On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions

We show in the context of livestock auctions that a seller's revenue may increase or decrease as the number of buyers increases, whether the additional bidder wins or not an object. Additional bidders who fill part of their demand from an outside source may have an even more adverse effect on prices. We use data from the Quebec daily hog auction to measure the effect of new bidders on auction prices. Variations in the number of bidders come from the entry and exit of Quebec packers and sporadic invitations extended to Ontario packers. We find that entry by Quebec packers had a significant positive impact on hog auction prices but that sporadic participation by Ontario packers did not have a significant impact on hog prices.     

How well do conservation auctions perform in achieving landscape‐level outcomes? A comparison of auction formats and bid selection criteria

This paper studies the performance of auction design features regarding pricing mechanisms and bid selection criteria for securing wildlife zones across different holdings. We compare two pricing mechanisms: a discriminatory‐price auction and a uniform‐price ascending auction, and four bid selection criteria on the basis of: total bid, bid‐per‐value ratio, bid‐per‐area ratio and a mixed criterion where bids are formed on the basis of cost but they are selected based on the bid‐per‐value ratio. We develop a best‐response group‐bidding model for a discriminatory‐price auction where bidders form optimal group bids for individual wildlife zones. In the uniform‐price ascending auction, individual landholders respond to prices, which are successively raised by the auctioneer and whenever all the landholders from a single zone agree to participate (i.e. the first zone is formed), the auction stops. Based on numerical simulations using a bio‐economic model of malleefowl conservation, we observe that the discriminatory‐price auction is more cost‐effective than the uniform‐price ascending auction. However, the budgetary cost‐effectiveness of a discriminatory‐price auction is sensitive to bidder uncertainty about the number of competing bidder groups and the highest cost of establishing a wildlife zone among these groups. In terms of bid selection, the mixed bid selection criterion performs best. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.     

Auction markets for specialty food products with geographical indications

We present a first analysis of online auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume, and value for domestic and foreign-origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) that were sold in online auctions in Germany within a 1-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping costs have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we estimate relative price differences of 20–30% for the GIs of three specialty hams (Prosciutto di Parma, Jamón Serrano, and Schwarzwälder Schinken).     

地方政府土地财政依赖一定会推高城市一级土地市场化水平吗? ——基于2003—2015年中国省级面板数据的检验

研究目的：在深入分析地方政府土地财政依赖对城市一级土地市场作用机理的基础上，利用2003—2015年中国31个省（市、区）（不包括港澳台地区）的面板数据进行计量检验，测定地方政府土地财政依赖度对城市一级土地市场化率的影响程度。研究方法：计量经济分析方法。研究结果：为弥补地方政府土地财政缺口的刚性需求，地方政府领导人会权变地选择一级土地市场上各类用地的出让方式和出让量。土地财政依赖度与城市一级土地市场化率之间存在倒U型关系。研究结论：当土地财政依赖度与一级土地市场化率均较低时，地方政府会在一级土地市场上出让土地时适当增加“招拍挂”的比例，从而在提高土地财政依赖度的同时提升一级土地市场化率；当土地财政依赖度较高但一级土地市场化率较低时，地方政府会增加一级土地市场上“招拍挂”的比例，在降低土地财政依赖程度的同时提升一级土地市场化率。     

关于工业用地“招拍挂”的研究

本文简要分析了当前工业用地中存在的主要问题和实行工业用地“招拍挂”的意义,对实行工业用地“招拍挂”中应解决的几个关键性问题,以及实行工业用地“招拍挂”的制度建设和技术条件进行了重点剖析,在此基础上对开展工业用地“招拍挂”工作提出建议。     

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Conservation auctions allow landholders to propose conservation projects and associated payments (bids) for consideration by a conservation agency. Recently, the application of iterative combinatorial auction designs has been proposed to improve outcomes of conservation auctions. In combinatorial auctions, landholders are allowed to offer projects each of which involves activities aimed at providing one or multiple services. An iterative format allows bidders the opportunity to gradually explore the type of projects they want to offer, with this process being facilitated through price feedback provided based on intermediate auction round results. Auction designs vary with the type of feedback and respond differently to market conditions. At present there is a lack of information about their performance in markets with varying degrees of competition (in terms of number of bidders and level of target). Therefore, using an agent‐based simulation model, we evaluate a number of iterative auction designs. We observe that a higher degree of competition leads to a higher auction efficiency. In a high competition environment, efficiency outcomes tend to be less sensitive to auction design choices. Therefore, an auctioneer could enjoy freedom in design choice if adequate competition could be ensured. In weak competition environments, however, some auction designs perform better than others.     

