Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value

We use cross-sectional regressions to study how a firm's value is related to dividends and debt. With a good control for profitability, the regressions can measure how the taxation of dividends and debt affects firm value. Simple tax hypotheses say that value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt. We find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability (expected net cash flows) missed by a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures any tax effects of financing decisions.     

How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?

I integrate under firm-specific benefit functions to estimate that the capitalized tax benefit of debt equals 9.7 percent of firm value (or as low as 4.3 percent, net of personal taxes). The typical firm could double tax benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. I infer how aggressively a firm uses debt by observing the shape of its tax benefit function. Paradoxically, large, liquid, profitable firms with low expected distress costs use debt conservatively. Product market factors, growth options, low asset collateral, and planning for future expenditures lead to conservative debt usage. Conservative debt policy is persistent.     

ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBT

The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar ; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt.
Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980–1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch.     

Determinants of corporate borrowing: A note

In his article Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Myers (1977) says that it is not guaranteed that the maximum value of the firm is reached before the maximum value of the debt is utilized in the case in which the interest payment is fully tax deductible, but the tax shield is lost if the firm goes bankrupt. I have shown here that even in such a case the maximum value of the firm will always be achieved before the maximum available debt is utilized.     

Calculating The Cost of Capital of an Unlevered Firm For Use in Project Evaluation

The adjusted present value requires an estimate of the cost of equity of an unlevered firm. Traditional approaches for calculating this cost assume that firms maintain a constant market-value percentage of debt when in fact firms typically use a book-value percentage of debt. In this paper, we present an approach to correctly estimate the cost of equity of an unlevered firm whenever the firm fails to maintain a constant market-value-based leverage ratio. We also demonstrate that both the Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1980) approaches may yield substantial valuation errors when firms determine debt levels based on book-value percentages. In contrast our method makes no errors as long as managers know the marginal tax benefit of debt.     

On the value and determinants of the interest tax shields

We use a dynamic model of the firm to ascertain both the value and the determinants of the debt tax shields. For a representative U.S. firm, we find that the value of the interest tax shields represents less than 5 % of firm value, and it varies considerably across U.S. industries. Our results also show that this component of firm value behaves counter-cyclically over the business cycle. Finally, besides the interest rate on debt and the corporate income tax rate, we find that the curvature of the production function is one of the main determinants of the tax advantage of debt.     

Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?

There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.     

The Cost of Debt

We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.     

On the Equivalence between the APV and the wacc Approach in a Growing Leveraged Firm

While in a steady state framework the choice between the wacc approach ( Modigliani‐Miller, 1963 ) and the adjusted present value (APV) approach ( Myers, 1974 ) is irrelevant since the two approaches provide the same result, however, in a growing firm context the wacc equation seems to be inconsistent with the APV result. In this paper we propose a simple model to evaluate the tax savings in a growing firm in order to show under which assumptions the two approaches lead to the same results. We demonstrate that the use of the wacc model in a steady‐growth scenario gives rise to some unusual assumptions with regard to the discount rates to be used in calculating tax shields. We show that the widely used wacc formula, if used, as it is in most cases, in a growth context, implies that a) debt tax shield related to already existing debt are discounted using k_d; b) debt tax shield related to new debt, due to company's growth, are discounted, according to a mixed procedure, using both k_u and k_d. We discuss the inconsistency of such a discounting procedure and the preferred features of the APV approach.     

Tax reforms and the capital structure of banks

This paper studies the link between corporate income tax (CIT) reforms and domestic banks’ financing decisions. We use a dataset of CIT reforms and estimate the effect of tax rate changes on leverage, dividend policies and earnings management of banks. The results suggest that taxation influences all three variables. Leverage increases with the CIT rate in the first three years after the reform. The reason is that the statutory CIT rate determines the value of the debt tax shield. A higher tax rate increases incentives to use debt finance when interest payments are deductible from the CIT base. The tax effects we find are statistically and economically significant but considerably lower than those found in previous research. Also, dividend pay-outs increase after an increase in CIT rates. This could indicate that banks actively manage their pay-out policies around tax reforms and adjust their capital structure with changes in dividends. Furthermore, banks increase loss loan reserves in anticipation of tax rate cuts since losses become less valuable with lower CIT rates.     

西部地区上市公司债务融资效应的实证研究——基于2007-2010年的经验数据

本文选取沪市西部地区53家上市公司作为研究样本,着重研究债务融资的税盾效应与财务杠杆效应。基于样本公司的债务融资现状,通过因子分析、主成分分析与多元回归分析揭示了债务融资效应与各影响因素之间的关联程度及显著水平。结论表明,当总资产息税前利润率大于债务利息率时,提高资产负债率,税盾效应、财务杠杆效应同时增大,进而增强债务融资效应;当总资产息税前利润率小于债务利息率时,提高资产负债率,税盾效应增大,财务杠杆表现为负效应,债务融资效应呈现不确定性。     

Convertible calls and corporate taxes under asymmetric information

This paper develops a signalling model of call of convertible securities (bonds or preferred stock) in the presence of corporate taxes and asymmetric information about future earnings. In equilibrium, managers with relatively unfavorable information call to force convertible holders to convert to common stock (in spite of the loss of corporate tax benefits if the convertibles are bonds), while those with relatively favorable information do not call. The model predicts that the announcement period common stock returns are more negative at the call of convertible bond than at the call of convertible preferred stock. Furthermore, we predict that when the importance of the tax deductibility of interest differs among firms, so does the stock price reaction to the announcement of convertible debt call. Specifically, the loss of equity value at the announcement decreases with the amount of non-debt tax shield that the calling firm owns, decreases with the book value of convertible debt called, and increases with corporate taxes.     

Interest Tax Shields: A Barrier Options Approach

There is a link between barrier options and tax shields of interest expense. We combine this link with a traditional valuation approach, to present practical valuation formulas for interest tax shields in three debt scenarios with risk of default: (1) constant debt, (2) delayed debt, and (3) debt refinancing. In all cases, default and refinancing are contingent on the random evolution of the income of the firm. For each scenario, we work out sensitivity analysis of the value of tax shields with respect to income, growth, systematic and business risk, risk-free interest rate, interest coverage ratio covenant, and the firm??s refinancing strategy.     

Reformulating Tax Shield Valuation: A Note

Standard financial theory (in the absence of agency costs and personal taxes) implies that each dollar of debt contributes to the value of the firm in proportion to the firm's tax rate. To derive this result, incremental debt is assumed permanent. This paper shows that when the firm acts to maintain a constant market value leverage ratio, the marginal value of debt financing is much lower than the corporate tax rate. Since Hamada's 2 unlevering procedure for observed equity betas was derived under the assumption of permanent debt, we derive an unlevering procedure consistent with the assumption of a constant leverage ratio.     

减税政策对小微企业债务期限结构的影响

本文主要探讨减税政策对小微企业债务期限结构的影响。理论上,减税政策对企业债务期限结构产生两种方向相反的效果:一是减税后企业盈利状况改善,激励银行通过延长债务期限以争取企业客户;二是减税后企业可支配现金流增加,加剧银行与企业间的委托代理问题,促使银行缩短债务期限以便加强企业监督。本文以所得税减半征收政策作为自然实验,基于全国税收调查数据库(2010-2015)考察了减税政策对小微企业债务期限结构的影响。实证结果显示:减税后企业的债务期限整体得以延长;如果减税后企业的盈利状况改善更多,或可支配现金流增长更缓,企业债务期限延长幅度更大。此外,本文发现在快速扩张行业、有产能过剩风险行业以及房地产上下游关联行业中的企业往往会因为较强的代理成本效应而面临减税后债务期限的边际缩短。本文研究结论对改善企业融资结构,特别对提高小微企业获取中长期贷款能力,有一定的参考意义。     

The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress

Financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. The present value of distress costs therefore depends on risk premia. We estimate this value using risk‐adjusted default probabilities derived from corporate bond spreads. For a BBB‐rated firm, our benchmark calculations show that the NPV of distress is 4.5% of predistress value. In contrast, a valuation that ignores risk premia generates an NPV of 1.4%. We show that marginal distress costs can be as large as the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000) . Thus, distress risk premia can help explain why firms appear to use debt conservatively.     

The classical tax system,imputation tax and capital budgeting

Differences in the taxation systems in Britain, France, and some other European countries (which use the imputation system) compared with the USA and the Netherlands, among others (which use the classical tax system), mean that the cost of equity capital should be specified, using a capital asset pricing model methodology, in different ways. Under the imputation system its value should be net of personal taxes; under the classical tax system, it should be gross of personal taxes. Similarly the value of the tax shield on debt for input into adjusted present value calculations differs, being significantly greater under the classical tax system. Formulae are set out to enable the calculation of the magnitude of the tax shield readily to be undertaken.     

From Business Tax to Value‐added Tax: The Effects of Reform on Chinese Transport Industry Firms

We study the effects of switching from business tax (BT) to value‐added tax (VAT) on the performance of firms in the Chinese transport industry, in an effort to determine whether the change in policy improves firm performance. We study the effects of this new VAT reform from a theoretical perspective, and test the effects on 49 listed transportation firms using a difference‐in‐differences model. The results indicate that VAT reform has a positive effect on profitability and the growth ability of firms in the transport industry, but no significant effects on the debt‐paying ability and operating capability of firms are found. Furthermore, we propose some suggestions for speeding up the development of transportation firms by replacing BT with VAT.     

How do bond investors perceive dividend payouts?

We explore how bond investors view corporate cash distributions through dividends and how that view influences corporate cost of debt. Explaining between 45 and 67 percent of variance in credit spreads at the time of issuance, our model reveals a non-linear association between dividend payouts and investment return expected by bondholders. In particular, while bondholders view cash disbursements in small amounts as a positive signal, large dividend payouts are viewed negatively. Our results thus provide support for both the signaling hypothesis and for the agency-cost-of-debt hypothesis. The results are robust even after controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage, business risk, asset tangibility, and term structure. Exploiting the 2003 dividend tax cut as an exogenous shock, we demonstrate that our results are not vulnerable to endogeneity problems. Finally, we find no evidence of corporations timing the payouts strategically to influence the cost of debt.     

To be or not to be all-equity for firms that eliminate long-term debt

Despite the advantages of debt, a significant number of firms that have an established leverage policy deliberately become all-equity. These firms eliminate a substantial amount of long-term debt as the average firm’s leverage ratio is approximately 30 percent at the year-end prior to debt elimination. Firm-level “shocks” such as CEO turnover and changes in credit ratings cannot explain the dramatic recapitalization decision. Consistent with the tradeoff theory, firms that eliminate debt have lower benefits (less tax shield benefits, agency costs) and higher costs (probability of financial distress, access to capital markets, etc.) of leverage in the three prior years compared to a matched sample. We also find that the factors influencing the decision to eliminate all debt is different from those to significantly reduce leverage or to have very low debt levels. Firms primarily finance the approximately $70 million of average long-term debt eliminated using proceeds from sales of relatively unproductive assets and from equity issues. Interestingly, over half of these firms issue significant amount of new debt within three years of becoming all-equity. Firms with lower liquidity and non-debt tax shields, higher potential overinvestment agency costs, and those that issue equity at the debt elimination year are more likely to relever quickly.