The Effects of Monetary Policy “News” and “Surprises”

There is substantial agreement in the monetary policy literature over the effects of exogenous monetary policy shocks. The shocks that are investigated, however, almost exclusively represent unanticipated changes in policy, which surprise the private sector and which are typically found to have a delayed and sluggish effect on output. In this paper, we estimate a New Keynesian model that incorporates news about future policies to try to disentangle the anticipated and unanticipated components of policy shocks. The paper shows that the conventional estimates confound two distinct effects on output: an effect due to unanticipated or “surprise” shocks, which is smaller and more short‐lived than the response usually obtained in the literature, and a large, delayed, and persistent effect due to anticipated policy shocks or “news.” News shocks play a larger role in influencing the business cycle than unanticipated policy shocks, although the overall fraction of economic fluctuations that can be attributed to monetary policy remains limited.     

The Asymmetric Impact of Monetary Policy on Currency Markets

This study examines whether tightening and easing actions of the Federal Reserve symmetrically influence currency markets. Using daily data on four exchange rates from 1989 to 2001, we find that changes in the Fed's interest rate target are positively related to changes in the value of the dollar. Surprises associated with monetary tightening have a larger announcement effect as compared to monetary easing for the British pound, German mark, and Canadian dollar, whereas the opposite is true for the Japanese yen. The results appear to be driven by the reactions of foreign central banks to Fed actions, the Fed's credibility as a policymaker, and by the change in the Fed's disclosure policy beginning in 1994.     

Voluntary Reserve Targets

We study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets (VRTs). Operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade, as they have since the financial crisis. We show that, no matter the abundance of reserves, VRTs encourage market activity and support the central bank's control over interest rates. We consider (i) the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and (ii) a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the Federal Reserve. Overall, a VRT framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks.     

Estimating Monetary Policy Rules When Nominal Interest Rates Are Stuck at Zero

Did the Federal Reserve's response to economic fundamentals change with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis? Estimation of a monetary policy rule to answer this question faces a censoring problem since the interest rate target has been set at the zero lower bound since late 2008. Surveys by forecasters allow us to sidestep the problem and to use conventional regressions and break tests. We find that, in the opinion of forecasters, the Fed's inflation response has decreased and the unemployment response has increased, which suggests that the Federal Reserve's commitment to stable inflation has become weaker in the eyes of the professional forecasters.     

A Model of Monetary Policy Shocks for Financial Crises and Normal Conditions

Deteriorating economic conditions in late 2008 led the Federal Reserve to lower the target federal funds rate to near zero, inject liquidity through novel facilities, and engage in large‐scale asset purchases. The combination of conventional and unconventional policy measures prevents using the effective federal funds rate to assess the effects of monetary policy beyond 2008. We employ a broad monetary aggregate to elicit the effects of monetary policy shocks both before and after 2008. Our estimates align well with major changes in the Fed's asset purchase programs and yield responses that are free from price, output, and liquidity puzzles that plague other approaches.     

Credit risk dynamics in response to changes in the federal funds target: The implication for firm short-term debt

The recent credit crisis has raised a number of interesting questions regarding the role of the Federal Reserve Bank and the effectiveness of its expected and unexpected interventions in financial markets, especially during the crisis, given its mandate. This paper reviews and evaluates the impact of expected and unexpected changes in the federal funds rate target on credit risk premia. The paper's main innovation is the use of an ACH-VAR (autoregressive conditional hazard VAR) model to generate the Fed's expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks which are then used to determine the effects of a Federal Reserve policy change on counterparty credit risk and more importantly short-term firm debt financing. The findings answer a longstanding question sought by researchers on the effect of policy makers' announcements on firm debt financing. The results clearly show that the Federal Reserve influences short-term debt financing through the credit channel for both expansionary and contractionary monetary policies. In particular, we find that the growth in counterparty risk appears less responsive to anticipated responses in the Fed funds rate that fail to materialize than to an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate. Finally, we also document that the results appear to validate the Feds interventions in financial markets to stem counterparty risk and to make liquidity more readily available to firms.     

