Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.     

Transfer Pricing, Incentive Compensation and Tax Avoidance in a Multi-Division Firm

This article examines the relation between transfer pricing and production incentives using a model of a vertically integrated firm with divisions located in different tax jurisdictions. We show that if divisional profits are taxed at the same marginal rate, the transfer price should be set to minimize the compensation risk faced by the manager of the buying division. For the case where divisional profits are taxed at different marginal rates, we are able to characterize the trade-off between the tax savings from setting transfer prices to reduce profitability in the high tax jurisdication and the loss of effort attributable to the impact of tax avoidance on the incentive compensation system. Further, we show that if it is feasible to compensate the division managers using multiple performance measures, the transfer price should be used to minimize the firm's overall tax liability. Finally, we show that when authority to determine the transfer price must be delegated to one of the division managers, it is optimal to assign responsibility for setting the transfer price to the manager of the division with the most production uncertainty.     

Transfer Pricing and the Control of Internal Corporate Transactions

One potential weakness of all divisional profitability schemes is their inability to capture synergies among business units. One way of managing this problem is to design a transfer pricing scheme that attempts to assign common costs and benefits to different business units. What makes transfer pricing both so interesting, and such a challenge, is that the solution involves finding a way to encourage divisional managers whose pay is likely to depend on such transfer prices to reveal their private or unbiased information about the firm's costs in a way that serves the interest of the rest of the firm. With that end in view, the authors provide a general analytical framework for setting transfer prices and go on to discuss the costs and benefits of each of the most common transfer‐pricing methods: (1) market pricing; (2) marginal cost pricing; (3) full‐cost pricing; and (4) negotiated prices.     

Information technology,organizational design,and transfer pricing

We show how information technology affects transfer pricing. With coarse information technology, negotiated transfer pricing has an informational advantage: managers agree to prices that approximate the firm's cost of internal trade more precisely than cost-based transfer prices. With sufficiently rapid offers, this advantage outweighs opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining time, and negotiated transfer pricing generates higher profits than the cost-based method. However, as information technology improves, the informational advantage diminishes; the opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining eventually dominate, and cost-based methods generate higher profits. Our results explain why firms generally prefer cost-based methods, and when negotiated methods are preferable.     

Timing of Sale,Pricing, and Cost Information: Evidence from the Airline Industry*

This study examines the association between when an airline sells its passenger seats and the pricing method (marginal cost or full cost) it employs. Prior literature suggests that when firms are able to change prices during the selling period, the optimality of full cost pricing or marginal cost pricing depends on when demand information is revealed during the period between capacity commitment decisions and time of sale. Full cost‐based pricing is appropriate in determining capacity commitment and prices simultaneously, while marginal cost provides more relevant information for pricing when capacity has been committed. Using the price and cost data from a sample of four U.S. domestic airlines, we find that full cost explains price variations of first‐day sales robustly. The adjusted R² of the marginal cost pricing model is larger in the sample of sales two days prior to departure than in the sample of first‐day sales. In the analysis of the sample of sales two days prior to departure, we find that, based on the adjusted R² of the full cost pricing and marginal cost pricing models, the explanatory power of marginal cost pricing is relatively weaker than full cost pricing. Our results document the use of different cost information along the dynamic change of price and provide implications in understanding the role of cost information in setting prices.     

Trade openness and inflation: The role of real and nominal price rigidities

The paper revisits the long-standing question of the impact of trade openness on the inflation–output trade-off by accounting for the effects of product market competition on price flexibility. The study develops a New-Keynesian open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with non-constant price elasticity of demand and Calvo price setting in which the frequency of price adjustment is endogenously determined. It demonstrates that trade openness has two opposing effects on the sensitivity of inflation to output fluctuations. On the one hand, it raises strategic complementarity in firms' pricing decisions and the degree of real price rigidities, which makes inflation less responsive to changes in real marginal cost. On the other hand, it strengthens firms' incentives to adjust their prices, thereby reducing the degree of nominal price rigidities and increasing the sensitivity of inflation to changes in marginal cost. The study explains the positive relationship between competition and the frequency of price adjustment observed in the data. It also provides new insights into the effects of global economic integration on the Phillips Curve.     

Market pricing of executive stock options and implied risk preferences

When managers get to trade in options received as compensation, their trading prices reveal several aspects of subjective option pricing and risk preferences. Two subjective pricing models are fitted to show that executive stock option prices incorporate a subjective discount. It depends positively on implied volatility and negatively on option moneyness. Further, risk preferences are estimated using the semiparametric model of Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000). The results suggest that relative risk aversion is just above 1 for a certain stock price range. This level of risk aversion is low but reasonable, and it may be explained by the typical manager being wealthy and having low marginal utility. Related to risk aversion, it is found that marginal rate of substitution increases considerably in states with low stock prices.     

Aggressive leaders

I characterize the incentives to undertake strategic investments in markets with Nash competition and endogenous entry. Contrary to the case with an exogenous number of firms, when the investment increases marginal profitability, only a “top dog” strategy is optimal. For instance, under both quantity and price competition, a market leader overinvests in cost reductions and overproduces complement products. The purpose of the strategic investment is to allow the firm to be more aggressive in the market and to reduce its price below those of other firms. Contrary to the post‐Chicago approach, this shows that aggressive pricing strategies are not necessarily associated with exclusionary purposes.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets

There is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets: there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous. Also, despite the large number of firms in the market, prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise as more firms enter. In a non-cooperative oligopoly pricing model, I show that these anomalies arise when firms add complexity to their price structures. Complexity increases the market power of the firms because it prevents some consumers from becoming knowledgeable about prices in the market. In the model, as competition increases, firms tend to add more complexity to their prices as a best response, rather than make their disclosures more transparent. Because this may substantially decrease consumer surplus in these markets, such practices have important welfare implications.     

External and Internal Pricing in Multidivisional Firms

Multidivisional firms frequently rely on external market prices in order to value internal transactions across profit centers. This paper examines market‐based transfer pricing when an upstream division has monopoly power in selling a proprietary component both to a downstream division within the same firm and to external customers. When internal transfers are valued at the prevailing market price, the resulting transactions are distorted by double marginalization. The imposition of intracompany discounts will always improve overall firm profits provided the supplying division is capacity constrained. Under certain conditions it is then possible to design discount rules so that the resulting prices and sales quantities are efficient from the corporate perspective. In contrast, the impact of intracompany discounts remains ambiguous when the capacity of the selling division is essentially unlimited. It is then generally impossible to achieve fully efficient outcomes by means of market‐based transfer pricing unless the external market for the component is sufficiently large relative to the internal market.     

Trading and Manipulation Around Seasoned Equity Offerings

We investigate the potential for manipulation due to the interaction between secondary market trading prior to a seasoned equity offering (SO) and the pricing of the offering. Informed traders acting strategically may attempt to manipulate offering prices by selling shares prior to the SO, and profit subsequently from lower prices in the offering. The model predicts increased selling prior to a SO, leading to increases in the market maker's inventory and temporary price decreases. Further, since manipulation conceals information, the ratio of temporary to permanent components of the price movements is predicted to increase.     

Production and hedging implications of executive compensation schemes

This paper connects executive compensation with hedging and analyzes a crucial shareholders and managers agency source that evolves from the pricing of the hedging device. The shareholders are risk-neutral, while the risk-averse manager hedges the price risk of the manufactured quantity, and his compensation package includes equity-linked compensation-stock grants. Only when the hedging instrument's pricing includes a risk premium, hedging is costly to the shareholders, while it is costless to the manager. Then from the owners' point of view, we observe managerial over-hedging, increasing in the equity-linked compensation level. This result leads to a violation of the classical production and hedging separation theorem. We conclude that, in the case where the hedging device's pricing bears a risk premium, shareholders can regulate the corporate value diversion to managers through diminishing the managerial equity-linked compensation scheme or by putting restrictions on the extent of hedging activities of executives.     

Nonlinear Pricing and the Market for Settling Payments

Fedwire Funds is a real‐time gross settlement system that uses a decreasing block pricing scheme to attract nonurgent payments. A bank's optimal response to Fedwire's pricing depends on its perceived benefits to settling nonurgent payments quickly. If the urgency for immediate settlement is great enough, a bank responds to marginal price; otherwise, it responds to average price. We find banks respond to average price, suggesting that Fedwire's advantage over competing services of being able to provide immediate settlement is small. Moreover, attempts to increase demand for Fedwire services by lowering the cost of banks' final block of payments may be ineffective if there is not a corresponding decrease in average cost.     

Entry deterrence through credible commitment to transfer pricing at direct cost

This paper examines the choice between direct and absorption costing in a cost-based transfer pricing system for duopolistic firms competing with product market prices. Existing literature has shown that the adoption of an absorption costing system, which drives up the intrafirm transfer price, strategically dominates direct costing for the two firms, regardless of whether the transfer price is publicly observable, thereby constituting a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). However, we demonstrate that direct costing can strategically dominate absorption costing when one of the two firms is an incumbent, whereas the other is a potential entrant. Stated differently, the well-known result in the strategic cost allocation problem reverses if we consider entry threats. More specifically, we show that if the incumbent credibly commits to an observable transfer price, the upfront adoption of a direct costing system enables the incumbent to deter the entry of the potential rival in the SPNE. As a commitment device for the observable price, we consider the regulation of transfer prices that usually exists in oligopolistic network industries. We show that a regulator that pursues social welfare maximization approves direct costing but not absorption costing. Therefore, the firms and the regulator can share a mutual interest in the adoption of a direct costing system, a state thus sustained as the SPNE. This result yields managerial accounting implications for a divisionalized firm facing the threat of potential competitors entering the market in that the firm can use this accounting system to help monopolize the market.     

Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets

This paper examines the effectiveness of three transfer pricing methodologies for an intangible asset that is developed through bilateral, sequential investment. In general, a royalty-based transfer price that can be renegotiated provides better investment incentives than either a non-negotiable royalty-based transfer price or a purely negotiated transfer price, and in some cases induces first-best investment. This result contrasts with previous research that finds that the inability to limit renegotiation of initial contracts reduces investment efficiency. Further, I examine how tax transfer pricing rules inform optimal internal transfer prices when the firm decouples internal and external transfer prices.     

Managing price, gaining profit

The fastest and most effective way for a company to realize maximum profit is to get its pricing right. The right price can boost profit faster than increasing volume will; the wrong price can shrink it just as quickly. Yet many otherwise tough-minded managers miss out on significant profits because they shy away from pricing decisions for fear that they will alienate their customers. Worse, if management isn't controlling its pricing policies, there's a good chance that the company's clients are manipulating them to their own advantage. McKinsey & Company's Michael Marn and Robert Rosiello show managers how to gain control of the pricing puzzle and capture untapped profit potential by using two basic concepts: the pocket price waterfall and the pocket price band. The pocket price waterfall reveals how price erodes between a company's invoice figure and the actual amount paid by the customer--the transaction price. It tracks the volume purchase discounts, early payment bonuses, and frequent customer incentives that squeeze a company's profits. The pocket price band plots the range of pocket prices over which any given unit volume of a single product sells. Wide price bands are commonplace: some manufacturers' transaction prices for a given product range 60%; one fastener supplier's price band ranged up to 500%. Managers who study their pocket price waterfalls and bands can identify unnecessary discounting at the transaction level, low-performance accounts, and misplaced marketing efforts. The problems, once identified, are typically easy and inexpensive to remedy.     

Fair Value: Your Value or Mine? An Observation on the Ambiguity of the Fair Value Notion Illustrated by the Credit Crunch

Current International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) define fair value as a transaction price. In imperfect markets, buyer's and seller's marginal prices, at which they are rationally willing to transact, differ. The transaction price can be any amount within the range between those prices. However, scenarios are conceivable in which no such range exists because the seller's marginal price exceeds the buyer's. In this scenario, no arm's length transactions between knowledgeable, willing parties are possible. Such a scenario can be likely characterised by low liquidity and/or high information asymmetry and seems to be broadly consistent with what is recently referred to as the ‘credit crunch’. Under this scenario, the IFRS definition of fair value is not readily applicable. Two views are possible: under view 1, fair value refers to the potential buyer's marginal price. Although fair value does always exist conceptually, it negates the notion of two rationally acting parties. View 2 acknowledges that no arm's length transaction is possible, resulting in the fair value notion not being applicable. If these two views are applied to the IFRS definition of an active market, view 1 results in markets that are always active. Only view 2 allows distinguishing between active and inactive markets.     

Speed Splasher: an interactive,team-based target costing exercise

Target costing is an important strategic cost management topic. The competitive business environment requires firms to produce products with the quality and functionality demanded by customers while at the same time selling them for prices largely determined by the market. Conventional cost management and cost plus pricing strategies are not very effective in this new environment. The design-centered and market-driven focus of the target costing process and the inability of firms to trade off quality and functionality to achieve target costs, are concepts not always easy to demonstrate in an accounting exercise. To overcome this problem, the authors have developed an interactive, in-class, team-based target costing exercise. This problem involves students in the dynamic process required to bring a product to market that simultaneously meets customer requirements for quality, functionality, and price-cost, and the firm's target profit requirement. The authors describe and explain this exercise, and provide guidelines for conducting the exercise in class.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Labor Market Frictions: The Role of the Wage Channel

This paper introduces right‐to‐manage bargaining into a labor search model with sticky prices instead of standard efficient bargaining and examines the Ramsey‐optimal monetary policy. Without real wage rigidity, even when the steady state is inefficient, price stability is nearly optimal in response to technology or government shocks. Right‐to‐manage bargaining creates the wage channel to inflation, because there is a direct relationship between real wages and real marginal cost. In the presence of the wage channel, price markups consist of only real marginal cost, and real wages and hours per worker are determined such as in the Walrasian labor market.