which may help us to understand the recent trends in UC levels.     

Can you trust the good guys? Trust within and between groups with different missions

Non-governmental organizations and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves with their missions. We study whether these “good guys” are more trustworthy, and how such pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and towards out-groups. We find that subjects who strongly identify themselves with a non-profit mission are more trustworthy in a minimal group setting but also harshly discriminate against out-groups when subjects are grouped by the missions they identify themselves with.     

The nonprofit sector and industry performance

Despite the importance of nonprofit industries in the economy, little analysis has been conducted as to whether the behavior of such industries differs from that of for-profit industries. Extending previous firm-level analyses, we propose a neoclassical theory with an endogenous nonprofit sector. Our analysis implies that nonprofit firms have a competitive advantage over for-profit firms, so that marginal changes in the industry operate through the for-profit sector. As such, marginal industry behavior is identical to that of a for-profit industry and nonprofit regulations may have a limited impact or even no impact on overall industry performance. Our theory has the methodological advantage that standard for-profit analysis applies directly to nonprofit firms, because they can be analyzed as for-profit firms with lower costs. We discuss aspects of the empirical literature that test this theory of nonprofit activity.     

Bringing science to market: commercializing from NIH SBIR awards

We offer empirical information on the correlates of commercialization activity for research projects funded through the US National Institutes of Health's (NIH's) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) award program. Based on this analysis we suggest possible recommendations for improving this aspect of the performance of NIH's SBIR program. Specifically, we estimate a model of the probability of commercialization as a function of the project's ability to attract additional developmental funding, along with other control variables. We find that additional developmental funding from non-SBIR federal sources and from own internal sources are important predictors of commercialization success, relatively more so than additional developmental funding from venture capitalists. We also find, among other things, that university involvement in the underlying research increases the probability of commercialization. Thus, these factors should be considered by NIH when making awards, if increased commercialization is an objective.     

Social interaction and volunteer satisfaction: an exploratory study in primary healthcare

This research investigates the relationship between social interaction amongst volunteers working for non-profit organizations and their satisfaction with what they are doing. Drawing on the literature on social capital, we apply social network theories so as to represent various kinds of interaction. We then specify a CATREG model to pick up the effects of goal-specific social capital on volunteer satisfaction. We test our hypotheses on a population of 100 volunteers in a non-profit organization. The empirical evidence we collect reports that benefits of co-working relationships, like the opportunity to acquire competences or the involvement in decision making, affect levels of satisfaction more than any outcomes of solidarity interaction.     

Nash bargaining model of HMO premiums

This paper estimates a model of commercial HMO premiums based on Nash's axiomatic approach to bargaining between HMOs and employers. The bargaining models incorporate variables that measure the?‘power’?of the parties to affect the division of potential gains from a contract. It is found that an increase in the number of competing HMOs increases the employer's bargaining power and leads to lower premiums, especially for for-profit HMOs. It is also found that employers’?bargaining power over non-profit HMOs is positively related to the ratio of the HMO's administrative expenses/total expenses.     

An international comparison of hospital efficiency: does institutional environment matter?

The consensus among many health economists is that no meaningful performance differences exist among for-profit and non-profit hospitals in the US, but this topic has continued to be a matter of academic, judicial, and public policy interest. A similar debate has ensued internationally, regarding the potential efficiency gains from privatization of public enterprises. In this paper, we examine empirical evidence from the public, highly regulated Norwegian hospital sector and the private, highly competitive and unregulated California hospital sector to ascertain whether institutional environment and level of market competition significantly affect the degree of productive efficiency in hospitals. We compare and discuss the productive efficiency of four similar sets of hospitals operating in different institutional and competitive environments. The four samples are carefully matched in the dimensions of sample size, hospital size, and average lengths of stay. Heterogeneity in output definition is used to control for other dimensions (casemix, age distribution of patients). We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate and compare average long-run as well as short-run efficiency measures across groups. We find that scale and scope regulation of Norwegian hospitals improves long-run efficiency, primarily due to better utilization of capital.     

