A paradigm shift from production function to production copula: statistical description of production activity of firms

The heterogeneity of economic agents is emphasized in a new trend in macroeconomics. Accordingly, the new emerging discipline requires one to replace the production function, one of the key ideas in conventional economics, by an alternative that can take explicit account of the distribution of firms' production activities. In this paper we propose a new idea referred to as a production copula; a copula is an analytic means for modeling the dependence among variables. Such a production copula predicts the value added by firms with given capital and labor in a probabilistic way. It is thereby in sharp contrast to the production function, where the output of firms is completely deterministic. We demonstrate the empirical construction of a production copula using financial data of listed Japanese firms. Analysis of the data shows that there are significant correlations among capital, labor and value added, and confirms that the values added are too widely scattered to be represented by a production function. We employ four models for the production copula, that is trivariate versions of Frank, Gumbel and survival Clayton and non-exchangeable trivariate Gumbel. The latter was found to be the best.     

A MULTIPERIOD MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The continuing interest in the capital structure issue among financial researchers is evidenced by the stream of capital structure models that have appeared in the literature. Much of this research has used a risk-neutral and/or a single-period framework. In this paper, we develop a capital structure model for multiperiod firms and allow for the firm's cash flows to grow over time, for the firm to issue new debt, and for two types of bankruptcy costs to occur. The types of bankruptcy costs that occur are determined by the firm's uncertain operating cash flows and negotiations between the firm and creditors. Risk is priced via the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model. Multiperiod risk-priced models, we argue, realistically represent actual firms and are thus an important step toward the development of more testable and usable models of capital structure. We execute a demonstration example in which the value of the levered firm achieves a maximum and discuss the steps the firm would take to maximize shareholder wealth within this example. The example illustrates that the value of the firm passes through an interior optimum as the promised debt payment is increased. A simulation of the effect of changes in firm-specific parameters shows that the model exhibits expected and appealing relationships between these parameters and the value of the levered firm.     

Political connections and the cost of equity capital

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.     

Equity market valuation of human capital and stock returns

We investigate whether and how well firms’ stock market valuations reflect their employees’ collective skills and effectiveness relative to that of their industry peers and competitors. We devise a relative stock market valuation measure of human capital intangibles (EVHC) and find that portfolios of low EVHC firms systematically outperform portfolios of high EVHC firms by an average 1.34% per month. However, this is primarily a small firms effect, because for large firms the excess returns of the arbitrage portfolio that is long on the low EVHC stocks and short on the high EVHC stocks is zero. Our results suggest that reliance on human capital intangibles may proxy for risk not fully accounted for by conventional asset pricing models, or alternatively, that the market cannot correctly price human capital intangibles for small size firms.     

Fixed costs and long-lived investments

Fixed costs models are difficult to analyze because they feature non-degenerate, time-varying distributions of capital across firms. If investments are sufficiently long-lived however then the cross-sectional distribution of capital holdings has virtually no bearing on the equilibrium and the aggregate behavior of fixed-cost models is essentially identical to neoclassical models. The findings are due to a near infinite elasticity of investment timing for long-lived investments – a feature shared by fixed-cost models and neoclassical models. “Irrelevance results” found in numerical studies of fixed-cost models are not parametric special cases but instead are fundamental properties of models with long-lived investment goods.     

Institutions and Capital Structure: The Case of Chinese Property Firms

Different institutional features have been found to affect capital structure decisions, but their connections to corporate finance theories are not always clear. This study aims to assess the predictive power of the agency and pecking order theories in two distinct information environments. The strategy is to compare two similar groups of property firms listed on the Mainland and Hong Kong stock exchanges respectively. Both groups operate in the Mainland property market and are subject to the same tax code, but the degrees of transparency and integrity of the stock markets are weaker for the Mainland-listed firms. We find that factors related to agency conflicts and information asymmetries exert a stronger influence on the capital structure decisions of Mainland-listed firms than on those of the Hong Kong-listed firms. This is confirmed by a test of the agency theory using such corporate governance factors as managerial shareholding and shareholding concentration and by a test of the pecking order theory using an error correction model. A further test on the increments of R-squared in the regression models shows that variables derived from the two theories better explain the variations of the capital structure of Mainland-listed firms than those of Hong Kong-listed firms.     

Inward FDI and Financial Constraints in Central and East European Countries

This study examines whether domestically owned firms in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) confronted higher financial constraints in their investments than did foreign-owned enterprises, and whether the domestic enterprises' financial constraints were caused by incoming foreign direct investment (FDI). In theory, foreign investment may be needed to bring in capital only initially; the subsequent investment can be financed locally. On the other hand, foreign-owned companies may be more attractive borrowers, crowding out domestic firms from imperfect host-country capital markets. Both hypotheses, however, are rejected, as the results are not consistent across different dependent variables and verification methods. There is some evidence that FDI reduced foreign subsidiaries' constraints without increasing the constraints suffered by the domestic enterprises. Tests are performed with regressions based on two alternative firm-level models, a direct one using perception-based assessment of the constraints, and an indirect one with financial indicators.     

Investment,leverage and political risk: Evidence from project-level FDI

Does capital structure influence firms' FDI capital expenditure decisions into countries with varying degrees of political risk? We explore this question using a novel dataset that matches 10,000 unique outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) projects with 1135 distinct U.S. firms over the period 2003–2014. We find that capital expenditures allocated to FDI projects are significantly lower for highly leveraged firms, in particular for firms with low growth opportunities. Firms also commit lower capital amounts to investments located in countries characterized by higher political risk. Furthermore, leverage and political risk interact with one another in determining the financial commitment of the FDI, with leverage exerting a significantly stronger negative effect on capital expenditures in countries where political risk is elevated. Our findings are consistent with the monitoring role of debt in curbing exposure to political risk in multinational firms' foreign operations, and corroborate the disciplinary role of leverage on firms' investment decisions.     

Information asymmetry,information dissemination and the effect of regulation FD on the cost of capital

This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital.     

Capital structure decisions: old issues,new insights from high-tech small- and medium-sized enterprises

Using panel data models and this study analyses the capital structure decisions of high-tech small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and non-high-tech SMEs. The results suggest that the capital structure decisions of high-tech SMEs are closer to what is predicted by the Pecking Order Theory. However, the results also suggest a modified version of the Pecking Order Theory for high-tech SMEs that have relied on venture capital. These firms prefer equity issues to debt, when internal finance is exhausted. The empirical evidence suggests that problems relating to information asymmetry as well as technological and market uncertainty influence the capital structure decisions of high-tech SMEs.     

Macroeconomic conditions and capital structure adjustment speed

Using two dynamic partial adjustment capital structure models to estimate the impact of several macroeconomic factors on the speed of capital structure adjustment toward target leverage, we find evidence that firms adjust their leverage toward target faster in good macroeconomic states relative to bad states. This evidence holds whether or not firms are subject to financial constraints. Our results are robust to an alternative method of calculating states and to omitting zero-debt boundary firms and are not driven by firm size, deviation from target, or leverage definitions.     

Venture Capital Networks in Southeast Asia: Network characteristics and cohesive subgroups

Venture capital firms (VC) have encountered with uncertainty and risk of asymmetric information due to an investment in early-to-growth stage start-ups with technological base and high growth potential. Venture capital syndication network helps reduce a broad gap of information asymmetry in a venture capital investment. Moreover, network connections are found to be the success factor for venture capitalists under a lack of fully developed institutional environment in emerging market. Venture capital industry in Southeast Asia is nascent yet in demanding and fast growing. Despite a decline in the number of venture deals in the US, the deals keep surging in Southeast Asia (SEA), one of the most significant and dynamic propellers of the world economy. To develop the entrepreneurial ecosystem in SEA, it is interesting to examine how VC firms are connected to one another. Even though several literatures found some distinctive network characteristics amidst the US, European and Chinese venture capital market, the Southeast Asian has left unattended. In this paper, we initiate the network of venture capital firms among Southeast Asian nations and explore their relationships through social network analysis. The purposes of this study are to investigate the topological and statistical properties of VC network consisting of small-world behavior, power law distribution, and centrality measure such as degree, closeness, and betweenness. In addition, we classify various levels of connections into subnetworks and examine influential groups of VCs in Southeast Asia.We initiate an empirical study on the characteristics of VC network across different countries in Southeast Asia by using a unique hand-collected dataset of syndicated deals. Social network analysis has initially and preliminarily been applied to the VC network in this region. This paper contributes to VC network literature in providing a unique network structure and network metrics of venture capital in SEA. In managerial contribution, this study provides more structural VC cooperation towards VC syndication networks. This benefits to venture capital firms who are looking for potential partners in Southeast Asian region and start-up companies who are looking for funding with high-networked or influencial VCs. The results also confirm previous evidence of significance on VC networks in emerging market, even if the institution and regulation are claimed to fall behind that in the developed market. This research introduces the fact that the venture capital network in Southeast Asia has small-world pattern and Singapore acts as a hub of venture capital market in the region. Top-ranking VC firms have been listed by network centrality across nations, while multi-company syndications are prevailing in Southeast Asia.     

