Privatization of the Urban Land Market in Shanghai

After the initiation of the privatization program of land use rights in China, land markets began to rapidly develop. This is undoubtedly due to a market mechanism finally being established to allocate land according to economic principles. However, the socialist practice of planned allocation for land leaves behind a land use pattern that affects the privatization of land market to a certain degree. In this study, a major land market in Asia—Shanghai, China—is examined in order to ascertain how the merging of the old land use pattern and the new market system for land use rights produces both opportunities and constraints in the process of privatization.     

Partial Privatization and Firm Performance

Most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non‐controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market. Since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact. This perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner. Using data on Indian state‐owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and investment.     

Competition and Efficiency after Privatization: The Role of the NAO

One of the arguments for privatization is to promote market competition in order to facilitate efficiency gains. This review of NAO privatization reports shows that the promotion of competition is rarely stated as an objective of a privatization and, where it is, it can lead to difficulties in drawing objective audit conclusions. The work of the regulators is of considerable importance after privatization; and a more recent role for the NAO is that of responsibility for the financial audit and value-for-money studies of these regulators. These NAO studies provide new opportunities to review the effectiveness of the regulators and to promote accountability in competition policy after privatization.     

Privatization,political risk and stock market development in emerging economies

This paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk. We argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market-oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights. We present evidence suggesting that progress in privatization is indeed correlated with improvements in perceived political risk. Our analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies. We conclude that the resolution of political risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies.     

Privatization and Fiscal Deficits in European Emerging Markets

Privatization and fiscal deficits have been linked theoretically as emerging market countries completed transitions from command to market-based economies. This study examines the joint relationships among relative fiscal deficits, privatization, and exogenous factors for twenty-five Central and Eastern European emerging market countries. Pooled regression models suggest that increased privatization does not reduce fiscal deficits, but fiscal deficits increase as privatization increases over time. These effects are dependent upon the set of countries considered and the privatization measure employed. There is limited support for the hypothesis that privatization is increased when fiscal deficits decline for the nine early privatizers.     

The dynamics of privatization, the legal environment and stock market development

In this paper, we examine under which conditions privatization is an effective means to develop local stock markets for a panel of 61 countries over the last twenty four years. By addressing the endogeneity between privatization and stock market development, we show for the 1980-98 period that the initial legal environment is a significant contemporary determinant of stock market development, while privatization is not. When we examine the dynamics of privatization in interaction with the legal environment, we find that privatization has a two-year-lagged effect on stock market development in emerging markets, and a one-year-lagged effect in developed countries. Results for the 1999-2003 period seem to be largely affected by the global crash that followed the Asian crisis.     

Privatization as an agency problem: Auctions versus private negotiations

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization options. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently sub-optimal privatization mechanism: private negotiations.     

民营化、融资约束与企业创新——来自中国工业企业的证据

本文研究国有企业民营化对企业创新的影响及其影响机制。利用中国工业企业数据库,以民营化企业为实验组、以国有企业为对照组进行双重差分检验,结果发现,国有企业民营化显著抑制了企业创新,而融资约束是抑制民营化企业创新的重要因素。进一步检验发现,融资约束对民营化企业创新的抑制作用主要存在于金融发展水平较低的地区,而在金融发展水平较高的地区,这种抑制作用并不明显。本文的研究结果从融资约束的角度拓展了民营化影响企业创新的相关研究,且从民营化的角度为金融市场如何影响企业创新提供了新的视角。此外,本文有助于澄清有关民营化的争议,为进一步深化混合所有制改革、加强金融对民营企业的支持以促进民营企业的创新和发展提供理论依据和政策参考。     

Do Privatization IPOs Outperform in the Long Run?

This paper investigates the long-run stock returns of privatization initial public offering (IPO) firms using a sample of 241 privatization IPOs from 42 countries during the period 1981-2003. We compare one-, three-, and five-year holding period returns of privatization IPOs to those of the domestic stock market indices and to size and size- and book-to-market equity ratio (BM)-matched firms from the same countries. Consistent with previous studies, we find that privatization IPOs significantly outperform their domestic stock markets in the long run. However, they show less consistent abnormal long-term stock performance relative to their size or size- and BM-matched benchmark firms.     

Credible reforms and stock return volatility: Evidence from privatization

In this paper we investigate how privatization affects stock return volatility. A credible privatization builds investors’ confidence through a reduction in political risk. In particular, a privatization program that is maintained over time signals credibility, which reduces political risk and in turn volatility. We further show that privatization is associated with lower idiosyncratic volatility mainly among developed markets, while it is associated with lower systematic volatility in developing markets. Additional tests suggest that the reduction in volatility is greater when privatization sales are carried out through the stock market than through asset sales.     

China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform

The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China?s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

The Choice of Private Versus Public Capital Markets: Evidence from Privatizations

We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic factors on the choice between selling a state‐owned enterprise in the public capital market through a share issue privatization (SIP) and selling it in the private capital market in an asset sale. SIPs are more likely in less developed capital markets, for more profitable state‐owned enterprises, and where there are more protections of minority shareholders. Asset sales are more likely when there is less state control of the economy and when the firm is smaller. Our results suggest the importance of privatization activities in developing the equity markets of privatizing countries.     

The Financial and Economic Lessons of Italy's Privatization Program

Since 1994 the Italian government has sold equity stakes in some 75 large state enterprises, in the process raising over $125 billion‐more than any other country during the same period. In this article, a U.S. academic collaborates with the Italian government's Director of Privatization in summarizing the accomplishments and disappointments of Italy's privatization program, assessing its impact on Italian capital markets, and offering lessons for other countries embarking on new privatization programs. The article also describes the share issuance methods used by the government to execute several massive offerings, including the largest IPO in history. The principal benefits of Italian privatization have been dramatic increases in the size and efficiency of Italy's stock markets and in the safety and stability of its banking system. Despite such improvements, however, privatization has failed to bring about the increased competition in key industries and lower prices for consumers its planners originally envisioned. And based on this experience, the authors offer a number of lessons for government planners. Perhaps most important, privatization is likely to yield decisive benefits only if the divestment program is properly designed and sequenced. Governments should begin by privatizing state‐owned banks and other financial institutions, and as quickly as economically and politically feasible. Especially in less developed economies, commercial banks are for many companies both the only suppliers of credit and the only effective source of market discipline‐which explains why results have often been disastrous when governments have retained control of banks while privatizing other industries. Privatizing governments should also emphasize privatizations accomplished through share issuances rather than asset sales, with the aim of developing liquid and efficient stock markets and promoting effective corporate governance.     

The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries

This paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992. We use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures. Both unadjusted and market-adjusted results show significant increases in profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment spending, output, employment level, and dividends. We also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios. Our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples.     

Testing limits to policy reversal: Evidence from Indian privatizations

We examine the effect of regime change on privatization. In the 2004 Indian election, the pro-reform BJP was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Stock prices of government-controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the BJP dropped 3.5% relative to private firms. Government-controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7.5% relative to private firms. This is consistent with investor belief of a “point of no return,” where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse. Further analysis suggests that layoffs, combined with the privatization announcement, served as a credible commitment to privatize.     

Bank privatization in developing countries: A summary of lessons and findings

Although a large and growing literature shows that privatization can improve the performance of non-financial enterprises, there is less evidence on how it affects the performance of the banking sector. This paper summarizes the results from the papers in the special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance on bank privatization. It concludes that although bank privatization usually improves bank efficiency, gains are greater when the government fully relinquishes control, when banks are privatized to strategic investors, when foreign banks are allowed to participate in the privatization process and when the government does not restrict competition.     

Opting Out of Public Insurance: Is It Socially Acceptable?

The privatization of social services is being increasingly discussed. The market of social services is often characterized by market failures, like informational asymmetries, externalities, distributional problems, which all justify public intervention. But the quality of services provided by public authorities or by private insurers in the context of health insurance is different and could be observable. The public reimbursement of health care is often conditional on rules, like the choice of the physician or the hospital, that induce a disutility of using social insurance instead of private insurance. An alternative solution to a complete privatization is to allow some individuals to opt out. We can imagine that the government allows and even in some cases favors part of the population leaving the public health insurance system. We analyze the situations where the opting out is welfare improving. We then study the optimal policy depending on the characteristics of the economy considering a Rawlsian criterion.     

The Choice of Privatization Method and the Financial Performance of Newly Privatized Firms in Transition Economies

There is a gap between the theoretical literature which almost unanimously advocates the privatization of enterprises, as part of the solution to the commitment problem in economies in transition, and the empirical evidence regarding the best way to design a privatization program in order to secure an efficient use of resources. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on the determinants of the financial long‐run performance of privatized firms in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This long‐run performance is mainly influenced by the extent of retained state ownership, the choice of privatization method, and firm size.     

SHORT‐TERM EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON OPERATING PERFORMANCE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In this article I use a sample of 178 Czech firms that were in the first wave of voucher privatization to test changes in efficiency and profitability. Based on a previous study's methodology, nonparametric tests reveal that efficiency and profitability decreased immediately following privatization. This is in contrast to earlier studies that find privatization increases these measures. Changes in firms' operations do not vary significantly by size or ownership but do vary by industry type, with nonmanufacturing firms having more positive (or less negative) changes after privatization. Evidence indicates that in spite of the disappointing findings, positive operating performance changes are taking place, such as a decrease in employment. JEL classification: G32, L33, 052