Stochastic Cost Frontier and Inefficiency Estimates of Public and Private Universities: Does Government Matter?

Stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate operating cost inefficiencies of public and private non-profit universities in the U.S. while also accounting for the possible effects arising from differences in the degree of government ownership. Using panel data for four academic years, 2005?C2009, inefficiencies are estimated under two model specifications. Results indicate that public universities are more cost efficient when environmental factors influence cost frontiers but private universities are the cost efficient institutions when those factors are determinants of inefficiency. Increased government funding does matter and increases private sector inefficiency but offers some efficiency improvements among public universities. Following the global financial crisis, there is evidence indicating a considerable slowdown in the inefficiency growth among both public and private universities.     

Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals

Differential economic behavior of for-profit and nonprofit institutionscan be manifest in both output and input markets. When behaviorin output markets is difficult to observe, behavior in inputmarkets can be useful proxies. We examine monetary compensationand its composition between base salary and bonus, and the associatedincentive structures, in the U.S. hospital industry. Our datapermit controlling for interinstitutional differences in thescope and complexity of jobs having the same titles, as wellas differences in organization size and other variables. Wefind (1) total monetary compensation for the two top executivejobs is substantially higher in the for-profit sector; and (2)the composition of compensation as between base salary and bonusdiffers materially across forms of organization, bonuses beingabsolutely and relatively greater in the for-profit sector.Particularly noteworthy is the finding that for-profit hospitalsutilize compensation mechanisms that, by involving larger contingentcomponents, provide stronger incentives - greater rewards -as compared with nonprofit hospitals, for performance that ismore easily monitored. While our findings are consistent withmore than one model of comparative organizations differ in theirgoals and, hence, in the kinds of managers they demand and thereward structures they offer. Nonprofit organizations may pursueobjectives that reflect greater concern about collective goodsor other outputs that are more difficult to measure and reward.Alternatively, nonprofits, confronted by a nondistribution constrainton the payout of profit to managers, may lack incentives forefficiency, and so may pursue other goals such as a quiet life.Such differential objective functions, together with the differentialconstraints on the distribution of profit to managers, havetwo kinds of implications. (1) Nonprofit and for-profit organizationsmay attract different kinds of managers, especially at the toplevels, because nonprofits prefer working for a nonprofit organizationand, hence, may offer a lower supply price to them. (2) Thetwo types of organizations can be expected to offer differentialcomposition of compensation as between base salary and performance-basedbonus, providing different incentives for managers. Our analysisis positive in character, the goal being to identify systematicdifferences in organization behavior.     

BOT projects: Incentives and efficiency

In recent years, governments have been increasingly adopting Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts for large infrastructure projects. However, BOT contracts have received little attention from economists. The apparent agency problem in BOT projects has never been analyzed. In this paper, we develop a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in BOT contracts. We show that a BOT contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency. Both license extension and price control are observed in many real-world BOT projects. We also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors, including time consistency, price ceiling, foreign ownership, and the lack of price regulation.     

Improving ICANN’s governance and accountability: A policy proposal

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has control over extremely important aspects of the Internet. Yet, its non-profit corporation status, combined with the way that it is funded and governed, make accountability a serious problem. This paper draws on the accountability framework that has been developed by Mueller (2009) to evaluate the structure and governance of ICANN and then compares it to the structure and governance of a number of other organizations that perform a roughly comparable range of coordination and standard-setting functions, to explore what might be applicable to ICANN. Virtually all of these other organizations are governed by their direct users, thereby building accountability into their structures. We suggest that this would be a good model for ICANN as well.     

Platform competition and seller investment incentives

Many products and services are not sold on open platforms but on competing for-profit platforms, which charge buyers and sellers for access. What is the effect of for-profit intermediation on seller investment incentives? Since for-profit intermediaries reduce the available rents in the market, one might naively suspect that sellers have weaker investment incentives with competing for-profit platforms. However, we show that for-profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment when free access would lead to underinvestment because investment decisions affect the strength of indirect network effects and, thus, access prices. We characterize the effect of for-profit intermediation on investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment and on which side of the market singlehomes.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.     