A SIMULATED STUDY OF AN AUCTION MARKET

A simulated model of an auction market is developed showing the relationship between the variation in valuations, the price variation and the number of independent bidders in the market. Average prices paid in a market with two or three bidders are less than average valuations. Average prices are progressively greater than average valuations as the number of bidders increases beyond four. Some applications of this model in the Australian wool market are discussed.     

活立木交易的最优拍卖竞价研究——基于买方估价和两人竞购的视角

首先阐述了活立木现行交易的基本方式和在交易中活立木定价失真的缺陷,其次通过分析拍卖的优势提出活立木交易中拍卖定价方式。接着介绍了活立木交易中的主体,同时分析了竞买人双方在不同博弈策略和估价策略下的收益。在此基础上建立两人竞购的最优拍卖机制,以简单的概率分析描述竞买人的决策,以买方估价和最大化卖方的期望收益为前提,确定交易价格,得出最优拍卖竞价使得买方总期望收益的增长、使交易公开透明、物品配置合理等优势。     

Bidding for Cattle in the Texas Panhandle

Four beef-processing plants in the Texas Panhandle region procure cattle from feedlots in a form of first-price, sealed-bid auction. These auctions have features that distinguish them from standard auctions. Using transactions-level data, we estimated packer bid functions and, via simulations, compared the extant bidding environment to an alternative framework. The simulated auctions on average produced higher seller revenue, more frequent sales to the plant valuing the cattle most highly, and more switching by feedlots among competing packers. We attribute these results to packers' inconsistent bidding on the available lots of cattle and offer alternative explanations for this behavior.     

The declining price anomaly in sequential auctions of identical commodities with asymmetric bidders: empirical evidence from the Nephrops norvegicus market in France

The declining price anomaly for sequential sales of identical commodities challenges auction theory which predicts constant prices within a day. Among other hypotheses explaining the phenomenon stands the dual value of goods including a risk premium in early transactions. We consider that asymmetric bidder groups (primary processors, fishmongers, supermarket buyers) and seasonal landings may also affect the daily price pattern. On the basis of stylized facts and several panel data models, this hypothesis is tested on a Redundant French fish market of homogenous goods (live Nephrops norvegicus) when the time effects (high and low seasons, weekday effect) affecting the demand and supply conditions are taken into consideration. All models support the evidence of a daily declining pattern, but not to the same extent for all days and seasons, and all categories of buyers. Our results also show an earlier and steeper decline on periods of lower supply (or higher demand), supporting the theoretical hypothesis of risk‐averse behaviors of bidders, especially fishmongers with respect to primary processors and supermarkets.     

Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.     

Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods

Despite increased use of experimental auctions, a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results. This study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) , and random n th price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random n th price auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM auctions. We find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations, but the effect varies across auction mechanism.     

Willingness to Pay for Multiple Quantities of Animal Welfare Dairy Products: Results from Random Nth‐, Second‐Price,and Incremental Second‐Price Auctions

Nonhypothetical experimental auctions are used to elicit willingness to pay for humane animal care‐certified dairy products: cheese and ice cream. We use second‐price, random Nth‐price, and incremental second‐price auctions in multiproduct, multiquantity, and multiround contexts. The results contrast participants’ bids across different auction mechanisms and different products. Differences in bidding patterns are detected across auction mechanisms as well as products. Our results suggest that subjects on average are only willing to pay a premium price for one unit of humane animal case‐certified ice cream but not for multiple quantities.     

The impact of deal‐proneness on WTP estimates in incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods

Even after controlling for hypothetical biases, some incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods still produce different willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) estimates. In this study, we compare WTP estimates from three incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods: real choice experiment (RCE), real double‐bounded dichotomous contingent valuation (RCVM), and Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction (BDM). We find that participants’ aggressiveness in obtaining low prices (i.e., “deal‐proneness”) influences WTP estimates in the BDM auction, but not those elicited from the RCE and RCVM. The participants with higher levels of deal‐proneness tend to submit lower bids in the BDM auction. The discrepancies in WTP estimates between different incentive‐aligned procedures are narrower for participants with lower levels of deal‐proneness. Our results indicate that the bids in BDM auctions may be understated and the auction mechanism may induce the “gambling behavior” of people who are deal‐prone. That is, whether the BDM auction is truly incentive‐aligned is again called into question. We also discuss the practical implications for food retailers.     

