Stock and Compensation*

Compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems. Theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance. Employees fund a large proportion of their firm's activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company. These arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons, to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders. Moreover, tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times. Currently, both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements. Prior to the 1980s, however, tax rules favored funding in other than company stock, implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period.     

Corporate responses to the repatriation incentives and domestic production activities deduction

The 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA or the Act) sought to encourage U.S. companies to repatriate foreign earnings and invest them domestically in an effort to increase capital spending and employment. This investigation looks at how the two tax provisions in AJCA, i.e., the repatriation tax holiday and the domestic production activities deduction (DPAD), affected domestic investment and payout behaviors. An examination of repatriating firms based on the tightness of their capital constraints shows that the tax incentives fail to induce non-constrained, repatriating firms that benefit from DPAD to reinvest the capital domestically. Only capital-constrained, repatriating firms benefitting from DPAD increase domestic investment and reduce share repurchases; however, these firms also increase their cash dividend payments. The findings should be useful to policymakers as they consider modifying the corporate tax structure to increase domestic investment by encouraging U.S. firms to repatriate foreign earnings and reinvest them domestically.     

CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance

We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably reflects CEOs' incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.     

Investor-legislators: Tax holiday for politically connected firms

In this paper, we examine whether political connections in the U.S. Congress affect voting patterns with respect to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA). Using the financial disclosure statements of members of the U.S. Congress, we define political connections as equity-based ties between lawmakers and business groups, which capture the deliberate decision of lawmakers to establish a relationship by investing personal wealth in firm equity. We first examine whether politicians are more likely to hold equity in firms receiving benefits under the AJCA (i.e., firms with high repatriation tax costs). Our results suggest that politicians are more likely to hold equity positions in firms with high repatriation tax benefits only when such firms donate to their political campaign. We further examine how equity-based connections affect the AJCA voting outcomes and find that members of the House, but not of the Senate, holding repatriating firm's equity are more likely to vote in favour of the AJCA when PAC donations support their election campaigns. Last, we investigate whether politicians with equity holdings in repatriating firms are more likely to receive larger donations from firm-affiliated PACs before the AJCA vote in Congress. We find that PACs have larger contributions to House members who purchase equity in repatriating firms immediately prior to the AJCA vote. The results suggest that PACs of repatriating firms strategically target House representatives to increase political support for the tax holiday.     

管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据

本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。     

Corporate lobbying in the UK: an analysis of attitudes towards the ASB's 1995 deferred taxation proposals

This paper models corporate lobbying behaviour with respect to the ASB's 1995 discussion paper on deferred taxation. The study makes improvements to the methodology applied in prior studies. It expands the definition of lobbying beyond the submission of comment letters. It extends the analysis to control for past lobbying behaviour. It uses multinomial logistic regression to consider those companies lobbying in favour, those lobbying against, and those that did not lobby. The findings suggest that size and past lobbying behaviour are key determinants of the decision to lobby. In addition, companies that lobbied against the proposals were more likely to have debt covenants than were those that lobbied in favour. Debt covenants, however, did not explain the difference between non-lobbyists and lobbyists against. Companies that lobbied in favour were more likely to experience incentive compensation effects than were those that lobbied against. There was some evidence of the influence of US listing.     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

Clawbacks,Holdbacks, and CEO Contracting

“Clawbacks” are much discussed in the context of senior executive compensation, yet the discussion has largely ignored the presence of holdbacks that are already in place in many firms. Holdbacks are deferred compensation that is potentially foregone in the event that the CEO leaves the firm without good reason or they are dismissed for wrong‐doing. They are explicit or written features of a CEOs employment contract. Holdbacks are already in use at 70% of S&P 500 firms and average $18.4 million each. Firms with higher CEO replacement costs, greater information asymmetry, a recent bad experience (fraud, lawsuit, or restatement), or in more certain environments are more likely to have a holdback. In contrast, clawback adoptions are mainly driven by firms' bad experiences and external pressure from shareholders. Holdbacks and incentive‐based compensation are substitutes, as termination incentives can reduce the need for incentive compensation. As managers reasonably demand a premium for accepting risky compensation, a measure of abnormal compensation is positively associated with holdbacks, but there is no significant association between clawbacks and holdbacks. These findings suggest that the holdbacks many firms already have in place could help an “ex‐post settling up” in the event of financial misconduct, or even simply misstated financials. As companies have more control over the amounts held back ex‐ante, holdbacks are potentially more efficient.     

