ESG投资能够促进银行创造流动性吗?——兼论经济政策不确定性的调节效应

当前在我国致力于实现“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的大背景下,银行能否通过ESG投资促进流动性创造,进而推动高质量发展具有重大战略意义。本文利用2009年第一季度至2020年第二季度中国36家上市银行的面板数据,实证分析ESG投资对银行流动性创造的影响,并将其置于经济政策不确定性条件下予以讨论。研究发现:第一,ESG投资整体上促进流动性创造,表现为对资产端和负债端流动性创造的促进作用,以及对表外流动性创造的抑制作用。从ESG投资结构看,环境保护投资和社会责任投资均抑制流动性创造,而公司治理投资则促进流动性创造。异质性分析表明,地方性银行和资本短缺银行的ESG投资对流动性创造具有更强的促进作用。第二,中介机制分析发现,ESG投资主要通过“盈利”和“风险”渠道促进流动性创造。第三,在经济政策不确定性上升时期,ESG投资对流动性创造的促进作用更加显著。从ESG投资分项看,经济政策不确定性会增强环境保护投资和社会责任投资对流动性创造的抑制作用,以及公司治理投资对流动性创造的促进作用。本文结论为充分发挥ESG投资作用并以此推动高质量发展提供了政策启示。     

The liquidity of bank assets and banking stability

This paper shows that an increased liquidity of bank assets, paradoxically, increases banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures. This is because even though higher asset liquidity directly benefits stability by encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their balance sheets and by facilitating the liquidation of assets in a crisis, it also makes crises less costly for banks. As a result, banks have an incentive to take on an amount of new risk that more than offsets the positive direct impact on stability.     

Financial intermediation and the supply of liquidity

I study the role of financial intermediaries in supplying liquidity to the real economy. Firms hold liquid assets to meet unanticipated expenses. Financial intermediaries supply liquidity by pooling partially liquid assets, but their ability to commit future funds depends on their capital. When liquidity is scarce, there is a positive liquidity premium and investment is inefficiently low. Bank losses raise the liquidity premium and reduce investment. I analyze the optimal supply of public liquidity and find that when private liquidity is scarce the government should issue bonds for their liquidity properties, providing justification for countercyclical budget deficits.     

Liquidity Risk of Private Assets: Evidence from Real Estate Markets

Investment in thinly traded private assets involves liquidity risk. Existing literature provides limited guidance as it mainly focuses on publicly traded security assets such as stocks and bonds. This paper develops an analytical tool for quantifying liquidity risk of private assets. Using commercial real estate as a model asset and under reasonable assumptions, we find that the magnitude of liquidity risk is too large to be ignored, especially in down markets when liquidity risk is a great concern.     

Liquidity preference under uncertainty: A model of dynamic investment in illiquid opportunities

Whereas frictionless exchange markets provide a high degree of liquidity for financial assets, investments in real assets and productive capacity may be very costly to modify, and thus effectively irreversible in the short-run. This paper addresses the problem of an investor (individual or enterprise) who must allocate a limited resource to productive investments over time. Investment opportunities arrive in a random sequence and are irreversible in the short-run: thus investment decisions are made under uncertainty as to future opportunities (which may have to be foregone). The analysis demonstrates that a rational investor will demand a higher return on long-lasting opportunities than on those which are instantaneously reversible. The liquidity premium increases with the average duration of the non-liquid investments.     

融资流动性对商业银行资产配置行为的动态影响

使用14家上市银行2007~2013年季度数据建立面板向量自回归(PVAR)模型,运用脉冲响应函数分析融资流动性对银行资产配置行为的动态影响。研究结果表明：存款成本和银行间融资成本的上升,会激励银行增加风险资产,减少流动性储备,不利于银行防范结构性流动性风险;存款流失会削弱银行贷款扩张的动力,提升流动性偏好;同业融资依赖性的上升短期内可以改善银行资产的流动性,长期则会加大资金借短贷长的问题,为流动性危机埋下隐患。     

次贷危机对国内银行外币债券投资的影响分析

作为全球规模最大、流动性最好的市场,美国固定收益市场一直是国外投资者追求稳定收益回报的首选地。文章比较了我国相对于其他国家,在美国固定收益市场的投资规模、品种及投资特点,重点分析了随金融市场动荡的加剧,国内商业银行外币债券的持仓变动,以及次贷危机对其外币债券投资造成的潜在损失,建议商业银行应采取更为审慎的投资策略,降低风险资产的投资比例。     

The dark side of liquidity regulation: Bank opacity and funding liquidity risk

We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.     

Real liquidity and banking

In an economy where banks take numeraire goods, so called money, as deposits, money allows depositors suffering preference shocks to withdraw from banks prematurely without liquidation of real investment. If real liquidity, defined as the real value of the monetary base, is low, the amount of payment liquidity, constrained by the velocity of money, limits the short-term price level of investment goods before banks can settle their long-term loan contracts. This leads to an attractive nominal long-term investment return and over-investment. Allowing for inside money, that is, bank deposits, to be used for payment can improve social welfare but cannot fully resolve the liquidity shortage problem as the short-term interest rate offered by banks is constrained by the threat of bank runs. In the presence of systemic liquidity shocks, the price-adjustment mechanism cannot take full effects with insufficient payment liquidity, which can lead to non-zero profits for banks. Exchanging investment goods for numeraire goods through international trade can improve social welfare.     

中国银行流动性过剩的成因辨析:一个新的视角

本文将银行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分.通过建立银行预防性流动资产需求模型,运用向量误差修正模型(VEC)和方差分解方法实证分析我国银行流动性过剩的原因.实证结果表明:银行间同业拆借利率、汇率波动率、存款波动率和银行存款增加是银行流动性过剩的主要原因,银行的自愿性流动资产过剩和非自愿性流动性过剩并存,银行大量的流动性资产部分是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动等风险而持有的.     

Bank liquidity,the maturity ladder,and regulation

We investigate the liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, such as demand deposits, than strictly required under the regulation. More solvent banks hold fewer liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, suggesting an interaction between capital and liquidity buffers. However, this interaction turns out to be weaker during a crisis. Although not required, some banks consider cash flows scheduled beyond 1 month ahead when setting liquidity asset holdings, but they seldom look further ahead than 1 year.     

Investment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation

We model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity-marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.     

Asset liquidity,corporate investment,and endogenous financing costs

We analyze how the liquidity of real and financial assets affects corporate investment. The trade-off between liquidation costs and underinvestment costs implies that low-liquidity firms exhibit negative investment sensitivities to liquid funds, whereas high-liquidity firms have positive sensitivities. If real assets are not divisible in liquidation, firms with high financial liquidity optimally avoid external financing and instead cut new investment. If real assets are divisible, firms use external financing, which implies a lower sensitivity. In addition, asset redeployability decreases the investment sensitivity. Our findings demonstrate that asset liquidity is an important determinant of corporate investment.     

The Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio and bank net interest margins

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a new Basel III liquidity requirement designed to limit funding risk arising from maturity mismatches between bank assets and liabilities. This study explains the NSFR and estimates this ratio for banks in 15 countries. Banks below the ratio need to increase stable sources of funding and to reduce assets requiring funding. The most cost-effective strategies to meet the NSFR are to increase holdings of higher-rated securities and to extend the maturity of wholesale funding. These changes reduce net interest margins by 70–88 basis points on average, or around 40% of their year-end 2009 values. Universal banks with diversified funding sources and high trading assets are penalized most by the NSFR.     

商业银行流动性缺口管理的改进方法及实证分析

本文在中国当前使用的流动性缺口管理方法的基础上,结合巴塞尔委员会《流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架(征求意见稿)》(2009),给出关于流动性风险计量的改进方法。改进方法使用了高质量流动资产、净流动性缺口和净流动性缺口占总资产的比率三个指标,克服了传统流动性缺口管理没有充分考虑资产质量和资产流动性特征等缺点,更好地反映商业银行的流动性风险。通过实证分析先对国内3家银行2006~2009年年报数据进行比较,然后对国内10家银行2009年年报数据进行比较,进一步验证了改进方法的优越性。     

新会计准则下银行资产分类会计选择的理论建模

2007年1月1日起实施的新会计准则对商业银行最重要的影响在于资产分类方面的新规定。新准则规定基于管理者持有该证券的动机和是否具有持有到期的能力对金融资产分类。资产分类的不同决定着市场价值变化对盈利水平和银行权益的影响。本文考虑新会计准则对银行资产分类的可能影响,设计了一个债券类产品和贷款,根据投资者效用和动机研究银行的资产分类决策,对银行考虑新会计准则对其影响时的资产分类决策建模。模型的解表明,风险中性的银行权衡流动性需求、权益稳定、资产收益几个方面决定其金融资产的分类,而银行收益和股东价值仍主要取决于银行的投资战略和对市场的预期,对资产分类规定的变化不会影响银行的实际收益,但短期银行会考虑其流动性需求和监管资本的稳定性,来决定银行的分类决策。     

国内商业银行流动性选择的行为分析

银行愿意用流动性资产形式保持自己投资基于如下心理因素:在一定的资产总量下,银行的流动性偏好越强,对中长期资产要求的流动性溢价水平就越高,贷款利率定价就越高。当前,商业银行持有大量流动性资产和中长期贷款的低流动性溢价并存。商业银行的流动性选择行为,受来自于央行的政策压力的影响大于来自于市场的经济压力的影响。     

Liquidity Requirements,Free-Riding,and the Implications for Financial Stability Evidence from the Early 1900s

Maintaining sufficient liquidity in the financial system is vital for its stability. However, since returns on liquid assets are typically low, individual financial institutions may seek to hold fewer such assets, especially if they believe they can rely on other institutions for liquidity support. We examine whether state banks in the early 1900s took advantage of relatively high cash balances maintained by national banks, due to reserve requirements, to hold less cash themselves. We find that state banks did hold less cash in places where both state legal requirements were lower and national banks were more prevalent.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.