矿业权——地勘单位企业化经营的生命线

矿业权的简单招、拍、挂严重地损害了地勘单位的利益,也阻碍了找矿突破和政府应在探矿权市场管理中有所作为。矿业权是地勘单位实施企业化经营的生命线,各级政府要为疏通这条生命线制定和完善政策规定,切实抓好矿业权市场建设,为地勘单位实现找矿突破创造良好条件。     

Valuing an EU Animal Welfare Label using Experimental Auctions

The aim of this article is to determine consumers’ valuation for an EU Animal Welfare (EU‐CAW) Label for products providing higher animal welfare standards than the current legal requirements. Using revealed preference data from random nth price auction mechanism and two auction procedures, our results generally suggest that consumers are willing to pay a premium for an EU Animal Welfare (EU‐CAW) Label for cured ham. This finding is consistent in both the endowment and full‐bidding auction approaches we employed in our experiments conducted in Spain. The average premium that consumers are willing to pay for a cured ham with the EU‐CAW Label ranges between 19% and 23% of the average price of the regular cured ham that is currently available in supermarkets.     

Auctions as a Means of Creating a Market for Public Goods from Agriculture

The paper looks at the possibility of creating a market for environmental goods and services in the countryside by awarding conservation contracts to farmers on the basis of competitive bidding. Auctions have several theoretical advantages over alternative allocation mechanisms (such as standard-rate payments) because they allow the participants to deal with informational asymmetries and the uncertainty about the value of the (non-market) goods being traded. A formal model of bidding behaviour in ‘green auctions’ shows that bidding strategies are determined by the individual farmers' costs of implementing the conservation contracts and their beliefs about the maximum acceptable payment level, making the auction an imperfect cost revelation mechanism. Auctions can reduce the information rents accruing to farmers and can increase the cost-effectiveness of public goods provision. Strategic bidding behaviour in multiple-signup auctions as well as high transaction costs are potential sources of reduced efficiency.     

A Sealed‐bid Double Auction Experiment on German Milk Quota Exchanges

Standard double auctions perfectly mimic the neoclassical idea about the functioning of markets. The efficiency of the market outcome and speed of adjustment towards equilibrium have been studied in the literature to validate economic expectations. However, only a few real world examples outside the financial sector exist. In 2000, Germany implemented a sealed‐bid double auction mechanism for trading milk quota. The two main features of this mechanism are: (1) a sealed‐bid double auction that produces excess demands that are covered by state reserves free of charge, and (2) a variable price band that is used to exclude price bids above a certain range. To study these regulations a sealed‐bid double auction experiment is simulated and run with students. It is shown that the regulations lead to significant losses in welfare that are caused by direct effects and by an imperfect adjustment of individual bidding behaviour. Further, learning effects throughout the experiments appear to be very limited. Thus, complex auction mechanisms may need to be thoroughly tested before being introduced in the real world.     

Agri‐environmental auctions for phosphorus load reduction: experiences from a Finnish pilot

We examine environmental auctions on working agricultural lands. We organized a discriminatory auction where farmers were asked to make bids on spreading gypsum on their fields to reduce phosphorus loads to surface waters. The parcel‐specific bids were ranked based on their load reduction–compensation ratios. To assess load reductions, we built an environmental benefit index (EBI) based on three factors: P‐status of the soil (phosphorus available for crops), field slope and location with respect to waterways. As the per tonne price of gypsum delivery from the factory was higher for small quantities, the auction format allowed bundling of field parcels to reduce transportation costs. We evaluate auction's ability to target the environmental (or abatement) measures to field parcels with the highest load reduction potential and analyse the economic efficiency of the auction by comparing the pilot auction with simulated bidding behaviour and with hypothetical flat rate payment schemes. The pilot auction targeted the environmental measures effectively. It was also more efficient than a flat rate payment, even when the flat rate scheme was combined with an EBI eligibility criterion.     

城市土地价值最大化的实现难题与解决途径

界定土地价值最大化的涵义 ,分析影响城市土地价值最大化实现的难题 ,提出解决途径。研究结论 :城市土地价值最大化的实现途径包括 :( 1)建立规范的经营性项目国有土地使用权招标、拍卖制度 ;( 2 )调整房地产市场结构 ;( 3 )控制土地经济效益 ,彰显生态效益和社会效益