A Phillips Curve with Anchored Expectations and Short‐Term Unemployment

This paper examines the behavior of U.S. core inflation, as measured by the weighted median of industry price changes. We find that core inflation since 1985 is well‐explained by an expectations‐augmented Phillips curve in which expected inflation is measured with professional forecasts and labor‐market slack is captured by the short‐term unemployment rate. We also find that expected inflation was backward‐looking until the late 1990s, but then became strongly anchored at the Federal Reserve's target. This shift in expectations changed the relationship between inflation and unemployment from an accelerationist Phillips curve to a level‐level Phillips curve. Our specification explains why high unemployment during the Great Recession did not reduce inflation greatly: partly because inflation expectations were anchored, and partly because short‐term unemployment rose less sharply than total unemployment.     

The Most Beautiful Variations on Fair Wages and the Phillips Curve

This paper explores the connection between inflation and unemployment in two different models with fair wages in both the short and the long runs. Under customary assumptions regarding the sign of the parameters of the effort function, more inflation lowers the unemployment rate, albeit to a declining extent. This is because firms respond to inflation—which spurs effort by decreasing the reference wage—by increasing employment, thus maintaining the effort level constant as implied by the Solow condition. A stronger short‐run effect of inflation on unemployment is produced under varying as opposed to fixed capital, given that in the former case the boom produced by a monetary expansion is reinforced by an increase in investment. Therefore, I provide a new theoretical foundation for recent empirical contributions that find negative long‐ and short‐run effects of inflation on unemployment.     

A Closer Look at the Behavior of Uncertainty and Disagreement: Micro Evidence from the Euro Area

This paper examines point and density forecasts of real GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters. We analyze individual uncertainty measures as well as introduce individual point‐ and density‐based disagreement measures. The analysis indicates forecasters’ uncertainty and disagreement display substantial heterogeneity and persistence, with the latter feature challenging a key prediction of expectations models emphasizing information frictions. We also find that uncertainty is characterized by prominent respondent effects and disagreement by prominent time effects, suggesting these divergent properties underlie the well‐documented weak uncertainty–disagreement linkage. Taken together, our results provide a basis for further development of expectations models.     

Revenue maximizing inflation

A classic monetary policy result is that revenue maximization entails setting the inflation tax rate equal to the inverse of the interest semi-elasticity of the demand for money. The standard approach underlying “Cagan's rule” is partial equilibrium in nature, treating money demand as being given from outside the model and abstracting from the real effects of inflation. This paper reconsiders the question of the revenue maximizing inflation rate in a general equilibrium framework with a labor-leisure choice, where money is held because it reduces transactions costs. In this framework, the revenue maximizing inflation tax rate is lower than that implied by Cagan's rule.     

Labor‐Market Institutions and Long‐Term Effects of Youth Unemployment

Graduating from a school during a time of adverse economic conditions has a persistent, harmful effect on workers’ subsequent employment opportunities. An analysis of panel data from OECD countries during the 1960–2010 periods reveals that a worker who experiences a 1 percentage point higher unemployment rate while the worker is 16–24 years old has a 0.14 percentage point higher unemployment rate at ages 25–29 years and 0.03 percentage points higher at ages 30–34 years. The persistence of this negative effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection legislation. A composite index for labor‐market rigidity is constructed and the index is shown to have positive correlation with the persistence. Moderating macroeconomic fluctuations is more important in countries that have more persistent labor‐market entry effects on subsequent outcomes.     

Political Regimes and the Cost of Disinflation

This study investigates, using data from 1960 to 1998, whether the nature of political regimes can help explain cross‐national and intertemporal variations in the cost of disinflationary policies, as measured by the sacrifice ratio. We show that, ceteris paribus, right‐wing governments have lower costs of disinflations than left‐wing governments. We argue this is due to a superior credibility, resulting from their stronger anti‐inflation reputations. In addition (and in marked contrast to previous studies), we find that when we control for political regimes, trade openness, and other standard factors in this literature, central bank independence has no significant effect on the sacrifice ratio.     

Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model

Most central banks perceive a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade‐off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of nontrivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation–unemployment relation found in the data.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Cross‐Country Evidence

We explain the heterogeneous response of central banks to financial stability risks based on a financial stability orientation (FSO) index, which reflects statutory, regulatory, and discretionary components of central banks' monetary policy frameworks. Our baseline results from a cross‐country panel of modified Taylor rules suggest that central banks with a high FSO increase their policy rates in response to elevated financial stability risks by 0.27 percentage points more than central banks with a low orientation. Back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations suggest that this policy rate differential translates into a reduced crisis probability but also into considerably lower inflation and output growth rates.     

Screening and Labor Market Flows in a Model with Heterogeneous Workers

We construct a model in which screening of heterogeneous workers by employers plays a central role in determining both the flows into and out of unemployment. Following a negative productivity shock, the share of low‐efficiency workers in the pool of unemployed rises, and this composition effect reduces the incentive of firms to post vacancies, lowering job opportunities for all workers. Heterogeneity in workers’ efficiency amplifies unemployment fluctuations in economies with small gross labor flows and leads to persistent buildups of unemployment and slow recoveries. The composition effect worsens the unemployment–inflation trade‐off faced by the monetary authority, leading to very large sacrifice ratios when a fall in productivity primarily affects low‐efficiency workers.     

How to Weigh Unemployment Relative to Inflation in Monetary Policy?

The monetary policy mandate for the Federal Reserve and of the Riksbank are essentially the same and boil down to stabilizing inflation around the inflation target and employment or unemployment around a long‐run sustainable rate. The relative weight on stabilizing unemployment or employment versus stabilizing inflation may be close to one. A positive unemployment‐gap forecast normally calls for a positive inflation‐gap forecast.     

Robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity

Nominal wage rigidity has been shown to exist in periods of high inflation, while reduction in nominal pay has been hypothesized to occur in times of low inflation. Nominal wage rigidity would therefore become irrelevant because there is little need to cut nominal pay under high inflation, while the necessary cuts would occur under low inflation. We test this hypothesis by examining Swiss data in the 1990s, where wage inflation was low. Nominal wage rigidity proves robust in a low inflation environment, constituting a considerable obstacle to real wage adjustments. Real wages would indeed respond to unemployment without downward nominal rigidity. Moreover, wage sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity correlate strongly to unemployment, suggesting downward nominal wage rigidity fuels unemployment.     

In search of the natural rate of unemployment

The natural rate of unemployment can be measured as the time-varying steady state of a structural vector autoregression. For post-War US data, the natural rate implied by this approach is more volatile than most previous estimates, with its movements accounting for the bulk of the variation in the unemployment rate, as well as substantial portions of the variation in aggregate output and inflation. These movements, in turn, can be related to variables associated with labor-market search theory, including unemployment benefits, labor productivity, real wages, and sectoral shifts in the labor market. There is also a strong negative relationship between inflation and the corresponding measure of cyclical unemployment, supporting the existence of a short-run Phillips curve.     

Monetary Policy in a Low‐Inflation Environment: Developing a State‐Contingent Price‐Level Target

A number of academic studies find that either price‐level targeting or temporary above‐average inflation are nearly optimal policies to address a liquidity trap crisis. Still, central bankers and the public generally question whether even a temporarily higher inflation rate could be beneficial in addressing a liquidity trap or could be consistent with price stability over the longer term. At the same time, however, the Federal Reserve's projections for high unemployment and low inflation do not seem to be consistent with the best monetary policies to address the Fed's dual mandate responsibilities. Accordingly, it is useful to seriously discuss these potentially beneficial alternative policies.     

Reconsidering the Relationship between Inflation and Relative Price Variability

It has long been popularly believed that the relationship between inflation and relative price variability (RPV) is positive and stable. Using disaggregated CPI data for the United States and Japan, however, this study finds that the relationship is neither linear nor stable over time. The overall relationship is approximately U‐shaped around a nonzero threshold inflation rate. RPV therefore changes not with the inflation rate per se, but with the deviation of inflation from the threshold inflation rate. More importantly, the relationship is by no means stable over time but instead varies significantly in a way that coincides with regime changes of inflation or monetary policy. The relationship was positive during the period of high inflation of the 1970s and the early 1980s, as has been documented by a number of previous studies, whereas it takes a U‐shape profile during the Great Moderation. The results are robust to the use of core inflation, which excludes the traditionally volatile prices of food and energy. This paper then presents a modified version of the Calvo‐type sticky price model to describe the observed empirical regularities. Simulation experiments show that the modified Calvo model fits the data well, and that the underlying relationship hinges upon the degree of price rigidity, which is systematically related to inflation regime. For countries and periods with low inflation rates, the relationship takes a U‐shape as price adjustment is more sticky. In a high‐inflation environment, when price setting becomes more flexible, the U‐shaped profile vanishes.     

Interest‐Rate Pegs in New Keynesian Models

The conventional policy perspective is that lowering the interest rate increases output and inflation in the short run, while maintaining inflation at a higher level requires a higher interest rate in the long run. In contrast, it has been argued that a Neo‐Fisherian policy of setting an interest‐rate peg at a fixed higher level will increase the inflation rate. We show that adaptive learning argues against the Neo‐Fisherian approach. Pegging the interest rate at a higher level will induce instability and most likely lead to falling inflation and output over time. Eventually, this would precipitate a change of policy.     

Inflation and Innovation in a Schumpeterian Economy with North–South Technology Transfer

This study analyzes how inflation affects innovation and international technology transfer via cash‐in‐advance constraints on R&D. We consider a North–South quality‐ladder model that features innovative Northern R&D and adaptive Southern R&D. We find that higher Southern inflation causes a permanent decrease in technology transfer, a permanent increase in the North–South wage gap, and a temporary decrease in the Northern innovation rate. Higher Northern inflation causes a temporary decrease in the Northern innovation rate, a permanent decrease in the North–South wage gap, and ambiguous effects on technology transfer. Finally, we calibrate the model to China–U.S. data to perform a quantitative analysis.     

On the Asymmetric U‐Shaped Relationship between Inflation,Inflation Uncertainty,and Relative Price Skewness in the UK

We investigate the asymmetric relationships between aggregate inflation and the second and third moments of the cross‐sectional distribution of relative prices using a modified Calvo pricing model with regime‐dependent price rigidities. Calibration experiments reveal that the inflation‐standard deviation and inflation‐skewness relationships exhibit U‐shaped asymmetries around the historical mean inflation rate. UK sectoral data support our results. We conclude that monetary policy should target an inflation rate proximate to the (common) minima of these nonlinear relationships and that core inflation measures should not be used for policy purposes as they exclude much of the information contained in the higher moments.     

Fiscal-monetary policy interactions in the presence of unionized labor markets

This paper develops a framework for studying the interactions between labor unions, fiscal policy, monetary policy and monopolistically competitive firms. The framework is used to investigate the effects of labor taxes, the replacement ratio, labor market institutions and monetary policymaking institutions on economic peformance in the presence of strategic interactions between labor unions and the central bank. Given fiscal variables, higher levels of either centralization of wage bargaining, or of central bank conservativeness are associated with lower unemployment and inflation. However the forward shifting of changes in either labor taxes or in unemployment benefits to labors costs is larger the higher are those institutional variables. The paper also considers the effects of those institutions on the choice of labor taxes and of unemployment benefits by governments concerned with the costs of inflation and unemployment, as well as with redistribution to particular constituencies. A main result is that, normally, higher levels of centralization and conservativeness induce government to set higher labor taxes. JEL Classification: E5 · E6 · H2 · J3 · J5 · L1     

Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models

To understand European and American unemployment during the last 60 years, we use a search-island model and four matching models with workers who have heterogeneous skills and entitlements to government benefits. When there is higher turbulence, in the sense of worse skill transition probabilities for workers who suffer involuntary layoffs, high government mandated unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP) in Europe increase unemployment rates and durations. But when there is lower turbulence, high European EP suppresses unemployment rates despite high European UI. Four matching models differ in how they assign unemployed workers to matching functions. That affects how strongly unemployment responds to increases in turbulence. Heterogeneity among unemployed workers highlights the central role of adverse labor market externalities in matching models and reveals that the cost of posting vacancies is the lynchpin of a matching model.     

Asymmetric Labor Market Institutions in the EMU and the Volatility of Inflation and Unemployment Differentials

How does the asymmetry of labor market institutions affect the adjustment of a currency union to shocks? To answer this question, this paper sets up a dynamic currency union model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, hiring frictions, and real wage rigidities. In our analysis, we focus on the differentials in inflation and unemployment between countries, as they directly reflect how the currency union responds to shocks. We highlight the following three results. First, we show that it is important to distinguish between different labor market rigidities as they have opposite effects on inflation and unemployment differentials. Second, we find that asymmetries in labor market structures tend to increase the volatility of both inflation and unemployment differentials. Finally, we show that it is important to take into account the interaction between different types of labor market rigidities. Overall, our results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen the adjustment of a currency union to shocks.