综合经营趋势下金融集团的资本充足度监管

金融综合经营与金融集团的产生,对监管机构的资本充足度监管提出了一些挑战。在传统的分业监管框架下,金融集团可以利用其调配资本资产的灵活性进行监管资本套利,套利手段包括资产簿记调整、资本重复计算、债务资本化、利用非受监管成员企业承担风险等。我国的金融监管机构在已对银行集团和保险集团提出统一资本监管要求的基础上,应通过做实监管协调机制、扩大受监管金融集团范围、对集团内非金融企业进行审慎监管、健全金融集团内部防火墙制度等方法,完善对金融集团的资本充足度监管。     

世界主要国家金融监管体制的演变及我国的抉择

伴随着世界金融的不断发展,世界各国纷纷改革原有金融监管体制,向统一、混业的监管方向发展,以适应金融集团化发展的需要。面对金融发展趋势,本文提出,我国也应当适时调整监管架构,成立金融监管委员会：统一协调相关监管机构;研究实施金融集团的监管。     

我国金融集团发展的现状与问题分析

我国金融集团随着跨业合作以及各类金融创新的进程不断发展,也必然会出现一些问题。文章从现有我国金融集团的发展模式、发展中出现的问题出发,提出尽快建立准入标准、统一监管口径,并且长期建立集团整体的风险评估体系,加强国际间监管合作的建议。     

美欧金融集团监管的演变及对中国的启示

上世纪90年代,混业经营成为美欧金融业发展的大趋势,随之而来的是金融集团的不断涌现。美欧均对各自监管实践做出一些调整,但都不甚彻底,相关风险最终在2008年国际金融危机中爆发出来。对此,美欧进行了深刻反思,通过重塑监管框架、明确金融集团定义、统一审慎监管要求、强化当局间合作等措施,着力强化金融集团监管。我国金融业虽秉承分业经营、分业监管的发展模式,但近年来银、证、保业务相互渗透日益频繁和深入,金融集团已然存在。本文对美欧金融集团监管的改革历程进行了梳理、分析和比较,尝试借鉴其经验教训,以期为我国推进金融监管改革、防范金融风险及维护金融稳定提供参考。     

多元化金融集团的国际监管规则及其对中国监管实践的借鉴

多元化金融集团的兴起对传统的单一监管方式形成了挑战，为此以巴塞尔委员会为主的金融集团联合论坛颁布了题为《多元化金融集团监管的最终件》，对金融集团监管提出了一系列原则与标准。本通过对该件资本充足性、适宜性要求、信息共享、协调员等制度的研究，提出了完善我国金融集团监管体制的若干建议。     

多元化金融集团的国际监管研究

随着管制放松与竞争加剧，金融领域出现业务多元化、组织集团化趋势。传统国际金融监管手段无法适应形势需要。三大国际监管机构联全出台了《多元化金融集团监管的最终文件》。本文根据文件精神，从资本冯足与国际合作两上角度针对多元化金融集团国际合作两上角度针对多元化金融集团国际监管提出对策建议。     

金融集团资本充足性计算方法的国际比较

通过对金融集团资本充足性监管的国际比较,提出对中国制定金融控股公司资本充足率计算方法的参考。     

金融集团整体监管的新进展

20世纪80年代以来,大型跨国金融集团迅速发展,因其业务广泛,所辖受监管和未受监管的实体,模糊了行业界限,给分业监管带来诸多挑战。为弥补金融集团的监管缺失,1996年,巴塞尔银行监管委员会(BCBS)、国际证监会组织(IOSCO)、国际保险监督官协会(IAIS)共同成立"金融集团联合论坛     

金融控股集团资本充足的法律监管研究

资本充足监管是金融控股集团监管的一个重要方面。我国目前正在制定《金融控股公司监管条例》,而资本充足监管是其中的重要内容。本文结合联合论坛和欧盟的相关监管文件,介绍金融控股公司及由其为核心的金融集团资本衡量的主要方法以及欧盟的跨行业资本概念,并对我国的资本衡量法律创新提出了若干建议。     

金融集团的信息披露

随着金融监管的放松,金融机构间的并购现象逐渐增多,改变了过去金融机构只经营单一业务的局面,金融机构开始以金融集团的形式来经营多种金融业务,如某一金融集团同时经营银行、保险和证券业务.金融集团是在放松金融监管的背景条件下出现的,因而对金融集团的监管不可能回到限制金融机构经营业务范围的老路上去,依靠市场的力量加强对金融集团的约束将是金融监管的一个重要方面,而信息是市场机制发挥约束作用的重要基础.为了充分发挥市场机制的作用,金融监管机构应加强对金融集团信息披露的监管.     

全球化视野下金融集团监管的合作与协调

金融集团是二十世纪80年代以来发展起来的一种创新组织形式,在经济全球化背景下面临由复杂组织结构及集团内部交易等问题引起的特定风险。"金融集团联合论坛"自成立起来,先后发布多项旨在监督金融集团稳健运营的文件,以切实加强对多元化金融集团的监管。欧盟理事会发布的"监管指令"消弭了欧盟对金融集团监管的重复、脱节现象,使欧盟监管由行业监管向跨行业监管、由机构性监管向功能性监管的方向过渡。     

全球化视野下金融集团监管的合作与协调

金融集团是二十世纪80年代以来发展起来的一种创新组织形式,在经济全球化背景下面临由复杂组织结构及集团内部交易等问题引起的特定风险."金融集团联合论坛"自成立起来,先后发布多项旨在监督金融集团稳健运营的文件,以切实加强对多元化金融集团的监管.欧盟理事会发布的"监管指令"消弭了欧盟对金融集团监管的重复、脱节现象,使欧盟监管由行业监管向跨行业监管、由机构性监管向功能性监管的方向过渡.     

