美联储缩表的内涵及影响

<正>2008年美国爆发次贷危机,随后转为全球性金融危机。为了应对危机,美联储先是急剧地降低利率,继而将最后贷款人职能从传统的银行业机构扩展到了金融市场,再续之以固定频率和规模购买资产而实施量化宽松货币政策。多年非常规货币政策导致美联储资产负债表急剧扩张。北京时间2017年9月21日凌晨,美联储举行议息会议并宣布将于     

美联储非常规货币政策框架北大核心CSSCISSCI

金融危机后,主要依靠美联储非常规货币政策,美国经济避免滑向通缩,实现了缓慢复苏。尽管非常规货币政策框架基本具有危机前传统货币政策框架的主要特点,但非常规货币政策的理念、目标、工具、传导渠道等仍有诸多不同之处:(1)在长期通胀预期稳定的情况下强调最大就业;(2)过度宽松、稳定通胀预期及以平衡方式实现美联储双重目标的政策策略;(3)最优控制和成本收益比较的政策规则;(4)资产负债表工具和利率前瞻性指引的政策工具;(5)以资产组合平衡渠道和未来短期利率预期渠道为主的政策传导渠道;(6)"先量后价"、多工具组合和缓慢渐进的非常规货币政策退出,等等。危机后的这种非常规货币政策框架是传统政策框架的扩展和延伸,丰富了传统货币政策框架的内涵。     

美联储应对次贷危机的货币政策工具

在次贷危机的应对中，美联储的货币政策激进、灵活，与正常时期的渐进主义策略大相径庭。文章在对次贷危机以来美联储的货币政策操作进行梳理的基础上，研究美联储应对危机的货币政策机理，发现在危机时期，美联储始终坚持其担负的目标，货币政策体现为及时的、决定性的和灵活的。最后，文章探讨了美联储的危机时期政策对我国央行货币政策操作的启示。     

美联储应对金融危机的货币政策效果评估

美国爆发次贷危机后,为应对危机,美联储实施了以＂信贷宽松＂为特征的货币政策,并创新了一系列政策工具。审视2007年至2009年美联储的货币政策实际效果,应该说是成功的。美国金融市场已经趋于稳定,美国经济正在走出衰退,美联储已开始酝酿宽松货币政策的退出战略。     

中央银行介入资产证券化业务及其会计核算规则研究*--以美联储为例

介入资产证券化业务在次贷危机爆发后成为美联储实施非常规货币政策的工具。本文研究美联储介入资产证券化业务的历程、动因、方式和范围,分析美联储对持有资产证券化产品和对特殊目的实体进行会计报表合并的核算规则,指出我国中央银行要研究建立与资产证券化业务相配套的风险监控机制、救助应急机制、市场沟通机制和会计核算机制。     

从量化宽松到量化紧缩——美联储缩减资产负债表的决定因素及其影响

作为货币政策正常化的第二阶段,美联储将在2017年开始缩减因危机后实行的量化宽松政策而形成的规模庞大的资产负债表,并指出缩表结束后的证券资产持有规模将不会大于为有效执行货币政策所必须维持的水平。本文认为,决定美联储资产负债表长期规模的主要因素是美联储负债中的流通中货币量和准备金余额的长期水平,前者取决于美联储对未来名义GDP增长趋势的估计,后者则取决于美联储对未来货币政策执行框架的选择。如果美联储倾向于采用危机前的公开市场操作办法,准备金余额的长期水平将与银行交易性存款余额决定的必要准备金水平趋于一致,美联储资产负债表的长期规模将因此显著低于目前的水平。相反,如果依照本文所预计的,美联储将继续危机后实行的利率走廊机制,以超额准备金利率和隔夜反向回购利率控制联邦基金利率的变动范围,准备金余额的长期水平就将由银行对准备金的需求来决定。在这种情况下,美联储资产负债表的规模虽会在目前的基础上缩减,但程度相对有限,因而对经济的负面影响较小。此外,和危机前的以提高联邦基金利率作为紧缩性货币政策的主要工具不同,本次量化紧缩政策的特点是美联储可以同时运用短期利率和资产负债表两种政策工具,意味着美联储能够通过资产负债表的缩减来部分地取代联邦基金利率的提高,而不至于改变紧缩性货币政策的总体效果,这在一定程度上将缓和升息对经济造成的负面影响。     

