股权结构与企业投资多元化关系:理论与实证分析

本文以中国上市公司为样本,对股权结构与企业投资多元化关系进行了理论与实证分析。结果表明,股权集中度,包括第一大股东持股比例与企业投资多元化水平显著负相关;国有股比例与企业投资多元水平负相关,但相关性不显著;法人股比例与企业投资多元水平基本无关;流通A股(社会公众股的替代)比例与企业投资多元水平显著正相关;流通B股对企业投资多元化水平的影响可能是负向的。     

上市公司董事会特征与审计质量的实证分析—以山东省济南市上市公司为例

济南市上市公司董事会特征与审计质量存在一定程度的相关性,如董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事薪酬与审计质量显著正相关等;董事长与总经理兼任情况与审计质量呈显著负相关;董事会会议次数、四委会设立比例与审计质量有不显著正相关关系。本文在实证分析的基础上。提出建议措施,对提高济南市上市公司的审计质量有一定使用价值。     

上市公司董事会特征与审计质量的实证分析——以山东省济南市上市公司为例

济南市上市公司董事会特征与审计质量存在一定程度的相关性,如董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事薪酬与审计质量显著正相关等;董事长与总经理兼任情况与审计质量呈显著负相关;董事会会议次数、四委会设立比例与审计质量有不显著正相关关系。本文在实证分析的基础上,提出建议措施,对提高济南市上市公司的审计质量有一定使用价值。     

股权结构、公司治理与上市公司投资水平的实证研究

实证研究表明,在上市公司投资水平的决定因素中,资产负债率、资产规模、现金流都与投资显著正相关,但托宾Q并不显著,并且在方向上与预期相反;行业之间的投资行为存在差异;第一大股东持股比例与投资负相关;流通股比例与投资正相关但不显著,国有股比例和社会法人股比例都与投资负相关但只有国有股比例显著;高管持股比例和独董比例都与投资负相关,但同样不显著。     

董事会特征与财务舞弊——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2003～2007年间我国上市公司为研究对象,系统考察了董事会特征对财务舞弊的影响,结果表明:董事会规模与财务舞弊呈"U"型关系;董事会持股比例与财务舞弊显著正相关;公司领导权结构和董事会稳定性与财务舞弊负相关;董事会会议频度对财务舞弊的抑制作用在逐步加强;独立董事比例和审计委员会与财务舞弊不存在相关性。据此提出了政策建议。     

股权集中度、董事会治理特征与银行综合绩效——基于我国上市银行的实证研究

文章以2007-2010年我国上市满一年的14家银行为样本,实证分析了股权集中度和董事会治理特征对银行综合绩效的影响。研究结果表明：就股权集中度而言,第一大股东持股比例与综合绩效负相关,而前五大股东及前十大股东持股比例与综合绩效显著正相关;就董事会治理而言,董事会规模与综合绩效之间存在非线性的倒U型关系,董事会会议次数和董事薪酬与综合绩效显著正相关,但独立董事比例对综合绩效的影响不显著。     

我国民营上市公司董事会特征与现金持有水平关系的实证研究

董事会作为公司治理的核心,是影响企业现金持有水平的重要因素之一。文章以2008-2011年间民营上市公司为研究对象,对董事会特征与现金持有水平之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现:董事会规模、独立董事比例与现金持有水平存在不显著显著的负相关关系;董事会会议频次与现金持有水平存在显著负相关关系;两职合一、董事长持股比例、董事薪酬与现金持有水平存在不显著正相关关系。     

公司治理因素对我国上市公司资本结构选择的影响——基于Panel Data模型的实证分析

本文采用PanelData模型分内外两条路径检验了公司治理因素对资本结构选择的影响。研究结果表明,股权集中度、国家股比例、流通股比例、董事会规模、产品要素市场竞争程度、创新战略指标和私人收益指标与资本结构水平负相关;独立董事比例、董事会会议频率和股权制衡度指数与资本结构水平正相关;法人股比例、董事长是否兼任总经理与资本结构水平关系不显著。     

公司治理因素对我国上市公司资本结构选择的影响——基于Panel Data模型的实证分析

本文采用Panel Data模型分内外两条路径检验了公司治理因素对资本结构选择的影响.研究结果表明,股权集中度、国家股比例、流通股比例、董事会规模、产品要素市场竞争程度、创新战略指标和私人收益指标与资本结构水平负相关;独立董事比例、董事会会议频率和股权制衡度指数与资本结构水平正相关;法人股比例、董事长是否兼任总经理与资本结构水平关系不显著.     

中国证券公司内部治理影响公司经营效率的实证分析

通过实证分析中国证券公司内部治理对公司经营效率的影响表明:中国证券公司股权集中度与公司经营效率呈显著正相关关系;股权制衡度对公司经营效率的影响不显著;国有控股性质有助于提高公司经营效率;中国证券公司的董事会规模、独立董事比例与公司经营效率呈显著负相关关系;董事长与总经理的两职分离有利于提高公司经营效率;监事会规模、监事会独立性与公司经营效率负相关,但均在统计上不显著;中国证券公司管理层规模、管理层报酬与公司经营效率呈显著正相关关系。     

Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends

Using data from 944 public companies in 2006, I examine how a firm's propensity to pay dividends is related to (i) board independence and (ii) independent directors' tenure, number of board seats (busy) and equity incentive compensation. After controlling for the effects of traditional economic, CEO entrenchment and ownership determinants of the propensity to pay dividends, I find evidence of a positive association between the propensity to pay and (i) board independence and (ii) director tenure, and a negative association between the propensity to pay and (i) busy directors and (ii) greater equity incentive compensation in the director pay structure. I find consistent results when the decision is to pay cash dividends or repurchase shares. In further tests, I find that equity incentive compensation in the independent director pay structure is the most pervasive determinant across other dividend measures such as dividend payout, total payout and repurchases. Overall, the findings suggest that the characteristics of independent directors are important determinants of the payout policy. The results also suggest that future corporate governance research could benefit from incorporating characteristics of independent directors rather than limiting governance measures to board independence especially when recent empirical evidence (Linck et al., 2008, 2009) shows convergence, and therefore, narrowing variation in the proportion of outsiders and insiders on a board.     

Governance and Performance Implications of Diversification Strategies: Evidence from Large U.S. Firms

Recent research focuses on explaining the diversification discount. However, there is little direct evidence regarding the relation among ownership structure, corporate governance, and corporate diversification. The results in this paper suggest that agency issues do not account for firms adopting a particular diversification strategy. Also, the performance consequences of the shift in the diversification strategy and the subsequent changes in institutional and block ownership structures are not related to agency issues. In fact, investors seem not to avoid diversified firms per se. We suggest that observed board and ownership differences between diversified and focused firms are due to their being at different stages of corporate evolution.     

Muslim CEOs and bank risk-taking: Evidence from Indonesia

This study investigates the relationship between Muslim CEOs and bank risk-taking based on Indonesian banks from 2010 to 2017. We find that there is no significant difference in risk-taking among Indonesian banks based on whether the banks have Muslim CEOs or not. However, we find that only state-owned banks with Muslim CEOs display significantly low risk-taking. We further find that foreign-owned banks with Muslim CEOs display a significant low risk-taking only in the presence of Muslim-dominated boards. We show that Muslims must be in the majority on 2-tier boards (board of directors and board of commissioners) to significantly influence Muslim CEOs' risk-taking. In addition, we find no related evidence from family-owned firms. Further analysis reveals that banks with a low concentration of ultimate ownership indicate Muslim CEOs' low risk-taking behaviour, and vice versa.     

董事会规模、多元化战略与企业风险承担

不确定的外部竞争环境和公司战略定位对企业的风险承担水平具有重要影响.以2005-2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,以董事会规模作为门槛变量,分析当董事会人数在不同区间下多元化战略的实施对企业风险承担产生的影响.研究表明:随着董事会人数的增加,多元化战略与企业风险承担呈现先增后减的变化趋势,且二者存在基于董事会规模的双重门槛效应.     

Founders and board structure: Evidence from UK IPO firms

This study investigates whether a company's founders affect the combination of executive, grey and independent directors on its board at the time of initial public offering (IPO) in the UK. Particularly, we analyse how venture capitalists are associated with board structure in founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms. We find that UK IPO firms managed by founders tend to have more executive directors. Further, they are more likely to stack non-executive directors with more independent directors relative to grey directors. Venture capital ownership is not significantly associated with board structure at the IPO stage. However, further evidence suggests that venture capital ownership is negatively related to the percentage of executive directors and positively related to the percentage of grey directors in the founder-managed firms.     

The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis

Using a unique panel dataset that tracks corporate board development from a firm's IPO through 10 years later, we find that: (i) board size and independence increase as firms grow and diversify over time; (ii) board size—but not board independence—reflects a tradeoff between the firm-specific benefits and costs of monitoring; and (iii) board independence is negatively related to the manager's influence and positively related to constraints on that influence. These results indicate that economic considerations—in particular, the specific nature of the firm's competitive environment and managerial team—help explain cross-sectional variation in corporate board size and composition. Nonetheless, much of the variation in board structures remains unexplained, suggesting that idiosyncratic factors affect many individual boards’ characteristics.     

Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?

We examine the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information asymmetry in the equity market around quarterly earnings announcements. We use the change in market liquidity (i.e., bid–ask spreads and depths) around the announcements as a proxy for information asymmetry. We use principal components analysis to identify three factors, board independence, board structure and board activity, that capture the information in the eight individual corporate governance variables we examine. We then use ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares to estimate the relations between market liquidity changes and the following four explanatory variables: directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings, board independence, board structure, and board activity. Our results indicate that changes in bid–ask spreads at the time of earnings announcements are significantly negatively related to board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock holdings of directors and officers. We also find that depth changes are significantly positively related to board structure, board activity, and directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with higher levels of corporate governance have lower information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements.     

Corporate culture and board gender diversity: Evidence from textual analysis

Exploiting a distinctive measure of corporate culture based on advanced machine learning, we investigate the effect of board gender diversity on corporate culture. Our results demonstrate that greater board gender diversity considerably strengthens positive corporate culture. The findings support the notion that board gender diversity enhances board oversight and helps solve agency problems, resulting in managers being compelled to take measures that benefit shareholders and consequently, building a strong company culture. Further analysis validates the results, including propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, Lewbel's (2012) heteroscedastic identification, and Oster's (2019) testing for coefficient stability. Our study is the first to link board gender diversity to corporate culture, using cutting-edge information obtained from sophisticated machine learning.