股市波动对基金管理费报酬的影响研究——基于中介效应的分析

利用中介效应分析方法检验了理论假设:股市波动对基金管理费报酬有积极的影响,基金业绩在股市波动对基金管理费报酬的影响中存在正的中介效应,即基金有能力在股市波动中发掘机会来提高业绩,从而提高管理费报酬。实证结果表明,在没有增加基金业绩情况下,股市波动对基金管理费报酬具有积极影响,此结论从股市波动的视角证明了基金管理费激励机制并不是激励相容的。根据实证结果,可以从基金类型多样化、扩大管理费率范围和加强投资者教育等三个方面完善基金管理费激励机制。     

基金管理费制度安排的激励效应与优化选择

基金公司的主要收入来自基金管理费，管理费收入制度是基金管理过程中起核心激励作用的关键性制度。本文在委托-代理理论框架内，深入研究了不同模式的基金管理费制度对具有“强代理人VS弱委托人”特征的现阶段中国基金公司的激励作用，证明了目前中国基金业实行的单一的高费率的固定管理费模式是一种低效率的制度安排，提出并建立了将固定管理费和浮动管理费结合的混合管理费收入制度的模型框架，并进一步指出，兼顾基金受益人利益和基金公司运营成本的混合管理费模式，是基金管理费制度改革的方向。     

浅论我国公募基金管理费的现状与问题

近几年在股市低迷背景下,公募基金管理费收取模式屡屡被公众质疑,本文通过对公募金管理费现状和存在问题的剖析,结合其他理财产品管理费提取模式,提出了公募基金管理费费率模式改进以及相关管理措施调整的建议。     

公募基金管理费问题探讨

近几年在股市低迷背景下,公募基金管理费收取模式屡屡被公众质疑,本文通过对公募金管理费现状和存在问题的剖析,结合其他理财产品管理费提取模式,提出了公募基金管理费费率模式改进以及相关管理措施调整的建议。     

树立科学的理财观念 做成熟理性的投资者

过去2007年,我们经历了中国资本市场空前的大牛市.10月16日,一个历史性的日子,上证综指盘中最高冲至6124点,创造了内地股市的新高.基金市场也随牛市而繁荣,2007年国内基金资产管理总额较2006年增长3.7倍,中国约有1/4的家庭购买了基金.     

治理结构视角下的基金合约优化设计

代理人道德风险问题是证券投资基金与身俱来的问题,固定的管理费模式根本不能对管理人形成有效的激励,为了遏制代理人的道德风险,国内外的学者对基金合约进行了一系列的研究,提出了固定管理费和业绩提成相结合的模式,再到持基激励模式,不断地把基金管理人的激励机制往前推进。本文在持基激励模式的基础上,将基金管理公司传统的股东-职业经理人式治理结构转化成优先股股东-普通股股东式治理结构,基金经理先承担风险,这一设计可以更加有效地解决基金管理运作过程中的管理人激励约束问题。     

不要错过基金投资的黄金时代

2010年,60家基金公司的656只基金全年利润只有50.82亿元,但管理费却高达302亿元,这遭到投资者和财经评论人士的普遍批评。然而从中国公募基金的历史业绩和股市的估值水平来看,目前正是基金投资的黄金时代,投资者不可因各种偏见而拒绝公募股票型基金（以下简称＂基金＂）。     

证券投资基金行为的市场运作研究

在与市场发展的密切联系下,我国基金对于市场的影响力正在不断显现,特别在2007年基金投资行为与市场变动之间形成共振效应更加突出。作为最具规范性和机制健全性的机构投资者,基金成为中国股市理性投资者的代表,并在中国股市发挥着举足轻重的作用。     

如此蓝筹行情不值得奢望

权威人士透露,证监会正在研究建立基金业绩比较基准约束机制,拟鼓励基金将基金业绩相对其业绩比较基准的波动水平与基金管理费的提取挂钩。消息一出台,立刻得到了市场各方较为强烈的反响,其中有一个对于股市较有震撼力的延伸式分析,即认为该消息将推动蓝筹股行情再起波澜。     

参与投资基金应了解的常识

1.要了解基金的基本知识。基金即是组合投资,分散风险,专家理财。投资者购买基金,由基金管理人员具体操作投资股票或债券,亏盈均属于投资者,基金管理人收取一定比率的管理费。     

我国开放式基金绩效及选股和择时能力研究

近年来,开放式基金逐渐成为我国基金市场的绝对主体。开放式基金能否取得较好的绩效受到市场的普遍关注。本文选取了资金管理规模前20位的公司,并从中随机挑选1只基金,运用詹森指数、特雷诺比率、夏普指数和信息比率等单因素模型和Fama-French三因素模型对开放式基金的绩效进行分析,并使用T-M模型、H-M模型、C-L模型对基金经理人股票选股与择时能力进行分析。结果发现:第一,我国开放式基金经理的选股能力存在时变性,在上升期具备选股能力,在下跌期不具备选股能力,而无论是在上升期还是下跌期,基金经理普遍不具备择时能力。第二,在市场上升期基金经理比较注意对风险的把控,系统性风险较小,而在下跌期基金投资组合的系统性风险明显上升,基金经理冒险意愿上升,当市场出现大幅度下跌时,其不理性行为会加剧市场的波动。本文的研究结论有利于提升投资者的风险意识和理性意识、促进外部监管部门的精准监管审查,并能够激励基金经理人提高自身风险管控的能力。     

