区域性银行智力资本对经营绩效影响的实证分析

智力资本在商业银行财富创造过程中比物质资本更为重要。本文通过对国内主要区域性银行智力资本的测算,分析得出智力资本中的资本增值系数对银行绩效有主要推动作用,而人力资本增值系数对于银行绩效提升没有显著作用,结构资本增值系数则呈负相关。因此,当前区域性银行依靠利差的传统经营模式是不可持续的,应转向依靠经营和管理智力资本的发展...     

金融发展、资本配置效率与出口绩效——基于省际工业行业面板数据的经验研究

本文借鉴Wurgler(2000)的模型,运用27个工业行业的面板数据测算出2003-2009年间我国30个地区资本配置效率的平均值为0.517,且沿海的资本配置效率普遍高于内地,东部地区的资本配置明显高于中、西部;使用系统广义矩估计方法,发现金融发展、资本配置效率对出口总额及出口增长率都具有正向的影响,验证了金融发展可以通过资本配置效率这一渠道对出口绩效产生积极的影响。     

资本缓冲对中国上市银行绩效的影响研究——基于动态面板数据模型的实证分析

2008年金融危机之后,建立宏观审慎监管框架已成为各国金融监管部门与商业银行关注的焦点。在宏微观审慎框架下,商业银行积累资本缓冲以抵御未来金融危机的负面冲击。本文基于2000-2014年中国16家上市银行的非平衡面板数据,运用GMM动态面板估计方法,实证分析了资本缓冲对上市银行绩效的影响。研究发现:提取资本缓冲对上市银行绩效有一定的影响,但影响不稳健;资本的外部监管使得资本缓冲对绩效有显著的阻碍作用;银行绩效有显著的亲周期效应;资本监管平抑银行绩效亲周期效应的作用并不明显。     

智力资本与区域性银行经营模式转型

本文通过对国内主要区域性银行智力资本的测算,研究智力资本对银行绩效的影响,结果发现,在智力资本中,资本增值系数对银行绩效有主要推动作用,而人力资本增值系数对于银行绩效提升没有显著作用,结构资本增值系数则与银行绩效呈负相关。这说明物质资本仍是当前区域性银行最重要的资源,其对银行绩效的贡献最大,区域性银行的盈利模式仍然依靠传统的高资本消耗模式。本文认为,与传统发展模式不同,区域性银行的发展应该在新环境下依靠智力资本,应转向依靠经营和管理智力资本的发展模式,而非依靠传统的高信贷规模扩展、单纯依赖物质资本投入。     

资本管制下商业银行战略选择对绩效的影响

以我国14家上市商业银行2004～2009年的平衡面板数据为样本,通过银行关键战略资源配置来体现银行战略选择,将银行战略问题从定性向定量转化,并通过理论建模和实证分析来研究资本管制、战略选择和绩效三者的关系。结果认为,资本管制对银行的资本充足率与绩效都存在显著直接影响;资本管制通过调整商业银行资本充足率,对绩效产生间接影响;管制压力与不同的战略资源配置的交互作用分别对资本充足率、绩效有不同的影响。     

高科技行业的智力资本多重绩效研究

新经济时代,智力资本及其绩效越来越受到广泛关注。从智力资本增值的概念、计量出发,建立绩效和智力资本增值的实证模型,对深交所A股上市公司按行业和板块分类进行实证研究,发现智力资本对不同类型企业多重绩效均产生影响。     

智力资本与财务资本:谁对企业价值创造更有效——来自于江浙地区企业的实证研究

财务资本对于企业价值创造的作用是毋庸置疑的,而在知识经济时代,智力资本对于企业价值创造也发挥越来越重要的作用。研究以江苏、浙江等地的企业为分析样本,在智力资本三分法的基础上,通过结构化方程构建了四个嵌套模型。研究结果表明:(1)财务资本对于企业绩效具有重要意义,相对于人力资本更处于核心地位;(2)人力资本不能直接对企业绩效发挥作用,需要通过关系资本和结构资本作为中介;(3)智力资本对于企业绩效的可持续增长具有重要意义,企业要获得长期战略绩效,需要更关注于智力资本的积累与培育。     

资本缓冲、货币政策与信贷行为

本文基于2002-2013年我国上市银行的面板模型,构建我国上市商业银行的资本缓冲调整模型和信贷行为影响模型,探讨我国商业银行资本缓冲的周期性及其对信贷的影响。实证结果表明:我国上市商业银行的资本缓冲具有显著的逆周期性特征;资本缓冲调整对银行信贷扩张具有显著的负向作用,并且在一定程度上强化了货币政策对银行信贷的影响程度。根据这一研究结果,为了应对我国商业银行信贷投放的顺周期性,应进一步完善银行体系的逆周期资本缓冲机制,充分发挥资本缓冲机制对商业银行信贷行为的调节作用。     

我国商业银行智力资本、社会责任与顾客权益关系的实证研究

在知识经济时代中,智力资本、社会责任与顾客权益对金融业的可持续发展具有重要影响。本文提出了银行智力资本、社会责任与顾客权益的关系假设模型,并使用多层次问卷调查法对模型进行验证。实证研究的结果表明:商业银行智力资本、社会责任对顾客权益皆具有显著正向影响,同时社会责任对智力资本也具有显著正向影响。     

