De facto power in a transition economy: The case of China

That firms actively influence public policy to advance private interests is taken for granted in most economies. In China, the activism of public actors in shaping private interests suggests that the public rather than private sector is more influential to the political economy. In this paper, we test the extent to which this is true in among Chinese provinces. We conduct a cluster quasi-experiment using the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. We find that the declining involvement of public actors in economic decisions during the campaign did not result into lower productivity in provinces with higher private sector participation, especially in unregulated industries and those not dominated by state-owned enterprises. De facto political power from 30-years of private wealth accumulation may have helped establish market-driven norms of economic behavior, strengthening the political economy against the vicissitudes of public actors.     

Development of accounting regulation in Jordan

This study examines the development of accounting regulation in Jordan with emphasis on the dominant environmental factors that influence it. In order to have a better understanding of Jordan's present accounting practices, and its future development tendencies, we examine the path of accounting in Jordan since the early days of the nineteenth century, and analyze how Jordan's accounting environment — political, economic, legal and cultural — influenced the development of accounting in Jordan. We also examine Jordan's recent move towards full adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and find that Jordan's colonial past has exerted a strong influence. In addition, we conclude that political and economic factors, through privatization and the resulting accounting reforms, contributed more to the development of accounting practices than other environmental factors. Privatization led to reforming Jordan's disclosure regulation and laying down of the corporate-governance policy framework. Our conclusions could be of interest to other countries, particularly developing countries, who want to improve the quality of their accounting disclosures and practices.     

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.     

Does Tax Evasion Affect Economic Crime?*

This paper examines the effect of tax evasion on criminal activities in Italy. Specifically, we consider three types of crime that are related to economic determinants: property crimes (including robbery, theft and car theft), fraud and usury. We estimate different econometric models using annual data from the Italian provinces (NUTS-3 level) for the 2004–12 period. We find that tax evasion positively affects economic crimes, and our results suggest that tax evasion is an incentive to engage in criminal activities, in addition to more standard determinants that we include in the analysis, such as labour market opportunities and deterrence. Moreover, these crimes demonstrate different levels of persistence over time and reflect different adjustment costs.     

借鉴美欧经验思考中国的反倾销法

通过比对研究发现，美国、欧盟反倾销法在“非市场经济国家出口产品正常价值的确定”、“公共利益的考虑”、“对出口商替进口商交纳反倾销税的作弊行为的制裁”、“反规避的措施”和“承诺”问题上存在微妙差异，而这几个问题在我国反倾销法中或未涉及，或阐述较为粗略。研究这些差异。将有助于完善我国反倾销法以及更好地应对美国、欧盟反倾销调查。     

Egalitarianism and international investment

This study identifies how country differences on a key cultural dimension—egalitarianism—influence international investment flows. A society's cultural orientation toward egalitarianism is manifested by intolerance for abuses of market and political power and a desire for protecting less powerful actors. We show egalitarianism to be based on exogenous factors including social fractionalization, dominant religion circa 1900, and war experience from the 19th century. We find a robust influence of egalitarianism distance on cross-national flows of bond and equity issuances, syndicated loans, and mergers and acquisitions. An informal cultural institution largely determined a century or more ago, egalitarianism exercises its effect on international investment via an associated set of consistent contemporary policy choices. But even after controlling for these associated policy choices, egalitarianism continues to exercise a direct effect on cross-border investment flows, likely through its direct influence on managers' daily business conduct.     

Hail to the chief: The effect of political alignment with the presidency on corporate investment

We examine the effect of political alignment between the CEO and the US president on corporate investment. We find that when the CEO is from the same party as the President that the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on corporate investment are significantly reduced or eliminated. We arrive at this result after having controlled for investment opportunities, economic uncertainty, and political alignment with Congress. We also find that the political alignment between the CEO and the President has a greater effect on corporate investment for firms in industries with significant exposure to government spending. Our results go to confirm the effects of a country's politics and the occupier of the White House on CEOs’ business and economic outlooks. The results also point out that the effect of the behavioral traits of executives changes depending on the external environment.     

Contextualizing the Process of Accounting Regulation: A Study of Nineteenth-Century British Friendly Societies

Friendly societies date from the seventeenth century and have been the subject of statutory recognition and regulation since 1793. These societies developed rapidly in the nineteenth century as a mechanism of self-help for the emerging industrial working class. This article embraces an historical examination of the social, economic and political contexts within which a discourse on the issue of their regulation took place and reveals the ideologies underpinning the disciplinary framework that was constructed. Ideas of the philosophical radicals were influential in making friendly societies the subject of closer regulation. This development came at a time when laissez-faire as a guide to government action gave ground to the acceptance of the need for state control in the endeavour to enhance the common good. The concepts of paternalism and financial safety are found to have influenced the decision to regulate friendly societies, and the disciplinary framework constructed is located within the range of provisions applying to organizational entities operating in nineteenth-century Britain.     

Bank-based and market-based financial systems: Time-series evidence

In this paper, we reexamine the relative merits of bank-based and market-based financial systems in promoting long-run economic growth, which has been debated since the 19th century. We find that in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, the stock market played an important role in financing economic growth, whereas the banking sector played a more important role in Germany, France, and Korea. A more detailed subsample analysis shows that for all countries, the banking sector played an important role in the early years of economic growth. Regarding the causal relation between financial systems and economic growth, except for Korea, all countries show that the financial system leads economic growth. A further analysis shows that the banking sector and the stock market in each country were complementary to each other in each country in the process of economic growth except for the U.S., where the two sectors were mildly substitutable.     

Organising the profession: A theoretical and historical examination of the development of the major accountancy bodies in the U.K.

The paper is concerned with the organisation of the accountancy profession in the U.K. In the first part a theoretical framework for understanding the emergence, development and role of accountancy bodies is advanced. By including a consideration of professionalisation as well as an examination of the institutions of the market and the state, this framework provides a perspective for understanding professional associations as political bodies developed to defend the interests and preserve the scarcity of their members' labour. In the second part of the paper the history of the professional bodies is traced, focusing upon competition between the major associations as well as the economic and political contexts of their emergence, merger and failed integration. In conclusion, some speculations upon the future prospects of these bodies are entertained.     

Political uncertainty and firms' information environment: Evidence from China

How political uncertainty affects the supply of value relevant information about a firm is an important but unresolved question. Using an emerging market setting where political leaders are expected to exert significant influence on economic activities, we examine the effect of political uncertainty caused by turnovers of local government leaders on a firm’s information environment. We find that during periods of political uncertainty, the total amount of idiosyncratic information about a firm that is available to the market is reduced. The adverse effect on information supply is manifest in firms that are more politically dependent and stronger when uncertainty is more severe. Further, we provide evidence suggesting that firms react to political uncertainty by reducing the amount and the quality of information provided to investors. We find that information intermediaries such as financial analysts and the media have a moderating effect on the information environment as they increase the production of information during periods of political uncertainty. However, these intermediaries do not negate the net loss of information.     

Right‐to‐Work Laws and Financial Leverage

High leverage can be used to improve a firm's bargaining position with unions. I find that this use of leverage in the United States is concentrated in states without right‐to‐work (RTW) laws. The use of high leverage by unionized firms in these states is associated with high market‐to‐book ratios and is more likely when shareholder and manager interests are aligned through compensation contracts. I confirm these findings by examining the adoption of RTW laws in Oklahoma, as well as presidential and congressional elections. Moreover, I confirm the importance of RTW laws using cash balances instead of leverage.     

Criticisms of capitalism,budgeting and the double enrolment: Budgetary control rhetoric and social reform in France in the 1930s and 1950s

This article is a contribution to the study of the spread of management innovations, methods and rhetorics. It particularly concerns the influence of ideological and political factors, which have so far mostly escaped in-depth study. In particular, we seek to understand to what extent a critique of society developed by social reformers can be a source of inspiration for managers, leading them to change their practices and experiment with new devices. Relying on the framework of historical change in management practices developed by Boltanski and Chiapello [Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, E. (2005). The new spirit of capitalism. London: Verso (Translation of Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Paris: Gallimard, 1999)], we study the specific development of budgetary control in France, examined in the light of the general political and economic history of the 20th century. This framework simultaneously encompasses the dissemination of a new accounting practice, the transformation of capitalist institutions and mo des of regulation in a given period and country, and the programmatic discourses [Miller, P., & Rose, N. (1990). Governing economic life. Economy and Society, 19(1), 1–31] associated with the historical move.     

Political uncertainty and risk premia

We develop a general equilibrium model of government policy choice in which stock prices respond to political news. The model implies that political uncertainty commands a risk premium whose magnitude is larger in weaker economic conditions. Political uncertainty reduces the value of the implicit put protection that the government provides to the market. It also makes stocks more volatile and more correlated, especially when the economy is weak. We find empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.     

Stock return predictability and the adaptive markets hypothesis: Evidence from century-long U.S. data

This paper provides strong evidence of time-varying return predictability of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index from 1900 to 2009. Return predictability is found to be driven by changing market conditions, consistent with the implication of the adaptive markets hypothesis. During market crashes, no statistically significant return predictability is observed, but return predictability is associated with a high degree of uncertainty. In times of economic or political crises, stock returns have been highly predictable with a moderate degree of uncertainty in predictability. We find that return predictability has been smaller during economic bubbles than in normal times. We also find evidence that return predictability is associated with stock market volatility and economic fundamentals.     

The Origins of the German Corporation - Finance, Ownership and Control

The ownership of German corporations is quite different today from that of Anglo-American firms. How did this come about? To what extent is it attributable to regulation? A specially constructed data set on financing and ownership of German corporations from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century reveals that, as in the UK, there was a high degree of activity on German stock markets with firms issuing equity in preference to borrowing from banks, and insider and family ownership declining rapidly. However, unlike in the UK, other companies and banks emerged as the main holders of equity, with banks holding shares primarily as custodians of other investors rather than on their own account. The changing pattern of ownership concentration was therefore very different from that of the UK with regulation reinforcing the control that banks exercised on behalf of other investors.     

Postnormal network futures: A rejoinder to Ziauddin Sardar

Sardar's “Welcome to Postnormal Times” describes the chaotic, contradictory and uncertain climate today, and analyses the failure of progress, modernisation or efficiency to provide ethical, political or even trustworthy economic solutions to the instability of the present. Missing in his analysis is the role of knowledge, especially as it is migrating from individuals to technical networks. This paper argues that recent developments in the networking of knowledge point towards a new constellation in which networks are emerging as major powers alongside the nation and the market, the two pillars of global political economy in the 20th and early 21st century. It responds to Sardar's challenge to imagine the future by imagining the political consequences of recognising non-human agencies as political actors.     

Political patronage and analysts’ forecast precision

We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision.     

政绩诉求、政府控制与边际社会性支出——基于地方国有上市公司的研究

本文实证检验了政绩诉求——政府控制——边际社会性支出这样一条政府干预国有企业所产生经济后果的传导机制。研究发现:当地方政府在面临财政收入不足、国有经济面临的就业压力更大和经济增长缓慢时,地方政府往往会加大对国有企业的控制程度。尤其在面临就业压力时,会倾向于加强对员工规模大的企业的控制。随着地方政府对国有企业控制程度的加强,会导致国有企业发生更多的边际社会性支出,如非效率投资和冗员等。