Learning from peers' stock prices and corporate investment

Peers' valuation matters for firms' investment: a one standard deviation increase in peers' valuation is associated with a 5.9% increase in corporate investment. This association is stronger when a firm's stock price informativeness is lower or when its managers appear less informed. Also, the sensitivity of a firm's investment to its stock price is lower when its peers' stock price informativeness is higher or when demands for its products and its peers' products are more correlated. Furthermore, the sensitivity of firms' investment to their peers' valuation drops significantly after going public. These findings are uniquely predicted by a model in which managers learn information from their peers' valuation.     

Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity

We develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populatedby strategic liquidity traders of varying impatience. In equilibrium,patient traders tend to submit limit orders, whereas impatienttraders submit market orders. Two variables are the key determinantsof the limit order book dynamics in equilibrium: the proportionof patient traders and the order arrival rate. We offer severaltestable implications for various market quality measures suchas spread, trading frequency, market resiliency, and time toexecution for limit orders. Finally, we show the effect of imposinga minimal price variation on these measures.     

Market Making with Costly Monitoring: An Analysis of the SOES Controversy

This article presents a model of information monitoring andmarket making in a dealership market. We model how intensivelydealers monitor public information to avoid being picked offby professional day traders when monitoring is costly. Pricecompetition among dealers is hampered by their incentives toshare monitoring costs. The risk of being picked off by theday traders makes dealers more competitive. The interactionbetween these effects determines whether a firm quote rule improvestrading costs and price discovery. Our empirical results supportthe prediction that professional day traders prefer stocks withsmall spreads, but offer less support for the prediction thattheir trading leads to wider spreads.     

Reputation-based pricing and price improvements

Dealers often offer price improvements, relative to posted quotes, to their clients. In this paper, we propose an explanation to this practice. We also analyze its effects on market liquidity and traders’ welfare. Enduring relationships allow dealers to avoid informed trades by offering price improvements to clients who do not trade with the dealer when they are informed. A dealer never observes whether a specific client is informed or not but he can avoid informed orders by conditioning his offers on past trading profits. Cream-skimming of uninformed order-flow increases the risk of informed trading for dealers without a relationship. Thus, authorizing price improvements increases bid-ask spreads and impairs the welfare of investors without a relationship. It may even decrease the welfare of investors who develop a relationship as they sometimes need to trade at posted quotes. The model predicts a positive relationship between (a) the price improvements granted to a specific investor and past trading profits with this investor or (b) the frequency of price improvements and bid-ask spreads.     

Stock price informativeness,cross-listings,and investment decisions

We show that a cross-listing enables firms to obtain, from the stock market, more precise information about the value of their growth opportunities. Thus, cross-listed firms make better investment decisions and trade at a premium. This theory of cross-listings implies that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is larger for cross-listed firms. Moreover, the cross-listing premium is positively related to the size of growth opportunities and negatively related to the quality of managerial information. The sensitivity of the premium to the size of growth opportunities increases with factors that strengthen the impact of the cross-listing on price informativeness.     

Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?

We develop a model in which limit order traders possess volatilityinformation. We show that in this case the size of the bid–askspread is informative about future volatility. Moreover, ifvolatility information is in part private, we establish that(i) the size of the bid–ask spread and (ii) its informativenessabout future volatility should change in the same directionwhen limit order traders' identifiers stop being disclosed.We test these predictions using data from the Paris Bourse.As expected, we find that the average quoted spread and itsinformativeness are significantly smaller when limit order traders'identifiers are concealed. These findings suggest that the limitorder book is a channel for volatility information.