Asymmetric dynamic relations between stock prices and mutual fund units in Japan. An application of hidden cointegration technique

This paper examines “causality” effects between mutual fund flows and stock index prices in Japan. In particular, both the short and long run dynamics between stock prices and fund units are investigated. The novelty of our paper is the use of the hidden cointegration technique which attempts to capture heterogeneous fund flow reactions when stock index prices move up or down. Moreover, we employ the crouching error correction model (CECM) to assess the relationship between stock market movements and fund flow changes. The results show that stock prices and mutual fund units are cointegrated. In the case of positive movements there is a bi-directional effect interconnecting them, whereas for negative movements, causality runs only from fund flows to stock prices. The dynamics structure provides evidence that market microstructure, taxation and investors' sentiment affect stock price and unit formation.     

The liquidity risk of liquid hedge funds

This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).     

The destabilizing effect of mutual fund herding: Evidence from China

This paper examines the impact of mutual fund herding on the stability of China's stock market through the lens of idiosyncratic volatility. We show that mutual fund herding significantly amplifies future idiosyncratic volatility up to one-and-half years, suggesting a persistent destabilizing effect. We find that the destabilizing effect is larger for stocks with high mutual fund ownership and in high investor-sentiment periods. Furthermore, mutual fund herding destabilizes the stock market even further after China implemented the share reform in 2011. The destabilizing effect of mutual fund herding is robust to alternative measures of risk and China's institutional setting helps mitigate endogeneity concerns.     

Time‐Varying Fund Manager Skill

We propose a new definition of skill as general cognitive ability to pick stocks or time the market. We find evidence for stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions. Moreover, the same fund managers that pick stocks well in expansions also time the market well in recessions. These fund managers significantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks. Our results suggest a new measure of managerial ability that weighs a fund's market timing more in recessions and stock picking more in booms. The measure displays more persistence than either market timing or stock picking alone and predicts fund performance.     

股权激励会计处理及其经济后果分析——以伊利股份为例

本文结合《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》的相关规定,以伊利股份为例研究股权激励费用化的会计处理及其经济后果。研究结果表明,股权激励的费用化将对上市公司的业绩产生影响,且股权费用摊销集中程度的不同,对公司产生的影响也不同。股票市场对股权激励费用化的会计处理及公司业绩的变化有负向反应,而且反应的程度与激励费用对公司业绩的影响成正比。同时股权激励设计有福利之嫌,股权激励费用化的会计处理有可能导致上市公司修改其股权激励的方案。     

Relations between mutual fund flows and stock market returns in Korea

This paper analyses relations between stock market returns and mutual fund flows in Korea. A positive relationship exists between stock market returns and mutual fund flows, measured as stock purchases and sales and net trading volumes. In aggregate, mutual funds are negative feedback traders. Standard causality tests suggest that it is predominantly returns that drive flows, while stock sales may contain information about returns. After controlling for declining markets, the results suggest Korean equity fund managers tend to increase stock purchases in times of rising market volatility, possibly disregarding fundamental information, and to sell in times of wide dispersion in investor beliefs.     

Time-varying fund manager skills of socially responsible investing (SRI) funds in developed and emerging markets

We examine stock selectivity and timing abilities in the market-wide return, volatility and liquidity of SRI fund managers. We find that multi-dimensional fund manager skills are time-varying and persistent in the short run, with developed market funds exhibiting longer persistence in all dimensions. Fund manager skills tend to be affected by fund characteristics (i.e., expense ratio, fund size, turnover and management tenure) and market characteristics (i.e., ESG market capitalization, mandatory ESG regulation and 10–2 yield spread). Fund managers of developed (emerging) market funds outperform (underperform) the market indices. For both fund types, fund managers possess exceptional volatility and liquidity timing despite poor return timing. Moreover, fund managers focus more (less) on timing the market’s return and less (more) on picking stocks when the prospect of recession keeps increasing (decreasing). Interestingly, if fund managers attempt to time the market-wide return or liquidity, stock selectivity will be worsened by their timing behavior.     

The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation,incentives and optimality of executive stock options

This paper examines the effect on valuation and incentives of allowing executives receiving options to trade on the market portfolio. We propose a continuous time utility maximization model to value stock and option compensation from the executive's perspective. The executive may invest non-option wealth in the market and riskless asset but not in the company stock itself, leaving them subject to firm-specific risk for incentive?purposes. Since the executive is risk averse, this unhedgeable firm risk leads them to place less value on the options than their cost to the company.

By distinguishing between these two types of risks, we are able to examine the effect of stock volatility, firm-specific risk and market risk on the value to the executive. In particular, options do not give incentive to increase total risk, but rather to increase the proportion of market relative to firm-specific risk, so executives prefer high beta companies. The paper also examines the relationship between risk and incentives, and finds firm-specific risk decreases incentives whilst market risk may decrease incentives depending on other parameters. The model supports the use of stock rather than options if the company can adjust cash pay when granting stock-based compensation.