Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy

This paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset. Each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price, which in equilibrium serves as a ‘noisy’ aggregator of the total information observed by all traders. A closed-form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented. A counter-example to the existence of ‘fully revealing’ equilibrium is developed.     

An evolutionary multi‐objective optimization of trading rules in call markets

We evaluate an agent‐based model featuring near‐zero‐intelligence traders operating in a call market with a wide range of trading rules governing the determination of prices and which orders are executed, as well as a range of parameters regarding market intervention by market makers and the presence of informed traders. We optimize these trading rules using a multi‐objective population‐based incremental learning algorithm seeking to maximize the trading volume and minimize the bid–ask spread. Our results suggest that markets should choose a small tick size if concerns about the bid–ask spread are dominating and a large tick size if maximizing trading volume is the main aim. We also find that unless concerns about trading volume dominate, time priority is the optimal priority rule. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

开盘集合竞价透明度与市场质量

通过采用个股与市场同步法和价格反转的分析方法研究开盘集合竞价透明度与市场质量之间的关系，发现从日内效应来看，开盘集合竞价透明度提高以后，交易者的执行成本增加，整体来说市场的流动性是降低了；从事件前后市场模型的拟合优度比较结果来看，开盘集合竞价透明度提高以后股票个股与市场反应不一致，价格发现效率降低，市场质量降低。     

Do traders strategically time their pledges during real-world Walrasian auctions?

Experimental research suggests the Walrasian tâtonnement auction encourages traders to under-reveal preferences, even encouraging initial pledges contrary to true desires, because pledges are not binding. We analyze the timing and characteristics of individual pledges and trades during 9604 auctions for redbeans conducted by the Tokyo Grain Exchange. We find no evidence of contrarian pledging and little evidence of under-revelation – as many traders over-reveal as under-reveal. Most traders pledge seriously from the beginning. Despite the considerable heterogeneity in pledging behavior across individual traders, these differences appear to have no relationship with traders’ profits, nor do they appear to affect the achievement of equilibrium.     

Strategic trading and learning about liquidity

Many practitioners point out that the speculative profits of institutional traders are eroded by the difficulty in gauging the price impact of their trades. In this paper, we develop a model of strategic trading where speculators face such a dilemma because of incomplete information about time-varying market liquidity. Unlike the competitive market makers that they trade against, informed traders do not know the distribution of liquidity (“noise”) trades. Instead, they have to learn about liquidity from past prices and trading volume. This learning implies that strategic trades and market statistics such as informational efficiency are path-dependent on past market outcomes. Our paper also has normative implications for practitioners.     

Information dissemination by insiders in equilibrium

This paper generates an equilibrium explanation for partial disclosure of information by an insider to privileged associates. In our model, prices are set by competitive market makers in anticipation of trading volume, but not affected by the actual number of trades. Liquidity demand is not perfectly inelastic, but rather liquidity traders are sensitive to trading costs through a reservation price. Because profits from liquidity traders are bounded, the feasibility of an equilibrium depends on the balance between the number of associates, the precision of information and the number of liquidity traders. Partially, rather than fully, disclosing information alters this balance by limiting the informational advantage of individual associates. If the number of associates is exogenous, partial disclosure prevents market failure. If the insider chooses the number of associates, partial disclosure allows him to serve more associates but still increase total associate profits.     

Do Proprietary Algorithmic Traders Withdraw Liquidity during Market Stress?

We investigate the role of proprietary algorithmic traders in facilitating liquidity in a limit order market. Using order‐level data from the National Stock Exchange of India, we find that proprietary algorithmic traders increase limit order supply following periods of both high short‐term stock‐specific volatility and extreme stock price movement. Even following periods of high marketwide volatility, they do not decrease their supply of liquidity. We define orders from high‐frequency traders as a subclass of orders from proprietary algorithmic traders that are revised in less than three milliseconds. The behavior of high‐frequency trading mimics the behavior of its parent class. This is inconsistent with the theory that fast traders leave the market when stress situations arise, although their limit‐order‐supplying behavior becomes weaker when the increase in short‐term volatility is more informational than transitory. Agency algorithmic traders and nonalgorithmic traders behave opposite to proprietary algorithmic traders by reducing the supply of liquidity during stress situations. The presence of faster traders in the market possibly instills the fear of adverse selection in them. We document that the order imbalance of agency algorithmic traders is positively related to future short‐term returns, whereas the order imbalance of proprietary algorithmic traders is negatively related to future short‐term returns.     

