Institutional Ownership,Diversification, and Riskiness of Bank Holding Companies

We examine the relationship among the level and stability of institutional ownership, diversification, and riskiness of publicly traded bank holding companies. We find that large and stable institutional ownership is associated with a higher (lower) level of geographic, revenue, and nontraditional banking (asset) diversification and lower risk, suggesting that institutional investors are prudent and favor risk‐reducing diversification strategies. The association between institutional ownership level and diversification is more pronounced under deregulation and during the crisis, suggesting a substitution effect between regulation and market discipline, and a greater level of monitoring and/or advising by institutional investors during the crisis, respectively.     

The Impact of Institutional Ownership on the Reinsurance Decision

Risk management has a central role in corporate America. Insurance companies frequently manage risk by purchasing reinsurance because it reduces the downside risk (i.e., bankruptcy risk) of an insurer. Because reinsurance is costly, Mayers and Smith (1990, Journal of Business , 63: 19-40) argue that reinsurance purchases should be negatively associated with the diversification of the owners' portfolios. Further, institutional owners play a significant role in equity markets yet we know little about their effect on firm behavior. The purpose of this study is to examine empirically the influence of institutional ownership on reinsurance for a sample of widely held property-liability insurers. We hypothesize that insurers with higher levels of institutional ownership purchase less reinsurance. Using a sample of 45 publicly traded property-liability insurers from 1995 to 1997, we demonstrate that the utilization of reinsurance decreases as the level of institutional ownership increases. This suggests that the diversification of the owners' portfolios is a determinant of the insurers' reinsurance decisions.     

The Effect of Fiduciary Standards on Institutions' Preference for Dividend‐Paying Stocks

Many researchers apparently believe that some institutional investors prefer dividend‐paying stocks because they are subject to the “prudent man” (PM) standard of fiduciary responsibility, under which dividend payments provide prima facie evidence that an investment is prudent. Although this was once accurate for many institutions, during the 1990s most states replaced the PM standard with the less‐stringent “prudent investor” (PI) rule, which evaluates the appropriateness of each investment in a portfolio context. Controlling for the general decline in dividend‐paying stocks, we find that institutions reduced their holdings of dividend‐paying stocks by 2% to 3% as the PI standard spread during the 1990s. Studies of asset pricing and corporate governance should no longer consider dividend payments when evaluating the actions of institutional investors.     

Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover

We investigate whether institutional investors “vote with their feet” when dissatisfied with a firm's management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover. However, selling by institutions is far from universal. Overall, there is an increase in shareholdings of individual investors and a decrease in holdings of institutional investors who are more concerned with holding prudent securities, are better informed, or are engaged in momentum trading. Measures of institutional ownership changes are negatively related to the likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO.     

Effizienz und Eigentümerstruktur: Eine empirische Analyse des deutschen Lebensversicherungsmarktes

We provide new insights into the effect of ownership on efficiency by analyzing the German life insurance market over the period 2002–2005. Previous research on alternative organizational forms in the life insurance industry has focused on stock and mutual ownership only. Due to the uniqueness of the German insurance market, where privately-owned companies face competition by public insurers, we add to the recent literature the well known debate on public versus private ownership, by investigating stock, mutual and public ownership forms. Using traditional DEA, we calculate technical efficiency and cost efficiency scores to test the efficient structure hypothesis as well as the expense preference hypothesis. Our results give strong support to the latter, while we find no evidence that public ownership is an efficient corporate structure for life insurers. The group of stock firms dominates both, mutual and public insurers, although differences between stock and mutual companies are smaller than differences between stock and public firms. Analyzing within-group results, our findings suggest that high efficiency scores can be associated with certain firm characteristics which are publicly available: high returns on assets, low cancellation rates and low costs.     

Investor Tax Heterogeneity and Ex-Dividend Day Trading Volume

We propose that ex‐dividend day excess volume is motivated by tax heterogeneity among investors, and thus is increasing in investor tax heterogeneity. Institutional ownership is our measure of heterogeneity. Since investor heterogeneity is a concave function of institutional ownership, we hypothesize that ex‐day volume is a concave function of institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests support the tax‐motivated trading hypothesis. Additional tests, using trade size and pension ownership as proxies for institutional trades, yield similar results. We contribute to the literature by considering the interaction between payout policy and ownership structure in explaining the cross‐sectional variation in ex‐day volume.     

Institutional Investors Tilt Their Real Estate Holdings Toward Quality,Too

This article confirms and extends prior results regarding tilting of institutional investment in common stock toward quality. The evidence presented here suggests that, while both real estate investment trusts and institutional investors tilt their real estate holdings toward quality, the tilt is much more pronounced in the case of institutional investors. Controlling for quality, there is further evidence that institutional investors overweight locations where the share of local employment in business services, finance, insurance, and real estate, and transportation is relatively high (compared to national averages). This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that significant sector tilting by institutional investors is induced by the constraints of the prudent man rule.     

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.     

Reinsurance and Capital Structure: Evidence From the United Kingdom Non‐Life Insurance Industry

Using a data set consisting of statutory returns of U.K. non‐life insurers from 1985 to 2002, I find that insurers with higher leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and insurers with higher reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of debt. My results are consistent with the expected bankruptcy costs argument, agency costs theory, risk‐bearing hypothesis, and renting capital hypothesis. I also find that the impact of leverage on reinsurance will be weaker for insurers that use more derivatives than those that use less. Moreover, high levels of derivative use increase the leverage gains attributable to reinsurance.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

The effect of ownership on the prudential behavior of banks – The case of China

Although the relationship between bank ownership and performance is the current focus of much research, this paper investigates the relationship between ownership and the prudential behavior of banks. Using Chinese data, I show that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent than lending by joint-equity banks, but has improved over time. This is consistent with the hypothesis that accountability to shareholders and depositors gives joint-equity banks a better incentive than state-owned banks to engage in prudent lending, and with the hypothesis that the reform of the banking system has improved the incentive for state-owned banks to behave more prudently in their lending.     

Effects of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

Using a sample of property–liability insurers over the period 1995–2004, we develop and test a model that explains performance as a function of line‐of‐business diversification and other correlates. Our results indicate that undiversified insurers consistently outperform diversified insurers. In terms of accounting performance, we find a diversification penalty of at least 1 percent of return on assets or 2 percent of return on equity. These findings are robust to corrections for potential endogeneity bias, alternative risk measures, alternative diversification measures, and an alternative estimation technique. Using a market‐based performance measure (Tobin's Q) we find that the market applies a significant discount to diversified insurers. The existence of a diversification penalty (and diversification discount) provides strong support for the strategic focus hypothesis. We also find that insurance groups underperform unaffiliated insurers and that stock insurers outperform mutuals.     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

Firm size,ownership structure,and systematic liquidity risk: The case of an emerging market

Previous studies support the hypothesis that institutional ownership leads to an enhanced systematic liquidity risk by increasing the commonality in liquidity. By using a proprietary database of all incoming orders and ownership structure in an emerging stock market, we show that institutional ownership leads to an increase in commonality in liquidity for mid- to-large cap firms; however, only individual ownership can lead to such an increase for small cap firms, revealing a new source of systematic liquidity risk for a specific group of firms. We also reveal that commonality decreases with the increasing number of investors (for both individual and institutional) at any firm size level; suggesting that as the investor base gets larger, views of market participants become more heterogeneous, which provides an alternative way to decrease the systematic liquidity risk.     

Institutional investors,controlling shareholders and CEO pay‐performance relationship: evidence from China

Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2005 and 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have a positive effect on the CEO pay‐performance relationship, and this effect becomes stronger when their ownership is higher and closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This effect is stronger in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs), firms facing weaker industry competition incentives, and firms located in more developed regions. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) do not have such an influence. Overall, our study contends that the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring role is subject to their identity, controlling shareholders and institutional environments.     