The Prudential Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in the European Union

Abstract

Around the world, the formation of financial conglomerates is gaining importance. In the United States, the provisional agreement between Congress and President Clinton’s administration to break down the barriers between banking, insurance, and securities firms by repealing the Glass-Steagall Act is no less than revolutionary. Meanwhile, in the European Union (EU), where the establishment of financial groups working in all three sectors has long been permitted, the Financial Services Action Plan (COM 1999),¹ as endorsed by European Heads of State at the Köln Council, identifies the further development of prudential rules for financial conglomerates as a top priority for EU financial services legislation in the coming years.

The focus of EU prudential legislation is on individual financial services undertakings, that is, on the bank, insurance company, or securities undertaking and not on the position and operation of the conglomerate as a whole. From this angle, the potential danger is one of a growing mismatch between the prudential approach, which looks at the individual legal undertakings separately, and the business approach, which manages and controls the conglomerate as a whole in different product and geographic areas. For this reason, the basic EU prudential framework has been supplemented to address the conglomerate dimension.

This paper presents an overview of financial services prudential legislation in the EU. It explains the role of the European Commission and gives a summary of the basic prudential framework for financial services, focusing on the single passport concept and the principle of mutual recognition. It examines the recent history of financial concentration and conglomeration in Europe and discusses general prudential issues arising from financial conglomerates. The paper also examines existing EU prudential legislation on financial conglomerates and how this might be developed in the future. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. It is hoped that this brief overview of how the European Union has tackled and is tackling the difficult issue of financial conglomerate supervision might be of interest to North American readers at a time when the United States is changing its prudential legislation to permit the development of financial conglomerates.     

Spin‐offs: Tackling the Conglomerate Discount

Spin‐offs and other restructuring actions have risen sharply in 2011, driven by the need to streamline business models and increase corporate values. These transactions can be an effective tool for addressing the conglomerate valuation discount that has been a pervasive phenomenon over the past decade, affecting conglomerates in most regions across the world. In particular, North American and Western European conglomerates trade at valuation multiples that are roughly 10% lower than those of their pure‐play peers. A conglomerate discount also prevails in some of the emerging markets, including CEEMEA and Asia. Nevertheless, in some regions, notably Japan and Latin America, conglomerates typically trade at a premium. Although the average conglomerate discount narrowed during the financial crisis due to the perceived benefits of diversification during downturns, almost half of the conglomerates globally trade at a discount, and almost a third of all conglomerates have persistently traded at a discount during the past five years. For such companies, fixing the discount requires a simplification of the business model. The authors show that recent announcements of spin‐offs have led to significant share price outperformance by the parent company in both the short and the longterm, highlighting their effectiveness as a tool to enhance valuation. Spin‐offs can be particularly attractive for those conglomerates that operate unrelated business segments since these firms trade at a sharper discount than diversified firms operating in related businesses. The authors discuss how management should think about the financial implications of spin‐offs, including capital structure considerations, dividend policy, and turnover in the shareholder base.     

Is there a diversification discount in financial conglomerates?

This paper investigates whether the diversity of activities conducted by financial institutions influences their market valuations. We find that there is a diversification discount: The market values of financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities, e.g., lending and non-lending financial services, are lower than if those financial conglomerates were broken into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. While difficult to identify a single causal factor, the results are consistent with theories that stress intensified agency problems in financial conglomerates engaged in multiple activities and indicate that economies of scope are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium.     

德国金融混业经营及其监管

德国金融制度最大的特点就是长期以来一直坚持混业经营制度。虽然如此,德国也经历了一个金融制度的变迁和完善的演变过程。本文通过梳理德国金融混业经营制度的发展历程,发现德国能够坚持混业经营制度的重要原因在于具备了一套高效而且适合金融业发展规律的监管制度。     

中国金融控股集团发展：分业还是混业？

中国的金融控股集团可界定为跨业经营,再加上金融企业资产的弱专用性,因此现有金融管理体制下存在金融控股集团发展的空间。但本文分析认为金融控股集团的经营前景不能确定,应积极、审慎地发展。     

美欧金融危机中CDS泡沫形成的原因与影响以及相关风险管理问题的思考

2007年以来的国际金融危机中,大规模的CDS合约交易起到了推波助澜的作用,放大了实际风险。然而,也不能完全否定CDS产品在促进金融衍生品市场繁荣,尤其是有效对冲风险中的重要作用。目前,国内已出现了引入CDS的相关研究。本文以欧美危机为鉴,就完善COS市场监管,以及国内引入CDS类似的产品后如何把握好金融监管与市场繁荣之间的平衡进行了相关思考,以期及早进行相应的制度设计,实现市场的良性发展。     

Regulating financial conglomerates

We analyze the risk-taking incentives of a financial conglomerate that combines a bank and a non-bank financial intermediary. The conglomerate's risk-taking incentives depend on the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn is determined by the conglomerate's liability structure. We examine optimal capital regulation for standalone institutions, for integrated conglomerates and holding company conglomerates. We show that, when capital requirements are set optimally, capital arbitrage within holding company conglomerates can raise welfare by increasing market discipline. Because they have a single balance sheet, integrated conglomerates extend the reach of the deposit insurance safety net to their non-bank divisions. We show that the extra risk-taking that this effect causes may wipe out the diversification benefits within integrated conglomerates. We discuss the policy implications of these results.