Market's perception of deferred tax accruals

This study investigates the value relevance and incremental information content of deferred tax accruals reported under the ‘income statement method’ (AASB 1020 Accounting for Income Taxes) over the period 2001–2004. Our findings suggest that deferred tax accruals are viewed as assets and liabilities. We document a positive relation between recognized deferred tax assets and firm value using the levels model, while the results from the returns model suggest that deferred tax liabilities reflect future tax payments. The balance of unrecognized deferred tax assets provides a negative signal to the market about future profitability, particularly for companies from the materials and energy sectors and loss‐makers.     

Trade credit in Europe: Financial constraint and substitution effect in crisis times

This paper aims to prove whether financial rationing condition leads European enterprises to increase trade debt during the period 2008–2016 and whether companies offering deferred payments to customers obtain trade debt from suppliers. The work contributes to the existing literature by finding new empirical evidence on the substitution and matching hypotheses in times of crises, measuring the specific rationing conditions for businesses and distinguishing large, medium, small and micro-sized companies. The results revealed that, in times of crisis, medium, small and micro firms, highly likely to be constrained, employ trade credit more extensively, as those granting deferred payment terms.     

Deferred taxes,earnings management,and corporate governance: Malaysian evidence

This study examines whether Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) use deferred taxes to avoid an earnings decline. In addition, this study also examines whether corporate governance mechanisms attenuate the extent to which deferred taxes are used to manage earnings. Using a sample of 221 PLCs listed on the main and second boards of Bursa Malaysia in 2008 with a complete set of data available from 2005 to 2008, this study finds that Malaysian PLCs use both the accrual and valuation allowance components of net deferred tax liabilities to avoid a decline in earnings. The study also finds that ownership structure and board structure affect the extent to which earnings management is associated with a deferred tax component.     

Profit Measurement and UK Accounting Standards: A Case of Increasing Disharmony in Relation to US GAAP and IASs

UK accounting practice differs from International Accounting Standards (IASs) particularly with regard to amortisation of goodwill, provision for deferred taxation and the accounting treatment of pension costs. Under the core standards programme of the IASC the IASs have emerged closer to US practice. This paper evaluates the profit of those UK companies reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1988 and 1994, spanning a period which saw the establishment of the ASB and the implementation of the IASC's comparability project. An increasing gap was found between the reported profit under UK accounting principles and that restated under US GAAP. The difference lay most frequently in accounting for goodwill, provision for deferred tax, and the accounting treatment of pension costs, with accounting for goodwill showing a particularly significant impact in 1994. Notwithstanding the introduction of FRS 10, an overall impression of increasing disharmony could continue to cause reconciliations to be required of UK companies seeking full listing on a US stock exchange, with consequent disadvantage relative to companies in other European countries seeking international capital in the US.     

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China’s listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.     

Does CEO inside debt compensation benefit both shareholders and debtholders?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine whether the proportion of CEO inside debt holdings (pension and deferred compensation) to stock holdings benefit both shareholders and...     

