股利政策与公司过度投资行为研究

基于Richardson(2006)的过度投资测度,本文考察公司的股利支付政策是否影响了企业的过度投资。我们发现:首先,对总样本而言,我国公司普遍存在过度投资的现象;其次,现金股利的派发的确能有效制约过度投资行为;第三,经常派现公司较非经常派现公司在现金股利抑制过度投资的效果上有显著增强;最后,由于管理层存在对未来现金流的一定预期,现金股利在低自由现金流的公司中能发挥更好的抑制效果。     

The Impact of Investment Opportunities and Free Cash Flow on Financial Liberalization:A Cross-Firm Analysis of Emerging Economies

This study undertakes firm-level analysis of investment opportunities and free cash flow in an attempt to explain the source of the wealth effect of financial liberalization for 14 emerging countries. We find that the market's responses to stock market liberalization announcements are more favorable for high-growth firms than for low-growth firms, a result that is consistent with the investment opportunities hypothesis. We also demonstrate that firms with high cash flow experience lower announcement-period returns associated with stock market liberalization than do firms with low cash flow. Our findings suggest that the free cash flow hypothesis dominates the corporate governance hypothesis in terms of the net effect of stock market liberalization on a firm's stock returns. We further document similar evidence with regard to banking liberalization. Finally, we demonstrate that stock market liberalization leads to the more efficient allocation of capital.     

The conditional nature of the value of corporate governance

Agency theory suggests that governance matters more among firms with greater potential agency costs. Rational investors are unlikely to value safeguards against unlikely events. Yet, few studies of the relation between governance and firm value control for investor perceptions of the likelihood of agency conflicts. Shleifer and Vishny [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737–783] identify investment-related agency conflicts as the more severe type of agency conflicts in the US. We measure the perceived likelihood of this type of agency conflict using free cash flow (Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323–329). We find that firm value is an increasing function of improved governance quality among firms with high free cash flow. In contrast, governance benefits are lower or insignificant among firms with low free cash flow. We show that not controlling for this conditional relation between governance and firm value could lead to erroneous conclusions that governance and firm value are unrelated.     

Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US

Using governance metrics based on antitakeover provisions and inside ownership, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves. When distributing cash to shareholders, firms with weaker governance structures choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash and weak shareholder rights leads to increases in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Firms with low shareholder rights and excess cash have lower profitability and valuations. However, there is only limited evidence that the presence of excess cash alters the overall relation between governance and profitability. In the US, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather than hoard it.     

Dividend tax signaling and the pricing of future earnings: a case of taxable stock dividends

The purpose of our study is to explore what types of information content are conveyed by dividends on future earnings. We examine this issue by investigating the effect of dividends on the association between current year stock returns and future earnings (i.e. the future earnings response coefficient, FERC). Based on exploring the Taiwan market, our results reveal that taxable stock dividends enhance the FERC while nontaxable stock dividends do not, consistent with the tax-based signaling argument. We also find a positive relation between cash dividends and the FERC in firms with severe free cash flow problems, and this suggests that higher cash payouts mitigate manager over-investment so future earnings are more highly valued, consistent with the agency argument. Our main contributions are to specify what factors make dividends informative with regard to future earnings and the provision of evidence to support the tax-based signaling model.     

A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions

This paper tests (Jensen The American Economic Review, 76, 323–329 1986) free cash flow hypothesis using data on real estate transactions. We find that firms with either higher free cash flow or higher cash reserve pay more fore real estate, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. We also find that the agency costs of free cash flow associated with real estate transactions are more severe when firms have lower Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, we find that among the commonly used corporate governance measures, only equity compensation is effective in mitigating the agency problem of free cash flow.     

上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究

经理的机会主义引发企业过度投资行为,西方学者通过考察投资现金流相关性研究企业过度投资问题并找到相应经验证据。利用上市公司(2000—2002)数据研究上市公司是否存在过度投资行为以及相关制约机制是否有效,结果表明,(1)我国上市公司存在过度投资行为;(2)现金股利、举借债务是过度投资行为的有效制约机制;(3)公司治理机制在制约过度投资行为中基本有效,但是,独立董事并未发挥作用。     

Electronic voting in shareholder meetings and the market value of cash holdings

Electronic voting in shareholder meetings facilitates shareholders' direct monitoring by reducing the cost of attending the meetings. This study investigates how adopting electronic voting in shareholder meetings affects the market value of cash holdings. We document that the value of cash holdings is higher for firms adopting electronic voting than for non-adopting firms, especially for firms with large minority ownership and free cash flows. The increased value of cash is attributable to firms engaging in investments that are more value relevant. Collectively, the findings suggest that shareholders perceive corporate governance as strengthened with the adoption of electronic voting. This study contributes to the literature by providing initial empirical evidence on the benefits of electronic voting.     