美联储复合型宽松货币政策的实践及正常化

在由次贷危机引发的全球金融海啸中,美国金融体系和实体经济都遭受了巨大的冲击。一段时期内,流动性短缺和信贷可得性急剧下降且循环往复,诸多系统重要性金融机构面临破产或申请救助,房地产市场降至冰点,失业率迅速攀高至两位数,宏观经济陷入负增长,美国甚至面临再次陷入"大萧条"的风险。针对危机中金融体系和实体经济的复杂"病灶",关联储在强化传统货币政策工具应用的同时,实施了大量的非常规货币政策,最终取得了显著的成效。本文详细地梳理和评价了自危机以来美联储所实施的"复合型"宽松货币政策及其综合"疗效",包括了对系统重要性金融机构的直接和间接救助、常规价格型货币政策工具的应用、非常规数量型货币政策工具的应用等等。本文还探讨了美联储货币政策正常化的现实和理论基础,指出今年稍后时间美联储或将首次提高联邦基金利率,并在未来的三年内逐步提高至使中期通胀达到2%左右的名义利率水平。     

各国央行非常规货币政策综述

美国次贷危机爆发以来,全球金融系统和实体经济遭遇了严重冲击,为了有效缓解负面冲击,各国央行纷纷推出各种宽松性货币政策,但在实际应用中,传统货币政策不能有效克制危机,美联储等央行纷纷求助于量化宽松等新型非常规货币政策。目前来看,非常规货币政策产生了积极影响,美国等经济体实现了就业的改善、金融系统的稳定和经济增长的复苏。为全面了解货币政策,本文系统归纳了美联储等央行采取的各类非常规货币政策,探讨了非常规货币政策的实施途径及效能得失,并总结了美联储采取非常规货币政策的主要经验。     

次贷危机以来美联储资产负债表的变化

2007年下半年以来,美国次贷危机愈演愈烈,美联储为应对金融危机采取了大量拯救措施,为市场提供流动性,恢复市场信心。这导致美联储资产负债表的规模与结构发生显著变化,本文欲予以分析。     

次贷危机中美联储非常规货币政策应对、影响和效果

本文首先分析次贷危机中美联储货币政策所面临的两大难题,即传统货币政策工具难以应对以及如何应对金融加速器机制的巨大破坏作用,然后从传统货币政策工具的使用、货币政策工具创新、货币政策的协调与配合及量化宽松货币政策再启动四个方面考察美联储应对危机的货币政策操作。最后文章分析了美联储货币政策应对的影响和效果,体现为美联储通过信用扩张维护金融市场的稳定和通过建立货币政策工具的退出机制关注长期通胀;文章同时也分析了美联储购入大量风险资产带来的风险;对第三类创新工具有效性进行了检验,发现其并不显著。     

Monetary Policy Implementation: Making Better and More Consistent Use of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet

Since December 2015, the Federal Reserve has operated a new “floor system” in which it brings about desired changes in its targeted federal funds rate by managing the interest rate it pays on bank reserves and other short‐term liabilities. The design of this new system reflects the tendency of Fed officials to view monetary policy as affecting the economy through Keynesian” interest rate channels. From this Keynesian perspective, policy actions that change the size of the balance sheet are seen as tools for influencing credit market conditions that operate in addition to and independently of the Fed's monetary policy stance. The alternative monetarist framework proposed by the author views monetary policy and its effects as operating through the interaction between money supply and demand. Use of this framework makes clear that, even under a floor system, monetary policy actions designed to affect the aggregate price level and the rate of inflation must be accompanied sooner or later by traditional open market operations that have implications for the size and composition of the Fed's balance sheet. Use of the monetarist framework also underscores the likelihood that the Fed, by paying interest on reserves, has unknowingly contributed to the restrictiveness of its own monetary policies since the financial crisis, a period during which inflation has run consistently below target. More generally, the monetarist framework downplays the importance of the zero lower interest rate bound and suggests that monetary policy could be conducted more effectively by adopting and adhering to a consistent, rule‐like manner during good times and bad.     

A Limited Central Bank

The President of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank from 2006–2015 discusses the Fed's essential role as preserver of the currency's purchasing power and how the institution might be improved to better fulfill that role. To that end, the author proposes the imposition of four limits on the central bank that, by restricting its discretion, can be expected to improve outcomes and accountability.

