政策法规

最高人民法院发布企业破产法司法解释 最高人民法院不久前发布《关于适用〈中华人民共和国企业破产法〉若干问题的规定（一）》,主要就人民法院依法受理企业破产案件适用法律的有关问题作出了相关规定,从9月26日起正式实施。其中特别列举了债务人账面资产虽大于负债,但人民法院应当认定其明显缺乏清偿能力的情形,包括因资金严重不足或者财产不能变现等原因,无法清偿债务;     

金融机构破产的法律思考

2007年6月1日《中华人民共和国企业破产法》(以下简称《企业破产法》)正式施行。有识之士喜忧参半,喜的是,改革开放30年,中国终于有了市场经济第一法;忧的是,《企业破产法》提纲挈领,相关破产条例如何尽快跟进。日前,有消息透露,银行业金融机构破产条例已进入立法进程。酝酿金融机构破产条例,《企业破产法》精神是根本,对金融机构特殊性的认识和充分考虑是关键。     

破产管理人执业责任保险制度初探

新施行的《中华人民共和国企业破产法》第二十四条第四款规定“个人担任管理人的，应当参加执业责任保险”。这使得破产管理人执业责任保险制度首次出现于我国成文法。该制度不仅涉及破产法、保险法两大商法领域，并因其责任保险的特殊性质而与侵权行为法、合同法等传统民法相关联。[第一段]     

契解“新破产法”——新《企业破产法》出台恰逢其时：专访新《企业破产法》起草小组成员、中国政法大学教授李曙光

2006年8月27日,十届全国人大常委会第二十三次会议审议并通过了新的《中华人民共和国企业破产法》.新《企业破产法》进一步规范了企业的破产程序,以保护债权人和债务人合法权益为目标,在社会主义市场经济秩序构建中必将起到极其重要的作用.就大家关心的问题,本刊专访了《企业破产法》起草小组成员、中国政法大学研究生院副院长、破产法与企业重组研究中心主任李曙光教授.     

新司法解释下的破产申请注意事项

《中华人民共和国企业破产法》自2007年6月1日施行以来,各地法院受理破产案件数量不但没有增加,反而下降。《企业破产法》的空转导致许多企业未能依法定程序退出市场。2011年8月29日,《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国企业破产法〉若干问题的规定(一)》(简称"破产法司法解释一")由最高人民法院审判委员会第1527次会议通过,自2011年     

《企业破产法》将给中国经济带来些什么？

2006年8月27日，《中华人民共和国企业破产法》在十届全国人大常委会第二十三次会议上获高票通过。 《企业破产法》起草于1994年，2004年6月首次提交审议。到2006年8月27日通过，历时12年。新通过的《企业破产法》，将于2007年6月1日起施行，《中华人民共和国企业破产法（试行）》将同时废止。     

论我国破产法适用范围的扩大

我国新破产法规定其适用范围仍局限于企业法人,使得我国刚刚制定的新破产法的适用范围仍无法适应市场经济迅猛发展的要求,而将破产法的适用范围扩大为企业法人、非法人企业、自然人、非企业营利组织在我国有着现实必要性。国外有关破产法适用范围的立法趋势为实行一般破产主义,即破产法对于商人与一般人均适用。我国可通过修改破产法等途径扩大破产法的适用范围,并应注意具体的制度设计。     

论新《破产法》对破产会计理论的影响

早在1986年12月2日,全国人大常委会就发布了《中华人民共和国企业破产法(试行)》(以下简称《企业破产法(试行)》),并于1988年11月1日正式实施。然而随着我国市场经济体制的建立和国有企业改革的深化,《企业破产法(试行)》已不适应企业组织破产的实际情况。因此,全国人大常委会从1994年就开始着手起草新《破产法》,可谓十年磨一剑。目前,虽然在某些细节的制定上还存在争议,但在一些重要的基本问题上已经达成一致。新《破产法》的颁布和实施将对破产会计理论产生深远的影响,我们具体从以下四个方面来阐述。一、破产会计主体发生变化破产会计主…     

新《企业破产法》对银行信贷业务的影响及对策

相对于旧<企业破产法>而言,2007年6月1日施行的新<企业破产法>扩大了适用范围,明晰了破产条件,健全了破产法律责任追究制度,规定了跨境破产,调整了破产财产范围和债权的清偿顺序,新设了管理人、重整和撤销权等制度,新<企业破产法>的实施对银行信贷业务产生了重大影响.本文通过对新旧<企业破产法>进行比较,详细分析了新<企业破产法>的实施对银行信贷业务产生的影响,有针对性地提出了风险防范对策:正确选定融资对象,防范关联风险;严控贷款用途,关注借款及国家宏观调控政策的重大变化;全面掌握债务人财产状况;依法监督管理人行为等.     

新《企业破产法》对商业银行经营管理的影响

第十届全国人大常委会第23次会议于2006年8月27日通过的《中华人民共和国企业破产法》（以下简称额（《企业破产法》），将取代1986年12月2日第六届全国人大常委会第18次会议通过的《中华人民共和国企业破产法（试行）》（以下简称旧《企业破产法》），自2007年6月1日开始施行。这部以“规范企业破产程序，公平清理债权债务，保护债权人和债务人的合法权益，维护社会主义市场经济秩序”为立法目的的法律的出台和实施，将使商业银行债权维护手段更加规范有序，对企业逃废银行债务的现象有所遏制，而对商业银行的经营管理产生积极和深远的影响。本文拟对额《企业破产法》中可能涉及商业银行经营管理的额制度、额规则与旧《企业破产法》进行对照解读，并对商业银行的应对措施提出初步的看法。[编者按]     

我国破产会计研究的回顾与评价

商品经济产生了企业的优胜劣汰、产生了企业破产制度,进而产生了企业破产会计的理论和实践。本文以1978年为起点,重点回顾了1978年以来我国企业破产会计研究的简要历程,分析了不同时期相关的政治、经济、法律等环境影响,总结了破产会计研究的主要成果和存在的问题,提出了改进我国企业破产会计研究的相关建议。     

Apples and oranges? Corporate rescue and functional convergence in the US and UK

This paper challenges the standard characterisation that US law in the sphere of corporate bankruptcy is ‘pro debtor’ and UK law is ‘pro creditor’. It suggests that the traditional thesis is, at best, a potentially misleading over‐simplification. It also offers the conclusion that there is functional convergence in practice, while acknowledging that corporate rescue, as distinct from business rescue, still plays a larger role in the US. The functional convergence has partly come through the UK Enterprise Act 2002 but the paper suggests that the main move has been that of US law and practice in a UK direction with more emphasis on business disposals and speedier cases than on corporate reorganisations, as traditionally understood. This mirrors practice in the UK where the emphasis has always been on business disposals. Unfortunately, the current economic recession on both sides of the Atlantic has shone a heightened spotlight on business bankruptcy and is likely to generate further changes in practice and ultimately legislation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial distress, bankruptcy law and the business cycle

This paper explores the business cycle implications of financial distress and bankruptcy law. We find that due to the presence of financial imperfections the effect of liquidations on the price of capital goods can generate endogenous fluctuations. We show that a law reform that ‘softens’ bankruptcy law may increase the amplitude of the cycle in the long run. In contrast, a policy of bailing out businesses during the bust or actively managing the interest rate across the cycle could stabilize the economy in the long run. A comprehensive welfare analysis of these policies is provided as well.      

The role of stakeholders on rejection of bankruptcy applications in the case of “poverty” of the estate: A Polish case study

The aim of this article is to supplement the Law and Economics area of science with regard to the scope of the ex ante effectiveness of bankruptcy law using the example of Poland. Bankruptcy law is effective in the ex ante stage when it eliminates from the market insolvent entrepreneurs who cannot even afford to cover the costs of bankruptcy proceedings. In these cases, the bankruptcy court should dismiss the petition for bankruptcy because of “poverty” of the insolvent estate. As a result, the insolvent debtor should be liquidated and deleted from the register of companies. This paper investigates entities whose bankruptcy petition has been rejected due to “poverty” of the insolvent estate. The study shows that, after the filing has been dismissed, the majority of these entities are not liquidated. To determine who is responsible for this state of affairs, the article identifies the stakeholders at the time that applications are filed for bankruptcy proceedings and also after the bankruptcy petition has been rejected. The article highlights stakeholders' diverging interests, strengths, and weaknesses to assess their potential impact on bankruptcy procedures that should be dismissed due to “poverty” of the insolvent estate.     

区块链时代破产法的机遇与挑战

区块链与破产法在维系市场主体信用方面相得益彰,区块链能够提升破产程序运转效率,实现破产程序信息披露透明,维护破产结果的公平公正。区块链资产的价值具有较大波动性,判定破产界限存在反复。区块链资产包括数据资产和数据信息两部分,识别破产财产需要区分对待。数字货币承载着价值资产和货币流通的双重角色,破产财产的定性应当审慎选择。     

Company duplication – plain fraud or a ‘poor man's’ bankruptcy? A case study in the financial distress of small businesses

Two possible solutions to corporate financial distress are traditionally considered: commencing a formal bankruptcy proceeding or arranging an out‐of‐court capital restructuring. Corporate bankruptcy scholarship has largely ignored a third solution occasionally undertaken by small businesses, that is, resorting to self‐help measures. The purpose of this paper is to start filling the gap using a unique case study. The paper describes and analyses an existing phenomenon among small firms in Israel experiencing financial distress – company duplication. A typical scenario unfolds as follows. An entrepreneur who controls the financially distressed Company A registers a new Company B in an attempt to avoid a complete shutdown of her creditors' disturbed business. The assets of Company A are transferred to Company B in what appears to be fraudulent conveyance. Company B serves as a vehicle through which the original business is kept running. If necessary, the entrepreneur will also register Company C and repeat the process. Israeli law regulates company duplication in an ambivalent manner. On the one hand, conventional wisdom considers company duplication to be tantamount to fraud against Company A's unaware creditors. Accordingly, company duplication has been recently denounced by the Israeli Supreme Court as an illegitimate way of conducting business. The Court held that notwithstanding the principle of limited liability, an entrepreneur resorting to company duplication is personally liable to pay any debt of Company A that was not serviced by it. On the other hand, company duplicators do not face criminal charges. To the extent that company duplication is practiced by insolvent entrepreneurs, deterrence is therefore suboptimal, as insolvent duplicators are not sanctioned at all. Against this backdrop, this paper advances two normative arguments. First, a more sympathetic explanation should be considered to account for company duplication. An entrepreneur resorting to company duplication might actually be arranging for a ‘home‐made’ bankruptcy proceeding (i.e. buying time which could help the business establish its viability and regenerate). According to this narrative, the duplication mimics the role of a formal bankruptcy stay on unsecured creditors' collection efforts, thus suggesting that company duplication serves as ‘a poor man's’ bankruptcy proceeding. Second, this new explanation of company duplication, combined with the current level of suboptimal deterrence, mandates a re‐evaluation of this business pattern to assess its relative efficacy. I argue that at least in the Israeli context because of its special features, company duplication should be tolerated with regard to small businesses, assuming that the entrepreneur is not defrauding creditors or attempting to rescue a business that has failed due to economic rather than merely financial factors. To that end, company duplicators should be held personally liable to debts of the duplicated companies and be pursued with criminal sanctions only selectively, as explained in the paper. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation

This paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information, where the creditor cannot credibly commit to liquidate the firm if the default occurs. In our setting we consider a bankruptcy law to be a one-dimensional variable that influences creditor's expectation value of collateral. We find that there is an interval of the bankruptcy law, where the number of liquidations decreases in the toughness of the bankruptcy law. We also find that if the liquidation costs are high, softer bankruptcy law is preferred.     

Small Business Financial Distress and the “Phoenix Syndrome”—A Re‐evaluation

In a typical “phoenix syndrome” scenario, a small business entrepreneur who controls the financially distressed Company A registers Company B, to which the assets of Company A are transferred in what appears to be fraudulent conveyance. Company B serves as a vehicle through which the business is kept running, without the pressures of the business creditors. If necessary, the entrepreneur will also register Company C and repeat the process. The law usually considers the execution of a “phoenix syndrome” scheme (“phoenixizing”) to be fraud against Company A's unaware creditors. Two major problems undermine, however, the efficient regulation of “phoenix syndrome” schemes. First, although criminal sanctions are available, “phoenixizing” entrepreneurs are not regularly prosecuted and are usually only subject to monetary sanctions (e.g., personal civil liability to creditors). Because defrauders tend to be judgment proof, the result is sub‐optimal deterrence. Second, lawmakers have not considered a more sympathetic explanation to account for the “phoenix syndrome” phenomenon: an entrepreneur resorting to a “phoenix syndrome” scheme might actually be arranging for a last‐resort “home‐made” bankruptcy proceeding, that is, the entrepreneur might be mimicking the role of a formal bankruptcy stay on unsecured creditors' collection efforts, against the background of a cost prohibitive formal bankruptcy proceeding. Put simply, the “phoenix syndrome” scheme is, occasionally, “a poor man's” bankruptcy proceeding. Deterring a “phoenixizing” entrepreneur attempting to rescue a viable business is, of course, unwarranted, as the result is viable businesses being lost. These two problems of under‐deterrence and over‐deterrence mandate a re‐evaluation of the manner in which “phoenix syndrome” schemes are regulated. Obviously, the main question concerns implementation: How can “good” entrepreneurs, attempting to rescue a viable business, be separated from “bad” ones, who attempt to defraud or to rescue a non‐viable business? The paper discusses and evaluates several solutions. Copyright © 2012 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wealth distribution in Chinese bankruptcy reorganization law and practice

Wealth distribution provisions in bankruptcy reorganization law, which regulate the distribution of the debtor's overall value among all the interested parties with an aim of ensuring a fair and equitable distribution, constitute an important part of the bankruptcy reorganization law. This article first examines the wealth distribution provisions contained in Chinese bankruptcy reorganization law from a Sino‐US perspective and then explores the wealth distribution in Chinese bankruptcy reorganization practice through an empirical study of 18 bankruptcy reorganization cases of listed corporations in China. After an analysis of Chinese legal provisions on wealth distribution and their application in practice, this article draws the conclusion that wealth distribution in Chinese bankruptcy reorganization practice is far from being fair and equitable, which may cause abused use of the reorganization proceeding and distort the operation of the bargaining mechanism. Reform suggestions for Chinese bankruptcy reorganization law are proposed at the end. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.