Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements

We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.     

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix

While bank capital requirements permit a bank to freely substitute between equity and subordinated debt, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that, after controlling for the level of regulatory capital, the mix of debt in capital isolates the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that the mix of debt in capital affects bank behavior, but only when investors can impose real constraints. In particular, the mix of debt reduces the probability of failure and future distress for BHC-affiliated institutions (where the investor has control rights through an equity position) and for stand-alone banks before the Basel Accord (when debt issues included restrictive covenants). However, substituting equity for subordinated debt at the bank holding company level or in stand-alone banks since the Basel Accord (where the investor has few protections) only increases the probability of distress and failure.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

商业银行资本工具创新及定价研究

资本工具的创新可以拓展银行资本补充渠道和空间,提升银行补充资本的能力,强化银行业的资本约束,增强风险管理水平,推动商业银行业务转型,增强服务实体经济的能力.本文在阐述我国资本工具的应用及创新背景的基础上,通过建立二叉树模型,探讨了我国新型资本工具定价问题并提出相关建议.     

基于银行流动性管理视角的宏观审慎与货币政策协调研究

本文从商业银行流动性管理视角出发,探究银行微观主体行为如何影响宏观审慎与货币政策的协调。我们借鉴净稳定资金比例的设计理念,将商业银行的流动性管理行为纳入传统理论模型,刻画出两种流动性管理行为对货币政策信贷传导渠道效率的潜在影响及传导路径。在此基础上,采用我国50家商业银行2012年第1季度—2018年第2季度面板数据进行实证检验。我们发现,银行为提升长期流动性水平而进行的优化信贷资产结构的行为,能够显著提高货币政策传导效率。但是,部分净稳定资金比例较低的股份制银行和城市商业银行调整非信贷资产结构的行为则有可能降低货币政策传导效率。因此,在执行既有流动性监管措施的同时,关注与引导银行资产结构调整方式,对增强宏观审慎与货币政策的协调大有裨益。     

基于银行流动性管理视角的宏观审慎与货币政策协调研究

本文从商业银行流动性管理视角出发,探究银行微观主体行为如何影响宏观审慎与货币政策的协调。我们借鉴净稳定资金比例的设计理念,将商业银行的流动性管理行为纳入传统理论模型,刻画出两种流动性管理行为对货币政策信贷传导渠道效率的潜在影响及传导路径。在此基础上,采用我国50家商业银行2012年第1季度—2018年第2季度面板数据进行实证检验。我们发现,银行为提升长期流动性水平而进行的优化信贷资产结构的行为,能够显著提高货币政策传导效率。但是,部分净稳定资金比例较低的股份制银行和城市商业银行调整非信贷资产结构的行为则有可能降低货币政策传导效率。因此,在执行既有流动性监管措施的同时,关注与引导银行资产结构调整方式,对增强宏观审慎与货币政策的协调大有裨益。     

The good and bad news about the new liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries

New liquidity rules phased in under Basel III define the new net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to promote sustainable funding structures at financial institutions. In this paper, we analyze characteristics and drivers of NSFR for a sample of 921 Western European banks between 1996 and 2010. We find that a majority of banks have historically not fulfilled NSFR minimum requirements, in particular larger and faster growing institutions as well as banks also active in asset management and investment banking. Many of them have started increasing NSFR with the onset of financial crisis 2008 while this ratio had been sliding in earlier years. Interestingly, potential advantages in funding costs for low NSFR banks do not seem to translate into higher profitability and results of these banks are more volatile.     

The Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio and bank net interest margins

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a new Basel III liquidity requirement designed to limit funding risk arising from maturity mismatches between bank assets and liabilities. This study explains the NSFR and estimates this ratio for banks in 15 countries. Banks below the ratio need to increase stable sources of funding and to reduce assets requiring funding. The most cost-effective strategies to meet the NSFR are to increase holdings of higher-rated securities and to extend the maturity of wholesale funding. These changes reduce net interest margins by 70–88 basis points on average, or around 40% of their year-end 2009 values. Universal banks with diversified funding sources and high trading assets are penalized most by the NSFR.     

Banks’ capital buffer,risk and performance in the Canadian banking system: Impact of business cycles and regulatory changes

Using quarterly financial statements and stock market data from 1982 to 2010 for the six largest Canadian chartered banks, this paper documents positive co-movement between Canadian banks’ capital buffer and business cycles. The adoption of Basel Accords and the balance sheet leverage cap imposed by Canadian banking regulations did not change this cyclical behavior of Canadian bank capital. We find Canadian banks to be well-capitalized and that they hold a larger capital buffer in expansion than in recession, which may explain how they weathered the recent subprime financial crisis so well. This evidence that Canadian banks ride the business and regulatory periods underscores the appropriateness of a both micro- and a macro-prudential “through-the-cycle” approach to capital adequacy as advocated in the proposed Basel III framework to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector.     

Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

Financial Innovation,Basel Accord III,and Bank Value

I examine how financial innovation and Basel III capital requirements in Taiwan respond differently to banking crises and market competition. My panel data set comprises data from thirty-four banks for 2000-2012. I find a significant negative relationship between derivatives and the value of a bank and significant positive relationships among the capital adequacy ratio, bank-specific variables, and the value of a bank. Larger bank size and operational diversification tend to be positively associated with a bank's value, the holding of a relatively high amount of capital requirements, and nonperforming loans that are large. The latter result may simply reflect the scale of economy and improvement of efficiency in terms of financial innovation in the banking sector.     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

中国商业银行最优资本水平及其调整研究——基于部分调整模型和傅里叶单位根检验的分析

采用部分调整模型和傅里叶单位根检验对中国14家上市商业银行的最优资本水平进行研究,并估计出存在最优资本水平银行的最优资本比率值和资本调整速度。研究发现,大部分上市银行均存在最优资本水平,但不同类型和资产规模的银行在最优资本比率的目标变量选择方面有所差异。平均而言,大型商业银行最优资本水平较高,股份制银行最优资本水平较低。资本调整速度在银行间差异很大,自有资金比率调整速度最快,核心资本充足率和资本充足率调整速度较慢。     

Capital shocks, bank asset allocation, and the revised Basel Accord

In contrast to the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), the revised risk-based capital standards (Basel II) propose regulatory capital requirements based on credit ratings. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how banks will adjust their low and high credit risk commercial loans under the proposed newer standard. Capital-constrained banks respond to an adverse capital shock by reducing high credit risk loans, while under certain circumstances, low credit risk loans may actually increase. When compared to Basel I, it is shown that high-risk loans are reduced more under Basel II, but whether a bank reduces total lending more under Basel I or under the revised standards depends on a complex interaction of factors.     

Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity

In an economy with financial frictions, banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium, as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. The liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of Basel III can implement efficiency. Additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly. Micro‐ and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes. Optimally, macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle, while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk.     

Incentives and financial crises: Microfounded macroprudential regulation

We provide a micro-based rationale for macroprudential capital regulation of financial intermediaries (banks) by developing a model in which bankers can privately undertake a costly effort and reduce the probability of adverse shocks to their asset holdings that force liquidation (deterioration risk). A decline in the fundamental risk of assets ameliorates funding conditions, boosting the banks’ ability to expand their balance sheets. In principle, a higher continuation value would improve incentives to put effort. However, the rise in asset demand and prices also increases the payoff in liquidation, eventually reducing the equilibrium optimal effort. Poor incentives impose socially inefficient liquidation and can be corrected through a regulatory capital requirement. We show that the requirement should be high when fundamental risk is low. Therefore, the model suggests a theoretical foundation for macroprudential regulation and the countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III.     

Can regulators allow banks to set their own capital ratios?

Basel regulators have received widespread criticism for failing to prevent two credit crises that hit the U.S. over the last two decades. Nonetheless, banks were considerably overcapitalized prior to the onset of the 2007–2009 subprime crisis compared to those which had undergone the 1990–1991 recession. Therefore, if capital requirements were achieved prior to the subprime crisis, how could the Basel framework be blamed again for having accelerated if not caused another credit crunch? We find that the answer to this question lies in the relationship between the capital ratio and the leverage ratio which is governed by risk-weights categories determined by the Basel regulation. We show that changes to risk-weight categories which affect the correlation pattern between both ratios are not reflected in the subprime crisis. This minimizes the implication of the Basel II regulation in the crunch that succeeded its announcement, in contrast to Basel I. We demonstrate that these dynamics are governed by a formula linking the two ratios together which derives from the sensitivity of the risk-based capital ratio to a change in its risk-weight(s). One implication of our work regarding the Basel III regulation consists in validating the newly established capital increments in a mathematical rather than heuristical approach.     

资本充足率约束与我国商业银行经营转型的关联性分析

对于商业银行资本充足率的构成、影响因素、解决资本充足率不足的途径等问题,国内外很多学者已经进行了研究,其中,对于影响因素的研究,尤其成为20世纪90年代以来的银行业研究的热点问题。本文着重分析资本充足率约束与我国商业银行经营转型之间的内在逻辑关系,借助计量经济学模型方法,对近年来,资本充足率约束与我国部分股份制商业银行经营状况之间的关系进行了实证研究,结果显示,巴塞尔协议中的资本充足率约束已开始对我国的商业银行的经营发挥效应。     

Short-term wholesale funding and systemic risk: A global CoVaR approach

We use the CoVaR approach to identify the main factors behind systemic risk in a set of large international banks. We find that short-term wholesale funding is a key determinant in triggering systemic risk episodes. In contrast, we find weaker evidence that either size or leverage contributes to systemic risk within the class of large international banks. We also show that asymmetries based on the sign of bank returns play an important role in capturing the sensitivity of system-wide risk to individual bank returns. Since short-term wholesale funding emerges as the most relevant systemic factor, our results support the Basel Committee’s proposal to introduce a net stable funding ratio, penalizing excessive exposure to liquidity risk.     

Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks

Optimizing banks subject to runs are introduced in a macro model to study the transmission of monetary policy and its interplay with bank capital regulation when banks are risky. A monetary expansion and a positive productivity shock increase bank leverage and risk. Risk-based capital requirements amplify the cycle and are welfare detrimental. Within a class of simple policy rules, the best combination includes mildly anticyclical capital ratios (as in Basel III) and a response of monetary policy to asset prices or bank leverage.