Capital Allocation in Financial Firms

This paper develops a theory of capital allocation in financial intermediaries where the cost of "risk capital" is a critical consideration. The implication for capital budgeting is that financial firms should use a modified NPV rule in which projects are valued by calculating the NPV of cash flows using marketdetermined discount rates and then subtracting a deadweight cost of capital that reflects the project's marginal contribution to firm-wide risk.
By taking account of deadweight costs—mainly monitoring and moral hazard costs associated with having too little equity capital as well as "free cash flow" agency costs and higher taxes associated with having too much—the capital allocation model predicts that financial firms will diversify across businesses with similar deadweight costs. Such diversification reduces the cost of risk capital for the individual businesses, thereby creating more profitable investment opportunities at the margin and enabling the businesses to operate on a larger scale. The authors note that their model has similarities to but also important differences from the standard applications of RAROC models.     

Foreign competition and acquisitions

I provide evidence on the impact of foreign competition on firms' propensities to engage in mergers and acquisitions. Using import tariff reductions as exogenous shocks that increase foreign competition, I find that affected firms are more likely to make acquisitions following tariff reductions. Cross-sectional tests show that this association is more pronounced for single segment firms, capital intensive firms, firms with higher profit margins, and firms with better growth opportunities, which suggests that this association is stronger for firms that are affected by increased competition to a greater extent and firms that stand to gain more from acquisitions when faced with increased competition. Moreover, the positive relation between acquisition propensities and tariff cuts is more pronounced for financially unconstrained firms and during times of high capital liquidity, which implies that it is easier for firms with greater access to capital to respond to increases in foreign competition by making acquisitions. Finally, I find some evidence that the acquisitions made in response to tariff decreases are associated with better firm profitability ratios in the following year, indicating that firms respond to increased competition by making acquisitions to improve their operational efficiency.     

The deregulation of capital markets in France

This paper investigates how the deregulation of French capital markets affected corporate investment in the 1980s. Access to public financial markets may be less important in countries that have traditionally relied on institutional investors to finance their corporate investment projects. This should be true for France where, contrary to the US, banks and government agencies have always been involved in firms’ long term activities. In this study, French firms are categorized based on their ownership structure and trading characteristics. Two investment models are augmented with measures of corporate liquidity in order to test the role of internal funds on investment. Empirical results show that only small French firms trading on the secondary stock market have to rely on liquid assets to finance their capital expenditures. French firms with strong bank ties avoid this constraint since they are allowed to maintain higher debt levels.     

Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets

We analyze the relationship between conglomerates’ internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in winner-picking (Stein, 1997 [Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources. Journal of Finance 52, 111–133]) find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy have higher-productivity projects that are in need of additional capital. This bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets, because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital. We also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development. In such countries, a high degree of conglomeration, generated, for example, by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups, could decrease the efficiency of the capital market. Our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms because of a lack of finance.     

Determinants of corporate cash holdings: Evidence from spin-offs

We study the factors that influence the cash allocation decision around a spin-off, using variables suggested by the trade-off theory, and controlling for the possible endogeneity of leverage and cash ratios. Spin-offs provide an opportunity to examine the determinants of cash allocation at the margin at the time of creation of a new entity. Our results indicate that managers allocate higher cash ratios to smaller firms, and firms with high research and development expense ratio, low net working capital ratio, and low leverage. Thus, higher cash ratios are correlated with difficulty of raising external capital and reduced availability of cash from internal sources. In addition, managers also base the cash allocation on observable immediate growth opportunities instead of on long-term possible growth. An analysis of excess cash ratios, defined as the difference between the actual and predicted cash ratios, indicate that firms are, on average, allocated less cash than suggested by trade-off models, and this deviation in allocated cash from predicted levels is explained only by concurrent profitability of the firms (a pecking order theory implication).     

Estimating the frequency of price re-optimization in Calvo-style models

This paper assesses the empirical performance Calvo style models of price re-optimization. We first show that versions of these models in which firms update non-re-optimized prices to lagged inflation account well for the statistical behavior of post-war U.S. inflation rates. We then investigate whether these models imply plausible degrees of inertia in price setting behavior by firms. They do, but only if we depart from two standard auxiliary assumptions: monopolistically competitive firms face a constant elasticity of demand, and capital is homogeneous and can be instantaneously reallocated after a shock. We develop a version of the model in which these assumptions are relaxed and show that it is consistent with the view that firms re-optimize prices, on average, once every two quarters.     

Capital structure with risky foreign investment

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.     

Human capital investment,new firm creation and venture capital

This paper studies the relation between firm investment in general human capital, new firm creation and financial development for new firm financing, such as the existence of a venture capital industry. On one hand, firm investment in general human capital leads employees to generate new innovative ideas for starting their own firm. Since employees need a venture capitalist to start their new firm, firm investment in general human capital encourages the creation of venture capitalists by increasing the need for their services, such as providing advice and monitoring. On the other hand, as new firm financing becomes available, firms’ willingness to invest in general human capital increases, and as a by-product, the creation of employee-founded and venture capital-backed new firms increases in the economy. Hence, our model provides a rational explanation for the emergence of new firms created by employees of established firms, which represents one of the most common type of new firms in many industries.