Overinvestment,corporate governance,and dividend initiations

Firms with low Tobin's Q and high cash flow have significantly more positive dividend initiation announcement returns than do other firms. I interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that reductions in the agency costs of overinvestment at firms with poor investment opportunities and ample cash flow are reflected in higher dividend initiation announcement returns. Further tests, such as examining the impact of governance metrics on initiation announcement returns following the dividend tax cut of 2003 and examining the long-run cash-retention policies of dividend-initiating firms, are consistent with this interpretation. There is also some evidence that is consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis, as dividend-initiating firms with low Tobin's Q and low pre-initiation cash flow experience substantial revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and significantly positive initiation announcement returns.     

Form versus substance: The effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm value in Thailand

We examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance practices and firm value for Thai firms, which often have complex ownership structures. We develop a comprehensive measure of corporate governance and show that, in contrast to conventional measures of corporate governance, our measurement, on average, is positively associated with Tobin’s q. Furthermore, we find that q values are lower for firms that exhibit deviations between cash flow rights and voting rights. We also find that the value benefits of complying with “good” corporate governance practices are nullified in the presence of pyramidal ownership structures, raising doubts on the effectiveness of governance measures when ownership structures are not transparent. We conclude that family control of firms through pyramidal ownership structures can allow firms to seemingly comply with preferred governance practices but also use the control to their advantage.     

Growth,governance and corporate payout policy

We show that when growth opportunities decreased following the end of the Cold War, defence firms responded by increasing total payout. This change in policy was largely driven by increased stock buybacks as opposed to changes in cash dividends and primarily by firms that faced stronger external governance. On the other hand, firms with weaker internal governance that were more severely affected by the reduced growth chose to alter the mix of payout at the expense of repurchases. Overall, our findings (i) demonstrate a causal link where exogenous shocks to growth cause payout policy changes, (ii) support the role of internal governance in payout policy design where entrenched managers pre‐commit to higher dividends and (iii) emphasize the monitoring role of external governance in mitigating agency costs of free cash flow.     

Tender Offers and Free Cash Flow: An Empirical Analysis

High free cash flow firms are characterized by a mismatch between growth opportunities and resources. High free cash flow target firms receive higher-than-average abnormal returns. Target returns are lower when the bidder is a high free cash flow firm. During the 1970s, results suggested that cash-flow-rich bidding firms pursued low-benefit takeovers. During the 1980s, high free cash flow firms became the targets of tender offers. Results are consistent with the notion that reducing agency problems in target firms generates benefits and that bidding firms with large free cash flow undertake low-benefit acquisitions.     

Investor protection and corporate cash holdings around the world: new evidence

We provide new evidence that firms under weak governance regimes hold less cash than firms operating under strong governance, contrary to previous literature. Our findings also establish that there are two independent effects for the de jure and de facto aspects of governance that protect minority shareholders. Consistent with managerial empire building prediction, our study reveals that firms deplete their excess cash by overinvesting and this effect is exacerbated in countries with weak governance. The excess cash depletion has an adverse impact on firm performance, more so in countries with weak investor protection which is in support of the agency costs explanation.     

Internal Finance and Corporate Investment

This paper examines Pecking Order/Free Cash Flow behavior in small ($25–$50 million), medium ($100–250 million), and large ($1000 million and over) firms. The purpose is to proffer an explanation for the important role of cash flow on the investment expenditure of firms that is more complete than the commonly given accounts. The Pecking order theory (PO) emphasizes the value‐enhancing influence of cash flow, while the free cash flow hypothesis (FCF) underscores its value‐destroying effect. Using the vector error correction model, we find that although the overall behavior of small firms support the pecking order theory, the cash flow of these firms does not have any causal effect on their investment. We further find evidence of free cash flow theory in large firms.     

