The role of accounting in bank regulation on the eve of japan’s financial crisis: a failure of the new capital adequacy regulation

In contrast to previous examinations of the role of accounting in financial crises, this paper explores the way in which accounting has been woven into a new system of banking regulations. Although the regulatory reform of the mid-1980s was intended to maintain the soundness of banking businesses, it failed to prevent banks from excessive asset expansion in the latter half of the 1980s in Japan. One of the major causes of this regulatory failure is found in the way that the regulatory capital is defined for the new capital adequacy regulation. The latent revaluation reserves are partially counted as capital. Japanese domestic regulatory reform took place in the wider context of the international standardization of capital adequacy regulations (BIS standards). Japanese regulators utilized taken-for-granted practices of accounting to creatively comply with the BIS standards.     

The implications of the new capital adequacy rules for portfolio management of credit assets

Over the past several years, there has been an extensive discussion among practitioners and academics about whether and how a portfolio management approach could help banks to better manage risk capital and create shareholder value. In this article, the authors argue that there are four key drivers which require banks to move from a transactional to a more portfolio management like approach when managing credit assets. These are: structural changes in the credit markets, inefficiencies of risk transfer in lending markets, ballooning debt levels in the US, and the proposed changes for capital adequacy. The authors see the latter not as a one-time change in capital adequacy rules, but more as a first step towards full convergence between risk capital and regulatory capital for credit risk. These changes require banks to accelerate their efforts to build first class portfolio management skills and capabilities. Achieving best practice credit portfolio management is rewarded with attractive opportunities for shareholder value creation and enables bank to successfully compete going forward.     

资本充足率监管与商业银行经营目标的路径选择

满足资本充足率监管要求和实现盈利是商业银行需要完成的两个基本经营目标。本文建立了单期模型，从理论角度分析了商业银行是如何通过调整资本金水平、存贷款总量以及风险偏好等不同的路径选择来实现上述双重经营目标。文章对我国商业银行近年来的经营行为进行实证分析表明，依靠股东注资、上市融资和发行次级债的方式已成为有效补充商业银行资本金以达到资本充足率监管要求的中长期主要路径．而调整存贷款总量和贷款组合的风险偏好是调节商业银行资本充足率水平的短期工具。在此基础上，指出国有商业银行完成上述双重基本指标是一项涉及政府、监管机构和商业银行三位一体的系统工程，     

资本充足率监管与商业银行经营目标的路径选择

满足资本充足率监管要求和实现盈利是商业银行需要完成的两个基本经营目标。本文建立了单期模型,从理论角度分析了商业银行是如何通过调整资本金水平、存贷款总量以及风险偏好等不同的路径选择来实现上述双重经营目标。文章对我国商业银行近年来的经营行为进行实证分析表明,依靠股东注资、上市融资和发行次级债的方式已成为有效补充商业银行资本金以达到资本充足率监管要求的中长期主要路径,而调整存贷款总量和贷款组合的风险偏好是调节商业银行资本充足率水平的短期工具。在此基础上,指出国有商业银行完成上述双重基本指标是一项涉及政府、监管机构和商业银行三位一体的系统工程。     

The Effect of Bank Ownership Concentration on Capital Adequacy,Liquidity, and Capital Stability

We explore the effects of ownership concentration on the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our analysis focuses on East Asian countries because these nations have successfully implemented the Basel standards and demonstrate a high degree of regulatory convergence. For the period from 2005 to 2009, we analyzed the relation between ownership concentration and capital adequacy (Basel II) and find that an increase in ownership concentration by one standard deviation results in an improvement in capital adequacy by 7.64 %. Although Basel III does not go into effect until 2013, we retroactively apply the standards for capital stability on our sample. We find that ownership concentration would have been a significant determinant of capital stability. While at lower levels of ownership concentration, an increase in concentrated ownership would have reduced capital stability; at higher ownership levels, greater ownership concentration would have increased capital stability. We also find that concentrated ownership improves banks’ liquidity. Further, the recent financial crisis does not appear to change the fundamental associations among ownership concentration, capital adequacy, and liquidity.     

