Long-term persistence in corporate capital structure: Evidence from India

This study examines the stability of corporate capital structure in a sample of listed Indian firms for the period 1988–2015. In general, the firms do not maintain a stable level of leverage over long durations. The firm specific temporal variations in leverage are large and significant. We find that capital structure models that incorporate time varying firm effects perform better in explaining the variation in leverage than those that employ time invariant firm effects. The cross-sectional distribution of leverage also exhibits considerable variations over time. The quartile decompositions of leverage cross-sections reveal that migrations across leverage quartiles are pervasive. Only the firms with low leverage ratios ratio exhibit some persistence in their leverage ratios. High leverage ratios are not rare but are invariably transient.     

Internal capital markets and the partial adjustment of leverage

Prior literature provides support both for the existence of target capital structures and internal capital markets (ICM). The issue of whether firms use internal capital markets to reduce deviations from target capital structures, however, has yet to be examined. We provide the first empirical evidence of a link between deviations from target leverage and ICM activity. Based on data that allow us to trace intra-group capital market transactions for property–casualty insurers, our findings provide the first joint evidence that affiliated insurance companies have target leverage ratios and that ICM activity is used to manage deviations from target leverage.     

中国企业杠杆:一个周期性问题?

一直以来,企业部门杠杆率在中国宏观杠杆率中占有重要的地位。通过构建企业杠杆率的动态局部调整模型,本文区分了经济周期对企业杠杆率的直接和间接影响,并利用中国工业企业数据库对二者进行测算。结果显示,用观察经济周期哑变量估计系数的方式来判断经济周期对企业杠杆率的影响,会显著高估企业杠杆率顺周期调整的程度,因为这只捕捉了周期的直接影响。在同时考虑了经济周期对杠杆率的间接影响后,我们发现:第一,中国企业杠杆率总体仍具有顺周期性。这表明货币政策在维护物价水平、熨平经济周期波动时,能够对企业杠杆率稳定产生一定的正向溢出效应。因此,双支柱调控框架具有内在一致性,可以形成政策合力。第二,中国企业杠杆率变动的顺周期性较弱,尤其是国有企业。因此,想要在保持物价和经济增长稳定的同时实现稳杠杆,货币政策和宏观审慎政策需相互协调配合。本文的研究为思考双支柱调控框架的分工与协调提供了有益的微观基础。     

Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?

We empirically examine whether firms engage in a dynamic rebalancing of their capital structures while allowing for costly adjustment. We begin by showing that the presence of adjustment costs has significant implications for corporate financial policy and the interpretation of previous empirical results. After confirming that financing behavior is consistent with the presence of adjustment costs, we find that firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range. Our evidence suggests that the persistent effect of shocks on leverage observed in previous studies is more likely due to adjustment costs than indifference toward capital structure.     

Capital structure under collusion

We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.     

Ultimate Ownership and Adjustment Speed Toward Target Capital Structures: Evidence from China

We investigate whether ultimate ownership affects firms’ adjustment speed toward target capital structures for Chinese publicly listed companies over the period 1999–2009. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs according to their ultimate ownership. We find that SOEs have higher leverage ratios and slower adjustment speeds toward target capital structures. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory, implying that the political resources of SOEs can lead to a higher persistence and slower leverage adjustment speeds in comparison to non-SOEs. Finally, our results also raise a question: Why do Chinese companies adjust their capital structure so fast?     

Borrow Cheap,Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts

Private equity funds pay particular attention to capital structure when executing leveraged buyouts, creating an interesting setting for examining capital structure theories. Using a large, international sample of buyouts from 1980 to 2008, we find that buyout leverage is unrelated to the cross‐sectional factors, suggested by traditional capital structure theories, that drive public firm leverage. Instead, variation in economy‐wide credit conditions is the main determinant of leverage in buyouts. Higher deal leverage is associated with higher transaction prices and lower buyout fund returns, suggesting that acquirers overpay when access to credit is easier.     

Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from acquisitions

In the context of large acquisitions, we provide evidence on whether firms have target capital structures. We examine how deviations from these targets affect how bidders choose to finance acquisitions and how they adjust their capital structure following the acquisitions. We show that when a bidder's leverage is over its target level, it is less likely to finance the acquisition with debt and more likely to finance the acquisition with equity. Also, we find a positive association between the merger-induced changes in target and actual leverage, and we show that bidders incorporate more than two-thirds of the change to the merged firm's new target leverage. Following debt-financed acquisitions, managers actively move the firm back to its target leverage, reversing more than 75% of the acquisition's leverage effect within five years. Overall, our results are consistent with a model of capital structure that includes a target level and adjustment costs.     