科技项目资助对论文产出绩效的作用效率测度研究

以人工智能领域论文和学者为研究对象,探讨科技项目资助对论文产出绩效的作用效率。运用负二项回归分析不同国家、领域资助种类、强度对论文引用和载文期刊水平的影响,结果发现,各项资助指标均可提升论文质量,但在不同地域和研究方向上的作用效果有所差异。运用倾向得分分层和线性回归,从发文、被引量和h指数角度测度资助对学者产出绩效提升的有效性,结果发现,资助能够显著提升学者产出力和影响力。通过Tobit回归测度资助项目数量和金额对不同年龄群体学者发文、被引量与变化率等指标的影响,结果发现,资助项目数量增加可整体提升学者产出绩效,资助金额增加更能扩大产出力和影响力的动态提升幅度。据此,提出资助改进策略和评审机制优化等相关建议。     

Does organizational ownership matter? Objectives of employees in public,nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes

Does organizational ownership matter for employees? We conducted a discrete choice experiment to reveal employees’ objectives in for-profit, nonprofit and governmental nursing homes. The results indicate that differences in objectives among nursing home staff are at least partially related to differences in ownership type. More specifically, we find that employees of public nursing homes are less extrinsically motivated than their for-profit and nonprofit counterparts. However, the results also show that employees of for-profit, nonprofit and governmental nursing homes are trading off output quality and output quantity differently, in line with the view that public providers of elderly care are pursuing a supplier-of-last-resort objective function.     

Are individuals with entrepreneurial characteristics more likely to engage in destruction? An experimental investigation among potential 21st century entrepreneurs in Tunisia

We test experimentally whether individuals high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are more likely to engage in destructive behavior than other individuals. In the joy-of-destruction game, participants can either preserve or costly burn the endowment of each other. In some treatments they can hide from other participants whether they are responsible for destruction. We found that participants high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are significantly more likely to adopt destructive behaviours.     

Modelling the social funding and spill-over tax for addressing the green energy financing gap

The major challenge for filling the financing gaps of green energy is lower rate of return of green projects comparing to fossil fuels. Electricity tariffs are often regulated by governments; It has to be kept in low price to serve for every households as a necessary goods. Sources of revenue from green energy comes only from user charges. Hence it is not so much attractive for private investors. The paper is proposing a model for utilization of the tax revenue spillover of green energy supply by returning the portion of it to green energy projects in order to increase their rate of return. In addition, the paper is proposing a social community based funding scheme for smaller scale green projects (e.g. solar and wind). The paper theoretically and empirically shows that utilizing spillover effect in form of tax return for funding green energy projects will increase the rate of return and make them feasible and interesting for the private investors.     

国家自然科学基金地区科学基金资助情况及影响分析

根据1999-2011年国家自然科学基金地区科学基金资助项目信息,统计分析了地区科学基金项目资助情况,并结合1999-2011年自然科学基金资助其它项目情况计算基尼系数和泰尔指数,分析了地区科学基金对自然科学基金项目地区分布差异的影响。研究发现,地区科学基金资助力度明显增强,而学科分布和地区分布都有集中现象;自然科学基金项目分布地区差异较大,地区基金的设立对于平衡自然科学基金项目地区分布差异起到了积极作用,且效果在逐步提升;区域内不同省份间自然科学基金项目分配差异程度比区域间差异程度更高,全国7大区域中华北区域内差距对总体差异贡献最大。     

非营利组织信息披露与社会捐赠:一个博弈分析

对非营利组织来说,提高自身持续发展能力为社会提供公益服务是其目标之所在。实现这一目标,非营利组织必须建立一个固定的社会捐赠群体来获取稳定的资金来源。通过一个完全信息动态博弈模型的分析可知,非营利组织在管理和运作中只有充分披露所接收的社会捐赠款的使用效率和效果,才能满足捐赠人的信息需求并使其享受到捐赠行为所带来的效用,进而采取进一步捐赠行动,非营利组织也由此提高其社会公信力,并能持续地获得资金来源。