Differences in CEO compensation under large and small institutional ownership

I examine the influence of large and small institutional investors on different components of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, using US data for 2006–2015. An increase in large institutional ownership reduces total pay and current incentive compensation (i.e., options, stocks, bonus pay), whereas small institutional investors lower long‐term incentive pay (i.e., pension, deferred pay, stock incentive pay). These findings are consistent with managerial agency theory and the substitution of incentive pay by institutional monitoring. The effects are stronger for higher ownership levels and firms with weak governance, less financial distress, long‐tenured CEOs, multiple segments, and more free cash flow.     

Ownership level,ownership concentration and liquidity

We examine the link between the liquidity of a firm's stock and its ownership structure, specifically, how much of the firm's stock is owned by insiders and institutions, and how concentrated is their ownership. We find that the liquidity-ownership relation is mostly driven by institutional ownership rather than insider ownership. Importantly, liquidity is positively related to total institutional holdings but negatively related to institutional blockholdings. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that while the level of institutional ownership proxies for trading activity, the concentration of such ownership proxies for adverse selection.     

Determinants of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

This article analyzes variations in line‐of‐business diversification status and extent among property–liability insurers. Our results show that the extent of diversification is not driven by risk pooling considerations; insurers operating in more volatile business lines do not diversify more. Diversification can rather be explained by the benefits of internal capital markets and barriers to business growth like market size and concentration. In our analysis, we distinguish between related and unrelated diversification. Using a measure of unrelated line‐of‐business diversification we find the first support for the diversification prediction of the managerial discretion hypothesis that mutual insurers should be less diversified than stock insurers. While mutual insurers tend to exhibit higher levels of total diversification, they engage in significantly less unrelated diversification than do stock insurers.     

Institutional monitoring and litigation risk: Evidence from employee disputes

In this article, we investigate how institutional investors help mitigate business‐related risks in a corporate environment. Using a large sample of employment disputes, litigations, and court cases, we find that institutional investors play a significant role in reducing employment litigation. We observe that firms with larger shares of institutional ownership have a lower incidence of employment lawsuits and that long‐term institutional investors are more effective at decreasing employee mistreatment. Our results suggest that institutional investors can improve the employee work environment and help mitigate future employee litigation. The improvement in employee work conditions has been shown to increase a firm's value through increased employee output, reduced litigation, and direct and indirect costs. Our results shed light on the effectiveness of institutional monitoring on a firm's litigation risk.     

The Relations among Organizational and Distribution Forms and Capital and Asset Risk Structures in the Life Insurance Industry

This article is the first step toward integrating in a single framework two previously separate lines of research on major structural decisions of life insurers. The literature has previously studied the relation between capital structure and asset risk on the one hand, and the relation between organizational form and distribution system on the other hand, without integrating them. Using life insurer data for 1993–1999, we model the four key insurer decisions of capital structure, asset risk, organizational form, and distribution system as endogenous choices in a single interrelated set of simultaneous equations. The model assesses the nature of the interactions among these decisions. The model also assesses the impact of insurers' fundamental business strategy (treated as predetermined) on these choices. The business‐strategy hypothesis views other key decisions as jointly determined and driven by the fundamental business strategy, once the latter is set in motion. Confirming previous studies, we find a positive relation between capital ratios and asset risk. We also find an association in the simultaneous context between stock ownership and brokerage distribution, which was not found in prior studies. Stock ownership is related to greater financial and asset risk taking, whereas brokerage distribution is associated with lower risk taking. These and other results are interpreted in light of several theories, including transaction‐cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and regulatory and bankruptcy cost avoidance. Deriving from these theories, the finite risk paradigm emerges as the most comprehensive interpretation of the results, as opposed to the risk‐subsidy hypothesis of the impact of guarantee funds. We also find support for the notion that the business strategy drives the capital and distribution decisions, as predicted by TCE.