Corporate Pyramids,Conservatism and Cost of Debt: Evidence From Taiwan

This study investigates the extent to which the span of corporate pyramids (as measured by the number of ownership layers) is associated with higher agency costs of debt, and whether conservatism can moderate the agency cost. Consistent with corporate pyramids generating higher agency costs and information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside creditors, we find a positive association between the number of investment layers and cost of debt. However, we also find that multi-layered firms mitigate organizational opaqueness through increased financial reporting conservatism, which results in lower cost of debt capital. These findings provide new insights into the relationship between organizational structure and financial reporting quality.     

Debt contracts in the presence of performance manipulation

Empirical evidence suggests that firms often manipulate reported numbers to avoid debt covenant violations. We study how a firm’s ability to manipulate reports affects the terms of its debt contracts and the resulting investment and manipulation decisions that the firm implements. Our model generates novel empirical predictions regarding the use and the level of debt covenant, the interest rate, the efficiency of investment decisions, and the likelihood of covenant violations. For example, the model predicts that the optimal debt contract for firms with relatively strong (weak) corporate governance (i.e., cost of manipulation) induces overinvestment (underinvestment). Moreover, for firms with strong (weak) corporate governance, an increase in corporate governance quality leads to tighter (looser) covenant, more (less) frequent covenant violations and lower (higher) interest rate. Our model highlights that the interest rate, which is a common proxy for the cost of debt, neither accounts for the distortion of investment efficiency nor the expected manipulation costs arising under debt financing. We propose a measure of cost of debt capital that accounts for these effects.     

Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts

We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.     

Determinants and consequences of debt maturity structure: A systematic review of the international literature

We conduct a systematic review of the international research on the determinants and consequences of debt maturity structure in the accounting, finance, and corporate governance literature. Our review reveals that a large volume of empirical research has been conducted on the determinants of debt maturity structure, and we categorize these determinants into the following five factors: (1) firm specific; (2) tax; (3) corporate governance; (4) country-level institutional; and (5) macroeconomic. The literature on the consequences of debt maturity structure is relatively scant and generally focuses on the effect of debt maturity structure on financial reporting quality and investment and financing decisions. We consider endogeneity as one of the major concerns in the reported empirical studies that, unless addressed satisfactorily, may render some of the findings untenable. Based on the review, we also provide several future research directions.     

Financial Reporting Quality,Debt Maturity,and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the influence of different financing channels—bond issuance or bank loans—as well as debt maturity and the quality of financial reporting on the cost of debt in China. The authors find that conservative accounting is an important characteristic of high-quality financial reporting that can reduce the cost of longer maturity debt such as bank loans and bonds. Even state-owned enterprises, which have fewer financial constraints than non-state-owned enterprises, benefit from accounting conservatism's ability to reduce financial costs. Moreover, the findings indicate that bond investors are concerned about the issuer's fundamentals, while banks are more likely to focus on the operation and bankruptcy risk of borrowers.     

Real options,agency conflicts,and optimal capital structure

We examine the impact of a stockholder–bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy. We find that an equity-maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value-maximizing strategy, and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects. Equityholders’ incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage, and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt. Numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics.     

Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism

This study examines the association between debt maturity structure and accounting conservatism. Short‐maturity debt can mitigate agency costs of debt arising from information asymmetry and suboptimal investment problems inherent in debt financing. As such, debt‐contracting demand for accounting conservatism is expected to be lower in the presence of more short‐maturity debt. We find that short‐maturity debt is negatively associated with accounting conservatism. As firms could commit to more accounting conservatism to gain access to long‐maturity debt, we conduct lead‐lag tests of the direction of causality, and the results suggest that more short‐maturity debt leads to less conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. We also find the negative relation between short‐maturity debt and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among financially distressed firms, where ex ante severity of agency costs of debt are higher. Collectively, our results contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting and show how debt maturity, a key and pervasive feature of creditor protection in debt contracting, affects accounting conservatism.     