Changes in cash holdings around the S&P 500 additions

We analyze the changes in cash holding policies of S&P 500 firms from before to after their inclusion in the index. One year after inclusion, their mean industry-adjusted cash holdings decline by nearly 32% from the year before inclusion. Several factors explain this decline. The precautionary motive for cash subsides due to these firms becoming more visible, less uncertain, and less constrained to raise cheap external capital. Corporate governance deteriorates after inclusion due to increased managerial entrenchment, which leads to a reduction in cash as suggested by the free cash flow hypothesis. Most index firms face diminishing investment opportunities and decreasing capital expenditures, which implies a lesser need for cash holdings related to the transaction motive.     

Do Corporate Governance Motives Drive Hedge Fund and Private Equity Fund Activities?

We document empirical evidence that both hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) investments are driven by corporate governance improvements, but address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HFs focus on firms without a controlling shareholder, in particular family shareholders, PEs invest in firms with low managerial ownership. Both appear to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at increasing dividends, HFs tend to use commitment devices that can be implemented over a short horizon. PEs are inclined to longer‐term strategies: they target firms that are particularly well suited for leverage increases because of low expected financial distress costs.     

Financial constraints,board governance standards,and corporate cash holdings

This study examines whether financial constraints and board governance play substitution roles in lowering agency concerns in corporate cash holdings. Using four firm-specific characteristics of financial constraints and 28 forward-looking board governance standards, we find that board governance mitigates agency concerns in cash holdings more significantly for financially less-constrained firms. Consistently, financially less-constrained firms increase the level of board governance and adopt more board governance standards. A natural experiment with the 2007 financial crisis provides robustness to our findings. Our evidence suggests that financial constraints interrelate with the effectiveness of board governance on corporate cash holdings.     

Investment and financing decisions of private and public firms

We examine differences in the allocation of cash flow between Western European private and public firms. Public firms have a higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity than comparable private firms. This difference is not attributable to more severe financing constraints of public firms. Instead, because differences in investment‐cash flow sensitivities are only observed for the unexpected portion of firms’ cash flow, the empirical evidence supports an agency‐based explanation. Similar patterns are observable for the expected and unexpected portion of firms’ shareholder distributions. Our results are driven by firms from countries with low ownership concentration and more liquid stock markets, where shareholders have lower incentives to monitor. The results are also more pronounced for public firms with low industry Tobin's q and high free cash flow, which are more prone to suffer from agency problems.     

Large controlling shareholders and stock price synchronicity

This paper examines the effect of controlling shareholders on stock price synchronicity by focusing on two salient corporate governance features in a concentrated ownership setting, namely, ultimate cash flow rights and the separation of voting and cash flow rights (i.e., excess control). Using a unique dataset of 654 French listed firms spanning 1998–2007, this study provides evidence that stock price synchronicity increases with excess control, supporting the argument that controlling shareholders tend to disclose less firm-specific information to conceal opportunistic practices. Additionally, this study shows that firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes, consistent with the conjecture that controlling shareholders are more likely to hoard bad information when their control rights exceed their cash flow rights. Another important finding is that firms’ stock prices are less synchronous and less likely to crash when controlling shareholders own a large fraction of cash flow rights. This is consistent with the argument that controlling shareholders have less incentive to adopt poor disclosure policies and to accumulate bad news, since high cash flow ownership aligns their interests with those of minority investors.     

The Long Run Abnormal Performance of UK Acquirers and the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis

Abstract:   Evidence from recent US and UK studies reveals a pattern of poor long run post acquisition performance by acquiring firms. One explanation, due to Jensen (1986) is that acquirers with an excess of free cash flow (FCF) will have a propensity to squander this on wasteful investments, including take‐overs. In this paper, using a dataset of UK take‐overs and proxies for free cash flow similar to those used by Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) , we find no support for the FCF hypothesis and show that this conclusion is robust to the model of long run returns employed. Contrary to the free cash flow hypothesis there is evidence that acquirers with high free cash flow perform better than acquirers with low free cash flow. Although not consistent with the Jensen hypothesis, this evidence is compatible with the emerging UK evidence that shows cash flow‐to‐price measures are associated with market returns.