会计准则变更与资产减值计提行为分析

本文以2007年1月1日开始实施的新会计准则为研究背景,分析资产减值准则对资产减值计提行为的影响。结果发现:减值前亏损的公司会以转回资产减值进行盈余管理来避免亏损,减值前亏损且无法以转回资产减值避免亏损的公司会以计提资产减值从事大洗澡行为,为下一年盈利做准备;新会计准则的实施并不能有效遏制上市公司的扭亏盈余管理行为,但能够遏制上市公司的大洗澡盈余管理行为。     

盈余管理与短期资产减值准备关系的实证研究

本文选取2009年—2012年我国A股的工业上市公司的数据,对上市公司盈余管理的动机与短期资产减值准备的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:微利公司、配股达线公司倾向于少计提短期资产减值准备以避免亏损,亏损公司倾向于多计提减值准备进行盈余大冲洗,高盈利公司则利用资产减值准备进行利润平滑,而对于当年扭亏的上市公司则不存在利用短期资产减值准备进行扭亏的动机。     

盈余管理与短期资产减值准备关系的实证研究

本文选取2009年—2012年我国A股的工业上市公司的数据,对上市公司盈余管理的动机与短期资产减值准备的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:微利公司、配股达线公司倾向于少计提短期资产减值准备以避免亏损,亏损公司倾向于多计提减值准备进行盈余大冲洗,高盈利公司则利用资产减值准备进行利润平滑,而对于当年扭亏的上市公司则不存在利用短期资产减值准备进行扭亏的动机。     

我国新资产减值准则实施效果的实证分析

研究结果表明:2006年新资产减值准则颁布的当年,我国上市公司中确实存在着大量转回以前年度已计提的长期资产减值准备的现象;新资产减值准则的颁布和实施抑制了上市公司利用长期资产减值准备为工具而进行的盈余管理行为。     

浅析新会计准则下资产减值准备对企业盈余管理的影响

在我国,利用资产减值准备的计提与转回调节利润是上市公司盈余管理的重要手段之一。但过度的盈余管理行为不仅会影响社会经济资源的有效配置．而且会误导投资人的投资决策．导致不同的利益集团受益或受损。财政部2006年2月15日发布的新准则中关于资产减值的规定与原有会计准则相比发生了很多变化。这对上市公司资产减值准备的计提与转回产生了巨大的影响．从而对利用资产减值进行的盈余管理行为产生一定的作用及影响。因此,研究新会计准则下资产减值准备对上市公司盈余管理的影响是相当必要的。     

基于资产减值的盈余管理与税务成本之间的关系研究

资产减值的计提与转回作为利润的“蓄水池”、历来是上市公司进行盈余管理的重要手段。本文以沪深两市2007—2009年3207家A股上市公司为研究样本，对企业利用减值准备进行盈余管理的现象进行研究。研究发现，随着公司计提（转回）的减值准备在利润总额中比例的提高，公司的所得税税负也将提高。     

新减值准则对上市公司计提减值行为的影响研究

2006年国家颁布了新资产减值准则,新准则禁止计提的减值转回,以此遏止上市公司盈余管理行为。本文以2003~2008年A股上市公司为样本,直接以减值准备为因变量,采用TOBIT模型方法对新减值准则颁布前后公司减值行为进行实证检验。研究发现:新准则的实施使上市公司减值准备的计提变得比较谨慎,计提的幅度变小;无论减值准备与经济动因的关系还是与报告动因的关系,在减值准则实施前后均有显著差异,一定程度上抑制了盈余管理行为。     

资产减值与盈余管理——基于长期资产减值转回的实证研究

2006年2月15日《企业会计准则第8号：资产减值》的颁布，作为我国会计准则与国际会计准则的实质性差异之一，长期资产减值能否转回问题又成为人们瞩目的焦点。本文试图利用实证研究论证我国上市公司确实有利于资产减值转回（尤其是长期资产减值转回）进行盈余管理的行为，旨在为《资产减值》准则的制定与实施提供一些经验数据。同时重点关注上市公司2006年对于以前年度计提的长期资产减值准备的处理方式，以观测新准则的发布和实施对于上市公司的影响程度，以及是否的确出现了部分学者预言的“最后的疯狂”——上市公司资产减值转回的“赶集”现象。     

新资产减值准备对ST上市公司盈余管理的影响

<正>引言随着经济环境的日益复杂和技术条件的不断变化,资产减值准备成为会计界关注的焦点之一。由于计提和转回资产减值准备存在模糊性和灵活性,能够满足不同类型公司的盈余管理动机,因此资产减值准备成为上市公司调节盈余的重要工具。     

资产减值与盈余操纵的博弈及对策

<正>资产减值准备的计提和转回一直是企业进行盈余操纵的重要手段,随着《企业会计准则第8号——资产减值》的颁布和实施,盈余操纵受到了一定遏制,但仍有许多企业利用资产减值政策来人为操纵盈余。本文以资产减值准则和盈余操纵的博弈关系为出发点进行研究,并对存在的问题提出了相应对策。     

资产减值:稳健性还是盈余管理

本文研究了我国上市公司资产减值的计提动机。很多研究已发现减值准备的两种计提动机:经济因素和盈余管理因素,但本文发现,稳健性因素也能影响资产减值准备的计提。在同样的毁损情况下,"坏消息"公司将比"好消息"公司计提更多的减值准备。此外,本文还发现,在利用减值准备进行利润操纵时,盈余管理动机的不同会影响减值类型的选择。扭亏和大清洗公司会采取各种类型减值准备进行盈余管理,而平滑和管理层变更公司只使用长期资产减值准备,而且是不影响营业利润的减值准备。     

Accounting Standards and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This article examines the effect of an asset impairment–related regulatory reform on earnings management in China. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8), which prohibits the reversal of long‐lived asset impairments, was promulgated to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long‐lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short‐term asset impairment losses. Based on a sample of China's A‐share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2008, we reveal that managers use less current asset write‐downs and more reversals in the post–CAS No. 8 period. However, such reporting practices do not appear to be influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses and/or for “big bath” accounting purposes.     

避免亏损与公开增发盈余管理的识别与估计:来自聚束设计的实证证据

基于2002-2017年中国A股上市公司披露的加权平均净资产收益率(ROE)数据,本文识别出上市公司在0%(避免亏损)和6%(公开增发股票)两个阈值处的盈余管理动机,并对盈余管理频率和幅度进行估计。首先,数据证实A股上市公司ROE分布图在阈值0%和6%处存在明显的左侧样本缺失、右侧样本聚集现象,表明公司确实为满足政策要求在阈值附近进行了盈余管理,将公司ROE从阈值左侧操纵至右侧。其次,本文用聚束设计方法估计出3.18%的上市公司为避免汇报亏损而进行盈余管理,占真实亏损公司的59.25%,进行盈余管理的公司将ROE平均提高了2.115个百分点。为了成功公开增发而进行盈余管理的上市公司比例虽然仅有0.28%,但占到了实际股票公开增发公司的58.13%,平均盈余管理幅度为0.524个百分点。最后,异质性分析表明:2016年以前上市公司为了避免亏损而进行盈余管理的动机一直很稳定,2002-2005年是为了满足公开增发条件而进行盈余管理最严重的年份;动机强烈的ST企业和杠杆率高的企业进行盈余管理的频率更高。     

中国亏损上市公司第四季度盈余管理的实证研究

本文对中国A股上市公司是否在第四季度进行盈余管理以避免当年亏损或下一年亏损进行了实证研究,发现上市公司的确会在第四季度进行盈余管理来实现当年扭亏为盈或者调低利润,为下一年扭亏做好准备。因此审计师与投资者对上市公司第四季度的财务数据应该高度关注,并提高对会计信息质量的鉴别能力。     

Deferred taxes,earnings management,and corporate governance: Malaysian evidence

This study examines whether Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) use deferred taxes to avoid an earnings decline. In addition, this study also examines whether corporate governance mechanisms attenuate the extent to which deferred taxes are used to manage earnings. Using a sample of 221 PLCs listed on the main and second boards of Bursa Malaysia in 2008 with a complete set of data available from 2005 to 2008, this study finds that Malaysian PLCs use both the accrual and valuation allowance components of net deferred tax liabilities to avoid a decline in earnings. The study also finds that ownership structure and board structure affect the extent to which earnings management is associated with a deferred tax component.     

Goodwill impairments and chief executive officer tenure

The purpose of this paper is to examine the tenure of the chief executive officers of publicly held companies and their corresponding goodwill impairment decisions. An opportunity for managers to manage earnings exists via the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) goodwill accounting rules. It is hypothesized that CEOs will recognize this impairment in the early years of their tenure because blame can be placed on prior management's acquisition decisions, expensing goodwill early will make future earnings look better, or an objective evaluation of the reporting unit increases impairments.     

Earnings versus capital ratios management: role of bank types and SFAS 114

We document in this paper that large banks use Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) more than small banks to manage reported earnings, but we find no significant difference in the use of LLP to manage capital ratios between large and small banks. Additionally, we document that banks with high risk asset portfolios use more LLP to manage reported earnings as well as capital ratios compared to the banks with low risk asset portfolios. Our findings also show that SFAS 114 has a moderating effect on the use of LLP to manage reported earnings, especially by large banks, but there is no conclusive evidence on the impact of SFAS 114 to manage capital ratios. Furthermore, the findings show that there has been significantly more earnings management during the 2007–2008 financial crisis compared to earlier periods.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management During Shifting Regulatory Regimes

This study examines the relationship of CEO overconfidence with accrual‐based earnings management, real activities‐based earnings management, and targeting to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. Following, we measure “overconfidence” based on the CEO's tendency to hold in‐the‐money stock options, as rational expected utility maximizers should exercise early to avoid overexposure to company idiosyncratic risks. The results show that before the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), companies of overconfident CEOs were more likely than other CEOs to engage in managing earnings through accelerating the timing of cash flow from operations and achieving analyst forecast benchmarks. After SOX, we find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to have income‐increasing discretionary accruals. They remain more likely to engage in real activities management through abnormally high cash flows, and also have abnormally low discretionary expenses. These results are consistent with overconfident CEOs feeling less constrained by SOX, and suggest that this individual characteristic works against regulators’ attempts to constrain earnings management by corporate executives. In contrast, we find that the tendency of overconfident CEOs to manage to targets decreases after SOX, perhaps due to changes in investor behavior in the new regulatory environment.     

Roundtable on Corporate Disclosure

In an article published in this journal two years ago titled "Just Say No to Wall Street," Harvard's Michael Jensen and The Monitor Group's CEO Joseph Fuller urged companies to put an end to what they called the "earnings guidance game." Instead of earnings forecasts, Jensen and Fuller recommended that companies provide investors with information about their strategic goals and value drivers, and about the risks associated with carrying out those goals and management's plans to manage those risks.
In this roundtable, a group of corporate executives, equity analysts, and academics explore the possibility that companies can increase their values by resisting the temptation to "manage" earnings, committing to expanded disclosure, and engaging investors in a more strategic dialogue. By establishing such a dialogue, companies may be able to break out of the current "bad equilibrium" in which markets distrust managers and managers distrust markets.     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.