• First, limit the Fed's monetary policy goals to a narrow mandate in which price stability is the sole, or at least the primary, objective;
• Second, limit the types of assets that the Fed can hold on its balance sheet to Treasury securities;
• Third, limit the Fed's discretion in monetary policymaking by requiring a systematic, rule‐like approach; and
• Fourth, limit the boundaries of its lender‐of‐last‐resort credit extension.

These changes, by creating a more limited central bank, would help preserve the central bank's independence, thereby improving the effectiveness of monetary policy. They would also make it easier for the public to hold the Fed accountable for its policy decisions.     

危机以来全球主要发达经济体央行资产负债表变化概览

中央银行资产负债表是对中央银行职能及其各项政策执行情况的集中概括。危机以来,全球主要发达经济体中央银行为应对危机、救助金融体系和刺激实体经济,采取了大量非常规货币政策措施,这对其资产负债表产生了重要影响。文章比较分析了危机以来全球主要央行的资产负债表变化情况和特点,并简述了各主要央行资产负债表的发展趋势。     

The Fed's Communications: Suggestions for Improvement

The chief economist of Berenberg Capital Markets proposes three broad ways of improving the Fed's communications: (1) establish a more systematic approach to achieving its dual mandate; (2) clarify the proper role of monetary policy in achieving those objectives by distinguishing what is within the scope of monetary policy from what is clearly beyond it; and (3) articulate the Fed's goals and role in achieving macro‐prudential risk management and financial stability. With these three ends in view, the author begins by urging FOMC members to refrain from making public comments immediately following government data releases and, when making public speeches and statements, to relate their comments on the economy to the Fed's dual mandate. The author also suggests three modifications of the Fed's official Policy Statement following FOMC meetings. First, each statement should start with an assessment of monetary policy and its consistency with achieving the Fed's statutory mandate, rather than the Fed's assessments of the economy and its subsectors with which such statements now begin. Second, the Fed should communicate separate explicit risk assessments of inflation and of the prospects for employment and the economy. (The Fed's current practice of sometimes dropping the risk assessments from statements and replacing them with nuanced language—for example, on changes in inflation and inflationary expectations—can be a source of confusion.) Third, all statements should discuss as clearly as possible the Fed's strategy for its balance sheet and unwind policy. The Fed's quarterly Summary of Economic Projections (SEPs) should be redesigned to include FOMC estimates of forecast uncertainties and what they imply for monetary policy, and such alternative forecasts should be presented in place of the current central tendency and range of forecasts. The redesigned SEPs should be (1) based on a rigorous Fed assessment of expected monetary policy under different situations and contingency planning, and (2) as transparent as possible about the Fed's economic and inflation outlooks, the uncertainties in forecasting, and the conditionality of monetary policy. An illustration is provided of the alternative SEPs that would replace the current “dot plots” and include the Fed's forecasts of nominal GDP, calculated confidence intervals around the FOMC's median forecasts, and three separate forecasts of the Fed's perceived appropriate Fed funds rate. Finally, the author views the “optimal solution” as a more systematic approach in which the Fed publishes a single forecast based on a model consistent with its dual mandate that shows how the appropriate Fed funds rate path would be expected to vary under different economic and inflation outcomes. Such an approach, by thus mapping likely monetary policy responses to alternative plausible economic and inflation outcomes, would increase the Fed's accountability as well as its transparency.     

A model of unconventional monetary policy

We develop a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. We then use the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis. We interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermediation. Within our framework the central bank is less efficient than private intermediaries at making loans but it has the advantage of being able to elastically obtain funds by issuing riskless government debt. Unlike private intermediaries, it is not balance sheet constrained. During a crisis, the balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten, raising the net benefits from central bank intermediation. These benefits may be substantial even if the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is not binding. In the event this constraint is binding, though, these net benefits may be significantly enhanced.     

How to Promote Fed Independence: Perspectives from Political Economy and History

In two short histories of the independence of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank since its creation in 1913—the first with respect to the Fed's monetary policymaking, the second focused on its regulatory policymaking—the author shows that the range of the Fed's powers has varied greatly over time, and that changes in those powers have had major effects on the extent of Fed independence. Moreover, the shifts over time in Fed powers reflect, to a significant degree, conscious trade‐offs by Fed leaders. A large number of somewhat surprising Fed positions on important regulatory matters can be explained as more or less deliberate attempts to preserve the Fed's monetary powers from political interference by yielding some of its independence in exercising its regulatory authority. In a case involving one of the most destructive U.S. financial regulatory policies, the Fed's effective neutrality on, and thus failure to support, the elimination of restrictions on interstate branch banking is seen as contributing to the chronic instability of the U.S. banking system, which has suffered some 20 major crises since the early 1800s (as compared to the crisis‐free Canadian system, with its nationwide banking from its inception). The Fed's reluctance to intervene is attributed to its unwillingness to antagonize powerful Congressional supporters of state banking interests and, more generally, to a “game of bank bargains” that can be seen at work in the political economy of virtually all countries. In more recent times, the most costly episode in this time‐honored game features a series of implicit or, in some cases, explicit agreements between large U.S. banks and urban activist groups—under the aegis of the Community Reinvestment Act, and with the oversight and implicit blessing of the Fed—to make on the order of $4.6 trillion loans to “subprime” borrowers in exchange for the activists’ (and the Fed's) support in Congressional merger hearings. The resulting nationwide debasement of mortgage underwriting standards and sheer volume of “toxic assets,” in combination with clearly inadequate capital requirements (which the Fed also failed to correct), are viewed as if not the principal cause of the crisis, a far bigger contributor than, say, the Fed's widely criticized unwillingness to tighten monetary policy in the early 2000s. To prevent the Fed from continuing to sacrifice its independence in regulatory matters to preserve its freedom to conduct monetary policy, the author proposes that authority for regulatory and monetary policy be vested in two separate regulatory bodies. If carried out, such a policy change would enact a proposal made by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in 2008, just before the global financial crisis hit.     

美联储停止缩表的原因、影响及中国对策

近期美联储停止缩表引起广泛关注。美联储停止缩表主要有以下几个原因：一是货币需求大幅上升,二是美联储控制短期利率的能力出现下降,三是美国经济前景存在不确定性。此外,美联储停止缩表还有助于继续发挥财政作用、改善货币政策传导效率、降低污名效应、降低私人部门安全资产的供应以及降低对美联储信用风险和银行清算风险。美联储停止缩表对美国和中国都会产生十分广泛的影响。对美国的影响主要有：资产价格将获得支撑、投资可能出现过热、通胀可能出现阶段性上升、金融风险可能加大、美联储独立性可能受到影响、可能加剧收益率曲线倒挂;对中国的影响主要有：人民币汇率压力有望缓解、资产价格可能上升、短期资本流入可能增多。因此,中国货币政策应保持定力,密切关注国际资本流动趋势的变化,防范资产价格暴涨风险,同时,应加强人民币汇率风险管理。     

The effectiveness of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy: Comparative evidence from crisis and non-crisis Euro-area countries

During the European financial crisis, the European Central Bank implemented a series of unconventional monetary policy measures. We argue that these programs lowered the bond yield spreads of Euro-area countries. This hypothesis is tested using pooled OLS estimations and two different datasets: monetary policy event dummies and the purchase volumes of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Overall, we find significantly negative effects on bond yield spreads for both datasets, leading us to accept the hypothesis. While the OMT reduces the spreads of both crisis and non-crisis countries, LTROs and the lowering of the deposit rate to 0 percent are mainly effective in non-crisis countries. The SMP lowers the spreads of crisis countries, but it has the opposite effect on non-crisis countries. This converse effect is explained by the risk that increasingly accumulates on the ECB’s balance sheet through the SMP and that way constitutes a fiscal risk for non-crisis countries. The results are confirmed by pooled OLS estimations that measure the effect of unconventional monetary policy on central government debt.     

央行资本盒与货币政策的有效性

2007年次贷危机后,各国央行都承担起“最后贷款人”的职责,救助金融机构,央行自身资产负债表的质量不断恶化,引发对中央银行资本金的关注。央行在履行维持物价稳定和一些“准财政”职能时,资本金可能遭受损失,资本金的损失会影响到央行的公信力和独立性,以及货币政策的有效性。充足的央行资本金对于货币政策的有效执行来说是一种有力的保障。