Monitoring the “invisible” hand of market discipline: Capital adequacy revisited

The recent U.S. financial crisis and governmental bailout of financial institutions have intensified the debate on the need for effectively measuring and monitoring the financial institutions’ risks. This paper contributes to this discussion by introducing a market-based capital measurement that better captures the dynamics of bank risk and returns. Evidence confirms that these market-based capital adequacy metrics are much more sensitive to risk factors and more responsive to economic events than the traditional accounting/regulatory report based capital models, which often underestimate the true capital needs. The CDS premia, another market-bases solvency measure, seems to overreact to declines in capital adequacy.     

Why European Banks Are Undercapitalized and What Should Be Done About It

Major European banks are significantly undercapitalized as compared to large American banks, and, more importantly, as compared to the capital levels they would need to survive another severe financial crisis. Bank capital shortfalls in Italy, Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, in particular, are largely the consequence of European bank regulations that: (1) apply static risk weights to assets like mortgages and sovereign debt; (2) fail to require an overall market‐based capital ratio that is high enough to enable banks to survive a severe financial crisis; (3) fail to get banks to promptly write down their impaired assets to market value; (4) subject banks to weak stress tests that can create a false impression of capital adequacy; and (5) fail to compel banks to retain sufficient earnings and to raise sufficient capital externally to eliminate capital shortfalls promptly, all apparently out of fear that being tougher might cause investors and customers to lose confidence in the banks. This article summarizes important recent independent bank stress testing that has quantified the capital shortfalls in European banks. The recent highly publicized regulatory interventions to resolve failing European banks were inevitable due to these shortfalls. The authors recommend steps European bank regulators should take to address the problem and to eliminate the risk of serious capital shortfalls. In the absence of such steps, bank depositors, customers, and security holders should be prepared to expect further unwelcome surprises as the risks inherent in allowing undercapitalized banks to operate will continue to materialize in more bank failures.     

中国商业银行资本监管有效性实证研究

为了检验资本充足性管制对中国商业银行的资本充足率和风险水平的影响,本文在国外学者研究的基础上,构建了一个联立方程模型。根据这个模型,采用两阶段最小二乘法进行实证分析,分析结果表明:不管是资本充足情况较好的银行,还是资本充足情况较差的银行在资本充足性管制的压力下都提高了资本充足率;资本充足性管制促进了商业银行风险的降低。不过,由于多数银行已超过资本充足性管制中的最低标准,该标准产生的管制效应正在减弱。     

Replenishing the Banking Sector: Managing Bank Capital in the Post-Crisis World*

In the wake of the current financial crisis, there is a renewed focus on capital adequacy in the banking sector. A combination of impending regulatory changes, evolving views on both the level and composition of capital, the need to manage capital to stress-case scenarios, and the valuation implications of pro-cyclical versus counter-cyclical strategies will require banks to rethink their capital strategy in the postcrisis world. In this report, the authors (1) attempt to quantify the potential impact of further stresses on bank balance sheets and assess the magnitude of capital requirements for U.S. banks; (2) shed light on bank valuation dynamics; and (3) provide an analytical and empirical framework for measuring optimal equity capital buffers.     

Capital requirements and bank behaviour: Empirical evidence for Switzerland

In recent years, regulators have increased their focus on the capital adequacy of banking institutions to enhance the stability of the financial system. The purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on whether and how Swiss Banks react to constraints placed by the regulator on their capital. Building on previous work by Shrieves and Dahl (cf. Shrieves, R.E., Dahl, D., 1992. The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 16, 439–457), we use a simultaneous equations model to analyse adjustments in capital and risk at Swiss banks, when those approach the minimum regulatory capital level. Our results indicate that regulatory pressure induce banks to increase their capital, but does not affect the level of risk.     

银行资本监管与商业银行风险——对中国13家商业银行的实证研究

通过构建模型对2000～2005年我国商业银行风险与资本充足率变化进行实证检验,结果表明,我国实施银行资本监管能够促使已达到最低监管要求的银行提高资本充足率和降低银行风险,但对于达不到监管要求的银行,实施银行资本监管并不能促使其提高资本充足率和降低风险水平.实施银行资本监管不是我国商业银行风险降低的原因,资本监管在市场化程度较高的银行中会失效.市场及投资者并不因为银行资本充足率变化而对上市银行的收益或价值的评价产生变化.改革我国商业银行产权制度、建立显性的存款保险制度、加强市场约束是我国商业银行降低风险、提高资本监管有效性的基础.     

银行资本监管与商业银行风险——对中国13家商业银行的实证研究

通过构建模型对2000～2005年我国商业银行风险与资本充足率变化进行实证检验，结果表明，我国实施银行资本监管能够促使已达到最低监管要求的银行提高资本充足率和降低银行风险，但对于达不到监管要求的银行，实施银行资本监管并不能促使其提高资本充足率和降低风险水平。实施银行资本监管不是我国商业银行风险降低的原因，资本监管在市场化程度较高的银行中会失效。市场及投资者并不因为银行资本充足率变化而对上市银行的收益或价值的评价产生变化。改革我国商业银行产权制度、建立显性的存款保险制度、加强市场约束是我国商业银行降低风险、提高资本监管有效性的基础。     

The Impact of Owner’s Identity on Banks’ Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Risk

In this article, we test the potential impact of the owner’s identity on banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity risk as defined by the Basel III regulatory framework. Using a unique dataset on a sample of banks domiciled in the Middle East and North Africa region, we find that the ownership structure is an important driver of banks’ regulatory capital and liquidity risk. Private and foreign investors exhibit a stronger preference for higher levels of capital, whereas the impact of government ownership on banks’ risk remains inconclusive. Moreover, privately-owned banks evidenced lower levels of liquidity risk compared to the other groups during the last financial crisis because of tighter budget constraints and more compelling liquidity needs.     

Optimal portfolios with minimum capital requirements

We propose a novel approach to active risk management based on the recent Basel II regulations to obtain optimal portfolios with minimum capital requirements. In order to avoid regulatory penalties due to an excessive number of Value-at-Risk (VaR) violations, capital requirements are minimized subject to a given number of violations over the previous trading year. Capital requirements are based on the recent Basel II amendments to account for the ‘stressed’ VaR, that is, the downside risk of the portfolio under extreme adverse market conditions. An empirical application for two portfolios involving different types of assets and alternative stress scenarios demonstrates that the proposed approach delivers an improved balance between capital requirement levels and the number of VaR exceedances. Furthermore, the risk-adjusted performance of the proposed approach is superior to that of minimum-VaR and minimum-stressed VaR portfolios.     

国有商业银行资本充足监管有效性及其前提条件

资本充足问题一直是各国商业银行外部监管和内部控制共同关心的问题.<巴塞尔协议>出台以来,我国国有商业银行内部激励缺乏,而外部监管又流于形式,资本充足率持续下降.本文从国有悖论、监管宽容和实证推算三个方面重点对国有商业银行资本充足监管的有效性进行分析,认为当前对国有商业银行资本充足监管是无效或低效的.但在我国已经加入WTO的宏观背景下,对国有商业银行进行资本充足监管又是必要和必须的,而前提是对不良贷款进行二次剥离和彻底改制,以建立起现代商业银行制度,从而为国有商业银行资本充足有效监管奠定制度基础.     

