An analysis of efficiency in the delivery of financial services: The case of life insurance agencies

Scale and scope economies are examined for life insurance agencies that distribute multiple financial products. The results of this study suggest that there are significant administrative returns to scale for firms that sell a mix of financial products. The findings for scope estimates are inconsistent, suggesting that there are positive and negative cost complementaries for pairs of products. Subadditivity can be rejected, suggesting that joint distribution of financial products is not necessarily more efficient than specialization and that different-sized agencies are not necessarily at a cost disadvantage.     

Did securitization affect the cost of corporate debt?

This paper investigates whether the securitization of corporate bank loan facilities had an impact on the price of corporate debt. Our results suggest that loan facilities that are subsequently securitized are associated with a 17 basis point lower spread than that of facilities that are not subsequently securitized. We consider facility characteristics that are associated with the likelihood of securitization and estimate the extent to which these characteristics are related to spreads. We document that Term Loan B facilities, facilities of B-rated firms, and facilities originated by banks that originate CLOs are securitized more frequently than other facilities. Spreads on facilities estimated to be more likely to be subsequently securitized have lower spreads than otherwise similar facilities. The results are consistent with the view that securitization caused a reduction in the cost of capital.     

The Disparate Nature of Targeted Repurchases: Evidence from Long-Run Performance

Abstract:  We examine the announcement stock returns and long-run performance of 352 targeted repurchases from 1979 to 1998. For those repurchases of blocks that are non-control related we find a positive announcement stock price response and positive long-run stock performance indicating that these repurchases are timed to occur when the company's shares are undervalued and that the market underreacts to this signal. In contrast, for those repurchases of blocks that are control related we find a negative announcement stock price response and insignificant long-run stock performance indicating that these repurchases occur for a different reason. We conclude that control related repurchases are utilized solely to dismiss potential takeover bids and are not timed when the stock is undervalued.     

Agency costs,taxes and debt: The UK evidence

This paper provides an empirical examination of the impact of the corporation tax and agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Our evidence suggests that the agency costs are the main determinants of corporate borrowing. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms that have fewer growth options have more debt in their capital structure. Moreover, our results show that debt mitigates the free cash flow problem and that firms that are more likely to be diversified and less prone to bankruptcy are highly geared. the negative effect of insider shareholding on leverage disappears, however; when all the agency mechanisms are accounted for. In addition, we find that, in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms. However, in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation.     

On The Decomposition Of The Ruin Probability For A Jump-Diffusion Surplus Process Compounded By A Geometric Brownian Motion

Abstract

If one assumes that the surplus of an insurer follows a jump-diffusion process and the insurer would invest its surplus in a risky asset, whose prices are modeled by a geometric Brownian motion, the resulting surplus for the insurer is called a jump-diffusion surplus process compounded by a geometric Brownian motion. In this resulting surplus process, ruin may be caused by a claim or oscillation. We decompose the ruin probability in the resulting surplus process into the sum of two ruin probabilities: the probability that ruin is caused by a claim, and the probability that ruin is caused by oscillation. Integro-differential equations for these ruin probabilities are derived. When claim sizes are exponentially distributed, asymptotical formulas of the ruin probabilities are derived from the integro-differential equations, and it is shown that all three ruin probabilities are asymptotical power functions with the same orders and that the orders of the power functions are determined by the drift and volatility parameters of the geometric Brownian motion. It is known that the ruin probability for a jump-diffusion surplus process is an asymptotical exponential function when claim sizes are exponentially distributed. The results of this paper further confirm that risky investments for an insurer are dangerous in the sense that either ruin is certain or the ruin probabilities are asymptotical power functions, not asymptotical exponential functions, when claim sizes are exponentially distributed.     

Executive Stock Options: To Expense or Not?

In analyzing the decision to expense stock options, we find a greater likelihood of options expensing for firms with greater transparency and a closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These results provide indirect evidence that expensing is more likely in firms that practice good corporate governance. We show that firms are less likely to expense when option usage is higher and that this negative relation is stronger for firms that are smaller, have high growth, and are less profitable. We also find that the announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero.     

Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules

The 2001 to 2002 corporate scandals led to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and to various amendments to the U.S. stock exchanges' regulations. We find that the announcement of these rules has a significant effect on firm value. Firms that are less compliant with the provisions of the rules earn positive abnormal returns compared to firms that are more compliant. We also find variation in the response across firm size. Large firms that are less compliant earn positive abnormal returns but small firms that are less compliant earn negative abnormal returns, suggesting that some provisions are detrimental to small firms.     

Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.     

Liquidity mergers

We study the interplay between corporate liquidity and asset reallocation. Our model shows that financially distressed firms are acquired by liquid firms in their industries even in the absence of operational synergies. We call these transactions “liquidity mergers,” since their purpose is to reallocate liquidity to firms that are otherwise inefficiently terminated. We show that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur when industry-level asset-specificity is high and firm-level asset-specificity is low. We analyze firms' liquidity policies as a function of real asset reallocation, examining the trade-offs between cash and credit lines. We verify the model's prediction that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur in industries in which assets are industry-specific, but transferable across firms. We also show that firms are more likely to use credit lines (relative to cash) in industries in which liquidity mergers are more frequent.     

The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts

We show that although forecasts of independent analysts are less accurate ex post, they yield forecast errors that are more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns. This suggests that forecasts of independent analysts are superior to those of nonindependent analysts in representing ex ante market expectations. We also show that forecasts of nonindependent analysts become more accurate and less biased, and produce forecast errors more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns when independent analysts are following the same firms than when they are not. This suggests that the presence of independent analysts disciplines the behavior of nonindependent analysts.     

The Delisting Bias in CRSP Data

I document a delisting bias in the stock return data base maintained by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I find that delists for bankruptcy and other negative reasons are generally surprises and that correct delisting returns are not available for most of the stocks that have been delisted for negative reasons since 1962. Using over-the-counter price data, I show that the omitted delisting returns are large. Implications of the bias are discussed.     

THE VALUATION OF NEW ZEALAND UNDERWRITING AGREEMENTS

Almost all cash issues by New Zealand listed public companies are by way of a rights issue. This paper examines the terms of 143 issues between 1976 and 1984. Of those issues 86 were underwritten and 57 were not. The paper is concerned with two questions. The first question examines whether there are fundamental differences in the terms of the issues that explain why some issues were underwritten and some were not. The second question examines the extent to which the underwriters' fee corresponds to the value of a put option, where that value is given by an adaptation of the Black Scholes formula. The conclusions are that there are differences in the terms of issues that are underwritten, compared with those that are not, and that the underwriters' fee is substantially in excess of the Black Scholes put value.     

Analysts’ Momentum Recommendations

We document that the likelihood of analyst recommendations following past stock returns decreased abruptly in 2003, coinciding with the Global Settlement and other regulatory changes designed to restrain analysts’ conflicts of interest. We also document that the likelihood of recommendations following past stock returns is abnormally high for recommendations issued after negative stock returns (but not for those issued after positive stock returns), among inexperienced and inaccurate analysts, among large brokerage houses, and for companies with high share turnover. Moreover, the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns are accompanied by earnings forecast revisions that are larger in magnitude and less accurate ex post. Overall, our findings suggest that analysts with conflicts of interest and limited ability are more likely to base their recommendations on past stock returns. Finally, we document that the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns (especially those that were issued before 2003 and those that are issued after negative stock returns) contribute to existing price momentum by generating incrementally stronger short‐term and long‐term stock returns.     

The Incremental Information Content of Earnings and Cash Flows from Operations Affected by Their Extremity

Previous returns studies have shown that extreme earnings and extreme cash flows from operations are less informative than moderate (i.e., less extreme) earnings and moderate cash flows. Studies also report that cash flows supplement to earnings in firm valuation by showing a higher association of cash flows with returns when earnings are extreme than when earnings are moderate. We propose that this supplementary role of cash flows is affected by cash flows extremity. Using data from the US capital markets, we find that the supplementary role of cash flows exists only when cash flows are not extreme. We also investigate the supplementary role of earnings to cash flows and search for a higher association of earnings with returns when cash flows are extreme than when cash flows are moderate. Similar to results on cash flows, our findings show that the supplementary role of earnings exists only when earnings are not extreme. Our results imply that investors and researchers should consider both earnings and cash flows extremity when assessing the information content of these variables.     

Corporate governance norms and practices

We evaluate the impact of corporate governance on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we differentiate between minimally accepted governance attributes that are satisfied by all firms in a given country and governance attributes that are adopted at the firm level. This approach allows us to differentiate between firm-level and country-level corporate governance, thus contributing to an ongoing debate in the literature about whether governance attributes are largely determined by country factors or firm characteristics. Despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, we find that many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond those that are adopted by all firms in the country, and that these improvements in corporate governance are positively associated with firm valuation. Firms that choose not to adopt sound governance mechanisms tend to have concentrated ownership and sizeable free cash flow, consistent with agency theories based on self-interested managers and controlling shareholders. Our results indicate that the market rewards companies that are prepared to adopt governance attributes beyond those required by laws and common corporate practices in the home country.     

Stock Splits as a Manipulation Tool: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

We document that acquiring firms are more likely than nonacquiring firms to split their stocks before making acquisition announcements, especially when acquisitions are financed by stock and when the deals are large. Our findings support the hypothesis that some acquiring firms use stock splits to manipulate their equity values prior to acquisition announcements. Using earnings quality as a proxy for firms' intention to manipulate, we find that acquirers with low earnings quality (i.e., acquirers that are more likely to use stock splits to manipulate their stock values) have lower long‐run stock returns compared with their benchmarks, especially when the deals are financed with stock. In contrast, acquirers with high earnings quality do not show that pattern. Our evidence complements and extends the findings in the literature that some acquirers manipulate their stock prices before stock‐swap acquisitions. This study suggests that target shareholders should use information such as earnings quality and stock splits to discriminate among acquirers and ensure that exchanges are conducted on fair terms.     

Do Acquisitions Relieve Target Firms’ Financial Constraints?

Managers often claim that target firms are financially constrained prior to being acquired and that these constraints are eased following the acquisition. Using a large sample of European acquisitions, we document that the level of cash that target firms hold, the sensitivity of cash to cash flow, and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow all decline, while investment increases following the acquisition. These effects are stronger in deals that are more likely to be associated with financing improvements. Our findings suggest that acquisitions relieve financial frictions in target firms, especially when the target firm is relatively small.     

Performance effects of appointing other firms’ executive directors to corporate boards: an analysis of UK firms

This paper studies the effect on company performance of appointing non-executive directors that are also executive directors in other firms. The analysis is based on a new panel dataset of UK companies over 2002–2008. Our findings suggest a positive relation between the presence of these non-executive directors and the accounting performance of the appointing companies. The effect is stronger if these directors are executive directors in firms that are performing well. We also find a positive effect when these non-executive directors are members of the audit committee. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the view that non-executive directors that are executives in other firms contribute to both the monitoring and advisory functions of corporate boards.     

Aggregate Earnings and Asset Prices

A principal-components analysis demonstrates that common earnings factors explain a substantial portion of firm-level earnings variation, implying earnings shocks have substantial systematic components and are not almost fully diversifiable as prior literature has concluded. Furthermore, the principal components of earnings and returns are highly correlated, implying aggregate earnings risks and return risks are related. In contrast to previous studies, the correlation we report between the systematic components of earnings and returns is stable over time. We also show that the earnings factors are priced, in the sense that the sensitivities of securities' returns to the earnings factors explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in returns, even controlling for return risk. This suggests earnings performance is an underlying source of priced risk. Our evidence that the information sets of returns and earnings are jointly determined implies cash flow risk and return risk are not fully separable, and raises the possibility that it is the common variation of earnings and returns that is priced.