Option Prices Leading Equity Prices: Do Option Traders Have an Information Advantage?

Recent evidence shows that option volatility skews and volatility spreads between call and put options predict equity returns. This study investigates whether such predictive ability is driven by option traders’ information advantage. We examine the predictive ability of volatility skews and volatility spreads around significant information events including earnings announcements, other firm‐specific information events, and events that trigger significant market reactions. Consistent with option traders having an information advantage relative to equity traders before information events, we find that the option measures immediately before these events have higher predictive ability for short‐term event returns than they do in a more dated window or before a randomly selected pseudo‐event. We also find that option measures have predictive ability after information events. However, this predictive ability holds only for unscheduled corporate announcements, which suggests that, relative to equity traders, option traders have superior ability to process less anticipated information.     

Trading frequency and volatility clustering

Volatility clustering, with autocorrelations of the hyperbolic decay rate, is unquestionably one of the most important stylized facts of financial time series. This paper presents a market microstructure model that is able to generate volatility clustering with hyperbolically decaying autocorrelations via traders with multiple trading frequencies, using Bayesian information updates in an incomplete market. The model illustrates that signal extraction, which is induced by multiple trading frequencies, can increase the persistence of the volatility of returns. Furthermore, we show that the volatility of the underlying time series of returns varies greatly with the number of traders in the market.     

Equilibrium in a Dynamic Limit Order Market

We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game with rational traders. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes and McGuire (2001) to find a stationary Markov‐perfect equilibrium. We then generate artificial time series and perform comparative dynamics. Conditional on a transaction, the midpoint of the quoted prices is not a good proxy for the true value. Further, transaction costs paid by market order submitters are negative on average, and negatively correlated with the effective spread. Reducing the tick size is not Pareto improving but increases total investor surplus.     

Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity

We develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populatedby strategic liquidity traders of varying impatience. In equilibrium,patient traders tend to submit limit orders, whereas impatienttraders submit market orders. Two variables are the key determinantsof the limit order book dynamics in equilibrium: the proportionof patient traders and the order arrival rate. We offer severaltestable implications for various market quality measures suchas spread, trading frequency, market resiliency, and time toexecution for limit orders. Finally, we show the effect of imposinga minimal price variation on these measures.     

Learning to be overconfident

We develop a multiperiod market model describing both the processby which traders learn about their ability and how a bias inthis learning can create overconfident traders. A trader inour model initially does not know his own ability. He infersthis ability from his successes and failures. In assessing hisability the trader takes too much credit for his successes.This leads him to become overconfident. A trader's expectedlevel of overconfidence increases in the early stages of hiscareer. Then, with more experience, he comes to better recognizehis own ability. The patterns in trading volume, expected profits,price volatility, and expected prices resulting from this endogenousoverconfidence are analyzed.     

THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRADER COGNITIVE ABILITIES ON STOCK MARKET PROPERTIES

Market structure and individual rationality remain at the centre of a debate as to which is the main driving force in market performance. We examine the role of individual rationality, comparing zero‐intelligence traders with traders with different levels of intelligence using a special adaptive form of strongly typed genetic programming‐based learning algorithm. We use this approach with real data: historical quotes of the S&P 500 and Coca‐Cola stock prices. We find a mixture of positive and negative impacts from intelligence on market performance. Because the concept of market structure as a driving force has been significantly challenged in the literature, we suggest that the inclusion of both intelligence and market structures is important when examining the driving forces of market performance. This inclusion is consistent with the research of Todd and Gigerenzer (Journal of Economic Psychology, 24 (2003) 143–165), which asserts that both environment (market structure) and agents’ cognition play important roles. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chasing noise

We present a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders occasionally chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment shocks and moving prices away from fundamental values. In the model, noise traders can have an impact on market equilibrium disproportionate to their size in the market. The model offers a partial explanation for the surprisingly low market price of financial risk in the spring of 2007.     