上市公司高管薪酬变局

2010年年报业已收官,高管薪酬不出意外地再次成为热点话题。根据显示,上市公司高管薪酬依然呈现整体上涨的趋势,金融、地产成为平均薪酬最高的行业,且增幅远超出平均水平。另外一大特点是随着中小板、创业板公司的大幅扩容,上市公司高管财富的增长开始更加依赖于股权激励、直接持股等。与之遥相辉映的是华尔街的限薪运动愈演愈烈。美国证交会于2011年3月2日发布声明,宣布将对大银行、经纪公司以及对冲基金等金融机构的高额薪酬实施更严格监管。新规被认为是美国监管机构十几年来限制金融公司薪酬努力的最高峰。从高管收入来源的结构来看,呈现出典型的三个台阶:固定薪酬帮助高管进入百万元俱乐部;股权激励成就千万元富翁;而直接持股则是造就亿元富豪的终极法则。而且去年无论是海外上市还是创业板上市的IPO潮,都直接带动了今年高管薪酬的集体增长。而每一家上市公司背后,都离不开那些容易被闪光灯忽略的CFO们的身影。依据上市公司公开披露的信息,《首席财务官》杂志将中证100、创业板首批28家上市公司、2010年在香港证券交易所上市且融资额排名前10位的公司作为研究样本,从这些公司的薪酬、持股数中,解读中国上市公司高管薪酬变局,并特别聚焦其中CFO群体的...     

新所得税准则对上市公司盈利能力影响分析

新所得税准则要求企业运用资产负债表债务法进行所得税核算。资产负债表债务法通过比较资产负债的计税基础计算出应纳税暂时性差异和可抵扣暂时性差异,进而确认当期递延所得税,调整当期的所得税费用,所得税费用的调整会影响企业当期的净利润,进而影响股东的每股收益。因此,暂时性差异会影响企业的盈利能力。本文采用统计分析方法,分析新所得税准则对上市公司盈利能力的影响。     

Determining the value of wellness programs

Recent advances can give companies a solid set of return on investment (ROI) measurements on their health improvement programs, provided they are willing to invest in both wellness programs and measurement efforts that effectively gauge those programs' merit. As this article explains, choosing the right methodology will depend on the health improvement programs being evaluated, data and resources available, and the degree of precision desired by management. The authors discuss the different measurement methodologies and various measurement considerations. They conclude that using several methods and multiple iterations under varying sets of assumptions is often useful, not only for calculating ROI but also for providing companies a framework for continual program tracking and improvement.     

Managing for value. It's not just about the numbers.

In theory, value-based management programs sound seductively simple. Just adopt an economic profit metric, tie compensation to agreed-upon improvement targets in that metric, and voilà! Managers and employees will start making all kinds of value-creating decisions. If only it were that easy. The reality is, almost half of the companies that have adopted a VBM metric have met with mediocre success. That's because, the authors contend, the successful VBM program is really about introducing fundamental changes to a big company's culture. Results from their major research project into the practice of VBM reveal that putting VBM into practice is far more complicated than many of its proponents make it out to be, requiring a great deal of patience, effort, and money. According to the authors' study, companies that successfully use VBM programs share five main characteristics. First, nearly all made explicit and public their commitment to shareholder value. Second, through training, they created an environment receptive to the changes the program would engender. Third, they reinforced that training with broad-based incentive systems closely tied to the VBM performance measures, which gave employees a sense of ownership in both the company and the program. Fourth, they were willing to craft major organizational changes to allow all their workers to make those value-creating decisions. Finally, the changes they introduced to the company's systems and processes were broad and inclusive rather than focused narrowly on financial reports and compensation. A VBM program is difficult and expensive. Still, the authors argue, properly applied, it will put your company's profitability firmly on track.     

Executive compensation in firms with concentrated control: The impact of dual class structure and family management

We examine how two distinct ownership forms of concentrated control affect executive compensation. We compare executive compensation in dual class firms with that in single class companies with concentrated control. Although both samples of companies have agency problems associated with concentrated control, dual class companies have additional problems associated with controlling shareholders holding smaller equity positions. We show that family members in executive positions in dual class companies are paid significantly more than those of single class companies with concentrated control. The excess is in the form of more incentive compensation (bonuses and stock options). This finding is consistent with optimal contract theory of executive compensation in that the higher compensation is given to prevent dual class executives from taking advantage of their higher voting leverage. Our results are robust to an alternative specification of voting leverage which uses the difference between voting and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders.