Two Classroom Simulations in Financial Risk Management and Insurance

ABSTRACT: Few classroom experiences provide as much educational value as a simulation exercise. A properly structured simulation provides students with the motivation to learn, the opportunity to explore strategies in an environment conducive to experimentation, and the immediate instructional benefit of watching their decisions affect the outcome of the collective simulation experience. This article describes the procedure and relative success of two classroom simulations for students in introductory and intermediate risk management and insurance courses. The first simulation replicates the risk management function of futures contracts through the use of hypothetical traders in the corn market with different risk management needs. The corn futures trading simulation achieves several goals for an introductory course in risk management and insurance: (1) students learn the importance of capital market risk management mechanisms; (2) students understand the transfer of risk among hedgers and speculators; and (3) students receive exposure to the concept that risk management is both possible and necessary for both speculative and pure risks. The second simulation mimics the operation of the market for homeowners insurance. By dividing students into consumer groups and insurer groups, participants experience the effect of chance events and insurance purchase decisions on their wealth. Small groups of upper‐level students act as insurers, and must price, package, and sell their product with a limited amount of surplus. Introductory students serve as consumers with limited resources who must survey the market and decide what product to buy and from whom. The competitive element and relatively unregulated market provide students with the incentive to innovate in a market for a common type of insurance and also demonstrates the need for some amount of insurance regulation. These simulations supply a simple way to enhance students' understanding of important basic concepts in a format that provides a welcome break from the traditional lecture format.     

Insurance Rating Games: Strikes,Spares, and Bags

Carefully designed classroom activities and games can be used to increase student engagement, motivation, and learning. This article describes two games that have been used with students of risk management and insurance to help highlight the intricacies of insurance pricing. These two games, bowling insurance and bags insurance, help students experience the challenging nature of premium determination in risk transfer contracts and also connect the various actions taken by insurers during the insurance transaction.     

Mortality-Indexed Annuities Managing Longevity Risk Via Product Design

Abstract

Longevity risk has become a major challenge for governments, individuals, and annuity providers in most countries. In its aggregate form, the systematic risk of changes to general mortality patterns, it has the potential for causing large cumulative losses for insurers. Since obvious risk management tools, such as (re)insurance or hedging, are less suited for managing an annuity provider’s exposure to this risk, we propose a type of life annuity with benefits contingent on actual mortality experience.

Similar adaptations to conventional product design exist with investment-linked annuities, and a role model for long-term contracts contingent on actual cost experience can be found in German private health insurance. By effectively sharing systematic longevity risk with policyholders, insurers may avoid cumulative losses.

Policyholders also gain in comparison with a comparable conventional annuity product: Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we identify a significant upside potential for policyholders while downside risk is limited.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

Institutional Ownership Stability and Risk Taking: Evidence From the Life–Health Insurance Industry

We investigate the relationship between risk taking of life–health (LH) insurers and stability of their institutional ownership within a simultaneous equation system model. Three main results are obtained. First, stable institutional ownership of is associated with lower total risk of LH insurers, supporting the prudent‐man law hypothesis. Second, when investors are sorted in terms of stringency of the prudent‐man restrictions, their negative effect on risk holds for all, except insurance companies, as owners of LH insurers. Third, large institutional owners do not raise the riskiness of the investee‐firms, as proposed by the large shareholder hypothesis. Regulatory implications are drawn.     

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN UNDERGRADUATE INSURANCE EDUCATION: ACADEMIC AND REAL WORLD PERSPECTIVES

Abstract: The authors discuss the hiring patterns of some insurers and examine why insurers do not always seek out students with risk management and insurance backgrounds. The authors suggest that it is important for universities and insurers to work more closely so that students coming out of college insurance programs are well prepared to work in the insurance industry.     

Analysis of Systemic Risk in the Insurance Industry

In this paper, we discuss the systemic relevance of the insurance sector. Systemic risk is defined as the propensity of a financial institution to be undercapitalised when the financial system as a whole is undercapitalised. By the law of large numbers, traditional lines of insurance with idiosyncratic non-catastrophic risks cannot be systemic. On the contrary, undiversified insurers specialised in activities whose insured risks are highly correlated with GDP are systemic. In the life insurance sector, some contractual clauses such as unhedged minimum guarantees and free options to surrender raise the chance of systemic relevance. On the contrary, life insurers satisfying the classic solvency capital requirements contribute to the liquidity of financial markets thanks to the long-termist approach of their portfolio management. Finally, using historical data in the U.S. on the contribution of different sectors to the aggregate volatility of the economy, we show that investment banking is almost twice as volatile as aggregate GDP, while insurance is one fifth as volatile as aggregate GDP. The insurance sector thus appears to be a stabilising force of the economy.     

The Cost of Duplicative Regulation: Evidence From Risk Retention Groups

A vast majority of insurers are regulated by each state in which they conduct business; however, a small subset of specialized firms, risk retention groups (RRGs), are largely exempt from most aspects of duplicative regulation no matter how many states they operate. This article analyzes the differences between RRGs and standard insurers specializing in commercial liability insurance to determine the cost of duplicative regulation. The costs associated with multi‐state regulation are significantly higher than those for single‐entity regulation. These high regulatory compliance costs reduce the technical efficiency of firms, deter firms from operating in additional states, and increase the price of insurance.     

Risk Perception and Worry Related to Adolescents' Judgement of Three Types of Risk

The core aim of this study was to examine determinants of anticipated worry related to three types of risk among adolescents. The participants were Norwegian high‐school students aged 15–19 years (n = 335). They were students at 6 high schools and a total of 15 randomly selected school classes participated in the study. All the students were asked to fill in a self‐completion questionnaire. The response rate was 100 per cent. The participants were shown three video sequences of three‐minute conversations between a person and a listener discussing three risk sources, which each had developed into a problem (drug use, depression, and sexual abuse). The video sequences were shown to the students when they were in their classes. The results showed that there were gender differences in probability assessments as well as in anticipated worry related to the three types of risk. There were also differences in worry depending on the respondent's past experience with an identical or similar problem or risk. In addition to cognitive evaluations, own experience and gender, general worry, social support seeking, anxiety and depression significantly predicted worry. These variables explained 52 per cent of the variance. Worry may be a significant predictor of risk behaviour as well as decisions concerning risks and risk reduction. The results are related to the risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch) and other risk decision models are also discussed.     

Systemic Risk,Financial Crisis,and Credit Risk Insurance

Differing from conventional insurance firms whose underwriting business does not contribute to systemic risk, credit risk insurance companies providing credit protections for debt obligations are exposed to systemic risk. We show that credit risk insurers (CRIs) underperformed conventional insurance companies during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and such underperformance is attributed to the greater systemic risk of CRIs. We also find that the credit spreads of insured bonds increase significantly after their insurers are downgraded or put in the negative watch list. We control for alternative factors affecting bond credit spreads and the result is robust.     

Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market

We consider an oligopoly market where firms offer insurance coverage against a risk characterised by aggregate uncertainty. Firms behave as if they were risk averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game where firms choose their internal capital level at stage one and compete on price at stage two. We characterise the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and focus attention on the strategic impact of insurers capital choice. We discuss the model with regard to the insurance industry specificities and regulation.     

An Insurance Market Simulation With Both Adverse and Advantageous Selection

The theory of adverse selection predicts that high‐risk individuals are more likely to buy insurance than low‐risk individuals if asymmetric information regarding individuals’ risk type is present in the market. The theory of advantageous selection predicts the opposite—a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type can be obtained when hidden knowledge in other dimensions (e.g., the degree of risk aversion) is present in addition to the risk type. Using the heterogeneity of insurance buyers in either risk type or risk aversion, we first introduce a classroom‐based insurance market simulation game to show that adverse selection and advantageous selection can coexist. We then explain the underlying concepts using two methods: a mathematical framework based on expected utility theory and an empirical framework based on the results of the game itself. The game is easy to implement, reinforces textbook concepts by providing students a hands‐on experience, and supplements current textbooks by bringing their content up to date with current research.     

Insurance Market Effects of Risk Management Metrics

We extend the classical analysis on optimal insurance design to the case when the insurer implements regulatory requirements (Value-at-Risk). Presumably, regulators impose some risk management requirement such as VaR to reduce the insurers’ insolvency risk, as well as to improve the insurance market stability. We show that VaR requirements may better protect the insured and improve economic efficiency, but have stringent negative effects on the insurance market. Our analysis reveals that the insured are better protected in the event of greater loss irrespective of the optimal design from either the insured or the insurer perspective. However, in the presence of the VaR requirement on the insurer, the insurer's insolvency risk might be increased and there are moral hazard issues in the insurance market because the optimal contract is discontinuous.     

Market Risk,Interest Rate Risk,and Interdependencies in Insurer Stock Returns: A System‐GARCH Model

We examine market risk, interest rate risk, and interdependencies in returns and return volatilities across three insurer segments within a System‐GARCH framework. Three main results are obtained: market risk is greatest for accident and health (A&H) insurers, followed by life (Life) and property and casualty (P&C) insurers; interest rate sensitivity is negative and greatest for Life insurers; and interdependencies in returns are significant with the magnitude being strongest between P&C and A&H insurers. The implication is that greatest diversification benefits arise between Life and the other segments of the insurance industry. Market risk and interest rate risk for diversified firms are smaller than those for nondiversified firms for both product and geographic diversification.     

Managing Capital via Internal Capital Market Transactions: The Case of Life Insurers

The movement of capital within insurance groups is important for understanding insolvency risk management, as well as regulatory policies regarding capital standards and group supervision. Panel data estimates indicate that, on average, a dollar decrease in performance (net income plus unrealized capital gains) when performance is negative is associated with a $0.26 increase in capital contributions to life insurers from other entities in the group, and that a dollar increase in performance when performance is positive is associated with a $0.56 increase in the amount of internal shareholder dividends paid by life insurers to other entities in the group. Moreover, the sensitivity of internal dividends to performance is higher during the financial crisis than the noncrisis period. Also, insurers with low (high) risk‐based capital ratios receive more (less) internal capital contributions than other insurers, holding other factors constant.     

Designing feasible and effective health plan payments in countries with data availability constraints

Risk equalization schemes, which transfer money to/from insurers that have above/below average risks, are a fundamental tool in regulated health insurance markets in many countries. Risk sharing (the transfer of some responsibility for costs from a plan to the regulator or the overall insurance market), are an additional method of insulating insurers who attract higher-than-average risks. This paper proposes, implements and quantifies incorporating risk sharing within a risk equalization scheme that can be applied in a data-poor context. Using Chile's private health insurance market as case study, we show that modest amount of risk sharing greatly improves fit even in simple demographic-based risk equalization. Expanding the model's formula to include morbidity-based adjustors and risk sharing redirects compensations at insurer level and reduces opportunity to engage in profitable risk selection at the group level. Our emphasis on feasibility may make alternatives proposed attractive to countries facing data-availability constraints.     

The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation

This article considers the role of American International Group (AIG) and the insurance sector in the 2007–2009 financial crisis and the implications for insurance regulation. Following an overview of the causes of the crisis, I explore the events and policies that contributed to federal government intervention to prevent bankruptcy of AIG and the scope of federal assistance to AIG. I discuss the extent to which insurance in general poses systemic risk and whether a systemic risk regulator is desirable for insurers or other nonbank financial institutions. The last two sections of the article address the financial crisis's implications for proposed optional and/or mandatory federal chartering and regulation of insurers and for insurance regulation in general.     

Systemic Risk in the Insurance Sector: A Review and Directions for Future Research

This article reviews the extant research on systemic risk in the insurance sector and outlines new areas of research in this field. We summarize and classify 48 theoretical and empirical research papers from both academia and practitioner organizations. The survey reveals that traditional insurance activity in the life, nonlife, and reinsurance sectors neither contributes to systemic risk nor increases insurers’ vulnerability to impairments of the financial system. However, nontraditional activities (e.g., credit default swap underwriting) might increase vulnerability, and life insurers might be more vulnerable than nonlife insurers due to higher leverage. Whether nontraditional activities also contribute to systemic risk is not entirely clear; however, the activities with the potential to contribute to systemic risk include underwriting financial derivatives and providing financial guarantees. This article is not only likely of interest to academics but also highly relevant for the industry, regulators, and policymakers.     

Engineered nanomaterials: risk perception,regulation and insurance

Concerns surrounding the health risk of engineered nanomaterials, effective regulation and the lack of specifically tailored insurance products for the nanotechnology sector are putting the industry’s long-term economic viability at risk. From the perspective of the underwriter, this article speculates on the relationship between risk perception, regulation and insurability. In the nanotechnology sector, regulators are currently failing to keep pace with innovation, and insurers generally lack guiding principles for underwriting occupational risk from nanomaterial exposure. Such vulnerabilities when combined with misguided risk perceptions can lead to the overpricing of risk transfer and ill-conceived regulatory initiatives, thus potentially exhausting resources and stifling innovation in the sector. In the absence of well-developed regulatory protocols, the insurance industry has, and will continue, to occupy a key role as an effective lobby in terms of improved risk management practice. We suggest that the insurance industry will increasingly rely on control banding frameworks and ‘risk mitigation at source’ methods developed in conjunction with their clients to manage severe acute diversifiable risks. Long tail risk will continue to represent a serious challenge to insurers and regulators. In the meantime, insurers will have to bridge their current needs with improvised solutions. As an example of one possible solution, we outline a framework that utilizes financial instruments to hedge an insurer’s exposure to uncertain estimates of these long-term risks.     

寿险资金运用的风险限额管理

资金运用风险是寿险公司面临的两大最主要风险之一,加强资金运用风险管理对确保寿险公司持续稳健经营至关重要。风险限额管理作为风险管理的核心内容,是风险管理体系中不可或缺的组成部分。建立一个科学、可操作和有效的风险限额管理体系,为寿险资金运用风险管理提供控制标准,是决定风险管理成效的关键环节。本文借鉴风险限额分配模型,总结寿...