The cost of debt when all-equity firms raise sfinance: The role of investment opportunities, audit quality and debt maturity

This paper investigates the effect of investment opportunities, audit quality and debt maturity on the interest paid by all-equity firms. Debt holders are likely to charge higher interest to price-protect themselves because of the under-investment and asset substitution problems. All-equity firms, however, could reduce interest charge by employing Big 4 auditors to increase the reliability of audited financial statements or using short-term debt to allow more frequent monitoring of their financial condition by lenders and re-pricing of debt. The results show that interest charge is positively related to investment opportunities of all-equity firms. This relationship is weaker when the firms have Big 4 auditors or a higher proportion of debt due in the next year over total debt. In addition, the above results do not hold for highly levered firms since the lenders are constantly monitoring the financial condition of their borrowers.     

CONVERTIBLE DEBT AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

In this paper we examine the effect of convertible debt on the investment incentives facing stockholders. The effect depends critically on the value of existing assets relative to the firm's investment requirements. With a restrictive dividend covenant, convertible debt mitigates the overinvestment incentive associated with risky debt but exacerbates the underinvestment incentive at higher values of existing assets. A less-restrictive dividend covenant exacerbates overinvestment under straight debt financing but reduces the underinvestment incentive induced by the conversion feature. In this context, a convertible debt contract with a less-restrictive dividend covenant maximizes firm value.     

Economic policy uncertainty,corporate investment decisions and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

We examine the relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and stock price crash risk via the corporate investment in Chinese listed firms. Results show that higher EPU is associated with lower crash risk. Firms increase financial asset holdings and reduce overinvestment when EPU rises, leading to lower future crash risk. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with lower management incentives tend to reduce overinvestment, whereas non-SOEs tend to increase financial asset holdings. Thus, firms tend to be cautious in their investments when EPU is high, which reduces crash risk. Our study provides new insights into the validity of the Lucas critique in China.     

The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Corporate Investment during the Global Financial Crisis

This paper examines the effect of accounting conservatism on firm‐level investment during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Using a differences‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with less conservative financial reporting experienced a sharper decline in investment activity following the onset of the crisis compared to firms with more conservative financial reporting. This relationship was stronger for firms that were financially constrained, faced greater external financing needs, or had higher information asymmetry. We also find that more conservative firms experienced lower declines in both debt‐raising activity and stock performance. The evidence suggests that accounting conservatism reduces underinvestment in the presence of information frictions.     

Conditional conservatism and the yield spread of corporate bond issues

Building upon recent research which indicates that debt markets rather than equity markets shape financial reporting, this study examines how conditionally conservative financial reporting relates to the yield spread of corporate bond issues. Our findings suggest that the debt contract efficiency/information costs view of conditional conservatism, documented in private debt contracts, does not generalize to public debt contracts. Instead, a debt contract renegotiation costs perspective seems to better capture the dynamics of the public debt markets, with conditionally conservative reporting being associated with higher yield spread of corporate bond issues. Additional subsample test results indicate that the association between conditional conservatism and bond yield spreads is more pronounced in non-investment grade bonds, for bond issuers with more financial distress, and for bonds that are issued before the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. This study fills a gap in the conservatism literature, which focuses primarily on equity or private bank loan markets with traditional debt contract efficiency/information costs view.     

MAINBANKS AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS

We explore the effects of mainbanks on investment efficiency in financial distress. The previous literature argues that firms with close financial relationships with banks have lower costs of financial distress because of a reduced underinvestment problem. Although benefits may accrue to such close relationships, we contend shortcomings are possible as well. A firm in financial distress without a mainbank may be forced to reduce investment or sell assets to a buyer who has a higher value. However, for a firm with a mainbank, this disciplinary force is weakened. To firms with poor investment opportunities, the presence of mainbanks may actually induce an overinvestment problem. The empirical findings reported here are consistent with this idea. JEL classification: G31, G33, G34.     

Determinants of corporate debt maturity in South America: Do institutional quality and financial development matter?

We test whether a country's level of financial development or institutional quality (or both) has a first‐order effect on corporate debt maturity decisions on a sample of 359 non-financial firms from five South American countries over a 12‐year period. We find that there is a substantial dynamic component in the determination of a firm's debt maturity, and firms face moderate adjustment frictions toward their optimal maturities. More importantly, the level of financial development does not influence debt maturity, whereas the institutional quality of a country has a significant positive effect on the level of long-term debt in a firm's financial structure. Our results support the hypothesis that the quality of national institutions is an important determinant of corporate financing in general and of debt maturity in particular.     