Deposit Insurance, Capital Adequacy Requirements and Interest Rate Dynamics

This paper examines the long run interaction among deposit insurance, bank deposit rates and capital adequacy requirements. Using analysis similar to the price discrimination model of Lott and Roberts (1991) we find that a competitive environment among banks would link the spread between insured and uninsured deposit rates to the size of the insurance premium. We also find that banks that choose to operate at the regulatory minimum capital level, would increase asset risk with increased capital requirements if (1) the implicit interest paid to insured and uninsured depositors is equally sensitive to changes in risk and capital adequacy and (2) the insurance premium is independent of the level of risk and capital adequacy. Under the present risk-based premium structure, asset risk has the potential to decline when the regulatory agency raises capital requirements. Finally, we examine the time series behavior of insured and uninsured interest rates to see if it is consistent with our theoretical model. We find that insured and uninsured rates, along with deposit insurance premiums, are cointegrated series as suggested by our model.     

Using CAMEL ratings to evaluate regulator effectiveness at commercial banks

This study uses the capital adequacy component of the CAMEL rating system to assess whether regulators in the 1980s influenced inadequately capitalized banks to improve their capital. Using a measure of regulatory pressure that is based on publicly available information, I find that inadequately capitalized banks responded to regulators' demands for greater capital. This conclusion is consistent with that reached by Keeley (1988). Yet, a measure of regulatory pressure based on confidential capital adequacy ratings reveals that capital regulation at national banks was less effective than at state-chartered banks. This result strengthens a conclusion reached by Gilbert (1991).Much of the research for this article was carried out while I was a graduate student at the University of Florida. I thank Chris James, Mark Flannery and Joel Houston, members of my dissertation committee, for their helpful suggestions and guidance. I also thank the anonymous reviewers and editor Paul Horvitz for many substantive comments on earlier drafts.     

Capital incentives and adequacy for securitizations

This paper analyzes the capital incentives and adequacy of financial institutions for asset portfolio securitizations. The empirical analysis is based on US securitization rating and impairment data. The paper finds that regulatory capital rules for securitizations may be insufficient to cover implied losses during economic downturns such as the Global Financial Crisis. In addition, the rating process of securitizations provides capital arbitrage incentives for financial institutions and may further reduce regulatory capital requirements. These policy-relevant findings assume that the ratings assigned by rating agencies are correct and can be used to build a test for the ability of Basel capital regulations to cover downturn losses.     

Are regulatory capital adequacy ratios good indicators of bank failure? Evidence from US banks

Motivated by massive bank failures during the financial crisis, this paper examines whether capital adequacy ratios required by regulators are associated with bank failure. It investigates whether the association is affected by the bank's proximity to the minimum required capital ratios. If results show a significant association between regulatory capital and failure of banks falling below the minimum capital ratios, then the ratios are set at an adequate level. Examining a sample of 560 US bank holding companies for the period 2003–2009, results reveal that the association between the core (Tier 1) capital ratio and bank failure becomes significant only if the bank holding company has a Tier 1 capital ratio of less than 6%. This is the level below which US bank regulators do not regard banks as being well capitalized. During the financial crisis period of 2007–2009, there is a significant association only when the criterion is set at or above 8%. Market-based probability of default is more significantly associated with failure relative to Tier 1 capital ratio. The findings of this paper are relevant to regulatory policy discussions and Basel III deliberations on capital adequacy at times of financial turmoil.     

Banks’ capital buffer,risk and performance in the Canadian banking system: Impact of business cycles and regulatory changes

Using quarterly financial statements and stock market data from 1982 to 2010 for the six largest Canadian chartered banks, this paper documents positive co-movement between Canadian banks’ capital buffer and business cycles. The adoption of Basel Accords and the balance sheet leverage cap imposed by Canadian banking regulations did not change this cyclical behavior of Canadian bank capital. We find Canadian banks to be well-capitalized and that they hold a larger capital buffer in expansion than in recession, which may explain how they weathered the recent subprime financial crisis so well. This evidence that Canadian banks ride the business and regulatory periods underscores the appropriateness of a both micro- and a macro-prudential “through-the-cycle” approach to capital adequacy as advocated in the proposed Basel III framework to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector.