The dynamics of privatization, the legal environment and stock market development

In this paper, we examine under which conditions privatization is an effective means to develop local stock markets for a panel of 61 countries over the last twenty four years. By addressing the endogeneity between privatization and stock market development, we show for the 1980-98 period that the initial legal environment is a significant contemporary determinant of stock market development, while privatization is not. When we examine the dynamics of privatization in interaction with the legal environment, we find that privatization has a two-year-lagged effect on stock market development in emerging markets, and a one-year-lagged effect in developed countries. Results for the 1999-2003 period seem to be largely affected by the global crash that followed the Asian crisis.     

Privatization,political risk and stock market development in emerging economies

This paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk. We argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market-oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights. We present evidence suggesting that progress in privatization is indeed correlated with improvements in perceived political risk. Our analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies. We conclude that the resolution of political risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies.     

Infrastructure and Public Utilities Privatization in Developing Countries

Should governments in developing countries promote private ownershipand deregulated prices in noncompetitive sectors? Or shouldthey run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expenseof rents to insiders? A theoretical model is used to answerthese normative questions. The analysis focuses on the tradeoffbetween fiscal benefits and consumer surplus during privatizationof noncompetitive sectors. Privatization transfers control rightsto private interests and eliminates public subsidies, yieldingbenefits to taxpayers at the cost of increased prices for consumers.In developing countries, where budget constraints are tight,privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for lowprofitability industries but suboptimal for more profitableindustries. And once a market has room for more than one firm,governments may prefer to regulate the industry. Without a credibleregulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership.     

2011年全球经济与市场回顾和2012年展望

2011年,受欧洲主权债务危机不断蔓延的影响,发达国家经济复苏缓慢并呈现逐步分化趋势,新兴市场国家作为全球经济复苏主引擎的作用仍然突出,但也面临着经济增长趋缓的困扰。2012年,由于欧债危机隐患未除、全球金融系统依然脆弱以及发达国家自身结构性问题远未解决,全球经济方向将面临较大不确定性。未来新兴市场经济体有望继续充当全球经济复苏的主要动力,但增速将趋于放缓。发达经济体将维持宽松的货币政策,并将迫于财政赤字压力采取财政紧缩措施,而新兴经济体预计将实施相对稳健的货币政策与较为宽松的财政政策,以应对通货膨胀和经济增速趋缓的双重压力。     

Fiscal Rules and Government Financing Costs

This paper assesses the effect of fiscal rules on sovereign bond spreads over the short and medium term, for 34 advanced countries and 19 emerging market economies, over the period 1980–2016. Our results, based on impulse response functions, show that the dynamic impact of fiscal rules on sovereign yield spreads is negative and statistically significant, at around 1.2–1.8 percentage points, implying lower government borrowing costs. This result stems essentially from the advanced economies subsample. We also find that more fiscally responsible countries are the ones for which a fiscal rule reduces the government's borrowing costs. Moreover, in times of recession, a fiscal rule leads financial markets to reduce the risk premiums on government bonds. Finally, when it comes to design features of fiscal rules, independent monitoring of compliance to the rule, done outside government, also reduces sovereign spreads.     

What is the risk of European sovereign debt defaults? Fiscal space,CDS spreads and market pricing of risk

We estimate the pricing of sovereign risk for fifty countries based on fiscal space (debt/tax; deficits/tax) and other economic fundamentals over 2005–10. We focus in particular on five countries in the South-West Eurozone Periphery, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Dynamic panel estimates show that fiscal space and other macroeconomic factors are statistically and economically important determinants of sovereign risk. However, risk-pricing of the Eurozone Periphery countries is not predicted accurately either in-sample or out-of-sample: unpredicted high spreads are evident during global crisis period, especially in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis swept over the periphery area. We match the periphery group with five middle income countries outside Europe that were closest in terms of fiscal space during the European fiscal crisis. Eurozone Periphery default risk is priced much higher than the matched countries in 2010, even allowing for differences in fundamentals. One interpretation is that these economies switched to a “pessimistic” self-fulfilling expectational equilibrium. An alternative interpretation is that the market prices not on current but future fundamentals, expecting adjustment challenges in the Eurozone periphery to be more difficult for than the matched group of middle-income countries because of exchange rate and monetary constraints.     

The Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy: A Reassessment of the Empirical Evidence

This paper reassesses the sustainability of fiscal policy in India from 1950 to 2010. Overall, the evidence broadly supports the hypothesis that the fiscal policy is "weakly" sustainable and documents a higher speed of adjustment to the intertemporal budget constraint than earlier papers do. Notwithstanding this improvement in the fiscal outlook, the author suggests that India should pursue a policy of fiscal consolidation in the years ahead, both because the ratio of public debt to the gross domestic product is still high compared to other emerging market countries and because "weak" fiscal solvency implies potential adverse consequences on the management of public debt.     

Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Crises

This article develops an index of money market pressure to identify banking crises. We define banking crises as periods in which there is excessive demand for liquidity in the money market. We begin with the theoretical foundation of this new method. With the newly defined crisis episodes, we examine the determinants of banking crises using data complied from 47 countries. We find that slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, extremely high inflation, large fiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede banking crises. The effects of monetary base growth on the probability of banking crises are negligible.     

Privatization as an agency problem: Auctions versus private negotiations

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization options. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently sub-optimal privatization mechanism: private negotiations.     

A Structural VAR (SVAR) analysis of fiscal shocks on current accounts in India

The stimulus packages announced to deal with the economic slowdown has increased the fiscal deficit of many countries and it spurred the debate on the possible effect of these fiscal shocks on other economic variable especially the current account. In this study, we examine the effect of fiscal deficit on current account of India using the VAR as well as the Structural VAR (SVAR) analysis. Our analysis indicates that the fiscal deficit is positively affecting the current account deficit in India, as predicted by the twin deficit hypothesis. Therefore, the historical data indicates the presence of the twin deficits phenomenon in Indian context.     

主权债务风险跨国溢出研究——来自频域的新证据

本文从国家间主权债务风险溢出的持续期角度出发,采用基于广义方差分解谱表示的BK溢出指数方法,首次从频域视角对短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应进行研究。研究发现:第一,短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应均较为显著,并且时域下的总溢出主要由短期的风险溢出主导。第二,14个国家的短期和长期风险输出水平呈线性关系,但对于风险输入,不同类型国家出现分化并形成两个聚类,新兴市场国家的短期风险输入水平远高于长期,其具有较强的“短期脆弱性”。第三,风险输出国的自身风险越大,对他国的长期溢出水平越高,风险输入国的自身风险越大,接收他国的短期溢出水平越高,并且两两国家间的进出口规模、金融市场一体化水平和经济周期协同性与其长期风险溢出水平呈正相关关系,而与其短期风险溢出水平的关系并不显著。第四,短期和长期的主权债务风险溢出网络都呈现明显的区域聚集特征,并且各国在短期溢出网络中主要与同区域以及经济金融环境相似的国家连接,在长期溢出网络中则通过经贸关系将连接范围扩大至不同区域甚至经济金融环境差异较大的国家。     

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.      

The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets

We investigate the political determinants of residual state ownership for a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980 to 2001 period. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that the political institutions in place, namely, the political system and political constraints, are important determinants of residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. Unlike previous evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of privatization policies in developed countries, we find that right- or left-oriented governments do not behave differently in developing countries. These results confirm that privatization is politically constrained by dynamics that differ between countries.     

Fiscal deficits and inflation

Macroeconomic theory postulates that persistent fiscal deficits are inflationary. Yet empirical research has had limited success in uncovering this relationship. This paper reexamines the issue in light of broader data and a new modeling approach that incorporates two key features of the theory. Unlike previous studies, we model inflation as non-linearly related to fiscal deficits through the inflation tax base and estimate this relationship as intrinsically dynamic, using panel techniques that explicitly distinguish between short- and long-run effects of fiscal deficits. Results spanning 107 countries over 1960-2001 show a strong positive association between deficits and inflation among high-inflation and developing country groups, but not among low-inflation advanced economies.     

主权债务风险跨国溢出研究——来自频域的新证据

本文从国家间主权债务风险溢出的持续期角度出发,采用基于广义方差分解谱表示的BK溢出指数方法,首次从频域视角对短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应进行研究。研究发现:第一,短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应均较为显著,并且时域下的总溢出主要由短期的风险溢出主导。第二,14个国家的短期和长期风险输出水平呈线性关系,但对于风险输入,不同类型国家出现分化并形成两个聚类,新兴市场国家的短期风险输入水平远高于长期,其具有较强的“短期脆弱性”。第三,风险输出国的自身风险越大,对他国的长期溢出水平越高,风险输入国的自身风险越大,接收他国的短期溢出水平越高,并且两两国家间的进出口规模、金融市场一体化水平和经济周期协同性与其长期风险溢出水平呈正相关关系,而与其短期风险溢出水平的关系并不显著。第四,短期和长期的主权债务风险溢出网络都呈现明显的区域聚集特征,并且各国在短期溢出网络中主要与同区域以及经济金融环境相似的国家连接,在长期溢出网络中则通过经贸关系将连接范围扩大至不同区域甚至经济金融环境差异较大的国家。     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate the extent to which party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The data set includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far‐reaching institutional reform that entirely re‐distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. The results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co‐partisanship) drive short‐term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left‐wing local governments run higher deficits than their right‐wing counterparts; left‐wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right‐wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

Joint dynamics of foreign exchange and stock markets in emerging Europe

This paper proposes an ideal specification for studying joint dynamics of emerging stock and foreign exchange markets, and applies it on European emerging markets where this interaction is of particular significance due to large external deficits. Results show that global developed and emerging stock market returns account for a large proportion of the (permanent) comovement between the stock index and currency value. The residual interaction after controlling for global indexes is small. The sign of the currency-stock market relationship is driven by dependence on foreign capital (predominantly positive for countries which are net receivers of foreign portfolio capital) and depth of the local stock market. Bank of Russia's intensive involvement in the currency market delays Ruble's response to global information. Emerging European currencies predict reversals in global equity indexes several months ahead.     

Sovereign risk premiums in the European government bond market

This paper provides a study of bond yield differentials among EU government bonds on the basis of a unique data set of issue spreads in the US and DM (Euro) bond market between 1993 and 2009. Interest differentials between bonds issued by EU countries and Germany or the USA contain risk premiums which increase with fiscal imbalances and depend negatively on the issuer’s relative bond market size. The start of the European Monetary Union has shifted market attention to deficit and debt service payments as key measures of fiscal soundness and eliminated liquidity premiums in the euro area. With the financial crisis, the cost of loose fiscal policy has increased considerably.