Can earnings fixated investors survive in a competitive securities market? Implications for sustained price anomalies and mark-to-market accounting

We model the dynamic survival of earnings fixated investors in a competitive securities market that allows for learning and arbitrage and that is populated by heterogeneous investors. Our model is distinct from those based on aggressive trading by overconfident investors. We prove that in the absence of noise traders, rational investors will drive out earnings fixated investors from the market in the long-run. More interestingly, we show that in a market with noise traders, some proportion of earnings fixated investors survive in long-run equilibrium for all feasible model parameter values. Furthermore, under no circumstances can the earnings fixated investors be driven out of the market completely. On the contrary, for some parameter values, the earnings fixated investors drive out the rational investors entirely. These results rationalize the long-run sustainability of common pricing anomalies. They also highlight potential benefits to society of mark-to-market accounting.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Labor Market Frictions: The Role of the Wage Channel

This paper introduces right‐to‐manage bargaining into a labor search model with sticky prices instead of standard efficient bargaining and examines the Ramsey‐optimal monetary policy. Without real wage rigidity, even when the steady state is inefficient, price stability is nearly optimal in response to technology or government shocks. Right‐to‐manage bargaining creates the wage channel to inflation, because there is a direct relationship between real wages and real marginal cost. In the presence of the wage channel, price markups consist of only real marginal cost, and real wages and hours per worker are determined such as in the Walrasian labor market.     

Contagion as a Wealth Effect

Financial contagion is described as a wealth effect in a continuous-time model with two risky assets and three types of traders. Noise traders trade randomly in one market. Long-term investors provide liquidity using a linear rule based on fundamentals. Convergence traders with logarithmic utility trade optimally in both markets. Asset price dynamics are endogenously determined (numerically) as functions of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise. When convergence traders lose money, they liquidate positions in both markets. This creates contagion, in that returns become more volatile and more correlated. Contagion reduces benefits from portfolio diversification and raises issues for risk management.     

Working Orders in Limit Order Markets and Floor Exchanges

We analyze limit order markets and floor exchanges, assuming an informed trader and discretionary liquidity traders use market orders and can either submit block orders or work their demands as a series of small orders. By working their demands, large market order traders pool with small traders. We show that every equilibrium on a floor exchange must involve at least partial pooling. Moreover, there is always a fully pooling (worked order) equilibrium on a floor exchange that is equivalent to a block order equilibrium in a limit order market.     

Stock market dynamics with rational liquidity traders

In the Kyle (1985) finite horizon model of stock market dynamics with a trader who holds long-lived information, informed trading intensities rise with time, and the slopes of the equilibrium price schedules fall. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on the irrational liquidity trader assumption. We replace the irrational noise traders with a sequence of rational, risk averse, liquidity traders who receive endowment shocks to their holdings of the risky asset. We demonstrate that unless liquidity traders are sufficiently risk averse, the slope of equilibrium price schedule rises over time, while informed trading intensities fall. In particular, Kyle's result holds only when liquidity traders are so risk averse that they ‘over-rebalance’ their portfolio's holdings of the risky asset, so that their final holdings of the risky asset have the opposite sign of their initial position.     

Trade and the revelation of information through prices and direct disclosure

This article analyzes the volume of trade in a multiperiod noisyrational expectations model. When traders receive private signalsat the first trading date and are allowed a second round oftrade, two type of equilibria exist. In the first, traders donot learn about the average private signal from the second roundof trade, and all trade takes place at the first date. In thesecond, traders do learn from the second round, and trade thustakes places at both the first and second dates. The articlecharacterizes volume when a public signal is disclosed at thesecond date.