我国商业银行资本绩效实证分析

文章在对中国银行业的资本结构和绩效的分析基础之上,采用超对数成本函数法对我国银行业中几家具有代表性的国有和非国有商业银行的资本绩效进行了实证检验。结果显示:四大国有银行的资本运作效率低于新兴非国有商业银行,与资本规模效应理论并不相符;并发现目前银行资本绩效与其资本项目显著相关。在此基础上,针对存在问题,对我国商业银行的发展提出简要的改革建议。     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

外资股权、外币资产负债结构对我国银行稳定性影响的研究

目前,国际资本流动影响我国银行稳定性主要通过两条路径：一是通过持有我国商业银行股权,二是通过改变商业银行的资产负债结构。本文运用15家股份制商业银行2006—2012年面板数据,从微观角度探讨了外资股权结构、外币资产负债结构对其稳定性造成的影响。实证结果表明：（1）外资股权对商业银行稳定性影响在不同银行之间存在着一定差异;（2）外币资产负债结构对于我国商业银行稳定性有明显影响。据此,本文从外资股权、外币资产负债结构方面提出了商业银行稳定性管理的建议。     

公司治理、资本监管与银行风险承担

选取2007-2017年中国25家上市银行数据,采用面板回归模型对公司治理与资本监管对银行风险承担的影响进行实证分析。研究表明：股权集中度与银行风险承担之间呈正U型关系,较低的股权集中度会降低银行风险资产配置权重,股权集中度的提升会加大银行风险承担。董事会规模会促进银行风险承担,董事会规模过大将平滑单个董事表决权,导致董事会控制效率下降而引发银行经营决策频繁变动,由此加大银行风险承担。资本监管会抑制银行风险承担,资本监管的趋严促使银行减持风险资产进行资本补充;资本监管对股份制银行、国有大型银行与城农商银行风险承担的影响力度依次递减。货币供给增速的放缓将降低银行存款吸收能力,由此加大银行流动性风险,货币供给对银行信贷存在制约效应;经济增速的下调将降低企业盈利能力,由此加大银行风险承担,银行存在顺周期放贷倾向。     

Bank capital in the crisis: It's not just how much you have but who provides it

Bank capital is the cornerstone of bank regulation and is considered a key determinant of a bank's ability to withstand economic shocks. In the area of bank capital regulation, the general view is that more bank capital is better, irrespective of who provides it. In this paper, we investigate whether the investment horizon of bank capital providers matters for bank performance during the recent financial crisis. We observe that banks with more short-term investor ownership have worse stock returns during the crisis. Further exploration suggests that this is partially because banks with higher short-term investor ownership took more risk prior to the crisis but mainly because they experienced higher selling pressure during the crisis. Our results confirm the economic benefit of bank capital in helping banks to perform better during crises. However, when we decompose bank capital by the nature of its providers, we show that more capital is associated with worse performance when it is provided by short-term institutional investors.     

The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership concentration on two indicators of bank riskiness, namely banks’ non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Using balance sheet information for around 500 commercial banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 2005–2007, we find that concentrated ownership (proxied by different levels of shareholding) significantly reduces a bank’s non-performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration affects the capital adequacy ratio positively conditional on shareholder protection. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

Ownership concentration and bank risk: international study on acquisitions

This paper explores the effects of different types of bank ownership concentration on changes in bank risk during acquisition years. Using multi-country data from 2000 to 2006, during which market failures caused by various crises and government interventions are less influential to acquisition decisions, we collect 505 banking acquisition deals from 23 countries to examine which type of ownership concentration (such as financial intermediary, capital investor, non-financial, and state ownership) brings larger changes to an acquirer’s risk from pre-acquisition year to post-acquisition year (including non-performing loans, capital adequacy ratio, loan loss reserve, and credit rating). The empirical analyses show that acquirer banks with a concentration of shares owned by financial intermediaries and non-financial firms experience larger risk changes during acquisition years. In contrast, the risk changes of acquirer banks with a concentration of capital investors and state ownership are lower. Robustness checks from the random effect estimation, instrumental variables model, reverse causality, and different subsamples of (non-)U.S. or different levels of regulation enforcement confirm these results.     

银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.     

The Impact of Owner’s Identity on Banks’ Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Risk

In this article, we test the potential impact of the owner’s identity on banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity risk as defined by the Basel III regulatory framework. Using a unique dataset on a sample of banks domiciled in the Middle East and North Africa region, we find that the ownership structure is an important driver of banks’ regulatory capital and liquidity risk. Private and foreign investors exhibit a stronger preference for higher levels of capital, whereas the impact of government ownership on banks’ risk remains inconclusive. Moreover, privately-owned banks evidenced lower levels of liquidity risk compared to the other groups during the last financial crisis because of tighter budget constraints and more compelling liquidity needs.     

Institutional Shareholders and Bank Capital

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership and bank capital. Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we show that banks with greater institutional ownership operate with substantially higher capital ratios. The results are robust to controlling for standard determinants of bank capital structure, including market- and accounting-based risk measures. The results hold both for indexers and non-indexers, indicating that the effect of institutional ownership on bank capital cannot be explained by self-selection. We further address endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable strategy based on the inclusion of banks in the S&P index. We find supporting evidence that the superior monitoring abilities of institutional investors, which reduce the severity of agency costs, is the main explanation for our results.