大股东资金占用和公司绩效：来自其他应收款的证据

在具体考察大股东资金占用的经济后果和制度成因时,首先发现其他应收款比重不仅对公司经营绩效（EPS和ROE）具有显著且较强的负面影响,还对公司盈利能力（盈利概率）具有显著且较强的负面影响。结果表明,大股东通过其他应收款账户对上市公司的占款行为会对上市公司的经营绩效和盈利能力造成不利影响,并会损害其他中小股东的利益以及公司长远发展的后劲。另外还发现,第一大股东持股对其他应收款比重具有显著较强的非线性影响：当第一大股东的控股地位较弱时,第一大股东具有较强的激励效应去改善公司绩效,并减少对上市公司资金的无效占用;当第一大股东的控股地位较强时,第一大股东具有较强的动机和能力去攫取私人利益,并增加对上市公司的资金占用。     

大股东与盈余管理程度的实证研究

大股东是公司治理的重要主体,第一大股东的性质和持股比例的不同会对盈余管理行为产生不同的约束力。本文以2003～2005年的上市公司为样本,基于分行业修正的琼斯-现金模型研究了第一大股东的性质及其持股比例与盈余管理程度相关关系。研究结果表明:国有股似乎更能控制盈余管理行为;第一大股东持股比例与盈余管理程度之间呈线非线性关系,从大体上看呈近似U型曲线结构,以40%～60%这个区间的盈余管理程度比较轻也比较稳定。     

大股东治理与管理者过度投资行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

论文以中国A股上市公司2005～2006年的横截面数据为基础,分析了大股东持股及其相关的股权结构特征对管理者过度投资行为的治理效应。结果表明：（1）大股东持股比例与企业的过度投资水平呈一种倒“N”型的曲线关系,即大股东对管理者过度投资行为的监督作用同时存在激励效应和防御效应;（2）非国有大股东对管理者过度投资行为的监督更有力;（3）次大股东的存在有利于发挥大股东的激励效应,抑制大股东的防御效应,特别是当大股东不处于控股地位时。     

基于逐步回归的我国上市公司股权集中度与公司经营绩效的关系研究

以2012年上海证券交易所和深圳交易所上市的非金融类公司为样本,对公司经营绩效(资产收益率)和股权集中度指标(第一大股东持股比例CR_1、第一大股东与第二大股东持股份额比值Z指数、赫芬达尔指数H_5指数)进行相关性研究,并运用逐步回归法建立方程,深入研究股权集中度对公司经营绩效的影响机制。研究发现:股权集中度与公司绩效存在显著的相关性;公司第一大股东持股比例与公司资产收益率存在显著的正相关关系;公司第一大股东与第二大股东持股比例比值与公司资产收益率存在着不太显著的负相关关系。     

创业板股权集中度与公司绩效——基于面板数据的门槛效应研究

本文使用创业板面板数据,检验了公司股权集中度对经营绩效的门槛效应。实证结果显示,股权集中度与公司绩效之间存在显著的单一门槛效应。具体来看,第一大股东持股比例对公司绩效的影响总体为负,但在跨越相应门槛值后,负向作用显著降低;前五大股东持股比例对公司绩效的影响显著为正,但在跨越门槛值后,正向作用显著降低且不再显著。与此同时,前十大股东持股比例对公司绩效的影响则在统计上不显著。最后,本文给出了创业板公司相对较优的股权集中结构,并对创业板股权结构现状进行了评价。     

基于逐步回归的我国上市公司股权集中度与公司经营绩效的关系研究

以2012年上海证券交易所和深圳交易所上市的非金融类公司为样本,对公司经营绩效（资产收益率）和股权集中度指标（第一大股东持股比例CR₁、第一大股东与第二大股东持股份额比值Z指数、赫芬达尔指数H₅指数）进行相关性研究,并运用逐步回归法建立方程,深入研究股权集中度对公司经营绩效的影响机制。研究发现:股权集中度与公司绩效存在显著的相关性;公司第一大股东持股比例与公司资产收益率存在显著的正相关关系;公司第一大股东与第二大股东持股比例比值与公司资产收益率存在着不太显著的负相关关系。     

管理层持股与公司绩效的实证研究--基于2011年沪深上市公司的数据分析

为探索我国国有控股和非国有控股上市公司绩效与高级管理人员持股比例之间的关系,本文选取沪深证券交易所300家上市公司作为研究样本运用实证方法,检验了管理层持股与企业绩效之间的关系以及国有和非国有控股上市公司管理层持股的激励效应。研究结果表明,国有和非国有控股上市公司的管理层持股比例与企业绩效之间均呈现显著的非线性关系。     

中国生物医药上市公司股权结构与经营绩效关系的实证分析

股权结构通过控制公司的所有权结构,决定了公司的治理结构,进而影响其经营绩效。以生物医药行业上市公司为样本,运用因子分析成功地对13个原始指标做了处理,得到了综合绩效指标。在此基础上,以企业资产负债率和企业规模作为控制变量,分析了医药类上市公司的股权结构中股权集中度与企业经营绩效的关系。结果表明,第一、前五和前十大股东持有股比例与公司绩效都呈倒U字关系,存在最大值。第一、前五和前十大股东最适合的持有股比例分别为53.1%、59.7%和64.2%,当它们的持股比例分别小于各自的最适持股比例时,它们与公司绩效呈现正相关关系;当它们的持股比例分别大于各自的最适持股比例时,它们与公司绩效呈现负相关关系。本文为银行放贷,规避银行放贷的风险具有一定的参考意义。     