Accruals Quality and Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper we use panel data and GMM estimation to examine the effect of accounting quality on debt maturity structure in a bank‐based financial system and show that, even after controlling for unobservable heterogeneity, endogeneity, variables reflecting operating volatility and the cost of debt, firms with poor accounting quality face a shorter debt term than firms with higher accounting quality. This association between accounting quality and debt maturity is consistent with accounting quality as a means of reducing information asymmetry problems and improving the monitoring of managers.     

Can blockchain technology be effectively integrated into the real economy? Evidence from corporate investment efficiency

As a highly disruptive digital technology, blockchain provides new solutions for reshaping corporate governance mechanisms and improving resource allocation. We empirically examine the relationship between blockchain and corporate investment inefficiency. We find that blockchain can help improve corporate investment efficiency, and this result is valid after a series of robustness tests. Blockchain can not only significantly restrain overinvestment but also alleviate underinvestment. Reducing financing costs and alleviating agency conflicts are the two channels through which blockchain is associated with corporate investment efficiency, and financial reporting quality is the condition on which the channels depend. When the CEO holds few shares or the trade credit environment in the region where the company is located is poor, the effect of blockchain is more prominent than it is otherwise. Investment efficiency cannot be improved by blockchain for companies providing blockchain products or services to customers, only for those promoting their own operations and management with blockchain. Ultimately, blockchain can enhance companies’ value by alleviating inefficient investment. We reveal the role of blockchain in corporate investment efficiency, furnish microeconomic evidence for the integration of digital technology and the real economy and provide implications for China to promote digital technology to drive high-quality company development.     

The impact of financial reporting quality on debt maturity: the case of private firms

We examine whether the debt maturity structure of privately held firms is associated with the quality of their earnings numbers. We argue that earnings numbers that are better able to predict future cash flows lower information asymmetry between privately held firms and their creditors, improving privately held firms’ access to long-term debt. Furthermore, we examine whether the relationship between privately held firms’ earnings quality and their debt maturity differs between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and larger privately held firms. Using detailed financial statement information from a sample of privately held Belgian firms, we find that earnings quality is positively associated with the likelihood of having long-term debt and with the proportion of long-term debt in total debt. Further, we report evidence that these associations are more pronounced for SMEs than for larger privately held firms, which is consistent with smaller firms entailing more fundamental risk for creditors.     

To be or not to be all-equity for firms that eliminate long-term debt

Despite the advantages of debt, a significant number of firms that have an established leverage policy deliberately become all-equity. These firms eliminate a substantial amount of long-term debt as the average firm’s leverage ratio is approximately 30 percent at the year-end prior to debt elimination. Firm-level “shocks” such as CEO turnover and changes in credit ratings cannot explain the dramatic recapitalization decision. Consistent with the tradeoff theory, firms that eliminate debt have lower benefits (less tax shield benefits, agency costs) and higher costs (probability of financial distress, access to capital markets, etc.) of leverage in the three prior years compared to a matched sample. We also find that the factors influencing the decision to eliminate all debt is different from those to significantly reduce leverage or to have very low debt levels. Firms primarily finance the approximately $70 million of average long-term debt eliminated using proceeds from sales of relatively unproductive assets and from equity issues. Interestingly, over half of these firms issue significant amount of new debt within three years of becoming all-equity. Firms with lower liquidity and non-debt tax shields, higher potential overinvestment agency costs, and those that issue equity at the debt elimination year are more likely to relever quickly.     

A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang

Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; longer term debt can impose less if asset volatility is higher in bad times. For future investments, reduced correlation between assets‐in‐place and investment opportunities increases the shorter term debt overhang.     

Interactions of Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: A Dynamic Framework

This article analyzes the interaction between a firm's dynamic investment, operating, and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs. Using numerical analysis, we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects. We find that higher production flexibility (due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility) enhances the firm's debt capacity, thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing. While higher financial flexibility (resulting from lower recapitalization costs) has a similar effect, production flexibility and financial flexibility are, to some extent, substitutes. We find that the impact of debt financing on the firm's investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant.