Are consistent pegs really more prone to currency crises?

This paper evaluates the treatment effect of consistent pegs (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt announced pegged regimes) on the occurrence of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are indeed more prone to currency crises than other regimes. Using matching estimators as a control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than countries with other exchange rate policies. More interestingly, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than those with a “fear of announcing a peg” policy (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt pegged regimes but do not claim to have pegged regimes). The results stand up to a wide variety of robustness checks.     

Exchange rate regimes,capital controls,and currency crises: Does the bipolar view hold?

This paper empirically examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find no evidence that, as the bipolar view argues, intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find that hard pegs with capital account liberalization have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than intermediate regimes with capital controls and free floats with capital controls. Hence, the bipolar view does not strictly hold in the sense that intermediate regimes are significantly more prone to currency crises than the two extreme regimes. However, the fact that hard pegs with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to currency crises is worthy of note.     

Anatomy of banking crises in developing and emerging market countries

This paper uses a Binary Classification Tree (BCT) model to analyze banking crises in 50 emerging market and developing countries during 1990-2005. The BCT model identifies three conditions (and the specific threshold of the key indictors) at which the vulnerability to banking crisis increases—(i) very high inflation, (ii) highly dollarized bank deposits combined with nominal depreciation or low bank liquidity, and (iii) low bank profitability—which highlight that foreign currency risk, poor financial soundness, and macroeconomic instability are important drivers of banking crises. The results also emphasize the importance of conditional thresholds in triggering crises, in that banking crises are underlined by a combination of vulnerabilities—or a sequence of (non-linear) conditions—rather than the deterioration of a unique factor.     

Financial markets development,business cycles,and bank risk in South America

In this paper, we examine whether banking crises or business cycles affect the influence of financial markets development on bank risk in a sample of 37 publicly listed commercial banks in seven South American countries over a 22-year period between 1991 and 2012. Banking crises in this region offer a natural setting in which the impact of financial markets development on bank risk is examined. We find that financial markets development improves banks’ capitalization ratio and reduces their exposure to non-traditional banking activities, suggesting that financial markets development on average reduces bank risk. In addition, banking crises and business cycles appear to moderate the impact of financial markets development on bank risk. In the aftermath of banking crises, banks appear to concentrate more on their core traditional banking activities.     

The Twin Crises: Determinants of Banking and Currency Crises in the Turkish Economy

Several twin crises occurred in the Turkish economy in the last three decades. In this article, we aim to analyze the link between banking and currency crises and to illustrate the essential determinants of these twin crises by developing a multivariate logit model for the period 1990–2013. The empirical findings show that Turkish currency crises are mainly due to excessive fiscal deficits, rises in short-term external debt, overvaluation of Turkish lira, and external adverse shocks; banking crises are primarily caused by excessive money supplies and bank short positions. The empirical findings also indicate that banking crises lead to currency crises, and vice versa.     

Some Parallels Between Currency and Banking Crises

There is a sizeable literature on the causes of speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates and a large literature on the determinants of bank runs. Surprisingly, these two literatures rarely overlap, even though both types of crises involve attacks on asset price-fixing schemes. This paper draws a number of parallels between the work on currency crises and the work on banking crises and examines some of the new insights that are coming out of a more integrated approach in the aftermath of the Asian financial crises.     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.     

新兴市场国家的国际资本流动与双危机模型扩展

本文基于新兴市场国家经济背景下,从国内中央银行和国内投资者、国际投资者三类主体进行不完全信息博弈的角度对双危机理论模型进行了有效扩展,探讨了对国际资本流动进行和不进行数量和税费控制条件下银行危机与货币危机发生所满足的必要条件,从而更深入全面地探讨了国际资本流动与双危机之间的传导机制。以马来西亚的实际数据对扩展模型的合理性和有效性进行了验证,并对模型中的主要参数对均衡结果的不同影响进行了分析,为类似中国的新兴市场国家制定安全有效的货币政策以及防范金融危机提供了思路和政策建议。     

发展中国家的货币错配与汇率制度选择困境

货币错配是诱发发展中国家货币金融危机的一个重要因素,也加大了危机的解决成本。货币错配问题的形成是内外因素双重作用的结果,长期实行的“软”钉住汇率制度是其中的一个重要原因。发展中国家普遍遇到了货币错配与汇率制度选择的两难困境,僵硬的汇率制度为货币错配风险的累积提供了正向激励,加深了货币错配,货币错配程度的加深强化了汇率制度的“浮动恐惧”,必须采取有效措施走出这个困境。     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

The Banking Sector,Government Bonds,and Financial Intermediation: The Case of Emerging Market Countries

This paper develops an analytical framework to explore how financial-sector characteristics shape the terms and the scale of public borrowing in emerging market economies. We find that the more competitive the banking sector and the more liquid and deeper the deposit market, the better are conditions in the public securities market. We also show that the greater the central bank independence, the higher the cost of public borrowing. Furthermore, our results suggest that, in countries where banks rely significantly on foreign currency financing, the greater the government's reliance on bank lending, the greater is its exposure to exchange rate risk.     

