Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Reputation stretching in mutual fund starts

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.     

The determinants of mutual fund starts

For a sample of 1163 mutual funds started over the period 1979-1992,we find that fund initiations are positively related to thelevel of assets invested in and the capital gains embedded inother funds with the same objective, the fund family's priorperformance, the fraction of funds in the family in the lowrange of fees, and the decision by large families to open similarfunds in the prior year. In addition, consistent with the presenceof scale and scope economies in fund openings, we find thatlarge families and families that have more experience in openingfunds in the past are more likely to open new funds.     

Determinants of cost efficiencies in the mutual fund industry

We evaluate determinants of cost efficiencies in the U.S. mutual fund industry for 1998-2003. Our empirical results show that cost increases in this industry have been less than proportional to increases in assets. We find that funds without a 12b-1 plan show larger economies of scale than funds with a 12b-1 plan; institutional funds show greater economies of scale than do retail funds; and that fund families that are more focused in their investment objectives reap benefits of lower fund management costs than do fund families that are more diversified in their investment objectives.     

Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

We address how mutual funds vote on shareholder proposals and identify factors that help determine support of wealth-increasing shareholder proposals. We examine 213,579 voting decisions made by 1799 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. In an analysis of voting across funds within the same fund family, we find significant divergence in voting within families, emphasizing the importance of focusing on voting by individual funds. We also find that, in general, mutual funds vote more affirmatively for potentially wealth-increasing proposals and funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are significantly higher than those of other investors. Our results suggest that funds tend to support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance. We also find that funds with lower turnover ratios and social funds are more likely to support shareholder proposals. Finally, fund voting approval rates significantly impact whether a proposal passes and whether one is implemented.     

Investment restrictions and fund performance

We examine the effect of investment restrictions on mutual fund performance. Utilizing a unique panel of mutual fund contract changes, we explore several ways these changes affect a fund, including: performance, funding risk, and managerial contracting. We find that the general shift towards fewer restrictions over the period 1996–2011 has provided little benefit to mutual funds. Specifically, neither performance nor flow increased and we observe no changes in risk on average. We do find, however, an increased likelihood of management turnover when restrictions are removed. We conclude that contract restrictions do not explain the general underperformance of mutual funds, and that these investment restrictions are not binding.     

Portfolio concentration and fund manager performance

This research examines the relationships among portfolio concentration, fund manager skills, and fund performance in Taiwan's equity mutual fund industry, yielding several empirical findings as follows. First, after controlling for other factors, concentrated equity funds tend to have smaller net asset values, larger fund flows, higher turnover rates, and a younger age and prevail in smaller fund families. Second, concentrated fund managers buy and sell stocks more smartly based on economic trends or market factors than do diversified fund managers, i.e., they have better market‐timing abilities. Third, only partial evidence supports the premise that concentrated equity funds have better next‐quarter risk‐adjusted performances than do diversified ones, as these fund managers' skills positively correlate to risk‐adjusted fund performance. Fourth, fund managers who have better stock‐picking abilities and intensively invest in certain industries generally exhibit better Carhart's alpha in the next quarter than do other fund managers. Fifth, fund managers' stock‐picking abilities more closely relate to long‐term performance than do their market‐timing abilities. Lastly, positive performance persistence is much stronger than negative performance persistence, but concentrated funds do not have stronger performance persistence than do diversified funds.     

Mutual fund tournaments and fund Active Share

We study the impact of the tournament-like competition in the mutual fund industry by examining the Active Share choices of funds. Funds with relatively poor performance by the end of the third quarter in a calendar year tend to increase their Active Share during the last quarter. The increase in the trailing funds’ Active Share is accompanied by an increase in the funds’ downside risk exposure. The evidence suggests that the strategic shifts in Active Share we document are not information/skill motivated.     