Proactive Leverage Increases and The Value of Financial Flexibility

Traditional tradeoff models of corporate capital structure, although still featured prominently in finance textbooks and widely accepted by practitioners, have been criticized by financial economists for doing a poor job of explaining observed debt ratios. Moreover, the observed ratios are far less stable than what would be predicted by the standard tradeoff models. In a study published several years ago in the Review of Financial Studies, the authors of this article aimed to shed more light on the underlying forces governing capital structure decisions by analyzing a set of major changes in capital structure in which companies initiated large increases in leverage through substantial new borrowings. They then attempted to explain why these companies chose to increase leverage and how their capital structures changed during the years after the large debt issues. As summarized in this article, the authors' findings indicate, first of all, that the large debt financings were used primarily to fund major corporate investments—and not, for example, to make large distributions to shareholders. And the changes in leverage ratios that came after the debt offerings were driven far more by the evolution of the companies' realized cash flows and their investment opportunities than by deliberate or decisive attempts to rebalance their capital structures toward a stationary target. In fact, many of the companies chose to take on even more debt when faced with cash‐flow deficits, despite operating with leverage that was already well above any reasonable estimate of their estimated target leverage. At the same time, companies that generated financial surpluses used them to reduce debt, even when their leverage had fallen well below their estimated targets. Taken as a whole, the findings of the authors' study support the idea that unused debt capacity represents an important source of financial flexibility, and that preserving such flexibility—and making use of it when valuable investment opportunities materialize—may well be the critical missing link in connecting capital structure theory with observed corporate behavior.     

A stubborn persistence: Is the stability of leverage ratios determined by the stability of the economy?

The choice of capital structure firms make is a fundamental issue in the financial literature. According to a recent finding, the capital structure of firms remains almost unchanged during their lives. This stability of leverage ratios is mainly generated by an unobserved firm-specific effect that is liable for the majority of the variation in capital structure. We demonstrate that even substantial changes in the economic environment do not affect the stability of firms' leverage due to the presence of credit constraints. Financially unconstrained firms are more responsive to economic changes and adjust to the target substantially faster than constrained firms. Moreover, accounting for the ownership structure of firms boosts the explanatory power of the model in the subsample of unconstrained firms, suggesting that annual information on ownership and ownership changes together with financial constraints have the potential to be an answer to the puzzle of stability in capital structure.     

Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms

This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.     

Market Imperfections,Macroeconomic Conditions,and Capital Structure Dynamics: A Cross-Country Study

This article investigates how “systematic” adjustment costs proxied by market imperfections, and macroeconomic conditions affect capital structure dynamics in a cross-country setting. We document substantial variations in firms’ capital structure adjustments across countries and, particularly, over time. Consistent with adjustment costs impeding firms from rebalancing their capital structures, worse market imperfections are associated with slower speeds of adjustment (SOA) and larger leverage deviations. Intertemporally, capital structure adjustment is procyclical, with SOA increasing by 0.9 percentage point for a one-percentage-point increase in GDP growth rate. The procyclicality is attributable to good macroeconomic conditions mitigating market imperfections through channels of 1) facilitating free-ride restructuring and 2) uncertainty alleviation. Our investigation features a bootstrapping-based estimation method that addresses the mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio.     

Capital Structure Instability

This article summarizes the evidence from the authors’ recent study published in the Journal of Finance that documented the extent of the variation in the capital structures of individual public companies over long time horizons. It also reports the results of an exploratory investigation into the sources of variation over time in leverage ratios—an investigation that included case analyses of leverage instability at 24 U.S. companies that were included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average at some point in their histories. The main finding of the authors’ study is that substantial instability in leverage has been the norm at publicly held nonfinancial companies. “Episodic” cases of leverage stability were observed from time to time, but they were the exception, not the rule. Such cases almost always involved companies with low leverage ratios, and they invariably proved to be short‐lived, rarely exceeding a decade or two. Leverage was found to be “sticky” during periods lasting just a few years, but a company's currently high (or low) leverage became an increasingly poor predictor of whether its future leverage would be high (or low) as the amount of time between leverage observations lengthened. When attempting to explain companyspecific changes in leverage after extended periods of stability, the authors found a strong connection with company expansion and investment. At the same time, they found no systematic relations between company‐specific leverage changes and changes in industry leverage, company profitability, or other determinants of leverage that have been emphasized in previous academic studies. The authors' case analyses reinforced their finding that capital structure changes were often linked to the funding of company expansions, but such changes were also sometimes designed to support established payout policies while preserving financing flexibility.     

Local social environment and the speed of leverage adjustment

This study examines the impact of social capital on firms’ leverage adjustment speed. Using a comprehensive dataset of 83,374 firm-year observations for 744 US counties for 1990–2016, we find that both underleveraged and overleveraged firms located in US counties with higher levels of social capital incur slower leverage adjustment towards their optimal target capital structure. This finding is robust to alternative measures of leverage and social capital, different model specifications, controlling for county- and firm-level characteristics, and endogeneity. We further identify two mechanisms through which social capital affects leverage adjustments: monitoring (channel for underleveraged firms) and disciplinary (channel for overleveraged firms) mechanisms.     

Shareholders' control rights,family ownership and the firm's leverage decisions

We investigate the association between controlling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) and firms' leverage decisions in the Singaporean context. We examine whether the impact of ownership concentration on leverage differs across excess and lower control. We report that shareholders with excess control prefer leverage financing for an optimal capital structure and focus on value maximisation rather using leverage as a tool of minority shareholders' expropriation. Our analysis shows that firms capital structure significantly influences by the coalition of shareholders particularly decisions about leverage financing in addition to the firms' specific characteristics and institutional arrangements. Our empirical evidence shows that controlling shareholders with a lower fraction of equity are more concerned about limited holding thus prefer leverage over equity financing to inflate their equity stake to protect them from the potential takeovers and mergers. We report that capital structure decisions in Singapore are linked with the trade-off between the controlling shareholders' target of mitigating firm risk and their non-dilution entrenchment needs. Further, we found an inverted U-shaped association between control ownership and leverage financing. In terms of moderating effect of family-controlled ownership, our findings exhibit that leverage financing is less pronounced for family firms in Singapore due to the under-diversified investment portfolio.     

Correlated leverage and its ramifications

This paper develops a theory in which housing prices, the capital structures of banks (mortgage lenders) and the capital structures of mortgage borrowers are all endogenously determined in equilibrium. There are four main results. First, leverage is a “positively correlated” phenomenon in that high leverage among borrowers is positively correlated with high leverage among banks, and higher house prices lead to higher leverage for both. The intuition is that first-time homebuyers with fixed wealth endowments must borrow more to buy more expensive homes, whereas higher current house prices rationally imply higher expected future house prices and therefore higher collateral values on bank loans, inducing banks to be more highly levered. Second, higher bank leverage leads to greater house price volatility in response to shocks to fundamental house values. Third, a bank’s exposure to credit risk depends not only on its own leverage but also on the leverage decisions of other banks. Fourth, positive fundamental shocks to house prices dilute financial intermediation by reducing banks’ pre-lending screening, and this reduction in bank screening further increases house prices. Empirical and policy implications of the analysis are drawn out, and empirical evidence is provided for the first two main results. The key policy implications are that greater geographic diversification by banks, tying mortgage tax exemptions to the duration of home ownership, and increasing bank capital requirements when borrower leverage is high can help reduce house price volatility.     

Book-tax conformity and capital structure

We examine the effect of increased book-tax conformity on corporate capital structure. Prior studies document a decrease in the informativeness of accounting earnings for equity markets resulting from higher book-tax conformity. We argue that the decrease in earnings informativeness impacts equity holders more than debt holders because of the differences in payoff structures between debt and equity investments such that increases in book-tax conformity lead to increases in firms’ reliance on debt capital. We exploit a natural experiment in the U.S. and find that firms facing an increase in required book-tax conformity increase leverage relative to other firms. We also provide evidence of an increase in the cost of equity (but not of debt) capital for firms facing an increase in required book-tax conformity, relative to control firms, and show that these increases in cost of equity capital are positively associated with an increase in leverage. Our findings are consistent with firms substituting away from equity and toward more debt in the presence of higher book-tax conformity.     

Shareholder litigation rights and capital structure decisions

We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker shareholder litigation rights due to the UD laws adoption lead to higher financial leverage, which enhances firm value. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD laws adoption and financial leverage is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante or financially constrained firms. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage.     

Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance

We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders’ value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the CEO plays a more dominant role among top executives, the firm adopts significantly lower leverage, probably to evade the disciplinary mechanisms associated with debt financing. Our results are important as they demonstrate that CEO power matters to critical corporate outcomes such as capital structure decisions. In addition, we find that the impact of changes in capital structure on firm performance is more negative for firms with more powerful CEOs. Overall, the results are in agreement with prior literature, suggesting that strong CEO dominance appears to exacerbate agency costs and is thus detrimental to firm value.     

An Analysis of the Financing Decisions of REITs: The Role of Market Timing and Target Leverage

This paper examines the role of capital market conditions and target leverage on the marginal financing decisions of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which include both capital raising and capital reduction activities. We investigate the relevance of a hybrid hypothesis whereby REITs have target leverage, but they also choose and time their marginal financing decisions according to the capital market conditions. The empirical results suggest that target leverage behavior plays a secondary role to market timing behavior in the financing decisions of REITs. In particular, we find strong and consistent evidence that REITs exhibit market timing behavior in terms of when and what type of capital to issue or reduce. Such market timing practices, motivated by attempts to take advantage of capital market conditions, may shift the firms away from their target leverage. However, we observe that in the long run, most REITs do move their capital structure towards the target debt level.