监督还是合谋:多个大股东与公司内部控制质量

中国上市公司大股东持股比例相对较高,大股东之间可能存在合谋掏空或监督制衡的关系,为此,以2008~2016年A股上市公司为样本,探究多个大股东的股权结构对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现：相对于只有单一大股东的公司而言,具有多个大股东的公司内部控制质量更高;大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股比例越高、大股东之间股权偏离度越低,公司内部控制质量越高;外国投资者和国有法人大股东能够显著提升公司内部控制质量;多个大股东的治理效应主要体现在非国有企业中,公司所处地区的法律及市场环境越好,多个大股东监督效应对公司内部控制质量的提升作用越明显。     

股权结构对非经营性资金占用影响的实证研究——民营上市公司与国有上市公司的比较

本文以我国证券交易所公布的存在非经营性资金占用的上市公司为样本,研究股权结构对非经营性资金占用的影响。通过理论与实证分析,得出结论:民营上市公司的资金占用现象更为普遍;通过股权制衡作用可以抑制资金占用;当第一大股东持股比例在50%以下时,持股比例越大,资金占用率越高;当第一大股东持股比例大于50%时,民营上市公司表现为协同效应,而国有上市公司表现为壕沟效应。文章在分析过程中,提出“政府主导的壕沟效应”和“控股股东代理人的壕沟效应”的存在。     

Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings

This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.     

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.     

Reexamining the managerial ownership effect on firm value

Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership align the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.     

Insider Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

Real estate investment trust (REIT) provides a unique laboratory to study the relation between insider ownership and firm value. One, a REIT has to satisfy special regulations which weaken alternative mechanisms to control agency problems. Empirically, I find a significant and robust nonlinear relation between Tobin's Q and REIT insider ownership that is consistent with the trade-off between the incentive alignment and the entrenchment effect of insider ownership. Two, many REITs are Umbrella Partnership REITs (UPREITs) which have dual ownership structure. They have both common shares and Operating Partnership Units (OP units). Property owners can contribute their properties to the UPREIT in exchange for OP units. Their capital gains taxes remain deferred as long as they hold onto their OP units and the UPREIT does not sell the properties they contributed. OP units owners are locked in with the firm and have incentive to monitor firm management, but their interests diverge from the common shareholders because their tax bases are much lower. Consistent with the trade-off between positive monitoring effect of OP units and tax-induced agency costs, I find that UPREIT's firm value increases with the fraction of OP units, but the effect is significantly weaker for the UPREITs where insiders hold OP units.     

Sponsor Ownership in Asian REITs

This study examines the relationship between sponsor ownership and firm performance proxied by firm value, operating cash flow, and dividend policy with Asian real estate investment trusts (REITs) in Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore for the period from 2002 to 2012, focusing on both the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. Our study sheds new light on effective corporate governance for Asian REITs that are prone to agency problems. Such agency problems arise from the inequitable distribution of power to sponsors that results from the external management structure. The findings suggest that larger sponsor ownership aligns the interests of sponsors and minority shareholders and enhances the performance of Asian REITs, while such an effect diminishes as sponsors become more entrenched. We find that the incentive alignment effect and entrenchment effect are primarily driven by developer-sponsored REITs. Also evident is that the presence of institutional investors mitigates agency problems and increases firm performance.     

Do managers seek control and entrenchment?

A unique dataset of post-IPO thrifts with heterogeneous initial insider ownership allows us to use revealed preferences to determine the level of ownership insiders believe to be optimal. We find strong evidence that insider ownership converges to the 20% to 30% range, whether insiders begin with diffuse or concentrated ownership. This range of ownership has been found consistent with entrenchment and control in the literature. Our results are robust to a battery of variables related to insider ownership such as moral hazard, adverse selection, market timing, insider characteristics, and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that managers with diffuse ownership accumulate shares most aggressively during the period of regulatory anti-takeover protection, consistent with an entrenchment motive. We find that managers with above-average pay are more likely to seek higher ownership, consistent with the existence of private benefits of control. Finally, we find that insider ownership determines equity issuance, leverage, and share liquidity in ways consistent with expected accumulation or reduction in insider ownership for control purposes.     

Cost of equity capital,control divergence,and institutions: the international evidence

This study investigates the governance role of a country’s legal and extra-legal institutions in explaining the variations in firms’ cost of equity capital induced by concentrated ownership structures from 21 countries. Using four implied cost of equity proxies, the results show that the large ownership-control divergence of the ultimate owner has a positive and significant impact on the firm’s cost of equity capital. The finding lends support to the entrenchment effect in that the concentrated ownership structure increases the firm’s external financing cost. Further analyses demonstrate that the higher equity cost induced by the ultimate ownership structure is significantly reduced by a country’s stronger legal and extra-legal institutions, highlighting the governance role played by a country’s institutions in reducing the firm’s external financing cost.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

控股股东所有权结构与关联方担保

本文以我国A股上市公司1998年到2003年的关联方担保数据为研究对象,检验了不同股权结构下上市公司关联方担保发生的概率及其对公司价值的影响。本文的结果显示,随着上市公司控股股东持股比例的增加,上市公司为关联方担保发生的概率呈现出先显著上升、其后不显著、最后显著下降的交化趋势。此外,我们还进一步发现为关联方担保对上市公司自身价值的影响显著为负,且这种负相关关系在控股股东持股比例偏低时显著加强,而在控股股东持股比例处于高位时显著降低。这些研究发现意味着监管关联方担保行为的重点应更多侧重于控股股东持股水平较低的上市公司。     

Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital

This paper investigates the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of capital, the main determinant of shareholder value creation computed through economic value added (EVA). By reducing agency conflicts within the firm, we hypothesize that employee share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000–2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because it shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.