A review of behavioural and management effects in mutual fund performance

This paper surveys and critically evaluates the literature on the role of management effects and fund characteristics in mutual fund performance. First, a brief overview of performance measures is provided. Second, empirical findings on the predictive power of fund characteristics in explaining future returns are discussed. Third, the paper reviews the literature on fund manager behavioural biases and the impact these have on risk taking and returns. Finally, the impact of organizational structure, governance and strategy on both fund risk taking and future performance is examined. While a number of surveys on mutual fund performance are available, these have not focused on the role of manager behavioural biases, manager characteristics and fund management strategic behavior on fund performance and risk taking. This review is an attempt to fill this gap. Empirical results indicate that finding successful funds ex-ante is extremely difficult, if not impossible. In contrast, there is strong evidence that poor performance persists for many of the prior “loser fractile” portfolios of funds. A number of manager behavioural biases are prevalent in the mutual fund industry and they generally detract from returns.     

Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry

This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.     

Macroeconomic risk and hedge fund returns

This paper estimates hedge fund and mutual fund exposure to newly proposed measures of macroeconomic risk that are interpreted as measures of economic uncertainty. We find that the resulting uncertainty betas explain a significant proportion of the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. However, the same is not true for mutual funds, for which there is no significant relationship. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, the positive relation between uncertainty betas and future hedge fund returns remains economically and statistically significant. Hence, we argue that macroeconomic risk is a powerful determinant of cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.     

Capacity effects and winner fund performance: the relevance and interactions of fund size and family characteristics

This study analyzes the existence of capacity effects and performance persistence for US equity mutual funds for the period from 1992 to 2007. We focus on winner funds and distinguish between capacity effects from both size and inflows and explore their interactions with two measures of family size, i.e. family total net assets under management (family TNA) and the number of funds at the family level (family breadth). The differentiation of family size allows us to analyze competing effects at the family level such as economies of scale as well as organizational complexity costs and conflicts of interest. Our empirical results confirm diseconomies of scale at the winner fund level and indicate that only small winner funds with low inflows significantly outperform the four-factor benchmark on a net return basis. There are no universal benefits from economies of scale at the family level, but our findings suggest the existence of conflicts of interest in families offering a relatively large number of funds. Small winner funds in families offering a small number of funds significantly outperform while economies of scale only materialize among extremely small winner funds. We provide detailed robustness checks for our empirical results. Overall, simply conditioning on fund size is not sufficient for selecting future outperforming funds. The results indicate that fund investors may earn positive abnormal returns when combining information on fund size with information on fund flows or fund family affiliations in their asset allocation decisions.     

Why do fund managers increase risk?

This paper examines the relationship between the increase in fund risk and subsequent cash flows. We attempt to test the hypothesis that an increase in fund risk actually increases the net flows of equity funds, which is a basic assumption of risk shifting. We find that a change in fund risk has a positive and convex relationship with the fund's net flows. The effect of risk changes on net flows is a natural consequence of its effects on inflows and outflows. This paper's empirical results are robust to return frequency, fund age, and fund size. Our findings create incentives for managers to shift risk as documented in the mutual fund literature.     

Mutual fund performance: false discoveries, bias, and power

We analyze the performance of mutual funds from a multiple inference perspective. When the number of funds is large, random fluctuations will cause some funds falsely to appear to outperform the rest. To account for such “false discoveries,” a multiple inference approach is necessary. Performance evaluation measures are unlikely to be independent across mutual funds. At the same time, the data are typically not sufficient to estimate the dependence structure of performance measures. In addition, the performance evaluation model can be misspecified. We contribute to the existing literature by applying an empirical Bayes approach that offers a possible way to take these factors into account. We also look into the question of statistical power of the performance evaluation model, which has received little attention in mutual fund studies. We find that the assumption of independence of performance evaluation measures results in significant bias, such as over-estimating the number of outperforming mutual funds. Adjusting for the mutual fund investment objective is helpful, but it still does not result in the discovery of a significant number of successful funds. A detailed analysis reveals a very low power of the study. Even if outperformers are present in the sample, they might not be recognized as such and/or too many years of data might be required to single them out.     