Are twin currency and debt crises special?

In the literature on currency and banking crises it has become the standard procedure to distinguish pure currency crises, pure banking crises and combined (“twin”) currency and banking crises. We show theoretically and empirically that a similar differentiation should be chosen with regard to currency and debt crises. Twin currency and debt crises differ from both pure currency and pure debt crises in their determinants, course of events, and economic consequences. We find that each type of crises has a unique set of macroeconomic causes. We also identify internal contagion and selection bias effects, which may lead to biased empirical estimates if twin crises are not treated as a specific type of crises. Such a separation allows in significantly improving the efficiency of early warning systems especially for debt and twin crises.     

How do bank competition,regulation, and institutions shape the real effect of banking crises? International evidence

This paper studies the influence of bank competition on the real effect of 36 systemic banking crises in 30 countries over the 1980–2000 period and how this influence varies across countries depending on bank regulation and institutions. We find that bank market power is not on average useful for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis. Market power promotes higher growth during normal times in industries that are more dependent on external finance but induces a bigger reduction in growth during systemic banking crises. We also find a country-specific effect depending on bank regulation and institutions. Stringent capital requirements and poor protection of creditor rights increase the benefits of bank market power for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis because bank market power has a positive effect on economic growth during both crisis and non-crisis periods in these environments.     

Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises

Using a cross-section time-series of 47 banking crisis episodes in 35 industrial and emerging market economies between the 1970s and 2003, this study analyses the relationship between banking regulation and supervision, and the severity of banking crises measured in terms of the magnitude of output loss. The empirical results show that countries that provide comprehensive deposit insurance coverage and enforce strict bank capital adequacy requirements experience a smaller output cost of crises. Restrictions on bank activities also influence the severity of crises. The results, however, do not suggest that there is a significant impact of bank supervision. In addition, there is no robust evidence that the magnitude of the output cost of crises depends on the extent of banks’ financial intermediation.     

Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks

Market participants’ risk attitudes, wealth and portfolio composition influence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and, therefore, may have important effects on the sustainability of currency pegs. This paper analyzes such effects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices, generating a rich set of theoretical comparative static predictions related to often discussed but rarely modelled accounts of currency attacks. The model can be solved in closed form and the methods could be used to study other economic issues in which coordination and risk aversion play important roles.     

Banking,debt, and currency crises in developed countries: Stylized facts and early warning indicators

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we present stylized facts on banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression we find that banking and debt crises are interrelated and both typically precede currency crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, on a reduced sample we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. The most consistent result across the various specifications and time horizons is that significant growth of domestic private credit precedes banking crises, while rising money market rates and global corporate spreads are also leading indicators worth monitoring. For currency crises, we also corroborate the role of rising domestic private credit and money market rates and detect the relevance of domestic currency overvaluation. The role of other indicators differs according to the type of crisis and the warning horizon selected, but it mostly seems easier to find reliable predictors at a horizon shorter than two years. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. We also employ a signaling approach to derive the threshold value for the best single indicator (domestic private credit), and finally we provide a composite early warning index that further increases the usefulness of the model.     

Defending against speculative attacks – It is risky,but it can pay off

While currency crises are typically considered to be painful and costly events, a closer look reveals that economic developments after a speculative attack differ considerably. Monetary authorities can play a central role in determining the economic course and costs of currency crises. They have to decide whether to defend or not to defend the domestic currency giving rise to three different types of crises: (i) an immediate depreciation if the central bank does not intervene and either (ii) a successful defense or (iii) an unsuccessful defense in the case of an intervention. We find that a central bank has two options to mitigate the costs of speculative attacks, namely an immediate depreciation and a successful defense. If a central bank intervenes she might be able to stabilize the exchange rate only temporarily and risks to ultimately fail facing the worst of the three scenarios with the highest economic costs.     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

Costs of financial instability, household-sector balance sheets and consumption

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.