The Influence of Monetary Conditions on the Response of Interest Rate Futures to M1 Releases: 1976–1998

Abstract:   This study examines the response of T‐bill and T‐bond futures prices to weekly M1 announcements over the period March 1976 to November 1998 conditioned upon monetary operating procedures and the stance in monetary policy. In concurrence with previous studies, this study finds that unanticipated increases in M1 are negatively related to changes in T‐bill and T‐bond futures prices. However, when the data is sorted by monetary regime, the stance in monetary policy, and direction of money surprise, we find evidence to support the several competing theories historically suggested by Cornell (1983b) to explain the impact of money supply announcements.     

全球央行购买公司债的原因、效果及启示

中央银行购买公司债是次贷危机后货币政策理论的一项伟大创新和重要实践探索。通过对迄今为止购买过公司债的日本央行、英国央行和欧洲央行的公司债购买计划进行的系统梳理和总结,以及对中央银行购买公司债的理论依据进行分析,提出中央银行购买公司债的六大传导机制。对中央银行购买公司债的经验进行阐述后认为,鉴于当前实体经济依然存在融资难融资贵问题,中国央行在必要时也可实施公司债购买计划,以降低信用利差并提高货币政策传导效率。     

次贷危机后美联储非常规货币政策及退出机制分析——基于美联储资产负债表的视角

次贷危机发生后,很多国家中央银行都采取了大量的非常规货币政策来确保金融系统的稳定和促进经济增长,尤其以美联储的非常规货币政策最具代表性。虽然非常规货币政策复杂多变,但是通常在央行资产负债表中清晰记录。借助于美联储资产负债表,能够全面梳理次贷危机后美联储的非常规货币政策,有助于深入理解非常规货币政策的实施和退出机制。     

The Fed's Communications: Suggestions for Improvement

The chief economist of Berenberg Capital Markets proposes three broad ways of improving the Fed's communications: (1) establish a more systematic approach to achieving its dual mandate; (2) clarify the proper role of monetary policy in achieving those objectives by distinguishing what is within the scope of monetary policy from what is clearly beyond it; and (3) articulate the Fed's goals and role in achieving macro‐prudential risk management and financial stability. With these three ends in view, the author begins by urging FOMC members to refrain from making public comments immediately following government data releases and, when making public speeches and statements, to relate their comments on the economy to the Fed's dual mandate. The author also suggests three modifications of the Fed's official Policy Statement following FOMC meetings. First, each statement should start with an assessment of monetary policy and its consistency with achieving the Fed's statutory mandate, rather than the Fed's assessments of the economy and its subsectors with which such statements now begin. Second, the Fed should communicate separate explicit risk assessments of inflation and of the prospects for employment and the economy. (The Fed's current practice of sometimes dropping the risk assessments from statements and replacing them with nuanced language—for example, on changes in inflation and inflationary expectations—can be a source of confusion.) Third, all statements should discuss as clearly as possible the Fed's strategy for its balance sheet and unwind policy. The Fed's quarterly Summary of Economic Projections (SEPs) should be redesigned to include FOMC estimates of forecast uncertainties and what they imply for monetary policy, and such alternative forecasts should be presented in place of the current central tendency and range of forecasts. The redesigned SEPs should be (1) based on a rigorous Fed assessment of expected monetary policy under different situations and contingency planning, and (2) as transparent as possible about the Fed's economic and inflation outlooks, the uncertainties in forecasting, and the conditionality of monetary policy. An illustration is provided of the alternative SEPs that would replace the current “dot plots” and include the Fed's forecasts of nominal GDP, calculated confidence intervals around the FOMC's median forecasts, and three separate forecasts of the Fed's perceived appropriate Fed funds rate. Finally, the author views the “optimal solution” as a more systematic approach in which the Fed publishes a single forecast based on a model consistent with its dual mandate that shows how the appropriate Fed funds rate path would be expected to vary under different economic and inflation outcomes. Such an approach, by thus mapping likely monetary policy responses to alternative plausible economic and inflation outcomes, would increase the Fed's accountability as well as its transparency.     

MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS AS PREDICTORS OF STOCK RETURNS

We explore the linkage between stock return predictability and the monetary sector by examining alternative proxies for monetary policy. Using two complementary methods, we document that failure to condition on the Fed's broad policy stance causes a substantial understatement in the ability of monetary policy measures to predict returns. Industry analyses suggest that cross‐industry return differences are also linked to changes in monetary conditions, as monetary policy has the strongest (weakest) relation with returns for cyclical (defensive) industries. Overall, we find that monetary conditions have a prominent and systematic relation with future stock returns, even in the presence of business conditions.     

Evaluating the Macroeconomic Effects of the ECB's Unconventional Monetary Policies

We quantify the macroeconomic effects of the European Central Bank's unconventional monetary policies using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which includes a set of shadow interest rates. Extracted from the yield curve, these shadow rates provide unconstrained measures of the overall stance of monetary policy. Counterfactual analyses show that, without unconventional measures, the euro area would have suffered (i) a substantial loss of output since the Great Recession and (ii) a period of deflation from mid‐2015 to early 2017. Specifically, year‐on‐year inflation and GDP growth would have been on average about 0.61% and 1.09% below their actual levels over the period 2014Q1–17Q2, respectively.     

Words that shake traders : The stock market's reaction to central bank communication in real time

This paper investigates the effects of Federal Reserve's decisions and statements on U.S. stock and volatility indices (Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ 100, S&P 500, and VIX) using a high-frequency event-study analysis. I find that both the surprise component of policy actions and official communication have statistically significant and economically relevant effects on equity indices, with statements having a much greater explanatory power of the reaction of stock prices to monetary policy. For instance, around 90% of the explainable variation in S&P 500 is due to the surprise component of Fed's statements. This paper also shows that equity indices tend to incorporate FOMC monetary surprises within 40 min from the announcement release. Finally, I find that these results are robust along several dimensions. In particular, I consider different estimators, such as the Generalized Empirical Likelihood, and I extend the sample to include the recent period of heightened financial stress. This sensitivity analysis corroborates that central bank communication about its future policy intentions is a key driver of stock returns.     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and the Response of the Yield Curve to Policy Shocks

This paper studies the nonlinear response of the term structure of interest rates to monetary policy shocks and presents a new stylized fact. We show that uncertainty about monetary policy changes the way the term structure responds to monetary policy. A policy tightening leads to a significantly smaller increase in long-term bond yields if policy uncertainty is high at the time of the shock. We also look at the decomposition of bond yields into expectations about future policy and the term premium. The weaker response of yields is driven by the fall in term premia, which fall more strongly if uncertainty about policy is high. Conditional on a monetary policy shock, higher uncertainty about monetary policy tends to make securities with longer maturities relatively more attractive to investors. As a consequence, investors demand even lower term premia. These findings are robust to the measurement of monetary policy uncertainty, the definition of the monetary policy shock, and to changing the model specification.     

An Empirical Study of the Asset Price Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission in China

By testing the impact of monetary policy on the bond market and the impact of the bond market on the real macro economy using different empirical methods, this article examines the performance of the bond price transmission mechanism in China’s monetary policy. Empirical studies show that monetary policy has power over bond yield fluctuations, while the bond market has a relatively limited impact on the real macro economy. Short-term bond yields have relatively significant transmission effects on some output variables, such as consumption, investment, and the consumer price index, while the influence of long-term bonds is not significant.     

How to Promote Fed Independence: Perspectives from Political Economy and History

In two short histories of the independence of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank since its creation in 1913—the first with respect to the Fed's monetary policymaking, the second focused on its regulatory policymaking—the author shows that the range of the Fed's powers has varied greatly over time, and that changes in those powers have had major effects on the extent of Fed independence. Moreover, the shifts over time in Fed powers reflect, to a significant degree, conscious trade‐offs by Fed leaders. A large number of somewhat surprising Fed positions on important regulatory matters can be explained as more or less deliberate attempts to preserve the Fed's monetary powers from political interference by yielding some of its independence in exercising its regulatory authority. In a case involving one of the most destructive U.S. financial regulatory policies, the Fed's effective neutrality on, and thus failure to support, the elimination of restrictions on interstate branch banking is seen as contributing to the chronic instability of the U.S. banking system, which has suffered some 20 major crises since the early 1800s (as compared to the crisis‐free Canadian system, with its nationwide banking from its inception). The Fed's reluctance to intervene is attributed to its unwillingness to antagonize powerful Congressional supporters of state banking interests and, more generally, to a “game of bank bargains” that can be seen at work in the political economy of virtually all countries. In more recent times, the most costly episode in this time‐honored game features a series of implicit or, in some cases, explicit agreements between large U.S. banks and urban activist groups—under the aegis of the Community Reinvestment Act, and with the oversight and implicit blessing of the Fed—to make on the order of $4.6 trillion loans to “subprime” borrowers in exchange for the activists’ (and the Fed's) support in Congressional merger hearings. The resulting nationwide debasement of mortgage underwriting standards and sheer volume of “toxic assets,” in combination with clearly inadequate capital requirements (which the Fed also failed to correct), are viewed as if not the principal cause of the crisis, a far bigger contributor than, say, the Fed's widely criticized unwillingness to tighten monetary policy in the early 2000s. To prevent the Fed from continuing to sacrifice its independence in regulatory matters to preserve its freedom to conduct monetary policy, the author proposes that authority for regulatory and monetary policy be vested in two separate regulatory bodies. If carried out, such a policy change would enact a proposal made by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in 2008, just before the global financial crisis hit.     

Hot Money and Quantitative Easing: The Spillover Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy on the Chinese Economy

We develop a factor‐augmented vector autoregression (FA‐VAR) model to estimate the effects that unanticipated changes in U.S. monetary policy and economic policy uncertainty have on the Chinese housing, equity, and loan markets. We find the decline in the U.S. policy rate since the Great Recession has led to a significant increase in Chinese housing investment. One possible reason for this effect is the substantial increase in the inflow of “hot money” into China. The responses of Chinese variables to U.S. shocks at the zero lower bound are different from those responses in normal times.     

Does the Exchange Rate Respond to Monetary Policy in Mexico? Solving an Exchange Rate Puzzle in Emerging Markets

This paper argues that the null or weak response of emerging market currencies to domestic monetary policy documented in the literature is the result of wide event windows. An event study with intraday data for Mexico shows that an unanticipated tightening appreciates the currency and flattens the yield curve, consistent with the evidence for advanced economies. With daily event windows, however, only the yield curve responds to monetary policy. Noise in daily exchange rate returns explains the lack of response of the currency. Such noise gives rise to a bias that declines after controlling for potential omitted variables.     

Monetary policy surprises and international bond markets

We examine the impact and spillover effects of monetary policy surprises on international bond returns. Within the framework of Campbell and Ammer (1993), we decompose international bond returns into news regarding future returns, real interest rates and future inflation for Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. We examine how excess bond returns in these three countries are affected by surprise changes in monetary policy in each country. Our measure of the unanticipated element of monetary policy is based on futures markets rather than the more traditional vector autoregression. Our results indicate that excess bond returns primarily react to domestic as compared to foreign monetary policy surprises. We also find there is a strong divergence between the effects of domestic monetary policy on excess bond returns in Germany relative to the U.K. A surprise monetary tightening in Germany (U.K.) leads to a rise (fall) in the excess holding period return. We trace this effect to news about lower (higher) inflation expectations and could be potentially rationalized by differences in the credibility of the monetary policy authority in each country.     

Treasury Bond Volatility and Uncertainty about Monetary Policy

We show that dispersion‐based uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy is the single most important determinant of Treasury bond volatility across all maturities. The link between Treasury bond volatility and uncertainty about macroeconomic variables is much stronger than for the more traditional time series measures of macroeconomic volatility and adds beyond the information contained in lagged bond market volatility. Uncertainty about monetary policy subsumes the uncertainty about future inflation (consumer price index and the deflator) and economic activity (unemployment, real and nominal gross domestic product and industrial production). In addition, causality clearly runs one way: from monetary policy uncertainty to Treasury bond volatility.