International mutual fund selectivity and market timing during up and down market conditions

This study examines the selectivity and market-timing ability of international mutual fund managers. Ninety-seven international mutual funds with a minimum of five-year return history selected from the Morningstar OnDisc database are analyzed. Our findings suggest that managers of international mutual funds possess good selectivity and overall performance. We also find weak evidence of poor market-timing ability. Consistent with prior findings from domestic mutual funds, there is a negative correlation between the international fund managers' selection ability and market-timing ability. Finally, managers for Europea funds show poorer performance than those managing the other three international fund groups.     

Informed trading around earnings and mutual fund alphas

We examine whether informed trading around earnings announcements drives mutual fund performance. The measure is motivated by prior studies arguing that a mutual fund is skilled if it buys stocks with subsequent high earnings announcement returns. We find that this measure predicts future mutual fund returns. On average, after adjusting for Carhart’s four risk factors, the top decile of mutual funds outperforms the bottom decile by 44 basis points per quarter. By decomposing fund alphas into two components in their relations to earnings, we find that this measure is only associated with earnings-related fund alphas. This measure can also be used to predict stock returns at future earnings announcements.     

Mutual fund characteristics, managerial attributes, and fund performance

This study provides a comprehensive examination of recent mutual fund performance by analyzing a large set of both mutual funds and fund attributes in an effort to link performance to fund-specific characteristics. The results indicate that the hypothesized relationships between performance and the explanatory variables are generally upheld. After taking into consideration general market conditions and fund investment objective, the characteristic variables that relate to fund popularity, growth, cost, and management also explain performance. Finally, after controlling for survivorship and benchmark error as well as fund-specific factors, the results refute the performance persistence phenomenon.     

Coskewness timing ability in the mutual fund industry

The ability of mutual fund managers to time coskewness successfully can help them manage their portfolio’s exposure to potential losses and improve their fund’s performance. This study assesses whether mutual fund managers are able to manage the market exposure of their investment portfolios given a change in coskewness. We demonstrate that fund managers investing in Small Blend and Small Growth stocks possess the ability to time coskewness. On average, the fund managers of these two investment objectives increase the market exposures of their portfolios about 2.749 % and 1.340 %, respectively, based on their anticipations on future coskewness. Superiority is driven from the fact that the fund managers in small capitalization stocks are successfully able to manage the tail risk of their funds’ portfolios. The fund-by-fund results confirm that the number of individual funds succeeding in timing market skewness of the Small Blend and Small Growth investment objectives is larger than the remaining types. The main findings are robust when controlling for other types of timing ability, the periods of financial turbulence, and the construction of coskewness.     

Outsourcing accounting information systems: Evidence from closed-end mutual fund families

This study examines the factors associated with the decision of closed-end funds to outsource their accounting information systems. Using data from 2010 and 2011, we find that the outsourcing decision is made by groups of funds with common service providers (called “fund families”), rather than by individual funds. Our results indicate that fund families containing a larger number of funds and older fund families are less likely to outsource their accounting functions. These types of fund families may have greater internal economies of scale, diminishing the potential cost savings from outsourcing. We also find that fund families with more good-faith-valued assets are less likely to outsource accounting information systems than those with more market-valued assets. Valuing these good-faith-valued assets is both an important investment-management process and a key accounting task, reducing the need to outsource accounting to focus managers on their core competency. This study is of potential importance to investors and regulators in evaluating closed-end funds' decisions on outsourcing accounting functions.     

Mutual fund flows and investor returns: An empirical examination of fund investor timing ability

We examine the timing ability of mutual fund investors using cash flow data at the individual fund level. Over 1991–2004 equity fund investor timing decisions reduce fund investor average returns by 1.56% annually. Underperformance due to poor timing is greater in load funds and funds with relatively large risk-adjusted returns. In particular, the magnitude of investor underperformance due to poor timing largely offsets the risk-adjusted alpha gains offered by good-performing funds. Investors in both actively managed funds and index funds exhibit poor investment timing. We demonstrate that our empirical results are consistent with investor return-chasing behavior.